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

AN

ESSAY

CONCERNING

Human Underſtanding.

Written by JOHN LOCKE, Gent.

THE TWENTIETH EDITION.

TO WHICH ARE NOW ADDED,

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EXTRACTED FROM THE AUTHOR'S WORKS.

VOLUME I.

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1796.

LOCKED STACKS

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TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

THOMAS

Earl of *Pembroke* and *Montgomery*,

Baron Herbert *of* Cardiff, *Lord* Roſs, *of* Kendal, Par, Fitzhugh, Marmion, St. Quintin, *and* Shurland; *Lord Preſident of his Majeſty's Moſt Honourable Privy Council, and Lord Lieutenant of the County of* Wilts, *and of* South-Wales.

MY LORD,

THIS Treatiſe, which is grown up under your lordſhip's eye, and has ventured into the world by your order, does now, by a natural kind of right, come to your lordſhip for that protection, which you ſeveral years ſince promiſed it. It is not that I think any name, how great ſoever, ſet at the beginning of a book, will be able to cover the faults that are to be found in it. Things in print muſt ſtand and fall by their own worth, or the Reader's fancy. But there being nothing more to be deſired for truth, than a fair unprejudiced hearing, nobody is more likely to procure me that, than your lordſhip, who are allowed to have got ſo intimate an acquaintance with her, in her more retired receſſes. Your lordſhip is known to have ſo far

advanced your ſpeculations in the moſt abſtract and general knowledge of things, beyond the ordinary reach, or common methods, that your allowance and approbation of the deſign of this treatiſe, will at leaſt preſerve it from being condemned without reading; and will prevail to have thoſe parts a little weighed, which might otherwiſe, perhaps, be thought to deſerve no conſideration, for being ſomewhat out of the common road. The imputation of novelty is a terrible charge amongſt thoſe who judge of men's heads, as they do of their perukes, by the faſhion; and can allow none to be right, but the received doctrines. Truth ſcarce ever yet carried it by vote any where at its firſt appearance: new opinions are always ſuſpected, and uſually oppoſed, without any other reaſon, but becauſe they are not already common. But truth, like gold, is not the leſs ſo for being newly brought out of the mine. It is trial and examination muſt give it price, and not any antique faſhion: and though it be not yet current by the public ſtamp; yet it may, for all that, be as old as nature, and is certainly not the leſs genuine. Your lordſhip can give great and convincing inſtances of this, whenever you pleaſe to oblige the public with ſome of thoſe large and comprehenſive diſcoveries you have made of truths hitherto unknown, unleſs to ſome few, from whom your lordſhip has been pleaſed not wholly to conceal them. This alone were a ſufficient reaſon, were there no other, why I ſhould dedicate this Eſſay to your lordſhip; and its having ſome little correſpondence with ſome parts of that nobler and vaſt ſyſtem of the ſciences your lordſhip has made ſo new, exact, and inſtructive a draught of, I think it glory enough, if your lordſhip permit me to boaſt, that here and there I have fallen into ſome thoughts not

not wholly different from yours. If your lordſhip think fit, that, by your encouragement, this ſhould appear in the world, I hope it may be a reaſon, ſome time or other, to lead your lordſhip farther; and you will allow me to ſay, that you here give the world an earneſt of ſomething, that, if they can bear with this, will be truly worth their expectation. This, my lord, ſhows what a preſent I here make to your lordſhip; juſt ſuch as the poor man does to his rich and great neighbour, by whom the baſket of flowers or fruit is not ill taken, though he has more plenty of his own growth, and in much greater perfection. Worthleſs things receive a value, when they are made the offerings of reſpect, eſteem, and gratitude: theſe you have given me ſo mighty and peculiar reaſons to have, in the higheſt degree, for your lordſhip, that if they can add a price to what they go along with, proportionable to their own greatneſs, I can with confidence brag, I here make your lordſhip the richeſt preſent you ever received. This I am ſure, I am under the greateſt obligations to ſeek all occaſions to acknowledge a long train of favours I have received from your lordſhip; favours, though great and important in themſelves, yet made much more ſo by the forwardneſs, concern, and kindneſs, and other obliging circumſtances, that never failed to accompany them. To all this, you are pleaſed to add that which gives yet more weight and reliſh to all the reſt: you vouchſafe to continue me in ſome degrees of your eſteem, and allow me a place in your good thoughts; I had almoſt ſaid friendſhip. This, my lord, your words and actions ſo conſtantly ſhow on all occaſions, even to others when I am abſent, that it is not vanity in me to mention what every body knows: but it would be want of good man-

ners, not to acknowledge what ſo many are witneſſes of, and every day tell me, I am indebted to your lordſhip for. I wiſh they could as eaſily aſſiſt my gratitude, as they convince me of the great and growing engagements it has to your lordſhip. This I am ſure, I ſhould write of the underſtanding without having any, if I were not extremely ſenſible of them, and did not lay hold on this opportunity to teſtify to the world, how much I am obliged to be, and how much I am,

My LORD,

Your Lordſhip's

Moſt humble, and

Moſt obedient ſervant,

Dorſet-Court, 24th of May, 1689.

JOHN LOCKE.

THE EPISTLE TO THE READER.

READER,

I HERE put into thy hands, what has been the diverſion of ſome of my idle and heavy hours: if it has the good luck to prove ſo of any of thine, and thou haſt but half ſo much pleaſure in reading, as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy money, as I do my pains, ill beſtowed. Miſtake not this, for a commendation of my work; nor conclude, becauſe I was pleaſed with the doing of it, that therefore I am fondly taken with it now it is done. He that hawks at larks and ſparrows, has no leſs ſport, though a much leſs conſiderable quarry, than he that flies at nobler game: and he is little acquainted with the ſubject of this treatiſe, the UNDERSTANDING, who does not know, that as it is the moſt elevated faculty of the ſoul, ſo it is employed with a greater and more conſtant delight than any of the other. Its ſearches after truth, are a ſort of hawking and hunting, wherein the very purſuit makes a great part of the pleaſure. Every ſtep the mind takes in its progreſs towards knowledge, makes ſome diſcovery, which is not only new, but the beſt too, for the time at leaſt.

For the underſtanding, like the eye, judging of objects only by its own ſight, cannot but be pleaſed with what it diſcovers, having leſs regret for what has eſcaped it, becauſe it is unknown. Thus he who has raiſed

himſelf above the alms-baſket, and not content to live lazily on ſcraps of begged opinions, ſets his own thoughts on work, to find and follow truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miſs the hunter's ſatisfaction; every moment of his purſuit will reward his pains with ſome delight, and he will have reaſon to think his time not ill-ſpent, even when he cannot much boaſt of any great acquiſition.

This, Reader, is the entertainment of thoſe who let looſe their own thoughts, and follow them in writing; which thou oughteſt not to envy them, ſince they afford thee an opportunity of the like diverſion, if thou wilt make uſe of thy own thoughts in reading. It is to them, if they are thy own, that I refer myſelf: but if they are taken upon truſt from others; it is no great matter what they are, they are not following truth, but ſome meaner conſideration: and it is not worth while to be concerned, what he ſays or thinks, who ſays or thinks only as he is directed by another. If thou judgeſt for thyſelf, I know thou wilt judge candidly; and then I ſhall not be harmed or offended, whatever be thy cenſure. For though it be certain, that there is nothing in this treatiſe, of the truth whereof I am not fully perſuaded; yet I conſider myſelf as liable to miſtakes, as I can think thee, and know that this book muſt ſtand or fall with thee, not by any opinion I have of it, but thy own. If thou findeſt little in it new or inſtructive to thee, thou art not to blame me for it. It was not meant for thoſe that had already maſtered this ſubject, and made a thorough acquaintance with their own underſtandings; but for my own information, and the ſatisfaction of a few friends, who acknowledged themſelves not to have ſufficiently conſidered it. Were it fit to trouble thee with the hiſtory of this Eſſay, I ſhould tell thee, that five or ſix friends meeting at my chamber, and diſcourſing on a ſubject very remote from this, found themſelves quickly at a ſtand, by the difficulties that roſe on every ſide. After we had a while puzzled ourſelves, without coming any nearer a reſolution of thoſe doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts, that we took a wrong courſe; and

that

that before we ſet ourſelves upon inquiries of that nature, it was neceſſary to examine our own abilities, and ſee what objects our underſtandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with. This I propoſed to the company, who all readily aſſented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this ſhould be our firſt inquiry. Some haſty and undigeſted thoughts on a ſubject I had never before conſidered, which I ſet down againſt our next meeting, gave the firſt entrance into this diſcourſe; which having been thus begun by chance, was continued by intreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and after long intervals of neglect, reſumed again, as my humour or occaſions permitted; and at laſt, in a retirement, where an attendance on my health gave me leiſure, it was brought into that order thou now ſeeſt it.

This diſcontinued way of writing may have occaſioned, beſides others, two contrary faults, viz. that too little and too much may be ſaid in it. If thou findeſt any thing wanting, I ſhall be glad, that what I have writ gives thee any deſire, that I ſhould have gone farther: if it ſeems too much to thee, thou muſt blame the ſubject; for when I put pen to paper, I thought all I ſhould have to ſay on this matter, would have been contained in one ſheet of paper; but the farther I went, the larger proſpect I had; new diſcoveries led me ſtill on, and ſo it grew inſenſibly to the bulk it now appears in. I will not deny, but poſſibly it might be reduced to a narrower compaſs than it is; and that ſome parts of it might be contracted; the way it has been writ in, by catches, and many long intervals of interruption, being apt to cauſe ſome repetitions. But to confeſs the truth, I am now too lazy, or too buſy to make it ſhorter.

I am not ignorant how little I herein conſult my own reputation, when I knowingly let it go with a fault, ſo apt to diſguſt the moſt judicious, who are always the niceſt readers. But they who know ſloth is apt to content itſelf with any excuſe, will pardon me, if mine has prevailed on me, where, I think, I have a very good one. I will not therefore allege in my defence, that the ſame notion, having different reſpects, may

be

be convenient or neceſſary to prove or illuſtrate ſeveral parts of the ſame diſcourſe; and that ſo it has happened in many parts of this: but waving that, I ſhall frankly avow, that I have ſometimes dwelt long upon the ſame argument, and expreſſed it different ways, with a quite different deſign. I pretend not to publiſh this Eſſay for the information of men of large thoughts, and quick apprehenſions; to ſuch maſters of knowledge, I profeſs myſelf a ſcholar, and therefore warn them before-hand not to expect any thing here, but what, being ſpun out of my own coarſe thoughts, is fitted to men of my own ſize; to whom, perhaps, it will not be unacceptable, that I have taken ſome pains to make plain and familiar to their thoughts ſome truths, which eſtabliſhed prejudice, or the abſtractedneſs of the ideas themſelves, might render difficult. Some objects had need be turned on every ſide; and when the notion is new, as I confeſs ſome of theſe are to me, or out of the ordinary road, as I ſuſpect they will appear to others; it is not one ſimple view of it, that will gain it admittance into every underſtanding, or fix it there with a clear and laſting impreſſion. There are few, I believe, who have not obſerved in themſelves or others, that what in one way of propoſing was very obſcure, another way of expreſſing it has made very clear and intelligible: though afterward the mind found little difference in the phraſes, and wondered why one failed to be underſtood more than the other. But every thing does not hit alike upon every man's imagination. We have our underſtandings no leſs different than our palates; and he that thinks the ſame truth ſhall be equally reliſhed by every one in the ſame dreſs, may as well hope to feaſt every one with the ſame ſort of cookery: the meat may be the ſame, and the nouriſhment good, yet every one not be able to receive it with that ſeaſoning: and it muſt be dreſſed another way, if you will have it go down with ſome, even of ſtrong conſtitutions. The truth is, thoſe who adviſed me to publiſh it, adviſed me, for this reaſon, to publiſh it as it is: and ſince I have been brought to let it go abroad, I deſire it ſhould be underſtood by whoever gives

gives himſelf the pains to read it; I have ſo little affection to be in print, that if I were not flattered this Eſſay might be of ſome uſe to others, as I think it has been to me, I ſhould have confined it to the view of ſome friends, who gave the firſt occaſion to it. My appearing therefore in print, being on purpoſe to be as uſeful as I may, I think it neceſſary to make what I have to ſay, as eaſy and intelligible to all ſorts of readers, as I can. And I had much rather the ſpeculative and quick-ſighted ſhould complain of my being in ſome parts tedious, than that any one, not accuſtomed to abſtract ſpeculations, or prepoſſeſſed with different notions, ſhould miſtake, or not comprehend my meaning.

It will poſſibly be cenſured as a great piece of vanity or inſolence in me, to pretend to inſtruct this our knowing age; it amounting to little leſs, when I own, that I publiſh this Eſſay with hopes it may be uſeful to others. But if it may be permitted to ſpeak freely of thoſe, who with a feigned modeſty condemn as uſeleſs, what they themſelves write, methinks it ſavours much more of vanity or inſolence, to publiſh a book for any other end; and he fails very much of that reſpect he owes the public, who prints, and conſequently expects men ſhould read that, wherein he intends not they ſhould meet with any thing of uſe to themſelves or others: and ſhould nothing elſe be found allowable in this treatiſe, yet my deſign will not ceaſe to be ſo; and the goodneſs of my intention ought to be ſome excuſe for the worthleſſneſs of my preſent. It is that chiefly which ſecures me from the fear of cenſure, which I expect not to eſcape more than better writers. Men's principles, notions, and reliſhes are ſo different, that it is hard to find a book which pleaſes or diſpleaſes all men. I acknowledge the age we live in is not the leaſt knowing, and therefore not the moſt eaſy to be ſatisfied. If I have not the good luck to pleaſe, yet nobody ought to be offended with me. I plainly tell all my readers, except half a dozen, this treatiſe was not at firſt intended for them; and therefore they need not be at the trouble to be of that number. But yet

if any one thinks fit to be angry, and rail at it, he may do it ſecurely: for I ſhall find ſome better way of ſpending my time, than in ſuch kind of converſation. I ſhall always have the ſatisfaction to have aimed ſincerely at truth and uſefulneſs, though in one of the meaneſt ways. The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without maſter-builders, whoſe mighty deſigns, in advancing the ſciences, will leave laſting monuments to the admiration of poſterity: but every one muſt not hope to be a Boyle, or a Sydenham: and in an age that produces ſuch maſters, as the great—Huygenius, and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with ſome others of that ſtrain; it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing ſome of the rubbiſh that lies in the way to knowledge; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious and induſtrious men had not been much cumbered with the learned but frivolous uſe of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced into the ſciences, and there made an art of, to that degree, that philoſophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit, or uncapable to be brought into well-bred company, and polite converſation. Vague and inſignificant forms of ſpeech, and abuſe of language, have ſo long paſſed for myſteries of ſcience; and hard and miſapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by preſcription, ſuch a right to be miſtaken for deep learning, and height of ſpeculation, that it will not be eaſy to perſuade, either thoſe who ſpeak, or thoſe who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge. To break in upon the ſanctuary of vanity and ignorance, will be, I ſuppoſe, ſome ſervice to human underſtanding: though ſo few are apt to think they deceive or are deceived in the uſe of words; or that the language of the ſect they are of, has any faults in it, which ought to be examined or corrected; that I hope I ſhall be pardoned, if I have in the third book dwelt long on this ſubject, and endeavoured to make it ſo plain, that neither the inveterateneſs

terateneſs of the miſchief, nor the prevalence of the faſhion, ſhall be any excuſe for thoſe, who will not take care about the meaning of their own words, and will not ſuffer the ſignificancy of their expreſſions to be inquired into.

I have been told, that a ſhort epitome of this treatiſe, which was printed 1688, was by ſome condemned without reading, becauſe innate ideas were denied in it; they too haſtily concluding, that if innate ideas were not ſuppoſed, there would be little left, either of the notion or proof of ſpirits. If any one take the like offence at the entrance of this treatiſe, I ſhall deſire him to read it through; and then I hope he will be convinced, that the taking away falſe foundations, is not to the prejudice, but advantage of truth; which is never injured or endangered ſo much, as when mixed with, or built on falſhood. In the ſecond edition, I added as followeth:

The bookſeller will not forgive me, if I ſay nothing of this ſecond edition, which he has promiſed, by the correctneſs of it, ſhall make amends for the many faults committed in the former. He deſires too, that it ſhould be known, that it has one whole new chapter concerning identity, and many additions and amendments in other places. Theſe I muſt inform my reader are not all new matter, but moſt of them either farther confirmations of what I had ſaid, or explications, to prevent others being miſtaken in the ſenſe of what was formerly printed, and not any variation in me from it; I muſt only except the alterations I have made in Book II. Chap. 21.

What I had there writ concerning liberty and the will, I thought deſerved as accurate a view, as I was capable of; thoſe ſubjects having in all ages exerciſed the learned part of the world, with queſtions and difficulties, that have not a little perplexed morality and divinity; thoſe parts of knowledge, that men are moſt concerned to be clear in. Upon a cloſer inſpection into the working of men's minds, and a ſtricter examination of thoſe motives and views they are turned by, I have found reaſon ſomewhat to alter the thoughts

I formerly

I formerly had concerning that, which gives the laſt determination to the will in all voluntary actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledge to the world with as much freedom and readineſs, as I at firſt publiſhed what then ſeemed to me to be right; thinking myſelf more concerned to quit and renounce any opinion of my own, than oppoſe that of another, when truth appears againſt it. For it is truth alone I ſeek, and that will always be welcome to me, when or from whence ſoever it comes.

But what forwardneſs ſoever I have to reſign any opinion I have, or to recede from any thing I have writ, upon the firſt evidence of any errour in it; yet this I muſt own, that I have not had the good luck to receive any light from thoſe exceptions I have met with in print againſt any part of my book; nor have, from any thing that has been urged againſt it, found reaſon to alter my ſenſe, in any of the points have been queſtioned. Whether the ſubject I have in hand requires often more thought and attention than curſory readers, at leaſt ſuch as are prepoſſeſſed, are willing to allow: or, whether any obſcurity in my expreſſions caſts a cloud over it, and theſe notions are made difficult to others apprehenſions in my way of treating them: ſo it is, that my meaning, I find, is often miſtaken, and I have not the good luck to be every where rightly underſtood. There are ſo many inſtances of this, that I think it juſtice to my reader and myſelf, to conclude, that either my book is plainly enough written to be rightly underſtood by thoſe who peruſe it with that attention and indifferency, which every one, who will give himſelf the pains to read, ought to employ in reading; or elſe, that I have writ mine ſo obſcurely, that it is in vain to go about to mend it. Which ever of theſe be the truth, it is myſelf only am affected thereby, and therefore I ſhall be far from troubling my reader with what I think might be ſaid, in anſwer to thoſe ſeveral objections I have met with, to paſſages here and there of my book: ſince I perſuade myſelf, that he who thinks them of moment enough to be concerned whether they are true or falſe, will be able to

ſee,

ſee, that what is ſaid, is either not well founded, or elſe not contrary to my doctrine, when I and my oppoſer come both to be well underſtood.

If any, careful that none of their good thoughts ſhould be loſt, have publiſhed their cenſures of my Eſſay, with this honour done to it, that they will not ſuffer it to be an Eſſay; I leave it to the public to value the obligation they have to their critical pens, and ſhall not waſte my reader's time in ſo idle or ill-natured an employment of mine, as to leſſen the ſatisfaction any one has in himſelf, or gives to others, in ſo haſty a confutation of what I have written.

The bookſellers preparing for the fourth edition of my Eſſay, gave me notice of it, that I might, if I had leiſure, make any additions or alterations I ſhould think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertiſe the reader, that beſides ſeveral corrections I had made here and there, there was one alteration which it was neceſſary to mention, becauſe it ran through the whole book, and is of conſequence to be rightly underſtood. What I thereupon ſaid was this:

Clear and diſtinct ideas are terms, which, though familiar and frequent in men's mouths, I have reaſon to think every one, who uſes, does not perfectly underſtand. And poſſibly it is but here and there one, who gives himſelf the trouble to conſider them ſo far as to know what he himſelf or others preciſely mean by them: I have therefore in moſt places choſe to put determinate or determined, inſtead of clear and diſtinct, as more likely to direct men's thoughts to my meaning in this matter. By thoſe denominations, I mean ſome object in the mind, and conſequently determined, i. e. ſuch as it is there ſeen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be called a determinate or determined idea, when ſuch as it is at any time objectively in the mind, and ſo determined there, it is annexed, and without variation determined to a name or articulate ſound, which is to be ſteadily the ſign of that very ſame object of the mind, or determinate idea.

To explain this a little more particularly. By determinate, when applied to a ſimple idea, I mean that

ſimple

ſimple appearance which the mind has in its view, or perceives in itſelf, when that idea is ſaid to be in it: by determinate, when applied to a complex idea, I mean ſuch an one as conſiſts of a determinate number of certain ſimple or leſs complex ideas, joined in ſuch a proportion and ſituation, as the mind has before its view, and ſees in itſelf, when that idea is preſent in it, or ſhould be preſent in it, when a man gives a name to it: I ſay ſhould be; becauſe it is not every one, not perhaps any one, who is ſo careful of his language, as to uſe no word, till he views in his mind the preciſe determined idea, which he reſolves to make it the ſign of. The want of this is the cauſe of no ſmall obſcurity and confuſion in men's thoughts and diſcourſes.

I know there are not words enough in any language, to anſwer all the variety of ideas that enter into men's diſcourſes and reaſonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uſes any term, he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the ſign of, and to which he ſhould keep it ſteadily annexed, during that preſent diſcourſe. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or diſtinct ideas: it is plain his are not ſo; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obſcurity and confuſion, where ſuch terms are made uſe of, which have not ſuch a preciſe determination.

Upon this ground I have thought determined ideas a way of ſpeaking leſs liable to miſtakes, than clear and diſtinct: and where men have got ſuch determined ideas of all that they reaſon, inquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and diſputes at an end. The greateſt part of the queſtions and controverſies that perplex mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain uſe of words, or (which is the ſame) indetermined ideas, which they are made to ſtand for; I have made choice of theſe terms to ſignify, 1. Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, diſtinct from the ſound it uſes as a ſign of it. 2. That this idea, thus determined, i. e. which the mind has in itſelf, and knows, and ſees there, be

be determined without any change to that name, and that name determined to that preciſe idea. If men had ſuch determined ideas in their inquiries and diſcourſes, they would both diſcern how far their own inquiries and diſcourſes went, and avoid the greateſt part of the diſputes and wranglings they have with others.

Beſides this, the bookſeller will think it neceſſary I ſhould advertiſe the reader, that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the one of the aſſociation of ideas, the other of enthuſiaſm. Theſe, with ſome other larger additions never before printed, he has engaged to print by themſelves after the ſame manner, and for the ſame purpoſe, as was done when this eſſay had the ſecond impreſſion.

In the ſixth edition, there is very little added or altered; the greateſt part of what is new, is contained in the 21ſt chapter of the ſecond book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little labour, tranſcribe into the margin of the former edition.

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14. Complex ideas of ſubſtances.
15. Idea of ſpiritual ſubſtances, as clear as of bodily ſubſtances.
16. No idea of abſtract ſubſtance.
17. The coheſion of ſolid parts, and impulſe, the primary ideas of body.
18. Thinking

18. Thinking and motivity the primary ideas of ſpirit.
19—21. Spirits capable of motion.
22. Idea of ſoul and body compared.
23—27. Cohesion of ſolid parts in body, as hard to be conceived, as thinking in a ſoul.
28, 29. Communication of motion by impulſe, or by thought, equally intelligible.
30. Ideas of body and ſpirit compared.
31. The notion of ſpirit involves no more difficulty in it than that of body.
32. We know nothing beyond our ſimple ideas.
33—35. Idea of God.
36. No ideas in our complex one of ſpirits, but thoſe got from ſenſation or reflection.
37. Recapitulation.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of collective ideas of ſubſtances.

SECT.
1. One idea.
2. Made by the power of compoſing in the mind.
3. All artificial things are collective ideas.

CHAP. XXV.

Of relation.

SECT.
1. Relation, what.
2. Relations, without correlative terms, not eaſily perceived.
3. Some ſeemingly abſolute terms contain relations.
4. Relation different from the things related.
5. Change of relation may be without any change in the ſubject.
6. Relation only betwixt two things.
7. All things capable of relation.
8. The ideas of relation clearer often, than of the ſubjects related.
9. Relations all terminate in ſimple ideas.
10. Terms leading the mind beyond the ſubjects denominated, are relative.
11. Concluſion.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of cauſe and effect, and other relations.

SECT.
1. Whence their ideas got.
2. Creation, generation, making alteration.
3, 4. Relations of time.
5. Relations of place and extenſion.
6. Abſolute terms often ſtand for relations.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of identity and diverſity.

SECT.
1. Wherein identity conſiſts.
2. Identity of ſubſtances. Identity of modes.
3. Principium individuationis.
4. Identity of vegetables.
5. Identity of animals.
6. Identity of man.
7. Identity ſuited to the idea.
8. Same man.
9. Perſonal identity.
10. Conſciouſneſs makes perſonal identity
11. Perſonal

11. Perſonal identity in change of ſubſtances.
12—15. Whether in the change of thinking ſubſtances.
16. Conſciouſneſs makes the ſame perſon.
17. Self depends on conſciouſneſs.
18—20. Objects of reward and puniſhment.
21, 22. Difference between identity of man and perſon.
23—25. Conſciouſneſs alone makes ſelf.
26, 27. Perſon a forenſic term.
28. The difficulty from ill uſe of names.
29. Continued exiſtence makes identity.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of other relations.

SECT.

1. Proportional.
2. Natural.
3. Inſtituted.
4. Moral.
5. Moral good and evil.
6. Moral rules.
7. Laws.
8. Divine law, the meaſure of ſin and duty.
9. Civil law, the meaſure of crimes and innocence.
10, 11. Philoſophical law, the meaſure of virtue and vice.
12. Its inforcements, commendation, and diſcredit.
13. Theſe three laws the rules of moral good and evil.
14, 15. Morality is the relation of actions to theſe rules.
16. The denominations of actions often miſlead us.
17. Relations innumerable.
18. All relations terminate in ſimple ideas.
19. We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) notions of the relation, as of its foundation.
20. The notion of the relation is the ſame, whether the rule, any action is compared to, be true or falſe.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of clear and diſtinct, obſcure and confuſed ideas.

SECT.

1. Ideas, ſome clear and diſtinct, others obſcure and confuſed.
2. Clear and obſcure, explained by ſight.
3. Cauſes of obſcurity.
4. Diſtinct and confuſed, what.
5. Objection.
6. Confuſion of ideas, is in reference to their names.
7. Defaults which make confuſion. Firſt, complex ideas made up of too few ſimple ones.
8. Secondly, or its ſimple ones jumbled diſorderly together.
9. Thirdly, or are mutable or undetermined.
10. Confuſion, without reference to names, hardly conceivable.
11. Confuſion concerns always two ideas.
12. Cauſes of confuſion.
13. Complex ideas may be diſtinct in one part, and confuſed in another.
14. This, if not heeded, cauſes confuſion in our arguings.
15. Inſtance in eternity.
16. —— Diviſibility of matter.

CHAP. XXX.

Of real and fantaſtical ideas.

SECT.

1. Real ideas are conformable to their archetypes.
2. Simple ideas all real.
3. Complex ideas are voluntary combinations.
4. Mixed modes, made of conſiſtent ideas, are real.
5. Ideas of ſubſtances are real, when they agree with the exiſtence of things.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of adequate and inadequate ideas.

SECT.

1. Adequate ideas are ſuch as perfectly repreſent their archetypes.
2. Simple ideas all adequate.
3. Modes are all adequate.
4, 5. Modes in reference to ſettled names, may be inadequate.
6, 7. Ideas of ſubſtances, as referred to real eſſences, not adequate.
8—11. Ideas of ſubſtances, as collections of their qualities, are all inadequate.
12. Simple ideas ἐκτυπα, and adequate.
13. Ideas of ſubſtances are ἐκτυπα, and inadequate.
14. Ideas of modes and relations are archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of true and falſe ideas.

SECT.

1. Truth and falſehood properly belongs to propoſitions.
2. Metaphyſical truth contains a tacit propoſition.
3. No idea, as an appearance in the mind, true or falſe.
4. Ideas referred to any thing, may be true or falſe.
5. Other men's ideas, real exiſtence, and ſuppoſed real eſſences, are what men uſually refer their ideas to.
6—8. The cauſe of ſuch references.
9. Simple ideas may be falſe in reference to others of the ſame name, but are leaſt liable to be ſo.
10. Ideas of mixed modes moſt liable to be falſe in this ſenſe.
11. Or at leaſt to be thought falſe.
12. And why.
13. As referred to real exiſtences, none of our ideas can be falſe, but thoſe of ſubſtances.
14, 16. Firſt, ſimple ideas in this ſenſe not falſe, and why.
15. Though one man's idea of blue ſhould be different from another's.
17. Secondly, Modes not falſe.
18. Thirdly, Ideas of ſubſtances, when falſe.
19. Truth or falſehood always ſuppoſes affirmation or negation.
20. Ideas in themſelves neither true nor falſe.
21. But are falſe, Firſt, when judged agreeable to another man's idea without being ſo.
22. Secondly, When judged to agree to real exiſtence, when they do not.
23. Thirdly, When judged adequate without being ſo.
24. Fourthly,

24. Fourthly, When judged to repreſent the real eſſence.
25. Ideas, when falſe.
26. More properly to be called right or wrong.
27. Concluſion.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the aſſociation of ideas.

SECT.
1. Something unreaſonable in moſt men.
2. Not wholly from ſelf-love.
3. Nor from education.
4. A degree of madneſs.
5. From a wrong connexion of ideas.
6. This connexion how made.
7, 8. Some antipathies an effect of it.
9. A great cauſe of errours.
10—12. Inſtances.
13. Why time cures ſome diſorders in the mind, which reaſon cannot.
14—16. Farther inſtances of the effects of the aſſociation of ideas.
17. Its influence on intellectual habits.
18. Obſervable in different ſects.
19. Concluſion.

BOOK III.

Of WORDS.

CHAP. I.

Of words or language in general.

SECT.
1. Man fitted to form articulate ſounds.
2. To make them ſigns of ideas.
3, 4. To make general ſigns.
5. Words ultimately derived from ſuch as ſignify ſenſible ideas.
6. Diſtribution.

CHAP. II.

Of the ſignification of words.

SECT.
1. Words are ſenſible ſigns neceſſary for communication.
2, 3. Words are the ſenſible ſigns of his ideas who uſes them.
4. Words often ſecretly referred, Firſt, to the ideas in other men's minds.
5. Secondly, To the reality of things.
6. Words by uſe readily excite ideas.
7. Words often uſed without ſignification.
8. Their ſignification perfectly arbitrary.

CHAP. III.

Of general terms.

SECT.
1. The greateſt part of words general.
2. For every particular thing to have a name, is impoſſible.
3, 4. And uſeleſs.
5. What things have proper names.
6—8. How general words are made.
9. General natures are nothing but abſtract ideas.
10. Why

10. Why the genus is ordinarily made uſe of in definitions.
11. General and univerſal are creatures of the underſtanding.
12. Abſtract ideas are the eſſences of the genera and ſpecies.
13. They are the workmanſhip of the underſtanding, but have their foundation in the ſimilitude of things.
14. Each diſtinct abſtract idea is a diſtinct eſſence.
15. Real and nominal eſſence.
16. Conſtant connexion between the name and nominal eſſence.
17. Suppoſition, that ſpecies are diſtinguiſhed by their real eſſences, uſeleſs.
18. Real and nominal eſſence the ſame in ſimple ideas and modes, different in ſubſtances.
19. Eſſences ingenerable and incorruptible.
20. Recapitulation.

CHAP. IV.

Of the names of ſimple ideas.

SECT.
1. Names of ſimple ideas, modes, and ſubſtances, have each ſomething peculiar.
2. Firſt, Names of ſimple ideas and ſubſtances, intimate real exiſtence.
3. Secondly, Names of ſimple ideas and modes ſignify always both real and nominal eſſence.
4. Thirdly, Names of ſimple ideas undefinable.
5. If all were definable, it would be a proceſs in infinitum.
6. What a definition is.
7. Simple ideas, why undefinable.
8, 9. Inſtances, motion.
10. Light.
11. Simple ideas, why undefinable further explained.
12, 13. The contrary ſhowed in complex ideas by inſtances of a ſtatue and rainbow.
14. The names of complex ideas when to be made intelligible by words.
15. Fourthly, Names of ſimple ideas leaſt doubtful.
16. Fifthly, Simple ideas have few aſcents in linea prædicamentali.
17. Sixthly, Names of ſimple ideas, ſtand for ideas not at all arbitrary.

CHAP. V.

Of the names of mixed modes and relations.

SECT.
1. They ſtand for abſtract ideas as other general names.
2. Firſt, The ideas they ſtand for are made by the underſtanding.
3. Secondly, made arbitrarily, and without patterns.
4. How this is done.
5. Evidently arbitrary, in that the idea is often before the exiſtence.
6. Inſtances, murther, inceſt, ſtabbing.
7. But ſtill ſubſervient to the end of language.
8. Whereof the intranſlatable words of divers languages are a proof.
9. This ſhows ſpecies to be made for communication.
10, 11. In mixed modes, it is the name that ties the combination together, and makes it a ſpecies.
12. For the originals of mixed modes, we look no farther than the mind, which alſo ſhows them to be the workmanſhip of the underſtanding.
13. Their being made by the underſtanding without patterns,

terms, shows the reason why they are so compounded.
14. Names of mixed modes stand always for their real essences.
15. Why their names are usually got before their ideas.
16. Reason of my being so large on this subject.

CHAP. VI.

Of the names of substances.

SECT.
1. The common names of substances stand for sorts.
2. The essence of each sort is the abstract idea.
3. The nominal and real essence different.
4—6. Nothing essential to individuals.
7—8. The nominal essence bounds the species.
9. Not the real essence, which we know not.
10. Not substantial forms, which we know less.
11. That the nominal essence is that whereby we distinguish species, farther evident from spirits.
12. Whereof there are probably numberless species.
13. The nominal essence that of the species, proved from water and ice.
14—18. Difficulties against a certain number of real essences
19. Our nominal esse[illegible]ncerning facts. c. 16. § 6.
substances, not per[illegible] matters of speculation. § 12.
lections of proper
20. But such a colle[illegible]
name stands
22. Our ab[illegible]
[illegible] or rules of probability. § 7.
23.
24. Not by substantial forms.
25. The specific essences a[illegible] made by the mind.
26, 27. Therefore very various an[illegible] uncertain.
28. But not so arbitrary [illegible] mixed modes.
29. Though very imperfect.
30. Which yet serve for com[illegible] mon converse.
31. But make several essence[illegible] signified by the same nam[illegible]
32. The more general our ide[illegible] are, the more incomple[illegible] and partial they are.
33. This all accommodated the end of speech.
34. Instance in cassuaris.
35. Men make the species. [illegible] stance gold.
36. Though na[illegible] similitud[illegible]
37. And [illegible] rac[illegible]
38. Ea[illegible] se[illegible]
39. G[illegible] o. w[illegible]
40. S[illegible] l[illegible]
41. [illegible]
42.
43.

[illegible]er retention. II. 2.

OF

Human Underſtanding.

BOOK I. CHAP. I.

Introduction.

§. 1. SINCE it is the underſtanding, that ſets man above the reſt of ſenſible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion, which he has over them; it is certainly a ſubject, even for its nobleneſs, worth our labour to enquire into. The underſtanding, like the eye, whilſt it makes us ſee and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itſelf; and it requires art and pains to ſet it at a diſtance, and make it its own object. But, whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this enquiry; whatever it be, that keeps us ſo much in the dark to ourſelves; ſure I am, that all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own underſtandings, will not only be very pleaſant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the ſearch of other things.

An enquiry into the underſtanding, pleaſant and uſeful.

§. 2. This, therefore, being my purpoſe, to enquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge; together with the grounds, and degrees of belief, opinion, and aſſent; I ſhall not at preſent meddle with the phyſical conſideration of the mind; or trouble myſelf to examine, wherein its eſſence conſiſts, or by what motions of our ſpirits, or

Deſign.

or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any ſenſation by our organs, or any ideas in our underſtandings; and whether thoſe ideas do in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter or no: Theſe are ſpeculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I ſhall decline, as lying out of my way in the deſign I am now upon. It ſhall ſuffice to my preſent purpoſe, to conſider the diſcerning facultie of a man, as they are employed about the objects, which they have to do with: And I ſhall imagine I have not wholly miſemployed myſelf in the thoughts I ſhall have on this occaſion, if, in this hiſtorical, plain method, I can give any account of the ways, whereby our underſtandings come to attain thoſe notions of things we have, and can ſet down any meaſures of the certainty of our knowledge, or the grounds of thoſe perſuaſions, which are to be found amongſt men, ſo various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet aſſerted, ſomewhere or other, with ſuch aſſurance and confidence, that he that ſhall take a view of the opinions of mankind, obſerve their oppoſition; and at the ſame time conſider the fondneſs and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the reſolution and eagerneſs wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reaſon to ſuſpect, that either there is no ſuch thing as truth at all; or that mankind hath no ſufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.

Method. §. 3. It is, therefore, worth while to ſearch out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what meaſures, in things, whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our aſſent, and moderate our perſuaſions. In order whereunto, I ſhall purſue this following method.

Firſt, I ſhall enquire into the original of thoſe ideas, notions, or whatever elſe you pleaſe to call them, which a man obſerves, and is conſcious to himſelf he has in his mind; and the ways, whereby the underſtanding comes to be furniſhed with them.

Secondly, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew what knowledge the underſtanding hath by thoſe ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, I ſhall make ſome enquiry into the nature and grounds of faith, or opinion; whereby I mean that aſſent, which we give to any propoſition as true, of whoſe truth yet we have no certain knowledge: and here we ſhall have occaſion to examine the reaſons and degrees of aſſent.

Uſeful to know the extent of our comprehenſion.

§. 4. If, by this enquiry into the nature of the underſtanding, I can diſcover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any degree proportionate; and where they fail us: I ſuppoſe it may be of uſe to prevail with the buſy mind of man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehenſion; to ſtop when it is at the utmoſt extent of its tether; and to ſit down in a quiet ignorance of thoſe things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We ſhould not then perhaps be ſo forward, out of an affectation of an univerſal knowledge, to raiſe queſtions, and perplex ourſelves and others with diſputes about things, to which our underſtandings are not ſuited; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or diſtinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out how far the underſtanding can extend its view, how far it has faculties to attain certainty, and in what caſes it can only judge and gueſs; we may learn to content ourſelves with what is attainable by us in this ſtate.

Our capacity ſuited to our ſtate and concerns.

§. 5. For, though the comprehenſion of our underſtandings comes exceeding ſhort of the vaſt extent of things; yet we ſhall have cauſe enough to magnify the bountiful author of our being, for that proportion and degree of knowledge he has beſtowed on us, ſo far above all the reſt of the inhabitants of this our manſion. Men have reaſon to be well ſatisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, ſince he hath given them (as St. Peter ſays) πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν, whatſoever is neceſſary for the conveniencies of life, and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their diſcovery the comfortable *proviſion for this* life, and the way that

leads to a better. How ſhort ſoever their knowledge may come of an univerſal or perfect comprehenſion of whatſoever is, it yet ſecures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their maker, and the ſight of their own duties. Men may find matter ſufficient to buſy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight and ſatisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own conſtitution, and throw away the bleſſings their hands are filled with, becauſe they are not big enough to graſp every thing. We ſhall not have much reaſon to complain of the narrowneſs of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of uſe to us; for of that they are very capable: and it will be an unpardonable, as well as childiſh peeviſhneſs, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, becauſe there are ſome things that are ſet out of the reach of it. It will be no excuſe to an idle and untoward ſervant, who would not attend his buſineſs by candle-light, to plead that he had not broad ſun-ſhine. The candle, that is ſet up in us, ſhines bright enough for all our purpoſes. The diſcoveries we can make with this, ought to ſatisfy us; and we ſhall then uſe our underſtandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are ſuited to our faculties, and upon thoſe grounds they are capable of being propoſed to us; and not peremptorily, or intemperately require demonſtration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is ſufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will diſbelieve every thing, becauſe we cannot certainly know all things; we ſhall do muchwhat as wiſely as he, who would not uſe his legs, but ſit ſtill and periſh, becauſe he had no wings to fly.

Knowledge of our capacity, a cure of ſcepticiſm and idleneſs.

§. 6. When we know our own ſtrength, we ſhall the better know what to undertake with hopes of ſucceſs: and when we have well ſurveyed the powers of our own minds, and made ſome eſtimate what we may expect *from* them, we ſhall not be inclined either to ſit ſtill,

ſtill, and not ſet our thoughts on work at all, in deſpair of knowing any thing; or, on the other ſide, queſtion every thing, and diſclaim all knowledge, becauſe ſome things are not to be underſtood. It is of great uſe to the ſailor, to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows, that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at ſuch places as are neceſſary to direct his voyage, and caution him againſt running upon ſhoals that may ruin him. Our buſineſs here is not to know all things, but thoſe which concern our conduct. If we can find out thoſe meaſures, whereby a rational creature, put in that ſtate in which man is in this world, may, and ought to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereon, we need not to be troubled that ſome other things eſcape our knowledge.

Occaſion of this eſſay.

§. 7. This was that which gave the firſt riſe to this eſſay concerning the underſtanding. For I thought that the firſt ſtep towards ſatisfying ſeveral enquiries, the mind of man was very apt to run into, was to take a ſurvey of our own underſtandings, examine our own powers, and ſee to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I ſuſpected we began at the wrong end, and in vain ſought for ſatisfaction in a quiet and ſure poſſeſſion of truths that moſt concerned us, whilſt we let looſe our thoughts into the vaſt ocean of being; as if all that boundleſs extent were the natural and undoubted poſſeſſion of our underſtandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its deciſions, or that eſcaped its comprehenſion. Thus men extending their enquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into thoſe depths, where they can find no ſure footing; it is no wonder, that they raiſe queſtions, and multiply diſputes, which, never coming to any clear reſolution, are proper only to continue and increaſe their doubts, and to confirm them at laſt in perfect ſcepticiſm. Whereas, were the capacities of our underſtandings well conſidered, the extent of our knowledge once diſcovered, and the horizon found, which ſets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things, between

what is, and what is not comprehenſible by us; men would perhaps with leſs ſcruple acquieſce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and diſcourſe with more advantage and ſatisfaction in the other.

What idea ſtands for.

§. 8. Thus much I thought neceſſary to ſay concerning the occaſion of this enquiry into human underſtanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this ſubject, I muſt here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader for the frequent uſe of the word "idea," which he will find in the following treatiſe. It being that term, which, I think, ſerves beſt to ſtand for whatſoever is the object of the underſtanding when a man thinks; I have uſed it to expreſs whatever is meant by phantaſm, notion, ſpecies, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently uſing it (1).

I preſume

(1) This modeſt apology of our author could not procure him the free uſe of the word *idea*; but great offence has been taken at it, and it has been cenſured as of dangerous conſequence: to which you may here ſee what he anſwers. 'The world, ſaith the * biſhop of *Worceſter*, hath 'been ſtrangely amuſed with *ideas* of late; and we have been told, that 'ſtrange things might be done by the help of ideas; and yet theſe *ideas*, 'at laſt, come to be only common notions of things, which we muſt 'make uſe of in our reaſoning. You, (*i. e.* the author of the *Eſſay* con-'cerning *Human Underſtanding*) ſay in that chapter, about the exiſtence 'of God, you thought it moſt proper to expreſs yourſelf, in the moſt 'uſual and familiar way, by common words and expreſſions. I would 'you had done ſo quite through your book; for then you had never 'given that occaſion to the enemies of our faith, to take up your new way 'of *ideas*, as an effectual battery (as they imagined) againſt the myſteries 'of the Chriſtian faith. But you might have enjoyed the ſatisfaction of 'your *ideas* long enough before I had taken notice of them, unleſs I had 'found them employed about doing miſchief.'

To which our author (†) replies, It is plain, that that which your lordſhip apprehends, in my book, may be of dangerous conſequence to the article which your lordſhip has endeavoured to defend, is my introducing *new terms*; and that which your lordſhip inſtances in, is that of *ideas*. And the reaſon your lordſhip gives in every of theſe places, why your lordſhip has ſuch an apprehenſion of *ideas*, that they may be of dangerous conſequence to that article of faith, which your lordſhip has

* Anſwer to Mr. Locke's Firſt Letter.
† In his Second Letter to the Biſhop of Worceſter.

endeavoured

I preſume it will be eaſily granted me, that there are ſuch ideas in men's minds; every one is conſcious of them in himſelf, and men's words and actions will ſatisfy him that they are in others.

Our firſt enquiry then ſhall be, how they come into the mind.

CHAP.

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endeavoured to defend, is becauſe they have been applied to ſuch purpoſes. And I might (your lordſhip ſays) have enjoyed the ſatisfaction of my *ideas* long enough before you had taken notice of them, unleſs your lordſhip had found them employed in doing miſchief. Which, at laſt, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much, and no more, *viz.* That your lordſhip fears *ideas*, *i. e.* the term *ideas*, may, ſome time or other, prove of very dangerous conſequence to what your lordſhip has endeavoured to defend, becauſe they have been made uſe of in arguing againſt it. For I am ſure your lordſhip does not mean, that you apprehend the things, ſignified by *ideas*, may be of dangerous conſequence to the article of faith your lordſhip endeavours to defend, becauſe they have been made uſe of againſt it: For (beſides that your lordſhip mentions *terms*) that would be to expect that thoſe who oppoſe that article, ſhould oppoſe it without any thoughts; for the things ſignified by *ideas*, are nothing but the immediate objects of our minds in thinking: ſo that unleſs any one can oppoſe the article your lordſhip defends, without thinking on ſomething, he muſt uſe the things ſignified by *ideas*; for he that thinks, muſt have ſome immediate object of his mind in thinking, *i. e.* muſt have *ideas*.

But whether it be the name, or the thing; *ideas* in ſound, or *ideas* in ſignification; that your lordſhip apprehends *may be of dangerous conſequence to that article of faith, which your lordſhip endeavours to defend*; it ſeems to me, I will not ſay *a new way of reaſoning* (for that belongs to me), but were it not your lordſhip's, I ſhould think it a very extraordinary way of *reaſoning*, to write againſt a book, wherein your lordſhip acknowledges they are not uſed to bad purpoſes, nor employed to do miſchief; only becauſe you find that *ideas* are, by thoſe who oppoſe your lordſhip, *employed to do miſchief*; and ſo apprehend, *they may be of dangerous conſequence* to the article your lordſhip has engaged in the defence of. For whether *ideas* as *terms*, or *ideas* as the immediate objects of the mind ſignified by thoſe *terms*, may be, in your lordſhip's apprehenſion, *of dangerous conſequence to that article*; I do not ſee how your lordſhip's writing againſt the *notion of ideas*, as ſtated in my book, will at all hinder your oppoſers, *from employing them in doing miſchief*, as before.

However, be that as it will, ſo it is, that your lordſhip apprehends theſe *new terms*, theſe *ideas*, *with which the world hath, of late, been ſo ſtrangely amuſed, (though at laſt they come to be only common notions of things*, as your lordſhip owns) *may be of dangerous conſequence* to that article.

My lord, if any, in anſwer to your lordſhip's *ſermons*, and in other *pamphlets*, wherein your lordſhip complains they have talked ſo much of *ideas*, have been troubleſome to your lordſhip with that *term*; it is not ſtrange *that your lordſhip ſhould* be tired with that ſound: but how

natural ſoever it be to our weak conſtitutions, to be offended with any ſound, wherewith an importunate din hath been made about our ears; yet, my lord, I know your lordſhip has a better opinion of the articles of our faith, than to think any of them can be overturned, or ſo much as ſhaken, with a breath formed into any ſound, or *term* whatſoever.

Names are but the arbitrary marks of conceptions; and ſo they be ſufficiently appropriated to them in their uſe, I know no other difference any of them have in particular, but as they are of eaſy or difficult pronunciation, and of a more or leſs pleaſant ſound; and what particular antipathies there may be in men to ſome of them, upon that account, is not eaſy to be foreſeen. This I am ſure, no *term* whatſoever in itſelf bears, one more than another, any oppoſition to truth of any kind; they are only propoſitions that do or can oppoſe the truth of any article or doctrine: and thus no *term* is privileged for being ſet in oppoſition to truth.

There is no word to be found, which may not be brought into a propoſition, wherein the moſt ſacred and moſt evident truths may be oppoſed: but that is not a fault in the *term*, but him that uſes it. And therefore I cannot eaſily perſuade myſelf (whatever your lordſhip hath ſaid in the heat of your concern) that you have beſtowed ſo much pains upon my book, becauſe the word *idea* is ſo much uſed there. For though upon my ſaying, in my chapter about the exiſtence of God, 'That I ſcarce uſed the word *idea* in that whole chapter,' your lordſhip wiſhes, that *I had done ſo quite through my book*: yet I muſt rather look upon that as a compliment to me, wherein your lordſhip wiſhed, that my book had been all through ſuited to vulgar readers, not uſed to that and the like *terms*, than that your lordſhip has ſuch an apprehenſion of the word *idea*; or that there is any ſuch harm in the uſe of it, inſtead of the word *notion* (with which your lordſhip ſeems to take it to agree in ſignification), that your lordſhip would think it worth your while to ſpend any part of your valuable time and thoughts about my book, for having the word *idea* ſo often in it; for this would be to make your lordſhip to write only againſt an impropriety of ſpeech. I own to your lordſhip, it is a great condeſcenſion in your lordſhip to have done it, if that word have ſuch a ſhare in what your lordſhip has writ againſt my book, as ſome expreſſions would perſuade one; and I would, for the ſatisfaction of your lordſhip, change the *term* of *idea* for a better, if your lordſhip, or any one, could help me to it; for, that *notion* will not ſo well ſtand for every immediate object of the mind in thinking, as *idea* does. I have (as I gueſs) ſomewhere given a reaſon in my book, by ſhewing that the term *notion* is more peculiarly appropriated to a certain ſort of thoſe objects, which I call mixed modes: and I think, it would not ſound altogether ſo well, to ſay, the *notion of red*, and the *notion of a horſe*; as the *idea of red*, and the *idea of a horſe*. But if any one thinks it will, I contend not; for I have no fondneſs for, nor an antipathy to, any particular articulate ſounds: nor do I think there is any ſpell or faſcination in any of them.

But be the word *idea* proper or improper, I do not ſee how it is the better or the worſe, becauſe *ill men* have made uſe of it, or becauſe it has been made uſe of to *bad purpoſes*; for if that be a reaſon to condemn, or lay it by, we muſt lay by the terms, *ſcripture*, *reaſon*, *perception*, *diſtinct*, *clear*, &c. Nay, the name of *God* himſelf will not eſcape; for I do not think any one of theſe, or any other term, can be produced, which hath not been made uſe of by ſuch men, and to ſuch purpoſes.

And

And therefore, if *the* unitarians *in their late pamphlets have talked very much of, and ſtrangely amuſed the world with ideas*; I cannot believe your lordſhip will think that word one jot the worſe, or the more dangerous, becauſe they uſe it; any more than, for their uſe of them, you will think *reaſon* or *ſcripture* terms ill or dangerous. And therefore what your lordſhip ſays, that *I might have enjoyed the ſatisfaction of my* ideas *long enough before your lordſhip had taken notice of them, unleſs you had found them employed in doing miſchief*; will, I preſume, when your lordſhip has conſidered again of this matter, prevail with your lordſhip, to let me *enjoy* ſtill the *ſatisfaction I take in my ideas, i. e.* as much ſatisfaction as I can take in ſo ſmall a matter, as is the uſing of a proper term, notwithſtanding it *ſhould be employed by others in doing miſchief.*

For, my lord, if I ſhould leave it wholly out of my book, and ſubſtitute the word *notion* every where in the room of it; and every body elſe do ſo too (though your lordſhip does not, I ſuppoſe, ſuſpect, that I have the vanity to think they would follow my example) my book would, it ſeems, be the more to your lordſhip's liking; but I do not ſee how this would one jot abate the *miſchief* your lordſhip complains of. For the *unitarians* might as much employ *notions*, as they do now *ideas*, to do *miſchief*; unleſs they are ſuch fools to think they can conjure with this notable word *idea*; and that the force of what they ſay, lies in the ſound, and not in the ſignification of their terms.

This I am ſure of, that the truths of the Chriſtian religion can be no more battered by one word than another; nor can they be beaten down or endangered by any ſound whatſoever. And I am apt to flatter myſelf, that your lordſhip is ſatisfied that there is no harm in the word *ideas*, becauſe you ſay, you ſhould not have taken any notice of my *ideas*, if the *enemies of our faith had not taken up my new way of* ideas, *as an effectual battery againſt the myſteries of the Chriſtian faith.* In which place, *by new way of ideas*, nothing, I think, can be conſtrued to be meant, but my expreſſing myſelf by that of *ideas*; and not by other more common words, and of ancienter ſtanding in the *Engliſh* language.

As to the objection, of the author's way by *ideas* being *a new way*, he thus anſwers; *my new way by ideas, or my way by ideas*, which often occurs in your lordſhip's letter, is, I confeſs, a very large and doubtful expreſſion; and may, in the full latitude, comprehend my whole *eſſay*; becauſe, treating in it of the *underſtanding*, which is nothing but the faculty of thinking, I could not well treat of that faculty of the mind, which conſiſts in thinking, without conſidering the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, which I call *ideas*: and therefore in treating of the *underſtanding*, I gueſs it will not be thought ſtrange, that the greateſt part of my book has been taken up, in conſidering what theſe objects of the mind, in thinking, are; whence they come; what uſe the mind makes of them, in its ſeveral ways of thinking; and what are the outward marks whereby it ſignifies them to others, or records them for its own uſe. And this, in ſhort, is *my way by ideas*, that which your lordſhip calls *my new way by ideas*: which, my lord, if it be *new*, it is but a new hiſtory of an old thing. For I think it will not be doubted, that men always performed the actions of *thinking, reaſoning, believing*, and *knowing*, juſt after the ſame manner they do now; though whether the ſame account has heretofore been given of the way how they performed theſe actions, or wherein they conſiſted, I do not know. Were I as well read as your lordſhip, I ſhould have been ſafe from that gentle reprimand of your lordſhip's, for thinking *my way of*

ideas,

ideas, NEW, *for want of looking into other men's thoughts, which appear in their books.*

Your lordſhip's words, as an acknowledgment of your inſtructions in the caſe, and as a warning to others, who will be ſo bold adventurers as *to ſpin any thing barely out of their own thoughts*, I ſhall ſet down at large: And they run thus: *Whether you took this way of* ideas *from the modern philoſopher, mentioned by you, is not at all material; but I intended no reflection upon you in it (for that you mean, by my commending you as a ſcholar of ſo great a maſter); I never meant to take from you the honour of your own inventions: and I do believe you when you ſay, That you wrote from your own thoughts, and the* ideas *you had there. But many things may ſeem new to one, who converſes only with his own thoughts, which really are not ſo; as he may find, when he looks into the thoughts of other men, which appear in their books. And therefore, although I have a juſt eſteem for the invention of ſuch, who can ſpin volumes barely out of their own thoughts; yet I am apt to think, they would oblige the world more, if, after they have thought ſo much themſelves, they would examine what thoughts others have had before them, concerning the ſame things: that ſo thoſe may not be thought their own inventions which are common to themſelves and others. If a man ſhould try all the magnetical experiments himſelf, and publiſh them as his own thoughts, he might take himſelf to be the inventor of them: but he that examines and compares with them what* Gilbert, *and others have done before him, will not diminiſh the proof of his diligence, but may wiſh he had compared his thoughts with other men's; by which the world would receive greater advantage, although he had loſt the honour of being an original.*

To alleviate my fault herein, I agree with your lordſhip, that *many things may ſeem* NEW, *to one that converſes only with his own thoughts, which really are not ſo*; but I muſt crave leave to ſuggeſt to your lordſhip, that if in the ſpinning them out of his own thoughts, they ſeem new to him, he is certainly the inventor of them; and they may as juſtly be thought his own *invention*, as any one's; and he is as certainly the inventor of them, as any one who thought on them before him: the diſtinction of invention, or not invention, lying not in thinking firſt, or not firſt, but in borrowing, or not borrowing, our thoughts from another: and he to whom, ſpinning them out of his own thoughts, they *ſeem new*, could not certainly borrow them from another. So he truly invented *printing* in *Europe*, who without any communication with the *Chineſe*, ſpun it out of his own thoughts; though it were ever ſo true, that the *Chineſe* had the uſe of *printing*, nay, of *printing* in the very ſame way, among them, many ages before him. So that he that ſpins any thing out of his own thoughts, that *ſeems new to him*, cannot ceaſe to think it his own invention, ſhould he examine ever ſo far, *what thoughts others have had before him, concerning the ſame thing*, and ſhould find by examining, that they had the ſame thoughts too.

But what great *obligation this would* be to the world, or weighty cauſe of turning over and looking into books, I confeſs I do not ſee. The great end to me, in converſing with my own or other men's thoughts, in matters of ſpeculation, is to find truth, without being much concerned whether my own ſpinning of it out of mine, or their ſpinning of it out of their own thoughts, helps me to it. And how little I affect the *honour of an original*, may be ſeen at that place of my book, where, if any where, that itch of vain-glory was likelieſt to have ſhewn itſelf, had I been ſo over-run with it, as to need a cure. It is where I ſpeak of certainty,

tainty, in theſe following words, taken notice of by your lordſhip, in another place: 'I think I have ſhewn wherein it is that certainty, real 'certainty conſiſts, which whatever it was to others, was, I confeſs, to 'me, heretofore, one of thoſe *deſiderata*, which I found great want of.'

Here, my lord, however *new* this *ſeemed* to me, and the more ſo becauſe poſſibly I had in vain hunted for it in the *books of others*; yet I ſpoke of it as *new*, only to myſelf: leaving others in the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of what either by invention, or reading, was theirs before; without aſſuming to myſelf any other honour, but that of my own ignorance, till that time, if others before had ſhewn wherein certainty lay. And yet, my lord, if I had, upon this occaſion, been forward to aſſume to myſelf the *honour of an original*, I think I had been pretty ſafe in it; ſince I ſhould have had your lordſhip for my guarantee and *vindicator* in that point, who are pleaſed to call it *new*; and, as ſuch, to write againſt it.

And truly, my lord, in this reſpect, my book has had very unlucky ſtars, ſince it hath had the misfortune to diſpleaſe your lordſhip, with many things in it, for their novelty; as *new way of reaſoning*; *new hypotheſis about reaſon*; *new ſort of certainty*; *new terms*; *new way of ideas*; *new method of certainty*; &c. And yet in other places, your lordſhip ſeems to think it worthy in me of your lordſhip's reflection, for ſaying, but what others have ſaid before; as where I ſay, 'In the different make 'of men's tempers, and application of their thoughts, ſome arguments 'prevail more on one, and ſome on another, for the confirmation of 'the ſame truth.' Your lordſhip aſks, *What is this different from what all men of underſtanding have ſaid?* Again, I take it, your lordſhip meant not theſe words for a commendation of my book, where you ſay, *But if no more be meant by* 'The ſimple *ideas* that come in by ſenſation, or re-'flection, and their being the foundation of our knowledge,' *but that our notions of things come in, either from our ſenſes or the exerciſe of our minds: as there is nothing extraordinary in the diſcovery, ſo your lordſhip is far enough from oppoſing that, wherein you think all mankind are agreed.*

And again, *But what need all this great noiſe about* ideas *and* certainty, *true and real* certainty *by* ideas; *if, after all, it comes only to this, that our* ideas *only repreſent to us ſuch things, from whence we bring arguments to prove the truth of things?*

But, *the world hath been ſtrangely amuſed with* ideas *of late*; *and we have been told, that ſtrange things might be done by the help of* ideas; *and yet theſe* ideas, *at laſt, come to be only common notions of things, which we muſt make uſe of in our reaſoning.* And to the like purpoſe in other places.

Whether, therefore, at laſt, your lordſhip will reſolve, that it is *new* or no; or more faulty by its being *new*, muſt be left to your lordſhip. This I find by it, that my book cannot avoid being condemned on the one ſide or the other, nor do I ſee a poſſibility to help it. If there be readers that like only *new* thoughts; or, on the other ſide, others that can bear nothing but what can be juſtified by received authorities in print; I muſt deſire them to make themſelves amends in that part which they like, for the diſpleaſure they receive in the other: but if any ſhould be ſo exact, as to find fault with both, truly, I know not well what to ſay to them. The caſe is a plain caſe, the book is all over naught, and there is not a ſentence in it, that is not, either for its antiquity or novelty, to be condemned, and ſo there is a ſhort end of it. From your lordſhip, indeed, in particular, I can hope for ſomething better; for your lordſhip

lordſhip thinks the *general deſign of it ſo good*, that that, I flatter myſelf, would prevail on your lordſhip to preſerve it from the fire.

But as to the way, your lordſhip thinks, I ſhould have taken to prevent the *having it thought my invention, when it was common to me with others*, it unluckily ſo fell out, in the ſubject of my *Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*, that I could not look into the thoughts of other men to inform myſelf. For my deſign being, as well as I could, to copy nature, and to give an account of the operations of the mind in thinking; I could look into no-body's underſtanding but my own, to ſee how it wrought; nor have a proſpect into other men's minds, to view their thoughts there; and obſerve what ſteps and motions they took, and by what gradations they proceeded in their acquainting themſelves with truth, and their advance in knowledge: what we find of their thoughts in books, is but the reſult of this, and not the progreſs and working of their minds, in coming to the opinions or concluſions they ſet down and publiſhed.

All therefore, that I can ſay of my book, is, that it is a copy of my own mind, in its ſeveral ways of operation. And all that I can ſay for the publiſhing of it is, that I think the intellectual faculties are made, and operate alike in moſt men; and that ſome, that I ſhewed it to before I publiſhed it, liked it ſo well, that I was confirmed in that opinion. And therefore, if it ſhould happen, that it ſhould not be ſo, but that ſome men ſhould have ways of thinking, reaſoning, or arriving at certainty, different from others, and above thoſe that I find my mind to uſe and acquieſce in, I do not ſee of what uſe my book can be to them. I can only make it my humble requeſt, in my own name, and in the name of thoſe that are of my ſize, who find their minds work, reaſon, and know in the ſame low way that mine does, that thoſe men of a more happy genius would ſhew us the way of their nobler flights; and particularly would diſcover to us their ſhorter or ſurer way to certainty, than by *ideas*, and the obſerving their agreement or diſagreement.

Your lordſhip adds, *But now, it ſeems, nothing is intelligible but what ſuits with the new way of* ideas. My lord, *The new way of* ideas, and the old way of ſpeaking *intelligibly* * was always and ever will be the ſame: and if I may take the liberty to declare my ſenſe of it, herein it conſiſts: 1. That a man uſe no words, but ſuch as he makes the ſigns of certain determined objects of his mind in thinking, which he can make known to another. 2. Next, that he uſe the ſame word ſteadily for the ſign of the ſame immediate object of his mind in thinking. 3. That he join thoſe words together in propoſitions, according to the grammatical rules of that language he ſpeaks in. 4. That he unite thoſe ſentences in a coherent diſcourſe. Thus, and thus only, I humbly conceive, any one may preſerve himſelf from the confines and ſuſpicion of jargon, whether he pleaſes to call thoſe immediate objects of his mind, which his words do, or ſhould ſtand for, *ideas* or no.

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* Mr. Locke's Third Letter to the Biſhop of Worceſter.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

No Innate Principles in the Mind.

§. 1. IT is an eſtabliſhed opinion amongſt ſome men, that there are in the underſtanding certain innate principles; ſome primary notions, κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, characters, as it were, ſtamped upon the mind of man, which the ſoul receives in its very firſt being; and brings into the world with it. It would be ſufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falſeneſs of this ſuppoſition, if I ſhould only ſhew (as I hope I ſhall in the following parts of this diſcourſe) how men, barely by the uſe of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impreſſions; and may arrive at certainty, without any ſuch original notions or principles. For I imagine any one will eaſily grant, that it would be impertinent to ſuppoſe, the ideas of colours innate in a creature, to whom God hath given ſight, and a power to receive them by the eyes, from external objects: and no leſs unreaſonable would it be to attribute ſeveral truths to the impreſſions of nature, and innate characters, when we may obſerve in ourſelves faculties, fit to attain as eaſy and certain knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.

The way ſhewn how we come by any knowledge, ſufficient to prove it not innate.

But becauſe a man is not permitted without cenſure to follow his own thoughts in the ſearch of truth, when they lead him ever ſo little out of the common road; I ſhall ſet down the reaſons, that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuſe for my miſtake, if I be in one; which I leave to be conſidered by thoſe, who, with me, diſpoſe themſelves to embrace truth, wherever they find it.

§. 2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain principles, both ſpeculative and practical

General aſſent the great argument.

tical (for they ſpeak of both) univerſally agreed upon by all mankind: which therefore, they argue, muſt needs be conſtant impreſſions, which the ſouls of men receive in their firſt beings, and which they bring into the world with them, as neceſſarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.

Univerſal conſent proves nothing innate.

§. 3. This argument, drawn from univerſal conſent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths, wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way ſhewn, how men may come to that univerſal agreement, in the things they do conſent in; which I preſume may be done.

"What is, is;" and, "it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be," not univerſally aſſented to.

§. 4. But, which is worſe, this argument of univerſal conſent, which is made uſe of to prove innate principles, ſeems to me a demonſtration that there are none ſuch; becauſe there are none to which all mankind give an univerſal aſſent. I ſhall begin with the ſpeculative, and inſtance in thoſe magnified principles of demonſtration; "whatſoever is, is;" and, "it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be;" which, of all others, I think have the moſt allowed title to innate. Theſe have ſo ſettled a reputation of maxims univerſally received, that it will, no doubt, be thought ſtrange, if any one ſhould ſeem to queſtion it. But yet I take liberty to ſay, that theſe propoſitions are ſo far from having an univerſal aſſent, that there are great part of mankind to whom they are not ſo much as known.

Not on the mind naturally imprinted, becauſe not known to children, idiots, &c.

§. 5. For, firſt, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the leaſt apprehenſion or thought of them: and the want of that is enough to deſtroy that univerſal aſſent, which muſt needs be the neceſſary concomitant of all innate truths: it ſeeming to me near a contradiction, to ſay, that there are truths imprinted on the ſoul, which it perceives or underſtands not: imprinting, if it ſignify any thing, being nothing elſe, but the making certain truths to be perceived.

ceived. For to imprint any thing on the mind, without the mind's perceiving it, ſeems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have ſouls, have minds, with thoſe impreſſions upon them, they muſt unavoidably perceive them, and neceſſarily know and aſſent to theſe truths; which ſince they do not, it is evident that there are no ſuch impreſſions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To ſay a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the ſame time to ſay, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impreſſion nothing. No propoſition can be ſaid to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conſcious of. For if any one may, then, by the ſame reaſon, all propoſitions that are true, and the mind is capable of ever aſſenting to, may be ſaid to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: ſince, if any one can be ſaid to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it muſt be only, becauſe it is capable of knowing it, and ſo the mind is of all truths it ever ſhall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind, which it never did, nor ever ſhall know: for a man may live long, and die at laſt in ignorance of many truths, which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity of knowing, be the natural impreſſion contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know, will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of ſpeaking; which, whilſt it pretends to aſſert the contrary, ſays nothing different from thoſe, who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing ſeveral truths. The capacity, they ſay, is innate, the knowledge acquired. But then to what end ſuch conteſt for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the underſtanding without being perceived, I can ſee no difference there can be, between any truths the mind is capable of knowing, in reſpect of their original: they muſt all be innate, or all adventitious: in vain ſhall a man go about to diſtinguiſh them. He

therefore, that talks of innate notions in the underſtanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any diſtinct ſort of truths) mean ſuch truths to be in the underſtanding, as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if theſe words (to be in the underſtanding) have any propriety, they ſignify to be underſtood: ſo that, to be in the underſtanding, and not to be underſtood; to be in the mind, and never to be perceived; is all one, as to ſay, any thing is, and is not, in the mind or underſtanding. If therefore theſe two propoſitions, "whatſoever is, is;" and "it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be," are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them; infants, and all that have ſouls, muſt neceſſarily have them in their underſtandings, know the truth of them, and aſſent to it.

That men know them when they come to the uſe of reaſon, anſwered.

§. 6. To avoid this, it is uſually anſwered, That all men know and aſſent to them, when they come to the uſe of reaſon, and this is enough to prove them innate. I anſwer,

§. 7. Doubtful expreſſions, that have ſcarce any ſignification, go for clear reaſons, to thoſe, who being prepoſſeſſed, take not the pains to examine, even what they themſelves ſay. For to apply this anſwer with any tolerable ſenſe to our preſent purpoſe, it muſt ſignify one of theſe two things; either, that, as ſoon as men come to the uſe of reaſon, theſe ſuppoſed native inſcriptions come to be known, and obſerved by them: or elſe, that the uſe and exerciſe of men's reaſon aſſiſts them in the diſcovery of theſe principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

If reaſon diſcovered them, that would not prove them innate.

§. 8. If they mean, that by the uſe of reaſon men may diſcover theſe principles; and that this is ſufficient to prove them innate: their way of arguing will ſtand thus, (viz.) that, whatever truths reaſon can certainly diſcover to us, and make us firmly aſſent to, thoſe are all naturally imprinted on the mind: ſince that univerſal aſſent, which is made the mark of them, amounts to no more but this; that by the uſe of reaſon, we are capable to come to a certain knowledge of,

of, and aſſent to them; and, by this means, there will be no difference between the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them: All muſt be equally allowed innate; they being all diſcoveries made by the uſe of reaſon, and truths that a rational creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way.

It is falſe that reaſon diſcovers them.

§. 9. But how can theſe men think the uſe of reaſon neceſſary, to diſcover principles that are ſuppoſed innate, when reaſon (if we may believe them) is nothing elſe but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles, or propoſitions, that are already known? That certainly can never be thought innate, which we have need of reaſon to diſcover; unleſs, as I have ſaid, we will have all the certain truths, that reaſon ever teaches us, to be innate. We may as well think the uſe of reaſon neceſſary to make our eyes diſcover viſible objects, as that there ſhould be need of reaſon, or the exerciſe thereof, to make the underſtanding ſee what is originally engraven on it, and cannot be in the underſtanding before it be perceived by it. So that to make reaſon diſcover thoſe truths thus imprinted, is to ſay, that the uſe of reaſon diſcovers to a man what he knew before: and if men have thoſe innate impreſſed truths originally, and before the uſe of reaſon, and yet are always ignorant of them, till they come to the uſe of reaſon; it is in effect to ſay, that men know, and know them not, at the ſame time.

§. 10. It will here perhaps be ſaid, that mathematical demonſtrations, and other truths that are not innate, are not aſſented to, as ſoon as propoſed, wherein they are diſtinguiſhed from theſe maxims, and other innate truths. I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak of aſſent, upon the firſt propoſing, more particularly by and by. I ſhall here only, and that very readily allow, that theſe maxims and mathematical demonſtrations are in this different; that the one have need of reaſon, uſing of proofs, to make them out, and to gain our aſſent; but the other, as ſoon as underſtood, are, without any the leaſt reaſoning, embraced and aſſented to. But I withal beg leave to obſerve, that it lays open the weakneſs of

this ſubterfuge, which requires the uſe of reaſon for the diſcovery of theſe general truths: ſince it muſt be confeſſed, that in their diſcovery there is no uſe made of reaſoning at all. And I think thoſe, who give this anſwer, will not be forward to affirm, that the knowledge of this maxim, "That it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be," is a deduction of our reaſon. For this would be to deſtroy that bounty of nature they ſeem ſo fond of, whilſt they make the knowledge of thoſe principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts. For all reaſoning is ſearch, and caſting about, and requires pains and application. And how can it with any tolerable ſenſe be ſuppoſed, that what was imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reaſon, ſhould need the uſe of reaſon to diſcover it?

§. 11. Thoſe who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the operations of the underſtanding, will find, that this ready aſſent of the mind to ſome truths, depends not, either on native inſcription, or the uſe of reaſon; but on a faculty of the mind quite diſtinct from both of them, as we ſhall ſee hereafter. Reaſon, therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our aſſent to theſe maxims, if by ſaying, that men know and aſſent to them, when they come to the uſe of reaſon, be meant, that the uſe of reaſon aſſiſts us in the knowledge of theſe maxims, it is utterly falſe; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.

The coming to the uſe of reaſon, not the time we come to know theſe maxims

§. 12. If by knowing and aſſenting to them, when we come to the uſe of reaſon, be meant, that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind; and that, as ſoon as children come to the uſe of reaſon, they come alſo to know and aſſent to theſe maxims; this alſo is falſe and frivolous. Firſt, It is falſe: Becauſe it is evident theſe maxims are not in the mind ſo early as the uſe of reaſon: and therefore the coming to the uſe of reaſon is falſly aſſigned, as the time of their diſcovery. How many inſtances of the uſe of reaſon may we obſerve in children, a long time before they have any knowledge

of

of this maxim, "That it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be?" And a great part of illiterate people, and ſavages, paſs many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general propoſitions. I grant, men come not to the knowledge of theſe general and more abſtract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the uſe of reaſon; and I add, nor then neither. Which is ſo, becauſe, till after they come to the uſe of reaſon, thoſe general abſtract ideas are not framed in the mind, about which thoſe general maxims are, which are miſtaken for innate principles; but are indeed diſcoveries made, and verities introduced and brought into the mind by the ſame way, and diſcovered by the ſame ſteps, as ſeveral other propoſitions, which nobody was ever ſo extravagant as to ſuppoſe innate. This I hope to make plain in the ſequel of this diſcourſe. I allow therefore a neceſſity, that men ſhould come to the uſe of reaſon before they get the knowledge of thoſe general truths; but deny, that men's coming to the uſe of reaſon is the time of their diſcovery.

By this they are not diſtinguiſhed from other knowable truths.

§. 13. In the mean time it is obſervable, that this ſaying, That men know and aſſent to theſe maxims, when they come to the uſe of reaſon, amounts in reality of fact to no more but this, That they are never known, nor taken notice of, before the uſe of reaſon, but may poſſibly be aſſented to, ſome time after, during a man's life; but when, is uncertain: and ſo may all other knowable truths, as well as theſe; which therefore have no advantage nor diſtinction from others, by this note of being known when we come to the uſe of reaſon; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.

If coming to the uſe of reaſon were the time of their diſcovery, it would not prove them innate.

§. 14. But, ſecondly, were it true, that the preciſe time of their being known, and aſſented to, were, when men come to the uſe of reaſon, neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous, as the ſuppoſition of itſelf is falſe. For by what kind of logic will it appear,

that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its firſt conſtitution, becauſe it comes firſt to be obſerved and aſſented to, when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a diſtinct province, begins to exert itſelf? And therefore, the coming to the uſe of ſpeech, if it were ſuppoſed the time that theſe maxims are firſt aſſented to (which it may be with as much truth, as the time when men come to the uſe of reaſon) would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to ſay, they are innate, becauſe men aſſent to them, when they come to the uſe of reaſon. I agree then with theſe men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of theſe general and ſelf-evident maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exerciſe of reaſon: but I deny that the coming to the uſe of reaſon is the preciſe time when they are firſt taken notice of; and if that were the preciſe time, I deny that it would prove them innate. All that can with any truth be meant by this propoſition, that men aſſent to them when they come to the uſe of reaſon, is no more but this, that the making of general abſtract ideas, and the underſtanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it, children commonly get not thoſe general ideas, nor learn the names that ſtand for them, till, having for a good while exerciſed their reaſon about familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their ordinary diſcourſe and actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational converſation. If aſſenting to theſe maxims, when men come to the uſe of reaſon, can be true in any other ſenſe, I deſire it may be ſhown; or at leaſt, how in this, or any other ſenſe, it proves them innate.

The ſteps by which the mind attains ſeveral truths

§. 15. The ſenſes at firſt let in particular ideas, and furniſh the yet empty cabinet; and the mind by degrees growing familiar with ſome of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind, proceeding farther, abſtracts them, and by degrees learns the uſe of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furniſhed with ideas and language, the materials

terials about which to exerciſe its diſcurſive faculty: and the uſe of reaſon becomes daily more viſible, as theſe materials, that give it employment, increaſe. But though the having of general ideas, and the uſe of general words and reaſon, uſually grow together; yet, I ſee not, how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of ſome truths, I confeſs, is very early in the mind; but in a way that ſhows them not to be innate. For, if we will obſerve, we ſhall find it ſtill to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired: It being about thoſe firſt which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earlieſt to do, which make the moſt frequent impreſſions on their ſenſes. In ideas thus got, the mind diſcovers that ſome agree, and others differ, probably as ſoon as it has any uſe of memory; as ſoon as it is able to retain and perceive diſtinct ideas. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain, it does ſo long before it has the uſe of words, or comes to that, which we commonly call "the uſe of reaſon." For a child knows as certainly, before it can ſpeak, the difference between the ideas of ſweet and bitter (i. e. that ſweet is not bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to ſpeak) that wormwood and ſugar-plums are not the ſame thing.

§. 16. A child knows not that three and four are equal to ſeven, till he comes to be able to count ſeven, and has got the name and idea of equality: and then, upon explaining thoſe words, he preſently aſſents to, or rather perceives the truth of that propoſition. But neither does he then readily aſſent, becauſe it is an innate truth, nor was his aſſent wanting till then, becauſe he wanted the uſe of reaſon; but the truth of it appears to him, as ſoon as he has ſettled in his mind the clear and diſtinct ideas, that theſe names ſtand for: and then he knows the truth of that propoſition, upon the ſame grounds, and by the ſame means, that he knew before, that a rod and a cherry are not the ſame thing; and upon the ſame grounds alſo, that he may come to know afterwards, "that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be," as ſhall be more fully ſhown here-

after. So that the later it is before any one comes to have thoſe general ideas, about which thoſe maxims are; or to know the ſignification of thoſe general terms that ſtand for them; or to put together in his mind the ideas they ſtand for; the later alſo will it be before he comes to aſſent to thoſe maxims, whoſe terms, with the ideas they ſtand for, being no more innate than thoſe of a cat or a weeſel, he muſt ſtay till time and obſervation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of theſe maxims, upon the firſt occaſion that ſhall make him put together thoſe ideas in his mind, and obſerve whether they agree or diſagree, according as is expreſſed in thoſe propoſitions. And therefore it is, that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-ſeven, by the ſame ſelf-evidence, that he knows one and two to be equal to three: yet a child knows this not ſo ſoon as the other; not for want of the uſe of reaſon, but becauſe the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty-ſeven ſtand for, are not ſo ſoon got, as thoſe which are ſignified by one, two, and three.

Aſſenting as ſoon as propoſed and underſtood, proves them not innate.

§. 17. This evaſion therefore of general aſſent, when men come to the uſe of reaſon, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between thoſe ſuppoſed innate, and other truths, that are afterwards acquired and learnt, men have endeavoured to ſecure an univerſal aſſent to thoſe they call maxims, by ſaying, they are generally aſſented to as ſoon as propoſed, and the terms they are propoſed in, underſtood: ſeeing all men, even children, as ſoon as they hear and underſtand the terms, aſſent to theſe propoſitions, they think it is ſufficient to prove them innate. For ſince men never fail, after they have once underſtood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly theſe propoſitions were firſt lodged in the underſtanding, which, without any teaching, the mind, at the very firſt propoſal, immediately cloſes with, and aſſents to, and after that never doubts again.

§. 18.

§. 18. In anſwer to this, I demand "whether ready aſſent given to a propoſition upon firſt hearing, and underſtanding the terms, be a certain mark of an innate principle?" If it be not, ſuch a general aſſent is in vain urged as a proof of them: if it be ſaid, that it is a mark of innate, they muſt then allow all ſuch propoſitions to be innate, which are generally aſſented to as ſoon as heard, whereby they will find themſelves plentifully ſtored with innate principles. For upon the ſame ground, viz. of aſſent at firſt hearing and underſtanding the terms, that men would have thoſe maxims paſs for innate, they muſt alſo admit ſeveral propoſitions about numbers to be innate: and thus, that one and two are equal to three; that two and two are equal to four; and a multitude of other the like propoſitions in numbers, that every body aſſents to at firſt hearing and underſtanding the terms, muſt have a place amongſt theſe innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and propoſitions made about ſeveral of them; but even natural philoſophy, and all the other ſciences, afford propoſitions, which are ſure to meet with aſſent as ſoon as they are underſtood. That two bodies cannot be in the ſame place, is a truth, that nobody any more ſticks at, than at theſe maxims, "that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be; that white is not black: that a ſquare is not a circle; that yellowneſs is not ſweetneſs:" theſe and a million of ſuch other propoſitions, as many at leaſt as we have diſtinct ideas of, every man in his wits, at firſt hearing, and knowing what the names ſtand for, muſt neceſſarily aſſent to. If theſe men will be true to their own rule, and have aſſent at firſt hearing and underſtanding the terms, to be a mark of innate, they muſt allow, not only as many innate propoſitions as men have diſtinct ideas; but as many as men can make propoſitions wherein different ideas are denied one of another. Since every propoſition, wherein one different idea is denied of another,

If ſuch an aſſent be a mark of innate, then "that one and two are equal to three; that ſweetneſs is not bitterneſs;" and a thouſand the like, muſt be innate.

will as certainly find aſſent at firſt hearing and underſtanding the terms, as this general one, "it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be;" or that which is the foundation of it, and is the eaſier underſtood of the two, "the ſame is not different:" by which account they will have legions of innate propoſitions of this one ſort, without mentioning any other. But ſince no propoſition can be innate, unleſs the ideas, about which it is, be innate; this will be, to ſuppoſe all our ideas of colours, ſounds, taſtes, figure, &c. innate; than which there cannot be any thing more oppoſite to reaſon and experience. Univerſal and ready aſſent upon hearing and underſtanding the terms is (I grant) a mark of ſelf-evidence: but ſelf-evidence, depending not on innate impreſſions, but on ſomething elſe (as we ſhall ſhow hereafter) belongs to ſeveral propoſitions, which nobody was yet ſo extravagant as to pretend to be innate.

Such leſs general propoſitions known before theſe univerſal maxims.

§. 19. Nor let it be ſaid, That thoſe more particular ſelf-evident propoſitions, which are aſſented to at firſt hearing, as, that one and two are equal to three; that green is not red; &c; are received as the conſequences of thoſe more univerſal propoſitions, which are looked on as innate principles; ſince any one, who will but take the pains to obſerve what paſſes in the underſtanding, will certainly find, that theſe, and the like leſs general propoſitions, are certainly known, and firmly aſſented to, by thoſe who are utterly ignorant of thoſe more general maxims; and ſo, being earlier in the mind than thoſe (as they are called) firſt principles, cannot owe to them the aſſent wherewith they are received at firſt hearing.

One and one equal to two, &c. not general nor uſeful, anſwered

§. 20. If it be ſaid, that "theſe propoſitions, viz. two and two are equal to four; red is not blue; &c.; are not general maxims, nor of any great uſe:" I anſwer, that makes nothing to the argument of univerſal aſſent, upon hearing and underſtanding. For, if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever propo-

propoſition can be found, that receives general aſſent as ſoon as heard and underſtood, that muſt be admitted for an innate propoſition, as well as this maxim, "that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be;" they being upon this ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this maxim more remote from being innate; thoſe general and abſtract ideas being more ſtrangers to our firſt apprehenſions, than thoſe of more particular ſelf-evident propoſitions; and therefore it is longer before they are admitted and aſſented to by the growing underſtanding. And as to the uſefulneſs of theſe magnified maxims, that perhaps will not be found ſo great as is generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully conſidered.

These maxims not being known ſometimes till propoſed, proves them not innate.

§. 21. But we have not yet done with aſſenting to propoſitions at firſt hearing and underſtanding their terms; it is fit we firſt take notice, that this, inſtead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary: ſince it ſuppoſes, that ſeveral, who underſtand and know other things, are ignorant of theſe principles, till they are propoſed to them; and that one may be unacquainted with theſe truths, till he hears them from others. For if they were innate, what need they be propoſed in order to gaining aſſent, when, by being in the underſtanding, by a natural and original impreſſion, (if there were any ſuch) they could not but be known before? Or doth the propoſing them, print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If ſo, then the conſequence will be, that a man knows them better, after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whence it will follow, that theſe principles may be made more evident to us by others teaching, than nature has made them by impreſſion; which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them; but, on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge, as they are pretended to be. This cannot be denied, that men grow firſt acquainted

acquainted with many of theſe ſelf-evident truths, upon their being propoſed: but it is clear, that whoſoever does ſo, finds in himſelf, that he then begins to know a propoſition, which he knew not before; and which, from thenceforth, he never queſtions: not becauſe it was innate, but becauſe the conſideration of the nature of the things contained in thoſe words, would not ſuffer him to think otherwiſe, how, or whenſoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is aſſented to at firſt hearing and underſtanding the terms, muſt paſs for an innate principle, every well-grounded obſervation, drawn from particulars into a general rule, muſt be innate. When yet it is certain, that not all, but only ſagacious heads light at firſt on theſe obſervations, and reduce them into general propoſitions, not innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance, and reflection on particular inſtances. Theſe, when obſerving men have made them, unobſerving men, when they are propoſed to them, cannot refuſe their aſſent to.

Implicitly known before propoſing, ſignifies, that the mind is capable of underſtanding them, or elſe ſignifies nothing.

§. 22. If it be ſaid, "the underſtanding hath an implicit knowledge of theſe principles, but not an explicit, before this firſt hearing," (as they muſt, who will ſay, "that they are in the underſtanding before they are known") it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the underſtanding implicitly; unleſs it be this, that the mind is capable of underſtanding and aſſenting firmly to ſuch propoſitions. And thus all mathematical demonſtrations, as well as firſt principles, muſt be received as native impreſſions on the mind: which I fear they will ſcarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonſtrate a propoſition, than aſſent to it when demonſtrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn, were but copies of thoſe innate characters which nature had engraven upon their minds.

§. 23.

§. 23. There is, I fear, this farther weakneſs in the foregoing argument, which would perſuade us, that therefore thoſe maxims are to be thought innate, which men admit at firſt hearing, becauſe they aſſent to propoſitions, which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any argument or demonſtration, but a bare explication or underſtanding of the terms. Under which, there ſeems to me to lie this fallacy, that men are ſuppoſed not to be taught, nor to learn any thing *de novo*; when, in truth, they are taught, and do learn ſomething they were ignorant of before. For firſt it is evident, that they have learned the terms, and their ſignification; neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired knowledge in the caſe: the ideas themſelves, about which the propoſition is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got afterwards. So that in all propoſitions that are aſſented to at firſt hearing, the terms of the propoſition, their ſtanding for ſuch ideas, and the ideas themſelves that they ſtand for, being neither of them innate; I would fain know what there is remaining in ſuch propoſitions, that is innate. For I would gladly have any one name that propoſition, whoſe terms or ideas were either of them innate. We by degrees get ideas and names, and learn their appropriated connexion one with another; and then to propoſitions, made in ſuch terms, whoſe ſignification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or diſagreement we can perceive in our ideas, when put together, is expreſſed, we at firſt hearing aſſent; though to other propoſitions, in themſelves as certain and evident, but which are concerning ideas, not ſo ſoon or ſo eaſily got, we are at the ſame time no way capable of aſſenting. For though a child quickly aſſents to this propoſition, "that an apple is not fire," when, by familiar acquaintance, he has got the ideas of thoſe two different things diſtinctly imprinted on his mind, and has learnt that the names apple and fire ſtand for them; yet it will be ſome years after, perhaps, before the

The argument of aſſenting on firſt hearing, is upon a falſe ſuppoſition of no precedent teaching.

the ſame child will aſſent to this propoſition, "that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be:" becauſe that, though, perhaps, the words are as eaſy to be learnt, yet the ſignification of them being more large, comprehenſive, and abſtract, than of the names annexed to thoſe ſenſible things the child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their preciſe meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind thoſe general ideas they ſtand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child aſſent to a propoſition made up of ſuch general terms: but as ſoon as ever he has got thoſe ideas, and learned their names, he forwardly cloſes with the one, as well as the other of the forementioned propoſitions, and with both for the ſame reaſon; viz. becauſe he finds the ideas he has in his mind to agree or diſagree, according as the words ſtanding for them, are affirmed or denied one of another in the propoſition. But if propoſitions be brought to him in words, which ſtand for ideas he has not yet in his mind; to ſuch propoſitions, however evidently true or falſe in themſelves, he affords neither aſſent nor diſſent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty ſounds, any farther than they are ſigns of our ideas, we cannot but aſſent to them, as they correſpond to thoſe ideas we have, but no farther than that. But the ſhowing by what ſteps and ways knowledge comes into our minds, and the grounds of ſeveral degrees of aſſent, being the buſineſs of the following diſcourſe, it may ſuffice to have only touched on it here, as one reaſon that made me doubt of thoſe innate principles.

Not innate, becauſe not univerſally aſſented to.

§. 24. To conclude this argument of univerſal conſent, I agree with theſe defenders of innate principles, that if they are innate, they muſt needs have univerſal aſſent. For that a truth ſhould be innate, and yet not aſſented to, is to me as unintelligible, as for a man to know a truth, and be ignorant of it, at the ſame time. But then, by theſe men's own confeſſion, they cannot be innate; ſince they are not aſſented to by thoſe who underſtand

derſtand not the terms, nor by a great part of thoſe who do underſtand them, but have yet never heard nor thought of thoſe propoſitions; which, I think, is at leaſt one half of mankind. But were the number far leſs, it would be enough to deſtroy univerſal aſſent, and thereby ſhow theſe propoſitions not to be innate, if children alone were ignorant of them.

Theſe maxims not the firſt known.

§. 25. But that I may not be accuſed to argue from the thoughts of infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude from what paſſes in their underſtandings before they expreſs it; I ſay next, that theſe two general propoſitions are not the truths that firſt poſſeſs the minds of children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions; which, if they were innate, they muſt needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time when children begin to think, and their words and actions do aſſure us that they do ſo. When therefore they are capable of thought, of knowledge, of aſſent, can it rationally be ſuppoſed, they can be ignorant of thoſe notions that nature has imprinted, were there any ſuch? Can it be imagined, with any appearance of reaſon, that they perceive the impreſſions from things without, and be at the ſame time ignorant of thoſe characters which nature itſelf has taken care to ſtamp within? Can they receive and aſſent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of thoſe which are ſuppoſed woven into the very principles of their being, and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge, and future reaſonings? This would be, to make nature take pains to no purpoſe; or, at leaſt, to write very ill; ſince its characters could not be read by thoſe eyes, which ſaw other things very well; and thoſe are very ill ſuppoſed the cleareſt parts of truth, and the foundations of all our knowledge, which are not firſt known, and without which the undoubted knowledge of ſeveral other things may be had. The child certainly knows, that the nurſe that feeds it, is neither the cat it plays with, nor the blackmoor it is afraid

afraid of; that the wormſeed or muſtard it refuſes, is not the apple or ſugar it cries for; this it is certainly and undoubtedly aſſured of: but will any one ſay, it is by virtue of this principle, "that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be," that it ſo firmly aſſents to theſe, and other parts of its knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehenſion of that propoſition at an age, wherein yet, it is plain, it knows a great many other truths? He that will ſay, children join theſe general abſtract ſpeculations with their ſucking bottles and their rattles, may, perhaps, with juſtice, be thought to have more paſſion and zeal for his opinion, but leſs ſincerity and truth, than one of that age.

And ſo not innate.

§. 26. Though therefore there be ſeveral general propoſitions, that meet with conſtant and ready aſſent, as ſoon as propoſed to men grown up, who have attained the uſe of more general and abſtract ideas, and names ſtanding for them; yet they not being to be found in thoſe of tender years, who nevertheleſs know other things, they cannot pretend to univerſal aſſent of intelligent perſons, and ſo by no means can be ſuppoſed innate: it being impoſſible, that any truth which is innate (if there were any ſuch) ſhould be unknown, at leaſt to any one who knows any thing elſe: ſince, if they are innate truths, they muſt be innate thoughts; there being nothing a truth in the mind, that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any innate truths in the mind, they muſt neceſſarily be the firſt of any thought on; the firſt that appear there.

Not innate, becauſe they appear leaſt, where what is innate ſhows itſelf cleareſt.

§. 27. That the general maxims, we are diſcourſing of, are not known to children, idiots, and a great part of mankind, we have already ſufficiently proved; whereby it is evident, they have not an univerſal aſſent, nor are general impreſſions. But there is this farther argument in it againſt their being innate, that theſe characters, if they were native and original impreſſions, ſhould appear faireſt

and cleareſt in thoſe perſons in whom yet we find no footſteps of them: and it is, in my opinion, a ſtrong preſumption, that they are not innate; ſince they are leaſt known to thoſe, in whom, if they were innate, they muſt needs exert themſelves with moſt force and vigour. For children, idiots, ſavages, and illiterate people, being of all others the leaſt corrupted by cuſtom, or borrowed opinions; learning and education having not caſt their native thoughts into new moulds, nor, by ſuperinducing foreign and ſtudied doctrines, confounded thoſe fair characters nature had written there; one might reaſonably imagine, that in their minds theſe innate notions ſhould lie open fairly to every one's view, as it is certain the thoughts of children do. It might very well be expected, that theſe principles ſhould be perfectly known to naturals, which being ſtamped immediately on the ſoul (as theſe men ſuppoſe) can have no dependance on the conſtitutions or organs of the body, the only confeſſed difference between them and others. One would think, according to theſe men's principles, that all theſe native beams of light (were there any ſuch) ſhould in thoſe who have no reſerves, no arts of concealment, ſhine out in their full luſtre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of pleaſure, and abhorrence of pain. But alas, amongſt children, idiots, ſavages, and the groſsly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? what univerſal principles of knowledge? Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from thoſe objects they have had moſt to do with, and which have made upon their ſenſes the frequenteſt and ſtrongeſt impreſſions. A child knows his nurſe and his cradle, and by degrees the play-things of a little more advanced age: and a young ſavage has, perhaps, his head filled with love and hunting, according to the faſhion of his tribe. But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods, will expect theſe abſtract maxims and reputed principles of ſcience, will, I fear, find himſelf miſtaken. Such kind of general propoſitions are ſeldom

dom mentioned in the huts of Indians, much leſs are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impreſſions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and buſineſs of the ſchools and academies of learned nations, accuſtomed to that ſort of converſation or learning, where diſputes are frequent: theſe maxims being ſuited to artificial argumentation, and uſeful for conviction; but not much conducing to the diſcovery of truth, or advancement of knowledge. But of their ſmall uſe for the improvement of knowledge, I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more at large, *l.* 4. *c.* 7.

Recapitulation.

§. 28. I know not how abſurd this may ſeem to the maſters of demonſtration: and probably it will hardly down with any body at firſt hearing. I muſt therefore beg a little truce with prejudice, and the forbearance of cenſure, till I have been heard out in the ſequel of this diſcourſe, being very willing to ſubmit to better judgments. And ſince I impartially ſearch after truth, I ſhall not be ſorry to be convinced that I have been too fond of my own notions; which I confeſs we are all apt to be, when application and ſtudy have warmed our heads with them.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot ſee any ground to think theſe two ſpeculative maxims innate, ſince they are not univerſally aſſented to; and the aſſent they ſo generally find, is no other than what ſeveral propoſitions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them; and ſince the aſſent that is given them, is produced another way, and comes not from natural inſcription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following diſcourſe. And if theſe firſt principles of knowledge and ſcience are found not to be innate, no other ſpeculative maxims can (I ſuppoſe) with better right pretend to be ſo.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

No Innate Practical Principles.

§. 1. IF thoſe ſpeculative maxims, whereof we diſcourſed in the foregoing chapter, have not an actual univerſal aſſent from *all* mankind, as we there proved, it is much more viſible concerning practical principles, that they come ſhort of an univerſal reception: and I think it will be hard to inſtance any one moral rule, which can pretend to ſo general and ready an aſſent as, "what is, is;" or to be ſo manifeſt a truth as this, "that it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be." Whereby it is evident, that they are farther removed from a title to be innate; and the doubt of their being native impreſſions on the mind, is ſtronger againſt thoſe moral principles than the other. Not that it brings their truth at all in queſtion: they are equally true, though not equally evident. Thoſe ſpeculative maxims carry their own evidence with them: but moral principles require reaſoning and diſcourſe, and ſome exerciſe of the mind, to diſcover the certainty of their truth. They lie not open as natural characters engraven on the mind; which, if any ſuch were, they muſt needs be viſible by themſelves, and by their own light be certain and known to every body. But this is no derogation to their truth and certainty, no more than it is to the truth or certainty of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones; becauſe it is not ſo evident, as "the whole is bigger than a part;" nor ſo apt to be aſſented to at firſt hearing. It may ſuffice, that theſe moral rules are capable of demonſtration; and therefore it is our own fault, if we come not to a certain knowledge of them. But the ignorance wherein many men are of them, and the ſlowneſs of aſſent wherewith others receive them, are manifeſt proofs that they are

No moral principles ſo clear, and ſo generally received, as the forementioned ſpeculative maxims.

not innate, and ſuch as offer themſelves to their view without ſearching.

Faith and juſtice not owned as principles by all men.

§. 2. Whether there be any ſuch moral principles, wherein all men do agree, I appeal to any, who have been but moderately converſant in the hiſtory of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the ſmoke of their own chimnies. Where is that practical truth, that is univerſally received without doubt or queſtion, as it muſt be, if innate? Juſtice, and keeping of contracts, is that which moſt men ſeem to agree in. This is a principle, which is thought to extend itſelf to the dens of thieves, and the confederacies of the greateſt villains; and they who have gone fartheſt towards the putting off of humanity itſelf, keep faith and rules of juſtice one with another. I grant that out-laws themſelves do this one amongſt another; but it is without receiving theſe as the innate laws of nature. They practiſe them as rules of convenience within their own communities: but it is impoſſible to conceive, that he embraces juſtice as a practical principle, who acts fairly with his fellow highwayman, and at the ſame time plunders or kills the next honeſt man he meets with. Juſtice and truth are the common ties of ſociety; and therefore, even out-laws and robbers, who break with all the world beſides, muſt keep faith and rules of equity amongſt themſelves, or elſe they cannot hold together. But will any one ſay, that thoſe that live by fraud or rapine, have innate principles of truth and juſtice which they allow and aſſent to?

Objection. Though men deny them in their practice, yet they admit them in their thoughts, anſwered.

§. 3. Perhaps it will be urged, that the tacit aſſent of their minds agrees to what their practice contradicts. I anſwer, firſt, I have always thought the actions of men the beſt interpreters of their thoughts. But ſince it is certain, that moſt men's practices, and ſome men's open profeſſions, have either queſtioned or denied theſe principles, it is impoſſible to eſtabliſh an univerſal conſent, (though we ſhould look for it only amongſt grown *men*) *without* which it is impoſſible to conclude them innate.

innate. Secondly, it is very ſtrange and unreaſonable, to ſuppoſe innate practical principles, that terminate only in contemplation. Practical principles derived from nature are there for operation, and muſt produce conformity of action, not barely ſpeculative aſſent to their truth, or elſe they are in vain diſtinguiſhed from ſpeculative maxims. Nature, I confeſs, has put into man a deſire of happineſs, and an averſion to miſery: theſe indeed are innate practical principles, which (as practical principles ought) do continue conſtantly to operate and influence all our actions without ceaſing: theſe may be obſerved in all perſons and all ages, ſteady and univerſal; but theſe are inclinations of the appetite to good, not impreſſions of truth on the underſtanding. I deny not, that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men; and that, from the very firſt inſtances of ſenſe and perception, there are ſome things that are grateful, and others unwelcome to them; ſome things that they incline to, and others that they fly: but this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge, regulating our practice. Such natural impreſſions on the underſtanding are ſo far from being confirmed hereby, that this is an argument againſt them; ſince, if there were certain characters imprinted by nature on the underſtanding, as the principles of knowledge, we could not but perceive them conſtantly operate in us and influence our knowledge, as we do thoſe others on the will and appetite; which never ceaſe to be the conſtant ſprings and motives of all our actions, to which we perpetually feel them ſtrongly impelling us.

Moral rules need a proof, *ergo* not innate.

§. 4. Another reaſon that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles, is, that I think there cannot any one moral rule be propoſed, whereof a man may not juſtly demand a reaſon: which would be perfectly ridiculous and abſurd, if they were innate, or ſo much as ſelf-evident; which every innate principle muſt needs be, and not need any proof to aſcertain its truth, nor want any reaſon to gain it approbation. He would be thought void of common ſenſe, who aſked on the one

ſide, or on the other ſide went to give, a reaſon, why it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be. It carries its own light and evidence with it, and needs no other proof: he that underſtands the terms, aſſents to it for its own ſake, or elſe nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But ſhould that moſt unſhaken rule of morality, and foundation of all ſocial virtue, "that one ſhould do as he would be done unto," be propoſed to one who never heard it before, but yet is of capacity to underſtand its meaning, might he not without any abſurdity aſk a reaſon why? and were not he that propoſed it bound to make out the truth and reaſonableneſs of it to him? which plainly ſhows it not to be innate; for if it were, it could neither want nor receive any proof; but muſt needs (at leaſt, as ſoon as heard and underſtood) be received and aſſented to, as an unqueſtionable truth, which a man can by no means doubt of. So that the truth of all theſe moral rules plainly depends upon ſome other antecedent to them, and from which they muſt be deduced; which could not be, if either they were innate, or ſo much as ſelf-evident.

Inſtance in keeping compacts.

§. 5. That men ſhould keep their compacts, is certainly a great and undeniable rule in morality. But yet, if a chriſtian, who has the view of happineſs and miſery in another life, be aſked why a man muſt keep his word, he will give this as a reaſon; becauſe God, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us. But if an Hobbiſt be aſked why, he will anſwer, becauſe the public requires it, and the Leviathan will puniſh you, if you do not. And if one of the old philoſophers had been aſked, he would have anſwered, becauſe it was diſhoneſt, below the dignity of a man, and oppoſite to virtue, the higheſt perfection of human nature, to do otherwiſe.

Virtue generally approved, not becauſe innate, but becauſe profitable.

§. 6. Hence naturally flows the great variety of opinions concerning moral rules, which are to be found among men, according to the different ſorts of happineſs they have a proſpect of, or propoſe to themſelves:

ſelves: which could not be if practical principles were innate, and imprinted in our minds immediately by the hand of God. I grant the exiſtence of God is ſo many ways manifeſt, and the obedience we owe him ſo congruous to the light of reaſon, that a great part of mankind give teſtimony to the law of nature; but yet I think it muſt be allowed, that ſeveral moral rules may receive from mankind a very general approbation, without either knowing or admitting the true ground of morality; which can only be the will and law of a God, who ſees men in the dark, has in his hand rewards and puniſhments, and power enough to call to account the proudeſt offender. For God having, by an inſeparable connexion, joined virtue and public happineſs together, and made the practice thereof neceſſary to the preſervation of ſociety, and viſibly beneficial to all with whom the virtuous man has to do; it is no wonder, that every one ſhould not only allow, but recommend and magnify thoſe rules to others, from whoſe obſervance of them he is ſure to reap advantage to himſelf. He may, out of intereſt, as well as conviction, cry up that for ſacred, which if once trampled on and prophaned, he himſelf cannot be ſafe nor ſecure. This, though it takes nothing from the moral and eternal obligation which theſe rules evidently have; yet it ſhows that the outward acknowledgement men pay to them in their words, proves not that they are innate principles; nay, it proves not ſo much, as that men aſſent to them inwardly in their own minds, as the inviolable rules of their own practice: ſince we find that ſelf-intereſt, and the conveniencies of this life, make many men own an outward profeſſion and approbation of them, whoſe actions ſufficiently prove, that they very little conſider the law-giver that preſcribed theſe rules, nor the hell that he has ordained for the puniſhment of thoſe that trangreſs them.

Men's actions convince us, that the rule of virtue is not their internal principle.

§. 7. For, if we will not in civility allow too much ſincerity to the profeſſions of moſt men, but think their actions to be the interpreters of their thoughts, we ſhall find, that they have no ſuch internal veneration

for theſe rules, nor ſo full a perſuaſion of their certainty and obligation. The great principle of morality, "to do as one would be done to," is more commended than practiſed. But the breach of this rule cannot be a greater vice, than to teach others, that it is no moral rule, nor obligatory, would be thought madneſs, and contrary to that intereſt men ſacrifice to, when they break it themſelves. Perhaps conſcience will be urged as checking us for ſuch breaches, and ſo the internal obligation and eſtabliſhment of the rule be preſerved.

Conſcience no proof of any innate moral rule.

§. 8. To which I anſwer, that I doubt not but, without being written on their hearts, many men may, by the ſame way that they come to the knowledge of other things, come to aſſent to ſeveral moral rules, and be convinced of their obligation. Others alſo may come to be of the ſame mind, from their education, company, and cuſtoms of their country; which perſuaſion, however got, will ſerve to ſet conſcience on work, which is nothing elſe, but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions. And if conſcience be a proof of innate principles, contraries may be innate principles; ſince ſome men, with the ſame bent of conſcience, proſecute what others avoid.

Inſtances of enormities practiſed without remorſe.

§. 9. But I cannot ſee how any men ſhould ever tranſgreſs thoſe moral rules, with confidence and ſerenity, were they innate, and ſtamped upon their minds. View but an army at the ſacking of a town, and ſee what obſervation, or ſenſe of moral principles, or what touch of conſcience for all the outrages they do. Robberies, murders, rapes, are the ſports of men ſet at liberty from puniſhment and cenſure. Have there not been whole nations, and thoſe of the moſt civilized people, amongſt whom the expoſing their children, and leaving them in the fields to periſh by want or wild beaſts, has been the practice, as little condemned or ſcrupled as the begetting them? Do they not ſtill, in ſome countries, put them into the ſame graves with their mothers, if they die in child-birth: or diſpatch them, if a pretended aſtrologer

aſtrologer declares them to have unhappy ſtars? And are there not places where, at a certain age, they kill or expoſe their parents without any remorſe at all? In a part of Aſia, the ſick, when their caſe comes to be thought deſperate, are carried out and laid on the earth, before they are dead; and left there, expoſed to wind and weather, to periſh without aſſiſtance or pity (*a*). It is familiar among the Mingrelians, a people profeſſing chriſtianity, to bury their children alive without ſcruple (*b*). There are places where they eat their own children (*c*). The Caribbees were wont to geld their children, on purpoſe to fat and eat them (*d*). And Garcilaſſo de la Vega tells us of a people in Peru, which were wont to fat and eat the children they got on their female captives, whom they kept as concubines for that purpoſe; and when they were paſt breeding, the mothers themſelves were killed too and eaten (*e*). The virtues, whereby the Tououpinambos believed they merited paradiſe, were revenge, and eating abundance of their enemies. They have not ſo much as a name for God (*f*), and have no religion, no worſhip. The ſaints, who are canonized amongſt the Turks, lead lives, which one cannot with modeſty relate. A remarkable paſſage to this purpoſe, out of the voyage of Baumgarten, which is a book not every day to be met with, I ſhall ſet down at large in the language it is publiſhed in. *Ibi* (*ſc. prope* Belbes *in* Ægypto) *vidimus ſanctum unum Saracenicum inter arenarum cumulos, ita ut ex utero matris prodiit, nudum ſedentem. Mos eſt, ut didicimus,* Mahometiſtis, *ut eos, qui amentes & ſine ratione ſunt, pro ſanctis colant & venerentur. Inſuper & eos, qui cum diu vitam egerint inquinatiſſimam, voluntariam demum pœnitentiam & paupertatem, ſanctitate venerandos deputant. Ejuſmodi verò genus hominum libertatem quandam effrænem habent, domos quas volunt intrandi, edendi, bibendi, & quod majus eſt, concumbendi; ex quo concubitu ſi proles ſecuta fuerit, ſancta ſimiliter habetur. His ergo homini-*

(*a*) Gruber apud Thevenot, part 4. p. 13. (*b*) Lambert apud Thevenot, p. 38. (*c*) Voſſius de Nili Origine, c. 18, 19. (*d*) P. Mart. Dec. 1. (*e*) Hiſt. des Incas, l. 1. c. 12. (*f*) Lery, c. 16. 216, 231.

bus dum vivunt, magnos exhibent honores; mortuis verò vel templa vel monumenta extruunt ampliſſima, eoſque contingere ac ſepelire maximæ fortunæ ducunt loco. Audivimus hæc dicta & dicenda per interpretem à Mucrelo noſtro. Inſuper ſanctum illum, quem eo loco vidimus, publicitus apprimè commendari, eum eſſe hominem ſanctum, divinum ac integritate præcipuum; eo quod, nec fœminarum unquam eſſet, nec puerorum, ſed tantummodo aſſellarum concubitor atque mularum. Peregr. Baumgarten, l. 2. c. 1. p. 73. More of the ſame kind, concerning theſe precious ſaints amongſt the Turks, may be ſeen in Pietro della Valle, in his letter of the 25th of January, 1616. Where then are thoſe innate principles of juſtice, piety, gratitude, equity, chaſtity? Or, where is that univerſal conſent, that aſſures us there are ſuch inbred rules? Murders in duels, when faſhion has made them honourable, are committed without remorſe of conſcience, nay, in many places, innocence in this caſe is the greateſt ignominy. And if we look abroad, to take a view of men, as they are, we ſhall find, that they have remorſe in one place, for doing or omitting that, which others, in another place, think they merit by.

Men have contrary practical principles.

§. 10. He that will carefully peruſe the hiſtory of mankind, and look abroad into the ſeveral tribes of men, and with indifferency ſurvey their actions, will be able to ſatisfy himſelf, that there is ſcarce that principle of morality to be named, or rule of virtue to be thought on (thoſe only excepted that are abſolutely neceſſary to hold ſociety together, which commonly, too, are neglected betwixt diſtinct ſocieties) which is not, ſomewhere or other, ſlighted and condemned by the general faſhion of whole ſocieties of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living, quite oppoſite to others.

Whole nations reject ſeveral moral rules.

§. 11. Here, perhaps, it will be objected, that it is no argument that the rule is not known, becauſe it is broken. I grant the objection good, where men, though they tranſgreſs, yet diſown not the law; where fear of ſhame, cenſure, or puniſhment, carries the mark of ſome awe it has upon them. But it is impoſſible to conceive, that a whole nation of men

men ſhould all publickly reject and renounce what every one of them, certainly and infallibly, knew to be a law: for ſo they muſt, who have it naturally imprinted on their minds. It is poſſible men may ſometimes own rules of morality, which, in their private thoughts, they do not believe to be true, only to keep themſelves in reputation and eſteem amongſt thoſe, who are perſuaded of their obligation. But it is not to be imagined, that a whole ſociety of men ſhould publickly and profeſſedly diſown, and caſt off a rule, which they could not, in their own minds, but be infallibly certain was a law; nor be ignorant, that all men they ſhould have to do with, knew it to be ſuch: and therefore muſt every one of them apprehend from others, all the contempt and abhorrence due to one, who profeſſes himſelf void of humanity; and one, who, confounding the known and natural meaſures of right and wrong, cannot but be looked on as the profeſſed enemy of their peace and happineſs. Whatever practical principle is innate, cannot but be known to every one to be juſt and good. It is therefore little leſs than a contradiction to ſuppoſe, that whole nations of men ſhould, both in their profeſſions and practice, unanimouſly and univerſally give the lie to what, by the moſt invincible evidence, every one of them knew to be true, right, and good. This is enough to ſatisfy us, that no practical rule, which is any where univerſally, and with publick approbation or allowance, tranſgreſſed, can be ſuppoſed innate. But I have ſomething farther to add, in anſwer to this objection.

§. 12. The breaking of a rule, ſay you, is no argument that it is unknown. I grant it: but the generally allowed breach of it any where, I ſay, is a proof that it is not innate. For example: let us take any of theſe rules, which being the moſt obvious deductions of human reaſon, and conformable to the natural inclination of the greateſt part of men, feweſt people have had the impudence to deny, or inconſideration to doubt of. If any can be thought to be naturally imprinted, none, I think, can have a fairer pretence to be innate than this; "parents, preſerve and cheriſh your children." When therefore you ſay, that this

this is an innate rule, what do you mean? Either, that it is an innate principle, which upon all occaſions excites and directs the actions of all men: or elſe, that it is a truth, which all men have imprinted on their minds, and which therefore they know and aſſent to. But in neither of theſe ſenſes is it innate. Firſt that it is not a principle which influences all men's actions, is what I have proved by the examples before cited: nor need we ſeek ſo far as Mingrelia or Peru, to find inſtances of ſuch as neglect, abuſe, nay and deſtroy their children; or look on it only as the more than brutality of ſome ſavage and barbarous nations, when we remember, that it was a familiar and uncondemned practice amongſt the Greeks and Romans, to expoſe, without pity or remorſe, their innocent infants. Secondly, that it is an innate truth, known to all men, is alſo falſe. For, "parents, preſerve your children," is ſo far from an innate truth, that it is no truth at all; it being a command, and not a propoſition, and ſo not capable of truth or falſhood. To make it capable of being aſſented to as true, it muſt be reduced to ſome ſuch propoſition as this: "it is the duty of parents to preſerve their children." But what duty is, cannot be underſtood without a law; nor a law be known, or ſuppoſed, without a law-maker, or without reward and puniſhment: ſo that it is impoſſible, that this, or any other practical principle ſhould be innate; i. e. be imprinted on the mind as a duty, without ſuppoſing the ideas of God, of law, of obligation, of puniſhment, of a life after this, innate: For that puniſhment follows not, in this life, the breach of this rule; and conſequently, that it has not the force of a law in countries, where the generally allowed practice runs counter to it, is in itſelf evident. But theſe ideas (which muſt be all of them innate, if any thing as a duty be ſo) are ſo far from being innate, that it is not every ſtudious or thinking man, much leſs every one that is born, in whom they are to be found clear and diſtinct: and that one of them, which of all others ſeems moſt likely to be innate, is not ſo, (I mean the idea of God) I think, in the next chapter, will appear very evident to any conſidering man.

§. 13.

§. 13. From what has been ſaid, I think we may ſafely conclude, that whatever practical rule is, in any place, generally and with allowance broken, cannot be ſuppoſed innate; it being impoſſible that men ſhould, without ſhame or fear, confidently and ſerenely break a rule, which they could not but evidently know, that God had ſet up, and would certainly puniſh the breach of (which they muſt, if it were innate) to a degree, to make it a very ill bargain to the tranſgreſſor. Without ſuch a knowledge as this, a man can never be certain that any thing is his duty. Ignorance, or doubt of the law, hopes to eſcape the knowledge or power of the law-maker, or the like, may make men give way to a preſent appetite: but let any one ſee the fault, and the rod by it, and with the tranſgreſſion, a fire ready to puniſh it; a pleaſure tempting, and the hand of the Almighty viſibly held up, and prepared to take vengeance (for this muſt be the caſe, where any duty is imprinted on the mind) and then tell me, whether it be poſſible for people, with ſuch a proſpect, ſuch a certain knowledge as this, wantonly, and without ſcruple, to offend againſt a law, which they carry about them in indelible characters, and that ſtares them in the face whilſt they are breaking it? whether men, at the ſame time that they feel in themſelves the imprinted edicts of an omnipotent law-maker, can with aſſurance and gaiety ſlight and trample under foot his moſt ſacred injunctions? and laſtly, whether it be poſſible, that whilſt a man thus openly bids defiance to this innate law and ſupreme law-giver, all the by-ſtanders, yea, even the governors and rulers of the people, full of the ſame ſenſe both of the law and law-maker, ſhould ſilently connive, without teſtifying their diſlike, or laying the leaſt blame on it? Principles of actions indeed there are lodged in men's appetites, but theſe are ſo far from being innate moral principles, that if they were left to their full ſwing, they would carry men to the overturning of all morality. Moral laws are ſet as a curb and reſtraint to theſe exorbitant deſires, which they cannot be but by rewards and puniſhments, that will overbalance the ſatisfaction any one ſhall propoſe to himſelf in

in the breach of the law. If therefore any thing be imprinted on the minds of all men as a law, all men muſt have a certain and unavoidable knowledge, that certain and unavoidable puniſhment will attend the breach of it. For, if men can be ignorant or doubtful of what is innate, innate principles are inſiſted on, and urged to no purpoſe; truth and certainty (the things pretended) are not at all ſecured by them: but men are in the ſame uncertain, floating eſtate with, as without them. An evident indubitable knowledge of unavoidable puniſhment, great enough to make the tranſgreſſion very uneligible, muſt accompany an innate law; unleſs, with an innate law, they can ſuppoſe an innate goſpel too. I would not here be miſtaken, as if, becauſe I deny an innate law, I thought there were none but poſitive laws. There is a great deal of difference between an innate law, and a law of nature; between ſomething imprinted on our minds in their very original, and ſomething that we being ignorant of may attain to the knowledge of, by the uſe and due application of our natural faculties. And I think they equally forſake the truth, who, running into contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law, or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of nature, i. e. without the help of poſitive revelation.

Thoſe who maintain innate practical principles, tell us not what they are.

§. 14. The difference there is amongſt men in their practical principles, is ſo evident, that, I think, I need ſay no more to evince, that it will be impoſſible to find any innate moral rules by this mark of general aſſent: and it is enough to make one ſuſpect, that the ſuppoſition of ſuch innate principles is but an opinion taken up at pleaſure; ſince thoſe who talk ſo confidently of them, are ſo ſparing to tell us which they are. This might with juſtice be expected from thoſe men who lay ſtreſs upon this opinion: and it gives occaſion to diſtruſt either their knowledge or charity, who declaring, that God has imprinted on the minds of men the foundations of knowledge, and the rules of living, are yet ſo little favourable to the information of their neighbours, or the quiet of mankind,

mankind, as not to point out to them which they are, in the variety men are diſtracted with. But, in truth, were there any ſuch innate principles, there would be no need to teach them. Did men find ſuch innate propoſitions ſtamped on their minds, they would eaſily be able to diſtinguiſh them from other truths, that they afterwards learned, and deduced from them; and there would be nothing more eaſy, than to know what, and how many they were. There could be no more doubt about their number, than there is about the number of our fingers; and it is like then every ſyſtem would be ready to give them us by tale. But ſince nobody, that I know, has ventured yet to give a catalogue of them, they cannot blame thoſe who doubt of theſe innnate principles; ſince even they who require men to believe, that there are ſuch innate propoſitions, do not tell us what they are. It is eaſy to foreſee, that if different men of different ſects ſhould go about to give us a liſt of thoſe innate practical principles, they would ſet down only ſuch as ſuited their diſtinct hypotheſes, and were fit to ſupport the doctrines of their particular ſchools or churches: a plain evidence, that there are no ſuch innate truths. Nay, a great part of men are ſo far from finding any ſuch innate moral principles in themſelves, that by denying freedom to mankind, and thereby making men no other than bare machines, they take away not only innate, but all moral rules whatſoever, and leave not a poſſibility to believe any ſuch, to thoſe who cannot conceive, how any thing can be capable of a law, that is not a free agent: and upon that ground, they muſt neceſſarily reject all principles of virtue, who cannot put morality and mechaniſm together; which are not very eaſy to be reconciled, or made conſiſtent.

Lord Herbert's innate principles examined.

§. 15. When I had writ this, being informed that my lord Herbert had, in his book *de Veritate*, aſſigned theſe innate principles, I preſently conſulted him, hoping to find, in a man of ſo great parts, ſomething that might ſatisfy me in this point, and put an end to my enquiry. In his chapter *de Inſtinctu Naturali*, p. 72. edit. 1656, I met with theſe ſix marks of his *Notitiæ Communes*:

1. *Prioritas*.

1. *Prioritas.* 2. *Independentia.* 3. *Univerſalitas.* 4. *Certitudo.* 5. *Neceſſitas,* i. e. as he explains it, *faciunt ad hominis conſervationem.* 6. *Modus conformationis,* i. e. *Aſſenſus nullâ interpoſitâ morâ.* And at the latter end of his little treatiſe, *De Religioni Laici,* he ſays this of theſe innate principles: *Adeo ut non uniuſcujuſvis religionis confinio arctentur quæ ubique vigent veritates. Sunt enim in ipſâ mente cœlitus deſcriptæ, nulliſque traditionibus, ſive ſcriptis, ſive non ſcriptis, obnoxiæ,* p. 3. And, *Veritates noſtræ catholicæ quæ tanquam indubia Dei effata in foro interiori deſcriptæ.* Thus having given the marks of the innate principles or common notions, and aſſerted their being imprinted on the minds of men by the hand of God, he proceeds to ſet them down; and they are theſe: 1. *Eſſe aliquod ſupremum numen.* 2. *Numen illud coli debere.* 3. *Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimam eſſe rationem cultûs divini.* 4. *Reſipiſcendum eſſe à peccatis.* 5. *Dari præmium vel pœnam poſt hanc vitam tranſactam.* Though I allow theſe to be clear truths, and ſuch as, if rightly explained, a rational creature can hardly avoid giving his aſſent to; yet I think he is far from proving them innate impreſſions *in foro interiori deſcriptæ.* For I muſt take leave to obſerve,

§. 16. Firſt, that theſe five propoſitions are either not all, or more than all, thoſe common notions writ on our minds by the finger of God, if it were reaſonable to believe any at all to be ſo written: ſince there are other propoſitions, which, even by his own rules, have as juſt a pretence to ſuch an original, and may be as well admitted for innate principles, as at leaſt ſome of theſe five he enumerates, viz. "do as thou wouldeſt be done unto;" and, perhaps, ſome hundreds of others, when well conſidered.

§. 17. Secondly, that all his marks are not to be found in each of his five propoſitions, viz. his firſt, ſecond, and third marks agree perfectly to neither of them; and the firſt, ſecond, third, fourth, and ſixth marks agree but ill to his third, fourth, and fifth propoſitions. For beſides that we are aſſured from hiſtory, of many men, nay, whole nations, who doubt or diſbelieve ſome or all of them; I cannot ſee how the third, viz. "that virtue joined

joined with piety is the beſt worſhip of God," can be an innate principle, when the name, or ſound, virtue, is ſo hard to be underſtood; liable to ſo much uncertainty in its ſignification; and the thing it ſtands for, ſo much contended about, and difficult to be known. And therefore this cannot be but a very uncertain rule of human practice, and ſerve but very little to the conduct of our lives, and is therefore very unfit to be aſſigned as an innate practical principle.

§. 18. For let us conſider this propoſition as to its meaning (for it is the ſenſe, and not ſound, that is, and muſt be the principle or common notion) viz. "virtue is the beſt worſhip of God;" i. e. is moſt acceptable to him; which if virtue be taken, as moſt commonly it is, for thoſe actions, which, according to the different opinions of ſeveral countries, are accounted laudable, will be a propoſition ſo far from being certain, that it will not be true. If virtue be taken for actions conformable to God's will, or to the rule preſcribed by God, which is the true and only meaſure of virtue, when virtue is uſed to ſignify what is in its own nature right and good; then this propoſition, "that virtue is the beſt worſhip of God," will be moſt true and certain, but of very little uſe in human life: ſince it will amount to no more but this, viz. "that God is pleaſed with the doing of what he commands;" which a man may certainly know to be true, without knowing what it is that God doth command; and ſo be as far from any rule or principle of his actions, as he was before. And I think very few will take a propoſition, which amounts to no more than this, viz. that God is pleaſed with the doing of what he himſelf commands, for an innate moral principle writ on the minds of all men (however true and certain it may be) ſince it teaches ſo little. Whoſoever does ſo, will have reaſon to think hundreds of propoſitions, innate principles; ſince there are many, which have as good a title as this, to be received for ſuch, which nobody yet ever put into that rank of innate principles.

§. 19. Nor is the fourth propoſition (viz. "men muſt repent of their ſins") much more inſtructive, till what

thoſe actions are, that are meant by ſins, be ſet down. For the word *peccata*, or ſins, being put, as it uſually is, to ſignify in general ill actions, that will draw puniſhment upon the doers, what great principle of morality can that be, to tell us we ſhould be ſorry, and ceaſe to do that which will bring miſchief upon us, without knowing what thoſe particular actions are, that will do ſo? Indeed, this is a very true propoſition, and fit to be inculcated on, and received by thoſe, who are ſuppoſed to have been taught, what actions in all kinds are ſins; but neither this, nor the former, can be imagined to be innate principles, nor to be of any uſe, if they were innate, unleſs the particular meaſures and bounds of all virtues and vices, were engraven in men's minds, and were innate principles alſo; which I think, is very much to be doubted. And therefore, I imagine, it will ſcarce ſeem poſſible, that God ſhould engrave principles in men's minds, in words of uncertain ſignification, ſuch as virtues and ſins, which, amongſt different men, ſtand for different things: nay, it cannot be ſuppoſed to be in words at all; which, being in moſt of theſe principles very general names, cannot be underſtood, but by knowing the particulars comprehended under them. And in the practical inſtances, the meaſures muſt be taken from the knowledge of the actions themſelves, and the rules of them, abſtracted from words, and antecedent to the knowledge of names; which rules a man muſt know, what language ſoever he chance to learn, whether Engliſh or Japan, or if he ſhould learn no language at all, or never ſhould underſtand the uſe of words, as happens in the caſe of dumb and deaf men. When it ſhall be made out, that men ignorant of words, or untaught by the laws and cuſtoms of their country, know that it is part of the worſhip of God, not to kill another man; not to know more women than one; not to procure abortion; not to expoſe their children; not to take from another what is his, though we want it ourſelves, but, on the contrary, relieve and ſupply his wants; and whenever we have done the contrary, we ought to repent, be ſorry, and reſolve to do ſo no more: when, I ſay, all men ſhall be proved actually to know

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and allow all theſe and a thouſand other ſuch rules, all which come under theſe two general words made uſe of above, viz. "virtutes & peccata," virtues and ſins, there will be more reaſon for admitting theſe and the like, for common notions and practical principles. Yet, after all, univerſal conſent (were there any in moral principles) to truths, the knowledge whereof may be attained otherwiſe, would ſcarce prove them to be innate; which is all I contend for.

Obj. Innate principles may be corrupted, anſwered.

§. 20. Nor will it be of much moment here to offer that very ready, but not very material anſwer, (viz.) that the innate principles of morality, may, by education and cuſtom, and the general opinion of thoſe amongſt whom we converſe, be darkened, and at laſt quite worn out of the minds of men. Which aſſertion of theirs, if true, quite takes away the argument of univerſal conſent, by which this opinion of innate principles is endeavoured to be proved: unleſs thoſe men will think it reaſonable, that their private perſuaſions, or that of their party, ſhould paſs for univerſal conſent: a thing not unfrequently done, when men, preſuming themſelves to be the only maſters of right reaſon, caſt by the votes and opinions of the reſt of mankind, as not worthy the reckoning. And then their argument ſtands thus: "the principles which all mankind allow for true, are innate; thoſe that men of right reaſon admit, are the principles allowed by all mankind; we, and thoſe of our mind, are men of reaſon; therefore we agreeing, our principles are innate;" which is a very pretty way of arguing, and a ſhort cut to infallibility. For otherwiſe it will be very hard to underſtand, how there be ſome principles, which all men do acknowledge and agree in; and yet there are none of thoſe principles, which are not by depraved cuſtom, and ill education, blotted out of the minds of many men: which is to ſay, that all men admit, but yet many men do deny, and diſſent from them. And indeed the ſuppoſition of ſuch firſt principles will ſerve us to very little purpoſe; and we ſhall be as much at a loſs with, as without them, if they may, by any human power,

ſuch as is the will of our teachers, or opinions of our companions, be altered or loſt in us: and notwithſtanding all this boaſt of firſt principles and innate light, we ſhall be as much in the dark and uncertainty, as if there were no ſuch thing at all: it being all one, to have no rule, and one that will warp any way; or, amongſt various and contrary rules, not to know which is the right. But concerning innate principles, I deſire theſe men to ſay, whether they can, or cannot, by education and cuſtom, be blurred and blotted out: if they cannot, we muſt find them in all mankind alike, and they muſt be clear in every body: and if they may ſuffer variation from adventitious notions, we muſt then find them cleareſt and moſt perſpicuous, neareſt the fountain, in children and illiterate people who have received leaſt impreſſion from foreign opinions. Let them take which ſide they pleaſe, they will certainly find it inconſiſtent with viſible matter of fact, and daily obſervation.

Contrary principles in the world.

§. 21. I eaſily grant, that there are great numbers of opinions, which, by men of different countries, educations, and tempers, are received and embraced as firſt and unqueſtionable principles; many whereof, both for their abſurdity, as well as oppoſitions to one another, it is impoſſible ſhould be true. But yet all thoſe propoſitions, how remote ſoever from reaſon, are ſo ſacred ſomewhere or other, that men even of good underſtanding in other matters, will ſooner part with their lives, and whatever is deareſt to them, than ſuffer themſelves to doubt, or others to queſtion, the truth of them.

How men commonly come by their principles.

§. 22. This, however ſtrange it may ſeem, is that which every day's experience confirms; and will not, perhaps, appear ſo wonderful, if we conſider the ways and ſteps by which it is brought about; and how really it may come to paſs, that doctrines that have been derived from no better original than the ſuperſtition of a nurſe, or the authority of an old woman, may, by length of time, and conſent of neighbours, grow up to the dignity of principles in religion or morality. For ſuch, who

are careful (as they call it) to principle children well (and few there be who have not a ſet of thoſe principles for them, which they believe in) inſtil into the unwary, and as yet unprejudiced underſtanding (for white paper receives any characters) thoſe doctrines they would have them retain and profeſs. Theſe being taught them as ſoon as they have any apprehenſion; and ſtill as they grow up, confirmed to them, either by the open profeſſion, or tacit conſent, of all they have to do with; or at leaſt by thoſe, of whoſe wiſdom, knowledge and piety, they have an opinion, who never ſuffer theſe propoſitions to be otherwiſe mentioned, but as the baſis and foundation on which they build their religion and manners; come, by theſe means, to have the reputation of unqueſtionable, ſelf-evident, and innate truths.

§. 23. To which we may add, that when men, ſo inſtructed, are grown up, and reflect on their own minds, they cannot find any thing more ancient there than thoſe opinions which were taught them before their memory began to keep a regiſter of their actions, or date the time when any new thing appeared to them; and therefore make no ſcruple to conclude, that thoſe propoſitions, of whoſe knowledge they can find in themſelves no original, were certainly the impreſs of God and nature upon their minds, and not taught them by any one elſe. Theſe they entertain and ſubmit to, as many do to their parents, with veneration; not becauſe it is natural; nor do children do it, where they are not ſo taught; but becauſe, having been always ſo educated, and having no remembrance of the beginning of this reſpect, they think it is natural.

§. 24. This will appear very likely, and almoſt unavoidable to come to paſs, if we conſider the nature of mankind, and the conſtitution of human affairs; wherein moſt men cannot live without employing their time in the daily labours of their callings; nor be at quiet in their minds without ſome foundation or principle to reſt their thoughts on. There is ſcarce any one ſo floating and ſuperficial in his underſtanding, who hath not ſome reverenced propoſitions, which are to

him the principles on which he bottoms his reaſonings; and by which he judgeth of truth and falſhood, right and wrong: which ſome, wanting ſkill and leiſure, and others the inclination, and ſome being taught, that they ought not to examine; there are few to be found who are not expoſed by their ignorance, lazineſs, education, or precipitancy, to take them upon truſt.

§. 25. This is evidently the caſe of all children and young folk; and cuſtom, a greater power than nature, ſeldom failing to make them worſhip for divine what ſhe hath inured them to bow their minds, and ſubmit their underſtandings to; it is no wonder that grown men, either perplexed in the neceſſary affairs of life, or hot in the purſuit of pleaſures, ſhould not ſeriouſly ſit down to examine their own tenets; eſpecially when one of their principles is, that principles ought not to be queſtioned. And had men leiſure, parts, and will, who is there almoſt that dare ſhake the foundations of all his paſt thoughts and actions, and endure to bring upon himſelf the ſhame of having been a long time wholly in miſtake and error? who is there hardy enough to contend with the reproach which is every where prepared for thoſe who dare venture to diſſent from the received opinions of their country or party? And where is the man to be found that can patiently prepare himſelf to bear the name of whimſical, ſceptical, or atheiſt, which he is ſure to meet with, who does in the leaſt ſcruple any of the common opinions? And he will be much more afraid to queſtion thoſe principles, when he ſhall think them, as moſt men do, the ſtandards ſet up by God in his mind, to be the rule and touchſtone of all other opinions. And what can hinder him from thinking them ſacred, when he finds them the earlieſt of all his own thoughts, and the moſt reverenced by others?

§. 26. It is eaſy to imagine how by theſe means it comes to paſs, that men worſhip the idols that have been ſet up in their minds; grow fond of the notions they have been long acquainted with there; and ſtamp the characters of divinity upon abſurdities and errors, become zealous votaries to bulls and monkeys; and contend too, fight, and die in defence of their opinions: "Dum

ſolos

ſolos credit habendos eſſe deos, quos ipſe colit." For ſince the reaſoning faculties of the ſoul, which are almoſt conſtantly, though not always warily nor wiſely, employed, would not know how to move, for want of a foundation and footing, in moſt men; who through lazineſs or avocation do not, or for want of time, or true helps, or for other cauſes, cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge, and trace truth to its fountain and original; it is natural for them, and almoſt unavoidable, to take up with ſome borrowed principles: which being reputed and preſumed to be the evident proofs of other things, are thought not to need any other proof themſelves. Whoever ſhall receive any of theſe into his mind, and entertain them there, with the reverence uſually paid to principles, never venturing to examine them, but accuſtoming himſelf to believe them, becauſe they are to be believed, may take up from his education, and the faſhions of his country, any abſurdity for innate principles; and by long poring on the ſame objects, ſo dim his ſight, as to take monſters lodged in his own brain, for the images of the Deity, and the workmanſhip of his hands.

Principles muſt be examined.

§. 27. By this progreſs, how many there are who arrive at principles, which they believe innate, may be eaſily obſerved, in the variety of oppoſite principles held and contended for by all ſorts and degrees of men. And he that ſhall deny this to be the method, wherein moſt men proceed to the aſſurance they have of the truth and evidence of their principles, will perhaps find it a hard matter any other way to account for the contrary tenets, which are firmly believed, confidently aſſerted, and which great numbers are ready at any time to ſeal with their blood. And, indeed, if it be the privilege of innate principles, to be received upon their own authority, without examination, I know not what may not be believed, or how any one's principles can be queſtioned. If they may, and ought to be examined, and tried, I deſire to know how firſt and innate principles can be tried; or at leaſt it is reaſonable to demand the marks and characters, whereby the genuine

innate principles may be diſtinguiſhed from others; that ſo, amidſt the great variety of pretenders, I may be kept from miſtakes, in ſo material a point as this. When this is done, I ſhall be ready to embrace ſuch welcome and uſeful propoſitions; and till then I may with modeſty doubt, ſince I fear univerſal conſent, which is the only one produced, will ſcarce prove a ſufficient mark to direct my choice, and aſſure me of any innate principles. From what has been ſaid, I think it paſt doubt, that there are no practical principles wherein all men agree; and therefore none innate.

CHAP. IV.

Other Conſiderations concerning Innate Principles, both Speculative and Practical.

Principles not innate, unleſs their ideas be innate.

§. 1. HAD thoſe, who would perſuade us that there are innate principles, not taken them together in groſs, but conſidered ſeparately the parts out of which thoſe propoſitions are made; they would not, perhaps, have been ſo forward to believe they were innate: ſince, if the ideas which made up thoſe truths were not, it was impoſſible that the propoſitions made up of them ſhould be innate, or the knowledge of them be born with us. For if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without thoſe principles; and then they will not be innate, but be derived from ſome other original. For, where the ideas themſelves are not, there can be no knowledge, no aſſent, no mental or verbal propoſitions about them.

Ideas, eſpecially thoſe belonging to principles, not born with children.

§. 2. If we will attentively conſider new-born children, we ſhall have little reaſon to think, that they bring many ideas into the world with them. For bating perhaps ſome faint ideas of hunger and thirſt, and warmth, and ſome pains which they may have felt in the

the womb, there is not the leaſt appearance of any ſettled ideas at all in them; eſpecially of ideas, anſwering the terms, which make up thoſe univerſal propoſitions, that are eſteemed innate principles. One may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, ideas come into their minds; and that they get no more, nor no other, than what experience, and the obſervation of things, that come in their way, furniſh them with: which might be enough to ſatisfy us, that they are not original characters ſtamped on the mind.

§. 3. "It is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be," is certainly (if there be any ſuch) an innate principle. But can any one think, or will any one ſay, that impoſſibility and identity are two innate ideas? Are they ſuch as all mankind have, and bring into the world with them? And are they thoſe which are the firſt in children, and antecedent to all acquired ones? If they are innate, they muſt needs be ſo. Hath a child an idea of impoſſibility and identity, before it has of white or black, ſweet or bitter? And is it from the knowledge of this principle, that it concludes, that wormwood rubbed on the nipple hath not the ſame taſte that it uſed to receive from thence? Is it the actual knowledge of "impoſſibile eſt idem eſſe, & non eſſe," that makes a child diſtinguiſh between its mother and a ſtranger? or, that makes it fond of the one, and fly the other? Or does the mind regulate itſelf and its aſſent by ideas, that it never yet had? Or the underſtanding draw concluſions from principles, which it never yet knew or underſtood? The names impoſſibility and identity ſtand for two ideas, ſo far from being innate, or born with us, that I think it requires great care and attention to form them right in our underſtandings. They are ſo far from being brought into the world with us, ſo remote from the thoughts of infancy and childhood; that, I believe, upon examination it will be found, that many grown men want them.

§. 4. If identity (to inſtance in that alone) be a native impreſſion, and conſequently ſo clear and obvious to us, that we muſt needs know it even from our cradles; I would gladly be re-

Identity, an idea not innate.

ſolved by one of ſeven, or ſeventy years old, whether a man, being a creature conſiſting of ſoul and body, be the ſame man when his body is changed? Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having had the ſame ſoul, were the ſame men, though they lived ſeveral ages aſunder? Nay, whether the cock too, which had the ſame ſoul, were not the ſame with both of them? Whereby, perhaps, it will appear, that our idea of ſameneſs is not ſo ſettled and clear, as to deſerve to be thought innate in us. For if thoſe innate ideas are not clear and diſtinct, ſo as to be univerſally known, and naturally agreed on, they cannot be ſubjects of univerſal and undoubted truths; but will be the unavoidable occaſion of perpetual uncertainty. For, I ſuppoſe, every one's idea of identity will not be the ſame that Pythagoras, and others of his followers have: And which then ſhall be true? Which innate? Or are there two different ideas of identity, both innate?

§. 5. Nor let any one think, that the queſtions I have here propoſed about the identity of man, are bare empty ſpeculations; which if they were, would be enough to ſhow, that there was in the underſtandings of men no innate idea of identity. He that ſhall, with a little attention, reflect on the reſurrection, and conſider that divine juſtice will bring to judgment, at the laſt day, the very ſame perſons, to be happy or miſerable in the other, who did well or ill in this life; will find it perhaps not eaſy to reſolve with himſelf, what makes the ſame man, or wherein identity conſiſts; and will not be forward to think he, and every one, even children themſelves, have naturally a clear idea of it.

Whole and part not innate ideas.

§. 6. Let us examine that principle of mathematicks, viz. "that the whole is bigger than a part." This, I take it, is reckoned amongſt innate principles. I am ſure it has as good a title as any to be thought ſo; which yet no-body can think it to be, when he conſiders the ideas it comprehends in it, "whole and part," are perfectly relative: but the poſitive ideas, to which they properly and immediately belong, are extenſion and number, of which alone whole and part are relations. So that if whole

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and part are innate ideas, extenſion and number muſt be ſo too; it being impoſſible to have an idea of a relation, without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs, and in which it is founded. Now whether the minds of men have naturally imprinted on them the ideas of extenſion and number, I leave to be conſidered by thoſe, who are the patrons of innate principles.

Idea of worſhip not innate.

§. 7. "That God is to be worſhipped," is, without doubt, as great a truth as any can enter into the mind of man, and deſerves the firſt place amongſt all practical principles. But yet it can by no means be thought innate, unleſs the ideas of God and worſhip are innate. That the idea the term worſhip ſtands for, is not in the underſtanding of children, and a character ſtamped on the mind in its firſt original, I think, will be eaſily granted, by any one that conſiders how few there be, amongſt grown men, who have a clear and diſtinct notion of it. And, I ſuppoſe, there cannot be any thing more ridiculous, than to ſay that children have this practical principle innate, "that God is to be worſhipped;" and yet, that they know not what that worſhip of God is, which is their duty. But to paſs by this:

Idea of God not innate.

§. 8. If any idea can be imagined innate, the idea of God may, of all others, for many reaſons be thought ſo; ſince it is hard to conceive, how there ſhould be innate moral principles, without an innate idea of a Deity: without a notion of a law-maker, it is impoſſible to have a notion of a law, and an obligation to obſerve it. Beſides the atheiſts, taken notice of amongſt the ancients, and left branded upon the records of hiſtory, hath not navigation diſcovered, in theſe later ages, whole nations at the bay of Soldania (*a*), in Brazil (*b*), in Boranday (*c*), and in the Caribbee iſlands, &c. amongſt whom there was to be found no notion of a God, no religion? Nicholaus del Techo in literis, ex Paraquaria de Caaiguarum conver-

(*a*) Roe apud Thevenot, p. 2. (*b*) Jo. de Lery, c. 16.
(*c*) Martiniere $\frac{201}{211}$ Terry $\frac{17}{171}$ and $\frac{21}{171}$. Ovington $\frac{158}{161}$.

ſione,

ſione, has theſe words (*d*): "Reperi eam gentem nul-
"lum nomen habere, quod Deum & hominis animam
"ſignificet, nulla ſacra habet, nulla idola." Theſe are inſtances of nations where uncultivated nature has been left to itſelf, without the help of letters, and diſcipline, and the improvements of arts and ſciences. But there are others to be found, who have enjoyed theſe in a very great meaſure; who yet, for want of a due application of their thoughts this way, want the idea and knowledge of God. It will, I doubt not, be a ſurprize to others, as it was to me, to find the Siamites of this number. But for this, let them conſult the king of France's late envoy thither (*e*), who gives no better account of the Chineſe themſelves (*f*). And if we will not believe La Loubere, the miſſionaries of China, even the Jeſuits themſelves, the great encomiaſts of the Chineſe, do all to a man agree, and will convince us that the ſect of the literati, or learned, keeping to the old religion of China, and the ruling party there, are all of them atheiſts. Vid. Navarette, in the collection of voyages, vol. the firſt, and Hiſtoria cultus Sinenſium. And perhaps if we ſhould, with attention, mind the lives and diſcourſes of people not ſo far off, we ſhould have too much reaſon to fear, that many in more civilized countries have no very ſtrong and clear impreſſions of a deity upon their minds; and that the complaints of atheiſm, made from the pulpit, are not without reaſon. And though only ſome profligate wretches own it too bare-facedly now; yet perhaps we ſhould hear more than we do of it from others, did not the fear of the magiſtrate's ſword, or their neighbour's cenſure, tie up people's tongues: which, were the apprehenſions of puniſhment or ſhame taken away, would as openly proclaim their atheiſm, as their lives do (*g*).

§. 9.

(*d*) Relatio triplex de rebus Indicis Caaiguarum §§. (*e*) La Loubere du Royaume de Siam, t. 1. c. 9. ſect. 15, & c. 20, ſect. 22, & c. 22, ſect. 6. (*f*) Ib. t. 1. c. 20. ſect. 4, & c. 23.

(*g*) On this reaſoning of the author againſt innate ideas, great blame hath been laid: becauſe it ſeems to invalidate an argument commonly uſed to prove the being of a God, viz. univerſal conſent: To which our author

§. 9. But had all mankind, every where, a notion of a God (whereof yet hiſtory tells us the contrary) it would not from thence follow, that the idea of him was innate. For though no nation were to be found without a name, and ſome few dark notions of him: yet that would not prove them to be natural impreſſions on the mind, any more than the names of fire, or the ſun, heat, or number, do prove the ideas they ſtand for to be innate: becauſe the names of thoſe things, and the ideas of them, are ſo univerſally received and known amongſt mankind. Nor, on the contrary, is the want of

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author * anſwers, I think that the univerſal conſent of mankind, as to the being of a God, amounts to thus much, that the vaſtly greater majority of mankind have in all ages of the world actually believed a God; that the majority of the remaining part have not actually diſbelieved it; and conſequently thoſe who have actually oppoſed the belief of a God, have truly been very few. So that comparing thoſe that have actually diſbelieved, with thoſe who have actually believed a God, their number is ſo inconſiderable, that in reſpect of this incomparably greater majority, of thoſe who have owned the belief of a God, it may be ſaid to be the univerſal conſent of mankind.

This is all the univerſal conſent which truth or matter of fact will allow; and therefore all that can be made uſe of to prove a God. But if any one would extend it farther, and ſpeak deceitfully for God; if this univerſality ſhould be urged in a ſtrict ſenſe, not for much the majority, but for a general conſent of every one, even to a man, in all ages and countries; this would make it either no argument, or a perfectly uſeleſs and unneceſſary one. For if any one deny a God, ſuch a univerſality of conſent is deſtroyed; and if nobody does deny a God, what need of arguments to convince atheiſts?

I would crave leave to aſk your lordſhip, were there ever in the world any atheiſts or no? If there were not, what need is there of raiſing a queſtion about the being of a God, when nobody queſtions it? What need of proviſional arguments againſt a fault, from which mankind are ſo wholly free, and which, by an univerſal conſent, they may be preſumed to be ſecure from? If you ſay (as I doubt not but you will) that there have been atheiſts in the world, then your lordſhip's univerſal conſent reduces itſelf to only a great majority; and then make that majority as great as you will, what I have ſaid in the place quoted by your lordſhip, leaves it in its full force; and I have not ſaid one word that does in the leaſt invalidate this argument for a God. The argument I was upon there, was to ſhew, that the idea of God was not innate; and to my purpoſe it was ſufficient, if there were but a leſs number found in the world, who had no idea of God, than your lordſhip will allow there have been

* In his third letter to the biſhop of Worceſter.

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of ſuch a name, or the abſence of ſuch a notion out of men's minds, any argument againſt the being of a God; any more than it would be a proof that there was no load-ſtone in the world, becauſe a great part of mankind had neither a notion of any ſuch thing, nor a name for it; or be any ſhow of argument to prove, that there are no diſtinct and various ſpecies of angels, or intelligent beings above us, becauſe we have no ideas of ſuch diſtinct ſpecies, or names for them: for men being furniſhed with words, by the common language of their own countries, can ſcarce avoid having ſome kind

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of profeſſed atheiſts; for whatſoever is innate, muſt be univerſal in the ſtricteſt ſenſe. One exception is a ſufficient proof againſt it. So that all that I ſaid, and which was quite to another purpoſe, did not at all tend, nor can be made uſe of, to invalidate the argument for a Deity, grounded on ſuch an univerſal conſent, as your lordſhip, and all that build on it, muſt own; which is only a very diſproportioned majority: ſuch an univerſal conſent my argument there neither affirms nor requires to be leſs than you will be pleaſed to allow it. Your lordſhip therefore might, without any prejudice to thoſe declarations of good will and favour you have for the author of the "Eſſay of Human Underſtanding," have ſpared the mentioning his quoting authors that are in print, for matters of fact to quite another purpoſe, "as going about to invalidate the argument for a Deity, from the univerſal conſent of mankind;" ſince he leaves that univerſal conſent as entire and as large as you yourſelf do, or can own, or ſuppoſe it. But here I have no reaſon to be ſorry that your lordſhip has given me this occaſion for the vindication of this paſſage of my book; if there ſhould be any one beſides your lordſhip, who ſhould ſo far miſtake it, as to think it in the leaſt invalidates the argument for a God, from the univerſal conſent of mankind.

But becauſe you queſtion the credibility of thoſe authors I have quoted, which you ſay were very ill choſen; I will crave leave to ſay, that he whom I relied on for his teſtimony concerning the Hottentots of Soldania, was no leſs a man than an ambaſſador from the king of England to the Great Mogul: of whoſe relation, monſieur Thevenot, no ill judge in the caſe, had ſo great an eſteem, that he was at the pains to tranſlate into French, and publiſh it in his (which is counted no injudicious) collection of travels. But to intercede with your lordſhip, for a little more favourable allowance of credit to ſir Thomas Roe's relation; Coore, an inhabitant of the country, who could ſpeak Engliſh, aſſured Mr. Terry *, that they of Soldania had no God. But if he too have the ill luck to find no credit with you, I hope you will be a little more favourable to a divine of the church of England, now living, and admit of his teſtimony in confirmation of ſir Thomas Roe's. This worthy gentleman, in the relation of his voyage to Surat, printed but two years ſince, ſpeaking of

* Terry's Voyage, p. 17, 23.

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kind of ideas of thoſe things, whoſe names, thoſe they converſe with, have occaſion frequently to mention to them. And if they carry with it the notion of excellency, greatneſs, or ſomething extraordinary; if apprehenſion and concernment accompany it; if the fear of abſolute and irreſiſtible power ſet it on upon the mind, the idea is likely to ſink the deeper, and ſpread the farther; eſpecially if it be ſuch an idea as is agreeable to the common light of reaſon, and naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge, as that of a God is. For the viſible marks of extraordinary wiſdom and power appear ſo plainly in all the works of the creation, that a rational creature, who will but ſeriouſly reflect on them, cannot miſs the diſcovery of a deity.

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the ſame people, has theſe words: † "They are ſunk even below idolatry, are deſtitute of both prieſt and temple, and ſaving a little ſhow of rejoicing, which is made at the full and new moon, have loſt all kind of religious devotion. Nature has ſo richly provided for their convenience in this life, that they have drowned all ſenſe of the God of it, and are grown quite careleſs of the next."

But to provide againſt the cleareſt evidence of atheiſm in theſe people, you ſay, "that the account given of them, makes them not fit to be a ſtandard for the ſenſe of mankind." This, I think, may paſs for nothing, till ſomebody be found, that makes them to be a ſtandard for the ſenſe of mankind. All the uſe I made of them was to ſhow, that there were men in the world that had no innate idea of a God. But to keep ſomething like an argument going (for what will not that do?) you go near denying thoſe Cafers to be men. What elſe do theſe words ſignify? "a people ſo ſtrangely bereſt of common ſenſe, that they can hardly be reckoned among mankind, as appears by the beſt accounts of the Cafers of Soldania, &c." I hope, if any of them were called Peter, James, or John, it would be paſt ſcruple that they were men: however, Courwee, Wewena, and Cowſheda, and thoſe others who had names, that had no places in your nomenclator, would hardly paſs muſter with your lordſhip.

My lord, I ſhould not mention this, but that what you yourſelf ſay here, may be a motive to you to conſider, that what you have laid ſuch a ſtreſs on concerning the general nature of man, as a real being, and the ſubject of properties, amounts to nothing for the diſtinguiſhing of ſpecies; ſince you yourſelf own that there may be individuals, wherein there is a common nature with a particular ſubſiſtence proper to each of them; whereby you are ſo little able to know of which of the ranks or ſorts they are, into which you ſay God has ordered beings, and which he hath diſtinguiſhed by eſſential properties, that you are in doubt whether they ought to be reckoned among mankind or no.

† Mr. Ovington, p. 489.

And

And the influence that the diſcovery of ſuch a being muſt neceſſarily have on the minds of all, that have but once heard of it, is ſo great, and carries ſuch a weight of thought and communication with it, that it ſeems ſtranger to me, that a whole nation of men ſhould be any where found ſo brutiſh, as to want the notion of a God; than that they ſhould be without any notion of numbers, or fire.

§. 10. The name of God being once mentioned in any part of the world, to expreſs a ſuperior, powerful, wiſe, invifible being, the ſuitableneſs of ſuch a notion to the principles of common reaſon, and the intereſt men will always have to mention it often, muſt neceſſarily ſpread it far and wide, and continue it down to all generations; though yet the general reception of this name, and ſome imperfect and unſteady notions conveyed thereby to the unthinking part of mankind, prove not the idea to be innate; but only that they, who made the diſcovery, had made a right uſe of their reaſon, thought maturely of the cauſes of things, and traced them to their original; from whom other leſs conſidering people having once received ſo important a notion, it could not eaſily be loſt again.

§. 11. This is all could be inferred from the notion of a God, were it to be found univerſally in all the tribes of mankind, and generally acknowledged by men grown to maturity in all countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a God, as I imagine, is extended no farther than that; which if it be ſufficient to prove the idea of God innate, will as well prove the idea of fire innate; ſince, I think, it may be truly ſaid, that there is not a perſon in the world, who has a notion of a God, who has not alſo the idea of fire. I doubt not, but if a colony of young children ſhould be placed in an iſland where no fire was, they would certainly neither have any notion of ſuch a thing, nor name for it, how generally ſoever it were received, and known in all the world beſides: and perhaps too their apprehenſions would be as far removed from any name, or notion of a God, till ſome one amongſt them had employed his thoughts, to inquire into the conſtitution

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and cauſes of things, which would eaſily lead him to the notion of a God; which having once taught to others, reaſon, and the natural propenſity of their own thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongſt them.

Suitable to God's goodneſs, that all men ſhould have an idea of him, therefore naturally imprinted by him, anſwered.

§. 12. Indeed it is urged, that it is ſuitable to the goodneſs of God to imprint upon the minds of men characters and notions of himſelf, and not to leave them in the dark and doubt in ſo grand a concernment; and alſo by that means to ſecure to himſelf the homage and veneration due from ſo intelligent a creature as man; and therefore he has done it.

This argument, if it be of any force, will prove much more than thoſe, who uſe it in this caſe, expect from it. For, if we may conclude, that God hath done for men all that men ſhall judge is beſt for them, becauſe it is ſuitable to his goodneſs ſo to do; it will prove not only that God has imprinted on the minds of men an idea of himſelf, but that he hath plainly ſtamped there, in fair characters, all that men ought to know or believe of him, all that they ought to do in obedience to his will; and that he hath given them a will and affections conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will think better for men, than that they ſhould in the dark grope after knowledge, as St. Paul tells us all nations did after God, Acts xvii. 27. than that their wills ſhould claſh with their underſtandings, and their appetites croſs their duty. The Romaniſts ſay, it is beſt for men, and ſo ſuitable to the goodneſs of God, that there ſhould be an infallible judge of controverſies on earth; and therefore there is one. And I, by the ſame reaſon, ſay, it is better for men that every man himſelf ſhould be infallible. I leave them to conſider, whether by the force of this argument they ſhall think, that every man is ſo. I think it a very good argument, to ſay, the infinitely wiſe God hath made it ſo: and therefore it is beſt. But it ſeems to me a little too much confidence of our own wiſdom to ſay, "I think it beſt, and therefore God hath made it ſo;" and, in the

the matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from ſuch a topick that God hath done ſo, when certain experience ſhows us that he hath not. But the goodneſs of God hath not been wanting to men without ſuch original impreſſions of knowledge, or ideas ſtamped on the mind: ſince he hath furniſhed man with thoſe faculties, which will ſerve for the ſufficient diſcovery of all things requiſite to the end of ſuch a being. And I doubt not but to ſhow that a man, by the right uſe of his natural abilities, may, without any innate principles, attain a knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him. God having endued man with thoſe faculties of knowing which he hath, was no more obliged by his goodneſs to plant thoſe innate notions in his mind, than that having given him reaſon, hands, and materials, he ſhould build him bridges, or houſes; which ſome people in the world, however, of good parts, do either totally want, or are but ill provided of, as well as others are wholly without ideas of God, and principles of morality; or at leaſt have but very ill ones. The reaſon in both caſes being, that they never employed their parts, faculties, and powers induſtriouſly that way, but contented themſelves with the opinions, faſhions, and things of their country, as they found them, without looking any farther. Had you or I been born at the bay of Soldania, poſſibly our thoughts and notions had not exceeded thoſe brutiſh ones of the hottentots that inhabit there: and had the Virginia king Apochancana been educated in England, he had been perhaps as knowing a divine, and as good a mathematician, as any in it. The difference between him and a more improved Engliſhman lying barely in this, that the exerciſe of his faculties was bounded within the ways, modes, and notions of his own country, and never directed to any other, or farther inquiries: and if he had not any idea of a God, it was only becauſe he purſued not thoſe thoughts that would have led him to it.

Ideas of God varies in different men.

§. 13. I grant, that if there were any idea to be found imprinted on the minds of men, we have reaſon to expect it ſhould be the notion of his maker, as a mark God ſet on his

his own workmanſhip, to mind man of his dependance and duty; and that herein ſhould appear the firſt inſtances of human knowledge. But how late is it before any ſuch notion is diſcoverable in children? And when we find it there, how much more does it reſemble the opinion and notion of the teacher, than repreſent the true God? He that ſhall obſerve in children the progreſs whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have, will think that the objects they do firſt and moſt familiarly converſe with, are thoſe that make the firſt impreſſions on their underſtandings: nor will he find the leaſt footſteps of any other. It is eaſy to take notice, how their thoughts enlarge themſelves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of ſenſible objects, to retain the ideas of them in their memories; and to get the ſkill to compound and enlarge them, and ſeveral ways put them together. How by theſe means they come to frame in their minds an idea men have of a deity, I ſhall hereafter ſhow.

§. 14. Can it be thought, that the ideas men have of God are the characters and marks of himſelf, engraven on their minds by his own finger; when we ſee that in the ſame country, under one and the ſame name, men have far different, nay, often contrary and inconſiſtent ideas and conceptions of him? Their agreeing in a name, or ſound, will ſcarce prove an innate notion of him.

§. 15. What true or tolerable notion of a deity could they have, who acknowledged and worſhipped hundreds? Every deity that they owned above one was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of him, and a proof that they had no true notion of God, where unity, infinity, and eternity were excluded. To which if we add their groſs conceptions of corporeity, expreſſed in their images and repreſentations of their deities; the amours, marriages, copulations, luſts, quarrels, and other mean qualities attributed by them to their gods; we ſhall have little reaſon to think, that the heathen world, i. e. the greateſt part of mankind, had ſuch ideas of God in their minds, as he himſelf, out of care that they ſhould not be miſtaken about him, was author

of. And this univerſality of conſent, ſo much argued, if it prove any native impreſſions, it will be only this, that God imprinted on the minds of all men, ſpeaking the ſame language, a name for himſelf, but not any idea; ſince thoſe people, who agreed in the name, had at the ſame time far different apprehenſions about the thing ſignified. If they ſay, that the variety of deities, worſhipped by the heathen world, were but figurative ways of expreſſing the ſeveral attributes of that incomprehenſible being, or ſeveral parts of his providence: I anſwer, what they might be in the original, I will not here inquire; but that they were ſo in the thoughts of the vulgar, I think no-body will affirm. And he that will conſult the voyage of the biſhop of Beryte, c. 13. (not to mention other teſtimonies) will find, that the theology of the Siamites profeſſedly owns a plurality of Gods: or, as the abbe de Choiſy more judiciouſly remarks, in his Journal du voiage de Siam, $\frac{1}{177}$, it conſiſts properly in acknowledging no God at all.

If it be ſaid, That wiſe men of all nations came to have true conceptions of the unity and infinity of the deity, I grant it. But then this,

Firſt, Excludes univerſality of conſent in any thing but the name; for thoſe wiſe men being very few, perhaps one of a thouſand, this univerſality is very narrow.

Secondly, It ſeems to me plainly to prove, that the trueſt and beſt notions men had of God were not imprinted, but acquired by thought and meditation, and a right uſe of their faculties; ſince the wiſe and conſiderate men of the world, by a right and careful employment of their thoughts and reaſon, attained true notions in this as well as other things; whilſt the lazy and inconſiderate part of men, making far the greater number, took up their notions by chance, from common tradition and vulgar conceptions, without much beating their heads about them. And if it be a reaſon to think the notion of God innate, becauſe all wiſe men had it, virtue too muſt be thought innate, for that alſo wiſe men have always had.

§. 16. This

§. 16. This was evidently the caſe of all Gentiliſm; nor hath even amongſt Jews, Chriſtians, and Mahometans, who acknowledge but one God, this doctrine, and the care taken in thoſe nations to teach men to have true notions of a God, prevailed ſo far, as to make men to have the ſame, and the true ideas of him. How many, even amongſt us, will be found, upon inquiry, to fancy him in the ſhape of a man ſitting in heaven, and to have many other abſurd and unfit conceptions of him? Chriſtians, as well as Turks, have had whole ſects owning and contending earneſtly for it, and that the deity was corporeal, and of human ſhape: and though we find few among us who profeſs themſelves Anthropomorphites, (though ſome I have met with that own it) yet, I believe, he that will make it his buſineſs, may find, amongſt the ignorant and uninſtructed Chriſtians, many of that opinion. Talk but with country people, almoſt of any age, or young people of almoſt any condition; and you ſhall find, that though the name of God be frequently in their mouths, yet the notions they apply this name to are ſo odd, low and pitiful, that no-body can imagine they were taught by a rational man, much leſs that they were characters written by the finger of God himſelf. Nor do I ſee how it derogates more from the goodneſs of God, that he has given us minds unfurniſhed with theſe ideas of himſelf, than that he hath ſent us into the world with bodies unclothed, and that there is no art or ſkill born with us: for, being fitted with faculties to attain theſe, it is want of induſtry and conſideration in us, and not of bounty in him, if we have them not. It is as certain that there is a God, as that the oppoſite angles, made by the interſection of two ſtraight lines, are equal. There was never any rational creature, that ſet himſelf ſincerely to examine the truth of theſe propoſitions, that could fail to aſſent to them; though yet it be paſt doubt that there are many men, who, having not applied their thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmoſt of its extent) univerſal conſent, ſuch an one I eaſily allow; but ſuch an

univerſal conſent as this proves not the idea of God, any more than it does the idea of ſuch angles, innate.

If the idea of God be not innate, no other can be ſuppoſed innate.

§. 17. Since then, though the knowledge of a God be the moſt natural diſcovery of human reaſon, yet the idea of him is not innate, as, I think, is evident from what has been ſaid; I imagine there will ſcarce be any other idea found, that can pretend to it: ſince if God hath ſent any impreſſion, any character on the underſtanding of men, it is moſt reaſonable to expect it ſhould have been ſome clear and uniform idea of himſelf, as far as our weak capacities were capable to receive ſo incomprehenſible and infinite an object. But our minds being at firſt void of that idea, which we are moſt concerned to have, it is a ſtrong preſumption againſt all other innate characters. I muſt own, as far as I can obſerve, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other.

Idea of ſubſtance not innate.

§. 18. I confeſs there is another idea, which would be of general uſe for mankind to have, as it is of general talk, as if they had it; and that is the idea of ſubſtance, which we neither have, nor can have, by ſenſation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they ſhould be ſuch, as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourſelves: but we ſee, on the contrary, that ſince by thoſe ways, whereby our ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no ſuch clear idea at all, and therefore ſignify nothing by the word ſubſtance, but only an uncertain ſuppoſition of we know not what, i. e. of ſomething whereof we have no particular diſtinct poſitive idea, which we take to be the ſubſtratum, or ſupport, of thoſe ideas we know.

No propoſitions can be innate, ſince no ideas are innate.

§. 19. Whatever then we talk of innate, either ſpeculative or practical, principles, it may, with as much probability, be ſaid, that a man hath 100l. ſterling in his pocket, and yet denied, that he hath either penny, ſhilling, crown, or other coin, out of which the ſum is to be made up, [illegible] that certin propoſitions are

are innate, when the ideas about which they are can by no means be ſuppoſed to be ſo. The general reception and aſſent that is given doth not at all prove that the ideas expreſſed in them are innate: for in many caſes, however the ideas came there, the aſſent to words expreſſing the agreement or diſagreement of ſuch ideas, will neceſſarily follow. Every one, that hath a true idea of God and worſhip, will aſſent to this propoſition, "that God is to be worſhipped," when expreſſed in a language he underſtands: and every rational man, that hath not thought on it to-day, may be ready to aſſent to this propoſition to-morrow; and yet millions of men may be well ſuppoſed to want one or both thoſe ideas to-day. For if we will allow ſavages and moſt country people to have ideas of God and worſhip, (which converſation with them will not make one forward to believe) yet I think few children can be ſuppoſed to have thoſe ideas, which therefore they muſt begin to have ſome time or other; and then they will alſo begin to aſſent to that propoſition, and make very little queſtion of it ever after. But ſuch an aſſent upon hearing no more proves the ideas to be innate, than it does that one born blind (with cataracts, which will be couched to-morrow) had the innate ideas of the ſun, or light, or ſaffron, or yellow; becauſe, when his ſight is cleared, he will certainly aſſent to this propoſition, "that the ſun is lucid, or that ſaffron is yellow:" and therefore, if ſuch an aſſent upon hearing cannot prove the ideas innate, it can much leſs the propoſitions made up of thoſe ideas. If they have any innate ideas, I would be glad to be told what, and how many they are.

No innate ideas in the memory.

§. 20. To which let me add: If there be any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind, which the mind does not actually think on, they muſt be lodged in the memory, and from thence muſt be brought into view by remembrance; i. e. muſt be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the mind before, unleſs remembrance can be without remembrance. For to remember is to perceive any thing with memory, or with a

conſciouſneſs, that it was known or perceived before: without this, whatever idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembered; this conſciouſneſs of its having been in the mind before being that which diſtinguiſhes remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever idea was never perceived by the mind, was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is either an actual perception; or elſe, having been an actual perception, is ſo in the mind, that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again. Whenever there is the actual perception of an idea without memory, the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the underſtanding. Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with a conſciouſneſs, that it had been there before, and was not wholly a ſtranger to the mind. Whether this be not ſo, I appeal to every one's obſervation: and then I deſire on inſtance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any impreſſion of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember as an idea he had formerly known; without which conſciouſneſs of a former perception there is no remembrance; and whatever idea comes into the mind without that conſciouſneſs is not remembered, or comes not out of the memory, nor can be ſaid to be in the mind before that appearance: for what is not either actually in view, or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if he had never been there. Suppoſe a child had the uſe of his eyes, till he knows and diſtinguiſhes colours; but then cataracts ſhut the windows, and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark, and in that time perfectly loſes all memory of the ideas of colours he once had. This was the caſe of a blind man I once talked with, who loſt his ſight by the ſmall-pox when he was a child, and had no more notion of colours than one born blind. I aſk, whether any one can ſay this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind? And I think no-body will ſay, that either of them had in his mind any idea of colours at all. His eyes are couched, and then he has the ideas (which he remembers not) of colours, *de novo*, by his ſight reſtored

conveyed to his mind, and that without any conſciouſneſs of a former acquaintance: and theſe now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this caſe all theſe ideas of colours, which when out of view can be revived with a conſciouſneſs of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory, are ſaid to be in the mind. The uſe I make of this, is, that whatever idea, being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and if it be in the memory, it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view, without a perception that it comes out of the memory; which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembered. If therefore there be any innate ideas, they muſt be in the memory, or elſe no-where in the mind; and if they be in the memory, they can be revived without any impreſſion from without; and whenever they are brought into the mind, they are remembered, i. e. they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a conſtant and diſtinguiſhing difference between what is, and what is not in the memory, or in the mind; that what is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever it is ſuggeſted by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itſelf, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried, whether there be any innate ideas in the mind, before impreſſion from ſenſation or reflection. I would fain meet with the man, who when he came to the uſe of reaſon, or at any other time, remembered any one of them: and to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will ſay, there are ideas in the mind, that are not in the memory: I deſire him to explain himſelf, and make what he ſays intelligible.

Principles not innate, becauſe of little uſe or little certainty.

[redacted] Beſides what I have already ſaid, another reaſon why I doubt that nor any other principles are I am fully perſuaded, that the God made all things in per- cannot ſatisfy myſelf why he

ſhould be ſuppoſed to print upon the minds of men ſome univerſal principles; whereof thoſe that are pretended innate, and concern ſpeculation, are of no great uſe; and thoſe that concern practice, not ſelf-evident, and neither of them diſtinguiſhable from ſome other truths not allowed to be innate. For to what purpoſe ſhould characters be graven on the mind by the finger of God, which are not clearer there than thoſe which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be diſtinguiſhed from them? If any one thinks there are ſuch innate ideas and propoſitions, which by their clearneſs and uſefulneſs are diſtinguiſhable from all that is adventitious in the mind, and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us which they are, and then every one will be a fit judge whether they be ſo or no; ſince if there be ſuch innate ideas and impreſſions, plainly different from all other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in himſelf. Of the evidence of theſe ſuppoſed innate maxims I have ſpoken already; of their uſefulneſs I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more hereafter.

Difference of men's diſcoveries depends upon the different application of their faculties.

§. 22. To conclude: ſome ideas forwardly offer themſelves to all men's underſtandings; ſome ſorts of truth reſult from any ideas, as ſoon as the mind puts them into propoſitions; other truths require a train of ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be diſcovered and aſſented to. Some of the firſt ſort, becauſe of their general and eaſy reception, have been miſtaken for innate; but the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us than arts and ſciences, though ſome of them indeed offer themſelves to our faculties more readily than others, and therefore are more generally received: though that too be according as the organs of our bodies and powers of our minds happen to be employed: God having fitted men with faculties and means to diſcover, receive, and retain truths, according as they are employed. The great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind is from the different uſe they put their faculties to; whilſt ſome (and thoſe the moſt) taking things upon

upon truſt, miſemploy their power of aſſent, by lazily enſlaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others in doctrines, which it is their duty carefully to examine, and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to ſwallow. Others, employing their thoughts only about ſome few things, grow acquainted ſufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their thoughts looſe in the ſearch of other inquiries. Thus, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is a truth as certain as any thing can be, and I think more evident than many of thoſe propoſitions that go for principles; and yet there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, becauſe they never ſet their thoughts on work about ſuch angles: and he that certainly knows this propoſition, may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propoſitions, in mathematicks itſelf, which are as clear and evident as this; becauſe, in his ſearch of thoſe mathematical truths, he ſtopped his thoughts ſhort, and went not ſo far. The ſame may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a deity: for though there be no truth which a man may more evidently make out to himſelf than the exiſtence of a God, yet he that ſhall content himſelf with things as he finds them, in this world, as they miniſter to his pleaſures and paſſions, and not make inquiry a little farther into their cauſes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and purſue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention; may live long without any notion of ſuch a being. And if any perſon hath by talk put ſuch a notion into his head, he may perhaps believe it; but if he hath never examined it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon truſt, without examining the demonſtration; and may yield his aſſent as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of it: which yet his faculties, if carefully employed, were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only by the by, to ſhow how much our knowledge depends upon the right uſe of thoſe

Concluſion, §. 25. To ſhow how the underſtanding proceeds herein, is the deſign of the following diſcourſe; which I ſhall proceed to, when I have firſt premiſed, that hitherto, to clear my way to thoſe foundations, which I conceive are the only true ones whereon to eſtabliſh thoſe notions we can have of our own knowledge, it hath been neceſſary for me to give an account of the reaſons I had to doubt of innate principles. And ſince the arguments which are againſt them do ſome of them riſe from common received opinions, I have been forced to take ſeveral things for granted, which is hardly avoidable to any one, whoſe taſk is to ſhow the falſhood or improbability of any tenet; it happening in controverſial diſcourſes, as it does in aſſaulting of towns, where if the ground be but firm whereon the batteries are erected, there is no farther inquiry of whom it is borrowed, nor whom it belongs to, ſo it affords but a fit riſe for the preſent purpoſe. But in the future part of this diſcourſe, deſigning to raiſe an edifice uniform and conſiſtent with itſelf, as far as my own experience and obſervation will aſſiſt me, I hope to erect it on ſuch a baſis, that I ſhall not need to ſhore it up with props and buttreſſes, leaning on borrowed or begged foundations; or at leaſt, if mine prove a caſtle in the air, I will endeavour it ſhall be all of a piece, and hang together. Wherein I warn the reader not to expect undeniable cogent demonſtrations, unleſs I may be allowed the privilege, not ſeldom aſſumed by others, to take my principles for granted; and then, I doubt not, but I can demonſtrate too. All that I ſhall ſay for the principles I proceed on is, that I can only appeal to men's own unprejudiced experience and obſervation, whether they be true or no; and this is enough for a man who profeſſes no more, than to lay down candidly and freely his own conjectures, concerning a ſubject lying ſomewhat in the dark, without any other deſign than an unbiaſſed inquiry after truth.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of Ideas in general, and their Original.

§. 1. EVERY man being conſcious to himſelf that he thinks, and that which his mind is applied about, whilſt thinking, being the ideas that are there, it is paſt doubt, that men have in their minds ſeveral ideas, ſuch as are thoſe expreſſed by the words, Whiteneſs, Hardneſs, Sweetneſs, Thinking, Motion, Man, Elephant, Army, Drunkenneſs, and others. It is in the firſt place then to be inquired, how he comes by them. I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native ideas, and original characters, ſtamped upon their minds, in their very firſt being. This opinion I have, at large, examined already; and, I ſuppoſe, what I have ſaid, in the foregoing book, will be much more eaſily admitted, when I have ſhown, whence the underſtanding may get all the ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind; for which I ſhall appeal to every one's own obſervation and experience.

Idea is the object of thinking.

§. 2. Let us then ſuppoſe the mind to be, as we ſay, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furniſhed? Whence comes it by that vaſt ſtore which the buſy and boundleſs fancy of man has painted on it, with an almoſt endleſs variety? Whence has it all the materials of reaſon and knowledge? To this I anſwer, in one word, from experience; in all that our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itſelf. Our obſervation employed either about external ſenſible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourſelves, is that which ſupplies our underſtandings with all the materials of thinking.

All ideas come from ſenſation or reflection.

Theſe two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do ſpring.

The objects of ſenſation one ſource of ideas.

§. 3. Firſt, Our ſenſes, converſant about particular ſenſible objects, do convey into the mind ſeveral diſtinct perceptions of things, according to thoſe various ways wherein thoſe objects do affect them: and thus we come by thoſe ideas we have, of Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all thoſe which we call ſenſible qualities; which when I ſay the ſenſes convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there thoſe perceptions. This great ſource of moſt of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our ſenſes, and derived by them to the underſtanding, I call SENSATION.

The operations of our minds the other ſource of them.

§. 4. Secondly, The other fountain, from which experience furniſheth the underſtanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations when the ſoul comes to reflect on and conſider, do furniſh the underſtanding with another ſet of ideas, which could not be had from things without; and ſuch are Perception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Reaſoning, Knowing, Willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conſcious of and obſerving in ourſelves, do from theſe receive into our underſtandings as diſtinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our ſenſes. This ſource of ideas every man has wholly in himſelf; and though it be not ſenſe, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal ſenſe. But as I call the other ſenſation, ſo I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being ſuch only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itſelf. By reflection then, in the following part of this diſcourſe, I would be underſtood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them; by reaſon whereof there come to be ideas of theſe operations in the underſtanding. Theſe two, I ſay, viz. external material

material things, as the objects of ſenſation; and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of reflection; are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term operations here I uſe in a large ſenſe, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but ſome ſort of paſſions ariſing ſometimes from them, ſuch as is the ſatisfaction or uneaſineſs ariſing from any thought.

All our ideas are of the one or the other of theſe.

§. 5. The underſtanding ſeems to me not to have the leaſt glimmering of any ideas, which it doth not receive from one of theſe two. External objects furniſh the mind with the ideas of ſenſible qualities, which are all thoſe different perceptions they produce in us: and the mind furniſhes the underſtanding with ideas of its own operations.

Theſe, when we have taken a full ſurvey of them and their ſeveral modes, combinations, and relations, we ſhall find to contain all our whole ſtock of ideas; and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of theſe two ways. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and thoroughly ſearch into his underſtanding; and then let him tell me, whether all the original ideas he has there, are any other than of the objects of his ſenſes, or of the operations of his mind, conſidered as objects of his reflection: and how great a maſs of knowledge ſoever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a ſtrict view, ſee that he has not any idea in his mind, but what one of theſe two have imprinted; though perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the underſtanding, as we ſhall ſee hereafter.

Obſervable in children.

§. 6. He that attentively conſiders the ſtate of a child, at his firſt coming into the world, will have little reaſon to think him ſtored with plenty of ideas, that are to be the matter of his future knowledge: It is by degrees he comes to be furniſhed with them. And though the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities imprint themſelves before the

memory begins to keep a regiſter of time or order, yet it is often ſo late before ſome unuſual qualities come in the way, that there are few men that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them: and if it were worth while, no doubt a child might be ſo ordered as to have but a very few even of the ordinary ideas, till he were grown up to a man. But all that are born into the world being ſurrounded with bodies that perpetually and diverſly affect them; variety of ideas, whether care be taken of it or no, are imprinted on the minds of children. Light and colours are buſy at hand every-where, when the eye is but open; ſounds and ſome tangible qualities fail not to ſolicit their proper ſenſes, and force an entrance to the mind: but yet, I think, it will be granted eaſily, that if a child were kept in a place where he never ſaw any other but black and white till he were a man, he would have no more ideas of ſcarlet or green, than he that from his childhood never taſted an oyſter or a pine-apple has of thoſe particular reliſhes.

Men are differently furniſhed with theſe, according to the different objects they converſe with.

§. 7. Men then come to be furniſhed with fewer or more ſimple ideas from without, according as the objects they converſe with afford greater or leſs variety; and from the operations of their minds within, according as they more or leſs reflect on them. For though he that contemplates the operations of his mind cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them; yet unleſs he turns his thoughts that way, and conſiders them attentively, he will no more have clear and diſtinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and all that may be obſerved therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of any landſcape, or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it. The picture or clock may be ſo placed, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confuſed idea of all the parts they are made up of, till he applies himſelf with attention to conſider them each in particular.

§. 8.

Ideas of reflection later, becauſe they need attention.

§. 8. And hence we ſee the reaſon, why it is pretty late before moſt children get ideas of the operations of their own minds; and ſome have not any very clear or perfect ideas of the greateſt part of them all their lives: becauſe though they paſs there continually, yet, like floating viſions, they make not deep impreſſions enough to leave in their mind clear, diſtinct, laſting ideas, till the underſtanding turns inward upon itſelf, reflects on its own operations and makes them the objects of its own contemplation. Children when they come firſt into it, are ſurrounded with a world of new things, which, by a conſtant ſolicitation of their ſenſes, draw the mind conſtantly to them, forward to take notice of new, and apt to be delighted with the variety of changing objects. Thus the firſt years are uſually employed and diverted in looking abroad. Men's buſineſs in them is to acquaint themſelves with what is to be found without: and ſo growing up in a conſtant attention to outward ſenſations, ſeldom make any conſiderable reflection on what paſſes within them till they come to be of riper years; and ſome ſcarce ever at all.

The ſoul begins to have ideas, when it begins to perceive.

§. 9. To aſk at what time a man has firſt any ideas, is to aſk when he begins to perceive; having ideas, and perception, being the ſame thing. I know it is an opinion, that the ſoul always thinks, and that it has the actual perception of ideas in itſelf conſtantly as long as it exiſts; and that actual thinking is as inſeparable from the ſoul, as actual extenſion is from the body: which if true, to inquire after the beginning of a man's ideas is the ſame as to inquire after the beginning of his ſoul. For by this account ſoul and its ideas, as body and its extenſion, will begin to exiſt both at the ſame time.

The ſoul thinks not always; for this wants proofs.

§. 10. But whether the ſoul be ſuppoſed to exiſt antecedent to, or coeval with, or ſome time after the firſt rudiments of organization, or the beginnings of life in the body; I leave to be diſputed by thoſe who

have better thought of that matter. I confeſs myſelf to have one of thoſe dull ſouls, that doth not perceive itſelf always to contemplate ideas; nor can conceive it any more neceſſary for the ſoul always to think, than for the body always to move: the perception of ideas being (as I conceive) to the ſoul, what motion is to the body; not its eſſence, but one of its operations. And therefore, though thinking be ſuppoſed ever ſo much the proper action of the ſoul, yet it is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe that it ſhould be always thinking, always in action. That perhaps is the privilege of the infinite author and preſerver of things, who never ſlumbers nor ſleeps; but it is not competent to any finite being, at leaſt not to the ſoul of man. We know certainly by experience that we ſometimes think, and thence draw this infallible conſequence, that there is ſomething in us that has a power to think: but whether that ſubſtance perpetually thinks or no, we can be no farther aſſured than experience informs us. For to ſay that actual thinking is eſſential to the ſoul, and inſeparable from it, is to beg what is in queſtion, and not to prove it by reaſon; which is neceſſary to be done, if it be not a ſelf-evident propoſition. But whether this, "that the ſoul always thinks," be a ſelf-evident propoſition, that every body aſſents to at firſt hearing, I appeal to mankind. It is doubted whether I thought at all laſt night or no; the queſtion being about a matter of fact, it is begging it to bring, as a proof for it, an hypotheſis, which is the very thing in diſpute: by which way one may prove any thing: and it is but ſuppoſing that all watches, whilſt the balance beats, think; and it is ſufficiently proved, and paſt doubt, that my watch thought all laſt night. But he that would not deceive himſelf, ought to build his hypotheſis on matter of fact, and make it out by ſenſible experience, and not preſume on matter of fact, becauſe of his hypotheſis; that is, becauſe he ſuppoſes it to be ſo: which way of proving amounts to this, that I muſt neceſſarily think all laſt night, becauſe another ſuppoſes I always think, though I myſelf cannot perceive that I always do ſo.

But

But men in love with their opinions may not only ſuppoſe what is in queſtion, but allege wrong matter of fact. How elſe could any one make it an inference of mine, that a thing is not, becauſe we are not ſenſible of it in our ſleep? I do not ſay there is no ſoul in a man, becauſe he is not ſenſible of it in his ſleep: but I do ſay, he cannot think at any time waking or ſleeping, without being ſenſible of it. Our being ſenſible of it is not neceſſary to any thing, but to our thoughts; and to them it is, and to them it will always be neceſſary, till we can think without being conſcious of it.

It is not always conſcious of it.

§. 11. I grant that the ſoul in a waking man is never without thought, becauſe it is the condition of being awake: but whether ſleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man's conſideration; it being hard to conceive, that any thing ſhould think, and not be conſcious of it. If the ſoul doth think in a ſleeping man without being conſcious of it, I aſk, whether during ſuch thinking it has any pleaſure or pain, or be capable of happineſs or miſery? I am ſure the man is not, any more than the bed or earth he lies on. For to be happy or miſerable without being conſcious of it, ſeems to me utterly inconſiſtent and impoſſible. Or if it be poſſible that the ſoul can, whilſt the body is ſleeping, have its thinking, enjoyments and concerns, its pleaſure or pain, apart, which the man is not conſcious of nor partakes in; it is certain that Socrates aſleep and Socrates awake is not the ſame perſon: but his ſoul when he ſleeps, and Socrates the man, conſiſting of body and ſoul when he is waking, are two perſons; ſince waking Socrates has no knowledge of, or concernment for that happineſs or miſery of his ſoul which it enjoys alone by itſelf whilſt he ſleeps, without perceiving any thing of it; any more than he has for the happineſs or miſery of a man in the Indies, whom he knows not. For if we take wholly away all conſciouſneſs of our actions and ſenſations, eſpecially of pleaſure and pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place perſonal identity.

If a sleeping man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking man are two persons.

§. 12. "The soul, during sound sleep, thinks," say these men. Whilst it thinks and perceives, it is capable certainly of those of delight or trouble, as well as any other perceptions; and it must necessarily be conscious of its own perceptions. But it has all this apart; the sleeping man, it is plain, is conscious of nothing of all this. Let us suppose then the soul of Castor, while he is sleeping, retired from his body; which is no impossible supposition for the men I have here to do with, who so liberally allow life, without a thinking soul, to all other animals. These men cannot then judge it impossible, or a contradiction, that the body should live without the soul; nor that the soul should subsist and think, or have perception, even perception of happiness or misery, without the body. Let us then, as I say, suppose the soul of Castor separated, during his sleep, from his body, to think apart. Let us suppose too, that it chooses for its scene of thinking the body of another man, v. g. Pollux, who is sleeping without a soul: for if Castor's soul can think, whilst Castor is asleep, what Castor is never conscious of, it is no matter what place it chooses to think in. We have here then the bodies of two men with only one soul between them, which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns; and the soul still thinking in the waking man, whereof the sleeping man is never conscious, has never the least perception. I ask then, whether Castor and Pollux, thus, with only one soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one what the other is never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as distinct persons as Castor and Hercules, or as Socrates and Plato were? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miserable? Just by the same reason they make the soul and the man two persons, who make the soul think apart what the man is not conscious of. For I suppose no-body will make identity of persons to consist in the soul's being united to the very same numerical particles of matter; for if that be necessary to *identity*, it will be impossible, in that constant flux of

the particles of our bodies, that any man ſhould be the ſame perſon two days, or two moments together.

Impoſſible to convince thoſe that ſleep without dreaming, that they think.

§. 13. Thus, methinks, every drowſy nod ſhakes their doctrine, who teach, that the ſoul is always thinking. Thoſe at leaſt, who do at any time ſleep without dreaming, can never be convinced, that their thoughts are ſometimes for four hours buſy without their knowing of it; and if they are taken in the very act, waked in the middle of that ſleeping contemplation, can give no manner of account of it.

That men dream without remembering it, in vain urged.

§. 14. It will perhaps be ſaid, "that the ſoul thinks even in the ſoundeſt ſleep, but the memory retains it not." That the ſoul in a ſleeping man ſhould be this moment buſy a thinking, and the next moment in a waking man not remember nor be able to recollect one jot of all thoſe thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and would need ſome better proof than bare aſſertion to make it be believed. For who can without any more ado, but being barely told ſo, imagine, that the greateſt part of men do, during all their lives, for ſeveral hours every day, think of ſomething, which if they were aſked, even in the middle of theſe thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of? Moſt men, I think, paſs a great part of their ſleep without dreaming. I once knew a man that was bred a ſcholar, and had no bad memory, who told me, he had never dreamed in his life till he had that fever he was then newly recovered of, which was about the five or ſix and twentieth year of his age. I ſuppoſe the world affords more ſuch inſtances: at leaſt every one's acquaintance will furniſh him with examples enough of ſuch, as paſs moſt of their nights without dreaming.

Upon this hypotheſis the thoughts of a ſleeping man ought to be moſt rational.

§. 15. To think often, and never to retain it ſo much as one moment, is a very uſeleſs ſort of thinking: and the ſoul, in ſuch a ſtate of thinking, does very little, if at all, excel that of a looking-glaſs, which conſtantly receives variety of images, or ideas, but retains none; they diſappear and vaniſh, and

there remain no footſteps of them; the looking-glaſs is never the better for ſuch ideas, nor the ſoul for ſuch thoughts. Perhaps it will be ſaid, "that in a waking "man the materials of the body are employed, and "made uſe of, in thinking; and that the memory of "thoughts is retained by the impreſſions that are made "on the brain, and the traces there left after ſuch "thinking; but that in the thinking of the ſoul, which "is not perceived in a ſleeping man, there the ſoul "thinks apart, and, making no uſe of the organs of "the body, leaves no impreſſions on it, and conſe-"quently no memory of ſuch thoughts." Not to mention again the abſurdity of two diſtinct perſons, which follows from this ſuppoſition, I anſwer farther, that whatever ideas the mind can receive and contemplate without the help of the body, it is reaſonable to conclude, it can retain without the help of the body too; or elſe the ſoul, or any ſeparate ſpirit, will have but little advantage by thinking. If it has no memory of its own thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its own uſe, and be able to recall them upon occaſion; if it cannot reflect upon what is paſt, and make uſe of its former experiences, reaſonings, and contemplations; to what purpoſe does it think? They, who make the ſoul a thinking thing, at this rate, will not make it a much more noble being, than thoſe do, whom they condemn, for allowing it to be nothing but the ſubtileſt parts of matter. Characters drawn on duſt, that the firſt breath of wind effaces; or impreſſions made on a heap of atoms, or animal ſpirits, are altogether as uſeful, and render the ſubject as noble, as the thoughts of a ſoul that periſh in thinking; that once out of ſight are gone for ever, and leave no memory of themſelves behind them. Nature never makes excellent things for mean or no uſes: and it is hardly to be conceived, that our infinitely wiſe creator ſhould make ſo admirable a faculty as the power of thinking, that faculty which comes neareſt the excellency of his own incomprehenſible being, to be ſo idly and uſeleſly employed, at leaſt a fourth part of its time here, as to think conſtantly, without remembering any of thoſe thoughts, without doing

any

any good to itſelf or others, or being any way uſeful to any other part of the creation. If we will examine it, we ſhall not find, I ſuppoſe, the motion of dull and ſenſeleſs matter, any where in the univerſe, made ſo little uſe of, and ſo wholly thrown away.

On this hypotheſis the ſoul muſt have ideas not derived from ſenſation or reflection, of which there is no appearance.

§. 16. It is true, we have ſometimes inſtances of perception, whilſt we are aſleep; and retain the memory of thoſe thoughts: but how extravagant and incoherent for the moſt part they are; how little conformable to the perfection and order of a rational being, thoſe who are acquainted with dreams need not be told. This I would willingly be ſatisfied in, whether the ſoul, when it thinks thus apart, and as it were ſeparate from the body, acts leſs rationally than when conjointly with it, or no. If its ſeparate thoughts be leſs rational, then theſe men muſt ſay, that the ſoul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body: if it does not, it is wonder that our dreams ſhould be, for the moſt part, ſo frivolous and irrational; and that the ſoul ſhould retain none of its more rational ſoliloquies and meditations.

If I think when I know it not, nobody elſe can know it.

§. 17. Thoſe who ſo confidently tell us, that "the ſoul always actually thinks," I would they would alſo tell us what thoſe ideas are that are in the ſoul of a child, before, or juſt at the union with the body, before it hath received any by ſenſation. The dreams of ſleeping men are, as I take it, all made up of the waking man's ideas, though for the moſt part oddly put together. It is ſtrange if the ſoul has ideas of its own, that it derived not from ſenſation or reflection (as it muſt have, if it thought before it received any impreſſions from the body) that it ſhould never, in its private thinking (ſo private, that the man himſelf perceives it not) retain any of them, the very moment it wakes out of them, and then make the man glad with new diſcoveries. Who can find it reaſonable that the ſoul ſhould, in its retirement, during ſleep, have ſo many hours thoughts, and yet never light on any of thoſe ideas it borrowed not from ſenſation or reflection;

or at leaſt preſerve the memory of none but ſuch, which being occaſioned from the body, muſt needs be leſs natural to a ſpirit? It is ſtrange the ſoul ſhould never once in a man's whole life recall over any of its pure native thoughts, and thoſe ideas it had before it borrowed any thing from the body; never bring into the waking man's view any other ideas but what have a tang of the caſk, and manifeſtly derive their original from that union. If it always thinks, and ſo had ideas before it was united, or before it received any from the body, it is not to be ſuppoſed but that during ſleep it recollects its native ideas; and during that retirement from communicating with the body, whilſt it thinks by itſelf, the ideas it is buſied about ſhould be, ſometimes at leaſt, thoſe more natural and congenial ones which it had in itſelf, underived from the body, or its own operations about them: which, ſince the waking man never remembers, we muſt from this hypotheſis conclude, either that the ſoul remembers ſomething that the man does not; or elſe that memory belongs only to ſuch ideas as are derived from the body, or the mind's operations about them.

How knows any one that the ſoul always thinks? For if it be not a ſelf-evident propoſition, it needs proof.

§. 18. I would be glad alſo to learn from theſe men, who ſo confidently pronounce, that the human ſoul, or which is all one, that a man always thinks, how they come to know it; nay, how they come to know that they themſelves think, when they themſelves do not perceive it. This, I am afraid, is to be ſure without proofs; and to know, without perceiving: It is, I ſuſpect, a confuſed notion taken up to ſerve an hypotheſis; and none of thoſe clear truths, that either their own evidence forces us to admit, or common experience makes it impudence to deny. For the moſt that can be ſaid of it, is, that it is impoſſible the ſoul may always think, but not always retain it in memory: and I ſay, it is as poſſible that the ſoul may not always think; and much more probable that it ſhould ſometimes not think, than that it ſhould often think, and that a long while together, and not be conſcious to itſelf the next moment after, that it had thought.

§. 19. To

That a man ſhould be buſy in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable.

§. 19. To ſuppoſe the ſoul to think, and the man not to perceive it, is, as has been ſaid, to make two perſons in one man: and if one conſiders well theſe men's way of ſpeaking, one ſhould be led into a ſuſpicion that they do ſo. For they who tell us that the ſoul always thinks, do never, that I remember, ſay that a man always thinks. Can the ſoul think, and not the man? or a man think, and not be conſcious of it? This perhaps would be ſuſpected of jargon in others. If they ſay, the man thinks always, but is not always conſcious of it; they may as well ſay, his body is extended without having parts. For it is altogether as intelligible to ſay, that a body is extended without parts, as that any thing thinks without being conſcious of it, or perceiving that it does ſo. They who talk thus may, with as much reaſon, if it be neceſſary to their hypotheſis, ſay, that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it: whereas hunger conſiſts in that very ſenſation, as thinking conſiſts in being conſcious that one thinks. If they ſay, that a man is always conſcious to himſelf of thinking, I aſk, how they know it. Conſciouſneſs is the perception of what paſſes in a man's own mind. Can another man perceive that I am conſcious of any thing, when I perceive it not myſelf? No man's knowledge here can go beyond his experience. Wake a man out of a ſound ſleep, and aſk him, what he was that moment thinking of. If he himſelf be conſcious of nothing he then thought on, he muſt be a notable diviner of thoughts that can aſſure him that he was thinking: may he not with more reaſon aſſure him he was not aſleep? This is ſomething beyond philoſophy; and it cannot be leſs than revelation, that diſcovers to another thoughts in my mind, when I can find none there myſelf: and they muſt needs have a penetrating ſight, who can certainly ſee that I think, when I cannot perceive it myſelf, and when I declare that I do not; and yet can ſee that dogs or elephants do not think, when they give all the demonſtration of it imaginable, except only telling us that they do ſo. This ſome may ſuſpect to be a ſtep beyond

beyond the Roſecrucians; it ſeeming eaſier to make one's ſelf inviſible to others, than to make another's thoughts viſible to me, which are not viſible to himſelf But it is but defining the ſoul to be "a ſubſtance that always thinks," and the buſineſs is done. If ſuch definition be of any authority, I know not what it can ſerve for, but to make many men ſuſpect, that they have no ſouls at all, ſince they find a good part of their lives paſs away without thinking. For no definitions, that I know, no ſuppoſitions of any ſect, are of force enough to deſtroy conſtant experience; and perhaps it is the affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive, that makes ſo much uſeleſs diſpute and noiſe in the world.

No ideas but from ſenſation or reflection, evident, if we obſerve children.

§. 20. I ſee no reaſon therefore to believe, that the ſoul thinks before the ſenſes have furniſhed it with ideas to think on; and as thoſe are increaſed and retained, ſo it comes, by exerciſe, to improve its faculty of thinking, in the ſeveral parts of it, as well as afterwards, by compounding thoſe ideas, and reflecting on its own operations; it increaſes its ſtock, as well as facility, in remembering, imagining, reaſoning, and other modes of thinking.

§. 21. He that will ſuffer himſelf to be informed by obſervation and experience, and not make his own hypotheſis the rule of nature, will find few ſigns of a ſoul accuſtomed to much thinking in a new-born child, and much fewer of any reaſoning at all. And yet it is hard to imagine, that the rational ſoul ſhould think ſo much, and not reaſon at all. And he that will conſider, that infants, newly come into the world, ſpend the greateſt part of their time in ſleep, and are ſeldom awake, but when either hunger calls for the teat, or ſome pain, (the moſt importunate of all ſenſations) or ſome other violent impreſſion upon the body forces the mind to perceive, and attend to it: he, I ſay, who conſiders this, will, perhaps, find reaſon to imagine, that a fœtus in the mother's womb differs not much from the ſtate of a vegetable; but paſſes the greateſt part of its time without perception or thought, doing very little

little in a place where it needs not ſeek for food, and is ſurrounded with liquor, always equally ſoft, and near of the ſame temper; where the eyes have no light, and the ears, ſo ſhut up, are not very ſuſceptible of ſounds; and where there is little or no variety, or change of objects to move the ſenſes.

§. 22. Follow a child from its birth, and obſerve the alterations that time makes, and you ſhall find, as the mind by the ſenſes comes more and more to be furniſhed with ideas, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has matter to think on. After ſome time it begins to know the objects, which, being moſt familiar with it, have made laſting impreſſions. Thus it comes by degrees to know the perſons it daily converſes with, and diſtinguiſh them from ſtrangers; which are inſtances and effects of its coming to retain and diſtinguiſh the ideas the ſenſes convey to it. And ſo we may obſerve how the mind, by degrees, improves in theſe, and advances to the exerciſe of thoſe other faculties of enlarging, compounding, and abſtracting its ideas, and of reaſoning about them, and reflecting upon all theſe; of which I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more hereafter.

§. 23. If it ſhall be demanded then, when a man begins to have any ideas; I think the true anſwer is, when he firſt has any ſenſation. For ſince there appear not to be any ideas in the mind, before the ſenſes have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the underſtanding are coeval with ſenſation; which is ſuch an impreſſion or motion, made in ſome part of the body, as produces ſome perception in the underſtanding. It is about theſe impreſſions made on our ſenſes by outward objects, that the mind ſeems firſt to employ itſelf in ſuch operations as we call perception, remembering, conſideration, reaſoning, &c.

The original of all our knowledge.

§. 24. In time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations about the ideas got by ſenſation, and thereby ſtores itſelf with a new ſet of ideas, which I call ideas of reflection. Theſe are the impreſſions that are made on our ſenſes by outward objects that are extrinſical to the mind, and its

its own operations, proceeding from powers intrinſical and proper to itſelf; which when reflected on by itſelf, becoming alſo objects of its contemplation, are, as I have ſaid, the original of all knowledge. Thus the firſt capacity of human intellect is, that the mind is fitted to receive the impreſſions made on it; either through the ſenſes by outward objects; or by its own operations when it reflects on them. This is the firſt ſtep a man makes towards the diſcovery of any thing, and the ground-work whereon to build all thoſe notions which ever he ſhall have naturally in this world. All thoſe ſublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itſelf, take their riſe and footing here: in all that good extent wherein the mind wanders, in thoſe remote ſpeculations, it may ſeem to be elevated with, it ſtirs not one jot beyond thoſe ideas which ſenſe or reflection have offered for its contemplation.

In the reception of ſimple ideas the underſtanding is for the moſt part paſſive.

§. 25. In this part the underſtanding is merely paſſive; and whether or no it will have theſe beginnings, and as it were materials of knowledge, is not in its own power. For the objects of our ſenſes do, many of them, obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds whether we will or no: and the operations of our minds will not let us be without, at leaſt, ſome obſcure notions of them. No man can be wholly ignorant of what he does when he thinks. Theſe ſimple ideas, when offered to the mind, the underſtanding can no more refuſe to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones itſelf, than a mirror can refuſe, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects ſet before it do therein produce. As the bodies that ſurround us do diverſly affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive the impreſſions, and cannot avoid the perception of thoſe ideas that are annexed to them.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of Simple Ideas.

§. 1. THE better to underſtand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be obſerved concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that ſome of them are ſimple, and ſome complex. Uncompounded appearances.

Though the qualities that affect our ſenſes are, in the things themſelves, ſo united and blended, that there is no ſeparation, no diſtance between them; yet it is plain, the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the ſenſes ſimple and unmixed. For though the ſight and touch often take in from the ſame object, at the ſame time, different ideas; as a man ſees at once motion and colour; the hand feels ſoftneſs and warmth in the ſame piece of wax: yet the ſimple ideas, thus united in the ſame ſubject, are as perfectly diſtinct as thoſe that come in by different ſenſes: the coldneſs and hardneſs which a man feels in a piece of ice being as diſtinct ideas in the mind, as the ſmell and whiteneſs of a lily; or as the taſte of ſugar, and ſmell of a roſe. And there is nothing can be plainer to a man, than the clear and diſtinct perception he has of thoſe ſimple ideas; which, being each in itſelf uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance, or conception in the mind, and is not diſtinguiſhable into different ideas.

§. 2. Theſe ſimple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are ſuggeſted and furniſhed to the mind only by thoſe two ways above-mentioned, viz. ſenſation and reflection. (1) When the underſtanding is once ſtored with theſe The mind can neither make nor deſtroy them.

(1) Againſt this, that the materials of all our knowledge are ſuggeſted and furniſhed to the mind only by ſenſation and reflection, the biſhop of Worceſter makes uſe of the idea of ſubſtance in theſe words: "If the idea of ſubſtance be grounded upon plain and evident reaſon, then we muſt allow

theſe ſimple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almoſt infinite variety; and ſo can make at pleaſure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the moſt exalted wit, or enlarged underſtanding, by any quickneſs or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new ſimple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways aforementioned: nor can any force of the underſtanding deſtroy thoſe that are there. The dominion of man, in this little world of his own underſtanding, being much-what the ſame as it is in the great world of viſible things; wherein his power, however managed by art and ſkill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made

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allow an idea of ſubſtance, which comes not in by ſenſation or reflection; and ſo we may be certain of ſomething which we have not by theſe ideas."

To which our author * anſwers: Theſe words of your lordſhip's contain nothing as I ſee in them againſt me: for I never ſaid that the general idea of ſubſtance comes in by ſenſation and reflection, or that it is a ſimple idea of ſenſation or reflection, though it be ultimately founded in them; for it is a complex idea, made up of the general idea of ſomething, or being, with the relation of a ſupport to accidents. For general ideas come not into the mind by ſenſation or reflection, but are the creatures or inventions of the underſtanding, as I think I have ſhown †; and alſo how the mind makes them from ideas which it has got by ſenſation and reflection; and as to the ideas of relation, how the mind forms them, and how they are derived from, and ultimately terminate in ideas of ſenſation and reflection, I have likewiſe ſhown.

But that I may not be miſtaken what I mean, when I ſpeak of ideas of ſenſation and reflection, as the materials of all our knowledge; give me leave, my lord, to ſet down here a place or two, out of my book, to explain myſelf; as I thus ſpeak of ideas of ſenſation and reflection:

'That theſe, when we have taken a full ſurvey of them, and their 'ſeveral modes, and the compoſitions made out of them, we ſhall find to 'contain all our whole ſtock of ideas, and we have nothing in our minds, 'which did not come in one of theſe two ways ‡.' This thought, in another place, I expreſs thus.

'Theſe are the moſt conſiderable of thoſe ſimple ideas which the mind 'has, and out of which is made all its other knowledge; all which it 'receives by the two forementioned ways of ſenſation and reflection §.' And,

'Thus I have, in a ſhort draught, given a view of our original ideas, 'from whence all the reſt are derived, and of which they are made up ‖.'

* In his firſt letter to the biſhop of Worceſter. † B. 3. c. 3. B. 2. c. 25. & c. 28. §. 18. ‡ B. 2. c. 1. §. 5. § B. 2. c. 7. §. 10. ‖ B. 2. c. 21. §. 73.

This,

made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the leaſt particle of new matter, or deſtroying one atom of what is already in being. The ſame inability will every one find in himſelf, who ſhall go about to faſhion in his underſtanding and ſimple idea, not received in by his ſenſes from external objects, or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any taſte, which had never affected his palate; or frame the idea of a ſcent he had never ſmelt: and when he can do this, I will alſo conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man true diſtinct notions of ſounds.

§. 3. This

This, and the like, ſaid in other places, is what I have thought concerning ideas of ſenſation and reflection, as the foundation and materials of all our ideas, and conſequently of all our knowledge: I have ſet down theſe particulars out of my book, that the reader having a full view of my opinion herein, may the better ſee what in it is liable to your lordſhip's reprehenſion. For that your lordſhip is not very well ſatisfied with it, appears not only by the words under conſideration, but by theſe alſo: "But we are ſtill told, that our underſtanding can have no other ideas, but either from ſenſation or reflection."

Your lordſhip's argument, in the paſſage we are upon, ſtands thus: If the general idea of ſubſtance be grounded upon plain and evident reaſon, then we muſt allow an idea of ſubſtance, which comes not in by ſenſation or reflection. This is a conſequence which, with ſubmiſſion, I think will not hold, viz. That reaſon and ideas are inconſiſtent; for if that ſuppoſition be not true, then the general idea of ſubſtance may be grounded on plain and evident reaſon; and yet it will not follow from thence, that it is not ultimately grounded on and derived from ideas which come in by ſenſation or reflection, and ſo cannot be ſaid to come in by ſenſation or reflection.

To explain myſelf, and clear my meaning in this matter. All the ideas of all the ſenſible qualities of a cherry come into my mind by ſenſation; the ideas of perceiving, thinking, reaſoning, knowing, &c. come into my mind by reflection. The ideas of theſe qualities and actions, or powers, are perceived by the mind, to be by themſelves inconſiſtent with exiſtence; or, as your lordſhip well expreſſes it, we find that we can have no true conception of any modes or accidents, but we muſt conceive a ſubſtratum, or ſubject, wherein they are, i. e. That they cannot exiſt or ſubſiſt of themſelves. Hence the mind perceives their neceſſary connexion with inherence or being ſupported; which being a relative idea, ſuperadded to the red colour in a cherry, or to thinking in a man, the mind frames the correlative idea of a ſupport. For I never denied, that the mind could frame to itſelf ideas of relation, but have ſhowed the quite contrary in my chapters about relation. But becauſe a relation cannot be founded in nothing, or be the relation of nothing, and the thing here

§. 3. This is the reaſon why, though we cannot believe it impoſſible to God to make a creature with other organs, and more ways to convey into the underſtanding the notice of corporeal things than thoſe five, as they are uſually counted, which he has given to man: yet I think, it is not poſſible for any one to imagine any other qualities in bodies, howſoever conſtituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, beſides ſounds, taſtes, ſmells, viſible and tangible qualities. And had mankind been made but with four ſenſes, the qualities then, which are the object of the fifth ſenſe, had been as far from our notice, imagination, and conception, as now any belonging to a ſixth, ſeventh, or eighth ſenſe, can

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here related as a ſupporter, or a ſupport, is not repreſented to the mind, by any clear and diſtinct idea; therefore the obſcure and indiſtinct, vague idea of thing, or ſomething, is all that is left to be the poſitive idea, which has the relation of a ſupport, or ſubſtratum, to modes or accidents; and that general, indetermined idea of ſomething is, by the abſtraction of the mind, derived alſo from the ſimple ideas of ſenſation and reflection: and thus the mind, from the poſitive, ſimple ideas got by ſenſation and reflection, comes to the general, relative idea of ſubſtance, which, without theſe poſitive, ſimple ideas, it would never have.

This your lordſhip (without giving by detail all the particular ſteps of the mind in this buſineſs) has well expreſſed in this more familiar way: "We find we can have no true conception of any modes or accidents, but we muſt conceive a ſubſtratum, or ſubject, wherein they are; ſince it is a repugnancy to our conceptions of things, that modes or accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves."

Hence your lordſhip calls it the rational idea of ſubſtance: and ſays, "I grant that by ſenſation and reflection we come to know the powers and properties of things; but our reaſon is ſatisfied that there muſt be ſomething beyond theſe, becauſe it is impoſſible that they ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves;" ſo that if this be that which your lordſhip means by the rational idea of ſubſtance, I ſee nothing there is in it againſt what I have ſaid, that it is founded on ſimple ideas of ſenſation or reflection, and that it is a very obſcure idea.

Your lordſhip's concluſion from your foregoing words is, "and ſo we may be certain of ſome things which we have not by thoſe ideas;" which is a propoſition, whoſe preciſe meaning, your lordſhip will forgive me, if I profeſs, as it ſtands there, I do not underſtand. For it is uncertain to me, whether your lordſhip means, we may certainly know the exiſtence of ſomething, which we have not by thoſe ideas; or certainly know the diſtinct properties of ſomething, which we have not by thoſe ideas: or certainly know the truth of ſome propoſition, which we have not by thoſe ideas: for to be certain of ſomething may ſignify either of theſe. But in which ſoever of theſe it be meant, I do not ſee how I am concerned in it.

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poſſibly be: which, whether yet ſome other creatures, in ſome other parts of this vaſt and ſtupendous univerſe, may not have, will be a greater preſumption to deny. He that will not ſet himſelf proudly at the top of all things, but will conſider the immenſity of this fabrick, and the great variety that is to be found in this little and inconſiderable part of it which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that in other manſions of it there may be other and different intelligent beings, of whoſe faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehenſion, as a worm ſhut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the ſenſes or underſtanding of a man: ſuch variety and excellency being ſuitable to the wiſdom and power of the maker. I have here followed the common opinion of man's having but five ſenſes; though, perhaps, there may be juſtly counted more: but either ſuppoſition ſerves equally to my preſent purpoſe.

CHAP. III.

Of Ideas of one Senſe.

Diviſion of ſimple ideas.

§. 1. THE better to conceive the ideas we receive from ſenſation, it may not be amiſs for us to conſider them, in reference to the different ways whereby they make their approaches to our minds, and make themſelves perceivable by us.

Firſt, Then, there are ſome which come into our minds by one ſenſe only.

Secondly, There are others that convey themſelves into the mind by more ſenſes than one.

Thirdly, Others that are had from reflection only.

Fourthly, There are ſome that make themſelves way, and are ſuggeſted to the mind by all the ways of ſenſation and reflection.

We ſhall conſider them apart under their ſeveral heads.

Ideas of one ſenſe, as colours, of ſeeing; ſound, of hearing; &c.

First, There are ſome ideas which have admittance only through one ſenſe, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus light and colours, as white, red, yellow, blue, with their ſeveral degrees or ſhades and mixtures, as green, ſcarlet, purple, ſea-green, and the reſt, come in only by the eyes: all kinds of noiſes, ſounds, and tones, only by the ears: the ſeveral taſtes and ſmells, by the noſe and palate. And if theſe organs, or the nerves, which are the conduits to convey them from without to their audience in the brain, the mind's preſence-room (as I may ſo call it) are any of them ſo diſordered, as not to perform their functions, they have no poſtern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themſelves into view, and be perceived by the underſtanding.

The moſt conſiderable of thoſe belonging to the touch are heat and cold, and ſolidity: all the reſt, conſiſting almoſt wholly in the ſenſible conſiguration, as ſmooth and rough, or elſe more or leſs firm adheſion of the parts, as hard and ſoft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

Few ſimple ideas have names.

§. 2. I think, it will be needleſs to enumerate all the particular ſimple ideas, belonging to each ſenſe. Nor indeed is it poſſible, if we would; there being a great many more of them belonging to moſt of the ſenſes, than we have names for. The variety of ſmells, which are as many almoſt, if not more, than ſpecies of bodies in the world, do moſt of them want names. Sweet and ſtinking commonly ſerve our turn for theſe ideas, which in effect is little more than to call them pleaſing or diſpleaſing; though the ſmell of a roſe and violet, both ſweet, are certainly very diſtinct ideas. Nor are the different taſtes, that by our palates we receive ideas of, much better provided with names. Sweet, bitter, ſour, harſh, and ſalt, are almoſt all the epithets we have, to denominate that numberleſs variety of reliſhes, which are to be found diſtinct, not only in almoſt every of creatures, but in the different parts of the ſame plant, fruit, or animal. The ſame may be ſaid of ſounds. I ſhall therefore, in the

ſimple ideas I am here giving, content myſelf to ſet down only ſuch, as are moſt material to our preſent purpoſe, or are in themſelves leſs apt to be taken notice of, though they are very frequently the ingredients of our complex ideas, amongſt which, I think, I may well account ſolidity; which therefore I ſhall treat of in the next chapter.

CHAP. IV.

Of Solidity.

We receive this idea from touch.

§. 1. THE idea of ſolidity we receive by our touch; and it ariſes from the reſiſtance which we find in body, to the entrance of any other body into the place it poſſeſſes, till it has left it. There is no idea which we receive more conſtantly from ſenſation, than ſolidity. Whether we move or reſt, in what poſture ſoever we are, we always feel ſomething under us that ſupports us, and hinders our farther ſinking downwards; and the bodies which we daily handle make us perceive, that, whilſt they remain between them, they do by an inſurmountable force hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that preſs them. That which thus hinders the approach of two bodies, when they are moved one towards another, I call ſolidity. I will not diſpute, whether this acceptation of the word ſolid be nearer to its original ſignification, than that which mathematicians uſe it in: it ſuffices, that I think the common notion of ſolidity will allow, if not juſtify, this uſe of it; but, if any one think it better to call it impenetrability, he has my conſent. Only I have thought the term ſolidity the more proper to expreſs this idea, not only becauſe of its vulgar uſe in that ſenſe, but alſo becauſe it carries in it ſomething more of poſitive in it than impenetrability, which is more barely negative, and is perhaps more a conſequence of ſolidity. This, of all other, ſeems

ſeems the idea moſt intimately connected with and eſſential to body, ſo as no-where elſe to be found or imagined, but only in matter. And though our ſenſes take no notice of it, but in maſſes of matter, of a bulk ſufficient to cauſe a ſenſation in us; yet the mind, having once got this idea from ſuch groſſer ſenſible bodies, traces it farther; and conſiders it, as well as figure, in the minuteſt particle of matter that can exiſt: and finds it inſeparably inherent in body, wherever or however modified.

Solidity fills ſpace.

§. 2. This is the idea which belongs to body, whereby we conceive it to fill ſpace. The idea of which filling of ſpace is, that, where we imagine any ſpace taken up by a ſolid ſubſtance, we conceive it ſo to poſſeſs it, that it excludes all other ſolid ſubſtances; and will for ever hinder any other two bodies, that move towards one another in a ſtraight line, from coming to touch one another, unleſs it removes from between them, in a line not parallel to that which they move in. This idea of it the bodies which we ordinarily handle ſufficiently furniſh us with.

Diſtinct from ſpace.

§. 3. This reſiſtance, whereby it keeps other bodies out of the ſpace which it poſſeſſes, is ſo great, that no force, how great ſoever, can ſurmount it. All the bodies in the world, preſſing a drop of water on all ſides, will never be able to overcome the reſiſtance which it will make, ſoft as it is, to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their way: whereby our idea of ſolidity is diſtinguiſhed both from pure ſpace, which is capable neither of reſiſtance nor motion; and from the ordinary idea of hardneſs. For a man may conceive two bodies at a diſtance, ſo as they may approach one another, without touching or diſplacing any ſolid thing, till their ſuperficies come to meet: whereby, I think, we have the clear idea of ſpace without ſolidity. For (not to go ſo far as annihilation of any particular body) I aſk, whether a man cannot have the idea of the motion of one ſingle body alone without any other ſucceeding immediately into its place? I think it is evident he can: the idea of motion in one body no more including the

idea of motion in another, than the idea of a ſquare figure in one body includes the idea of a ſquare figure in another. I do not aſk, whether bodies do ſo exiſt that the motion of one body cannot really be without the motion of another? To determine this either way, is to beg the queſtion for or againſt a vacuum. But my queſtion is, whether one cannot have the idea of one body moved whilſt others are at reſt? And I think this no one will deny. If ſo, then the place it deſerted gives us the idea of pure ſpace without ſolidity, whereinto any other body may enter, without either reſiſtance or protruſion of any thing. When the ſucker in a pump is drawn, the ſpace it filled in the tube is certainly the ſame whether any other body follows the motion of the ſucker or not: nor does it imply a contradiction that, upon the motion of one body, another that is only contiguous to it, ſhould not follow it. The neceſſity of ſuch a motion is built only on the ſuppoſition that the world is full, but not on the diſtinct ideas of ſpace and ſolidity; which are as different as reſiſtance and not reſiſtance; protruſion and not protruſion. And that men have ideas of ſpace without a body, their very diſputes about a vacuum plainly demonſtrate; as is ſhowed in another place.

From hardneſs.

§. 4. Solidity is hereby alſo differenced from hardneſs, in that ſolidity conſiſts in repletion, and ſo an utter excluſion of other bodies out of the ſpace it poſſeſſes; but hardneſs, in a firm coheſion of the parts of matter, making up maſſes of a ſenſible bulk, ſo that the whole does not eaſily change its figure. And indeed, hard and ſoft are names that we give to things only in relation to the conſtitutions of our own bodies; that being generally called hard by us, which will put us to pain ſooner than change figure by the preſſure of any part of our bodies; and that on the contrary ſoft, which changes the ſituation of its parts upon an eaſy and unpainful touch.

But this difficulty of changing the ſituation of the ſenſible parts amongſt themſelves, or of the figure of the whole, gives no more ſolidity to the hardeſt body in in the world, than to the ſofteſt; nor is an adamant

one jot more ſolid than water. For though the two flat ſides of two pieces of marble will more eaſily approach each other, between which there is nothing but water or air, than if there be a diamond between them: yet it is not that the parts of the diamond are more ſolid than thoſe of water, or reſiſt more; but becauſe, the parts of water being more eaſily ſeparable from each other, they will, by a ſide motion, be more eaſily removed, and give way to the approach of the two pieces of marble. But if they could be kept from making place by that ſide-motion, they would eternally hinder the approach of theſe two pieces of marble as much as the diamond; and it would be as impoſſible by any force to ſurmount their reſiſtance, as to ſurmount the reſiſtance of the parts of a diamond. The ſofteſt body in the world will as invincibly reſiſt the coming together of any other two bodies, if it be not put out of the way, but remain between them, as the hardeſt that can be found or imagined. He that ſhall fill a yielding ſoft body well with air or water, will quickly find its reſiſtance: and he that thinks that nothing but bodies that are hard can keep his hands from approaching one another, may be pleaſed to make a trial with the air incloſed in a foot-ball. The experiment, I have been told, was made at Florence, with a hollow globe of gold filled with water and exactly cloſed, which farther ſhows the ſolidity of ſo ſoft a body as water. For the golden globe thus filled being put into a preſs which was driven by the extreme force of ſcrews, the water made itſelf way through the pores of that very cloſe metal; and, finding no room for a nearer approach of its particles within, got to the outſide, where it roſe like a dew, and ſo fell in drops, before the ſides of the globe could be made to yield to the violent compreſſion of the engine that ſqueezed it.

On ſolidity depend impulſe, reſiſtance, and protruſion.

§. 5. By this idea of ſolidity, is the extenſion of body diſtinguiſhed from the extenſion of ſpace: the extenſion of body being nothing but the coheſion or continuity of ſolid, ſeparable, moveable parts; and the extenſion of ſpace, the continuity of unſolid, inſeparable,

parable, and immoveable parts. Upon the ſolidity of bodies alſo depend their mutual impulſe, reſiſtance, and protruſion. Of pure ſpace then, and ſolidity, there are ſeveral (amongſt which I confeſs myſelf one) who perſuade themſelves they have clear and diſtinct ideas; and that they can think on ſpace, without any thing in it that reſiſts or is protruded by body. This is the idea of pure ſpace, which they think they have as clear, as any idea they can have of the extenſion of body; the idea of the diſtance between the oppoſite parts of a concave ſuperficies being equally as clear without as with the idea of any ſolid parts between: and on the other ſide they perſuade themſelves, that they have, diſtinct from that of pure ſpace, the idea of ſomething that fills ſpace, that can be protruded by the impulſe of other bodies, or reſiſt their motion. If there be others that have not theſe two ideas diſtinct, but confound them, and make but one of them; I know not how men, who have the ſame idea under different names, or different ideas under the ſame name, can in that caſe talk with one another; any more than a man who, not being blind or deaf, has diſtinct ideas of the colour of ſcarlet, and the ſound of a trumpet, could diſcourſe concerning ſcarlet colour with the blind man I mention in another place, who fancied that the idea of ſcarlet was like the ſound of a trumpet.

§. 6. If any one aſk me, what this ſolidity is? I ſend him to his ſenſes to inform him: let him put a flint or a foot-ball between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a ſufficient explication of ſolidity, what it is, and wherein it conſiſts; I promiſe to tell him what it is, and wherein it conſiſts, when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it conſiſts; or explains to me what extenſion or motion is, which perhaps ſeems much eaſier. The ſimple ideas we have are ſuch as experience teaches them us, but if, beyond that, we endeavour by words to make them clearer in the mind, we ſhall ſucceed no better, than if we went about to clear up the darkneſs of a blind man's

What it is.

mind by talking; and to diſcourſe into him the ideas of light and colours. The reaſon of this I ſhall ſhow in another place.

CHAP. V.

Of Simple Ideas of divers Senſes.

THE ideas we get by more than one ſenſe are of ſpace, or extenſion, figure, reſt, and motion; for theſe make perceivable impreſſions, both on the eyes and touch: and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extenſion, figure, motion, and reſt of bodies, both by ſeeing and feeling. But having occaſion to ſpeak more at large of theſe in another place, I here only enumerate them.

CHAP. VI.

Of Simple Ideas of Reflection.

Simple ideas are the operations of the mind about its other ideas.

§. 1. THE mind, receiving the ideas, mentioned in the foregoing chapters, from without, when it turns its view inward upon itſelf, and obſerves its own actions about thoſe ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of thoſe it received from foreign things.

The idea of perception, and idea of willing, we have from reflection.

§. 2. The two great and principal actions of the mind, which are moſt frequently conſidered, and which are ſo frequent, that every one that pleaſes may take notice of them in himſelf, are theſe two: Perception or Thinking; and Volition, or Willing.

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The power of thinking is called the underſtanding, and the power of volition is called the will; and theſe two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated faculties. Of ſome of the modes of theſe ſimple ideas of reflection, ſuch as are Remembrance, Diſcerning, Reaſoning, Judging, Knowledge, Faith, &c., I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak hereafter.

CHAP. VII.

Of Simple Ideas of both Senſation and Reflection.

Pleaſure and pain.

§. 1. THERE be other ſimple ideas which convey themſelves into the mind by all the ways of ſenſation and reflection, viz. Pleaſure or Delight, and its oppoſite, Pain or Uneaſineſs, Power, Exiſtence, Unity.

§. 2. Delight or uneaſineſs, one or other of them, join themſelves to almoſt all our ideas, both of ſenſation and reflection: and there is ſcarce any affection of our ſenſes from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleaſure or pain. By pleaſure and pain I would be underſtood to ſignify whatſoever delights or moleſts us moſt; whether it ariſes from the thoughts of our minds, or any thing operating on our bodies. For whether we call it ſatisfaction, delight, pleaſure, happineſs, &c. on the one ſide; or uneaſineſs, trouble, pain, torment, anguiſh, miſery, &c. on the other; they are ſtill but different degrees of the ſame thing, and belong to the ideas of pleaſure and pain, delight or uneaſineſs; which are the names I ſhall moſt commonly uſe for thoſe two ſorts of ideas.

§. 3. The infinitely wiſe author of our being having given us the power over ſeveral parts of our bodies, to move or keep them at reſt as we think fit; and alſo, by the motion of them, to move ourſelves and other contiguous bodies, in which conſiſt all the actions of our body;

body; having alſo given a power to our minds in ſeveral inſtances, to chooſe, amongſt its ideas, which it will think on, and to purſue the inquiry of this or that ſubject with conſideration and attention, to excite us to theſe actions of thinking and motion that we are capable of; has been pleaſed to join to ſeveral thoughts, and ſeveral ſenſations, a perception of delight. If this were wholly ſeparated from all our outward ſenſations and inward thoughts, we ſhould have no reaſon to prefer one thought or action to another; negligence to attention; or motion to reſt. And ſo we ſhould neither ſtir our bodies nor employ our minds, but let our thoughts (if I may ſo call it) run a-drift, without any direction or deſign; and ſuffer the ideas of our minds, like unregarded ſhadows, to make their appearances there, as it happened, without attending to them. In which ſtate man, however furniſhed with the faculties of underſtanding and will, would be a very idle unactive creature, and paſs his time only in a lazy, lethargick dream. It has therefore pleaſed our wiſe Creator to annex to ſeveral objects, and the ideas which we receive from them, as alſo to ſeveral of our thoughts, a concomitant pleaſure, and that in ſeveral objects, to ſeveral degrees; that thoſe faculties which he had endowed us with might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us.

§. 4. Pain has the ſame efficacy and uſe to ſet us on work that pleaſure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that, as to purſue this: only this is worth our conſideration, that pain is often produced by the ſame objects and ideas that produce pleaſure in us. This their near conjunction, which makes us often feel pain in the ſenſations where we expected pleaſure, gives us new occaſion of admiring the wiſdom and goodneſs of our Maker: who, deſigning the preſervation of our being, has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies, to warn us of the harm that they will do, and as advices to withdraw from them. But he not deſigning our preſervation barely, but the preſervation of every part and organ in its perfection, hath, in many caſes, annexed pain to thoſe very ideas which delight

delight us. Thus heat, that is very agreeable to us in one degree, by a little greater increaſe of it, proves no ordinary torment; and the moſt pleaſant of all ſenſible objects, light itſelf, if there be too much of it, if increaſed beyond a due proportion to our eyes, cauſes a very painful ſenſation. Which is wiſely and favourably ſo ordered by nature, that when any object does by the vehemency of its operation diſorder the inſtruments of ſenſation, whoſe ſtructures cannot but be very nice and delicate, we might by the pain be warned to withdraw before the organ be quite put out of order, and ſo be unfitted for its proper function for the future. The conſideration of thoſe objects that produce it may well perſuade us, that this is the end or uſe of pain. For though great light be inſufferable to our eyes, yet the higheſt degree of darkneſs does not at all diſeaſe them; becauſe that cauſing no diſorderly motion in it, leaves that curious organ unarmed in its natural ſtate. But yet exceſs of cold as well as heat pains us, becauſe it is equally deſtructive to that temper which is neceſſary to the preſervation of life, and the exerciſe of the ſeveral functions of the body, and which conſiſts in a moderate degree of warmth: or, if you pleaſe, a motion of the inſenſible parts of our bodies, confined within certain bounds.

§. 5. Beyond all this we may find another reaſon, why God hath ſcattered up and down ſeveral degrees of pleaſure and pain, in all the things that environ and affect us, and blended them together in almoſt all that our thoughts and ſenſes have to do with; that we finding imperfection, diſſatisfaction, and want of compleat happineſs, in all the enjoyments which the creatures can afford us, might be led to ſeek it in the enjoyment of him, with whom there is fulneſs of joy, and at whoſe right hand are pleaſures for evermore.

Pleaſure and pain.

§. 6. Though what I have here ſaid may not perhaps make the ideas of pleaſure and pain clearer to us than our own experience does, which is the only way that we are capable of having them; yet the conſideration of the reaſon why they are annexed to ſo many other ideas, ſerving to give

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us due ſentiments of the wiſdom and goodneſs of the ſovereign diſpoſer of all things, may not be unſuitable to the main end of theſe inquiries; the knowledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our thoughts, and the proper buſineſs of all underſtandings.

Exiſtence and unity.

§. 7. Exiſtence and unity are two other ideas that are ſuggeſted to the underſtanding by every object without, and every idea within. When ideas are in our minds, we conſider them as being actually there, as well as we conſider things to be actually without us; which is, that they exiſt, or have exiſtence: and whatever we can conſider as one thing, whether a real being or idea, ſuggeſts to the underſtanding the idea of unity.

Power.

§. 8. Power alſo is another of thoſe ſimple ideas which we receive from ſenſation and reflection. For obſerving in ourſelves, that we can at pleaſure move ſeveral parts of our bodies which were at reſt; the effects alſo, that natural bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every moment to our ſenſes; we both theſe ways get the idea of power.

Succeſſion.

§. 9. Beſides theſe there is another idea, which, though ſuggeſted by our ſenſes, yet is more conſtantly offered to us by what paſſes in our minds: and that is the idea of ſucceſſion. For if we look immediately into ourſelves, and reflect on what is obſervable there, we ſhall find our ideas always, whilſt we are awake, or have any thought, paſſing in train, one going and another coming, without intermiſſion.

Simple ideas the materials of all our knowledge.

§. 10. Theſe, if they are not all, are at leaſt (as I think) the moſt conſiderable of thoſe ſimple ideas which the mind has, and out of which is made all its other knowledge: all which it receives only by the two forementioned ways of ſenſation and reflection.

Nor let any one think theſe too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of man to expatiate in, which takes its flight farther than the ſtars, and cannot be confined by the limits of the world; that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmoſt expanſion of matter,

matter, and makes excurſions into that incomprehenſible inane. I grant all this, but deſire any one to aſſign any ſimple idea which is not received from one of thoſe inlets before-mentioned, or any complex idea not made out of thoſe ſimple ones. Nor will it be ſo ſtrange to think theſe few ſimple ideas ſufficient to employ the quickeſt thought, or largeſt capacity; and to furniſh the materials of all that various knowledge, and more various fancies and opinions of all mankind; if we conſider how many words may be made out of the various compoſition of twenty-four letters; or if, going one ſtep farther, we will but reflect on the variety of combinations may be made, with barely one of the above-mentioned ideas, viz. number, whoſe ſtock is inexhauſtible and truly infinite: and what a large and immenſe field doth extenſion alone afford the mathematicians?

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther Conſiderations concerning our Simple Ideas.

Poſitive ideas from privative cauſes.

§. 1. CONCERNING the ſimple ideas of ſenſation it is to be conſidered that whatſoever is ſo conſtituted in nature as to be able, by affecting our ſenſes, to cauſe any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the underſtanding a ſimple idea; which, whatever be the external cauſe of it, when it comes to be taken notice of by our diſcerning faculty, it is by the mind looked on and conſidered there to be a real poſitive idea in the underſtanding as much as any other whatſoever; though perhaps the cauſe of it be but a privation of the ſubject.

§. 2. Thus the idea of heat and cold, light and darkneſs, white and black, motion and reſt, are equally clear and poſitive ideas in the mind; though perhaps ſome

ſome of the cauſes which produce them are barely privations in ſubjects, from whence our ſenſes derive thoſe ideas. Theſe the underſtanding, in its view of them, conſiders all as diſtinct poſitive ideas, without taking notice of the cauſes that produce them; which is an inquiry not belonging to the idea, as it is in the underſtanding, but to the nature of the things exiſting without us. Theſe are two very different things, and carefully to be diſtinguiſhed; it being one thing to perceive and know the idea of white or black, and quite another to examine what kind of particles they muſt be, and how ranged in the ſuperficies, to make any object appear white or black.

§. 3. A painter or dyer, who never inquired into their cauſes, hath the ideas of white and black, and other colours, as clearly, perfectly, and diſtinctly in his underſtanding, and perhaps more diſtinctly, than the philoſopher, who hath buſied himſelf in conſidering their natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its cauſe poſitive or privative; and the idea of black is no leſs poſitive in his mind, than that of white, however the cauſe of that colour in the external object may be only a privation.

§. 4. If it were the deſign of my preſent undertaking to inquire into the natural cauſes and manner of perception, I ſhould offer this as a reaſon why a privative cauſe might, in ſome caſes at leaſt, produce a poſitive idea; viz. that all ſenſation being produced in us only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal ſpirits, variouſly agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion muſt as neceſſarily produce a new ſenſation, as the variation or increaſe of it: and ſo introduce a new idea, which depends only on a different motion of the animal ſpirits in that organ.

§. 5. But whether this be ſo or no, I will not here determine, but appeal to every one's own experience, whether the ſhadow of a man, though it conſiſts of nothing but the abſence of light (and the more the abſence of light is, the more diſcernable is the ſhadow) does not, when a man looks on it, cauſe as clear and poſitive

poſitive idea in his mind, as a man himſelf, though covered over with clear ſun-ſhine? and the picture of a ſhadow is a poſitive thing. Indeed we have negative names, which ſtand not directly for poſitive ideas, but for their abſence, ſuch as inſipid, ſilence, nihil, &c. which words denote poſitive ideas; v. g. taſte, ſound, being, with a ſignification of their abſence.

Poſitive ideas from privative cauſes.

§. 6. And thus one may truly be ſaid to ſee darkneſs. For ſuppoſing a hole perfectly dark, from whence no light is reflected, it is certain one may ſee the figure of it, or it may be painted: or whether the ink I write with makes any other idea, is a queſtion. The privative cauſes I have here aſſigned of poſitive ideas are according to the common opinion: but in truth it will be hard to determine, whether there be really any ideas from a privative cauſe, till it be determined, whether reſt be any more a privation than motion.

Ideas in the mind, qualities in bodies

§. 7. To diſcover the nature of our ideas the better, and to diſcourſe of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to diſtinguiſh them as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds, and as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cauſe ſuch perceptions in us: that ſo we may not think (as perhaps uſually is done) that they are exactly the images and reſemblances of ſomething inherent in the ſubject; moſt of thoſe of ſenſation being in the mind no more the likeneſs of ſomething exiſting without us, than the names that ſtand for them are the likeneſs of our ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us.

§. 8. Whatſoever the mind perceives in itſelf, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or underſtanding, that I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind I call quality of the ſubject wherein that power is. Thus a ſnow-ball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the powers to produce thoſe ideas in us, as they are in the ſnow-ball, I call qualities; and as they are ſenſations or perceptions in our underſtandings, I call them ideas: which ideas, if I ſpeak of ſometimes, as in the things

things themſelves, I would be underſtood to mean thoſe qualities in the objects which produce them in us.

Primary qualities.

§. 9. Qualities thus conſidered in bodies are, firſt, ſuch as are utterly inſeparable from the body, in what eſtate ſoever it be; ſuch as in all the alterations and changes it ſuffers, all the force can be uſed upon it, it conſtantly keeps; and ſuch as ſenſe conſtantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the mind finds inſeparable from every particle of matter, though leſs than to make itſelf ſingly be perceived by our ſenſes, v. g. Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has ſtill ſolidity, extenſion, figure, and mobility; divide it again, and it retains ſtill the ſame qualities; and ſo divide it on till the parts become inſenſible, they muſt retain ſtill each of them all thoſe qualities. For diviſion (which is all that a mill, or peſtle, or any other body does upon another, in reducing it to inſenſible parts) can never take away either ſolidity, extenſion, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two or more diſtinct ſeparate maſſes of matter, of that which was but one before: all which diſtinct maſſes, reckoned as ſo many diſtinct bodies, after diviſion make a certain number. Theſe I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may obſerve to produce ſimple ideas in us, viz. ſolidity, extenſion, figure, motion or reſt, and number.

Secondary qualities.

§. 10. Secondly, ſuch qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themſelves, but powers to produce various ſenſations in us by their primary qualities, i. e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their inſenſible parts, as colours, ſounds, taſtes, &c. theſe I call ſecondary qualities. To theſe might be added a third ſort, which are allowed to be barely powers, though they are as much real qualities in the ſubject, as thoſe which I, to comply with the common way of ſpeaking, call qualities, but for diſtinction, ſecondary qualities. For the power in fire to produce a new colour, or conſiſtency, in wax or clay, by its primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new idea

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or ſenſation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before, by the ſame primary qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion of its inſenſible parts.

How primary qualities produce their ideas.

§. 11. The next thing to be conſidered is, how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifeſtly by impulſe, the only way which we can conceive bodies to operate in.

§. 12. If then external objects be not united to our minds, when they produce ideas therein, and yet we perceive theſe original qualities in ſuch of them as ſingly fall under our ſenſes, it is evident that ſome motion muſt be thence continued by our nerves or animal ſpirits, by ſome parts of our bodies, to the brain, or the ſeat of ſenſation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And ſince the extenſion, figure, number and motion of bodies, of an obſervable bigneſs, may be perceived at a diſtance by the ſight, it is evident ſome ſingly imperceptible bodies muſt come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain ſome motion, which produces theſe ideas which we have of them in us.

How ſecondary.

§. 13. After the ſame manner that the ideas of theſe original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of ſecondary qualities are alſo produced, viz. by the operations of inſenſible particles on our ſenſes. For it being manifeſt that there are bodies and good ſtore of bodies, each whereof are ſo ſmall, that we cannot, by any of our ſenſes, diſcover either their bulk, figure, or motion as is evident in the particles of the air and water, and others extremely ſmaller than thoſe, perhaps as much ſmaller than the particles of air and water, as the particles of air and water are ſmaller than peaſe or hail-ſtones: let us ſuppoſe at preſent, that the different motions and figures, bulk and number of ſuch particles, affecting the ſeveral organs of our ſenſes, produce in us thoſe different ſenſations, which we have from the colours and ſmells of bodies; v. g. that a violet, by the impulſe of ſuch inſenſible particles of matter of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their motions, cauſes the

ideas of the blue colour and ſweet ſcent of that flower, to be produced in our minds; it being no more impoſſible to conceive that God ſhould annex ſuch ideas to ſuch motions, with which they have no ſimilitude, than that he ſhould annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of ſteel dividing our fleſh, with which that idea hath no reſemblance.

§. 14. What I have ſaid concerning colours and ſmells may be underſtood alſo of taſtes and ſounds, and other the like ſenſible qualities; which, whatever reality we by miſtake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themſelves, but powers to produce various ſenſations in us, and depend on thoſe primary qualities, viz. bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts; as I have ſaid.

Ideas of primary qualities are reſemblances; of ſecondary, not.

§. 15. From whence I think it eaſy to draw this obſervation, that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are reſemblances of them, and their patterns do really exiſt in the bodies themſelves; but the ideas, produced in us by theſe ſecondary qualities, have no reſemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas exiſting in the bodies themſelves. They are in the bodies, we denominate from them, only a power to produce thoſe ſenſations in us: and what is ſweet, blue or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the inſenſible parts in the bodies themſelves, which we call ſo.

§. 16. Flame is denominated hot and light; ſnow, white and cold; and manna, white and ſweet, from the ideas they produce in us: which qualities are commonly thought to be the ſame in thoſe bodies that thoſe ideas are in us, the one the perfect reſemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror; and it would by moſt men be judged very extravagant, if one ſhould ſay otherwiſe. And yet he that will conſider that the ſame fire, that at one diſtance produces in us the ſenſation of warmth, does at a nearer approach produce in us the far different ſenſation of pain, ought to bethink himſelf what reaſon he has to ſay, that his idea of warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually in the

the fire; and his idea of pain, which the ſame fire produced in him the ſame way, is not in the fire. Why are whiteneſs and coldneſs in ſnow, and pain not, when it produces the one and the other idea in us; and can do neither, but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion of its ſolid parts?

§. 17. The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire, or ſnow, are really in them, whether any one's ſenſes perceive them or no; and therefore they may be called real qualities, becauſe they really exiſt in thoſe bodies: but light, heat, whiteneſs or coldneſs, are no more really in them, than ſickneſs or pain is in manna. Take away the ſenſation of them; let not the eyes ſee light, or colours, nor the ears hear ſounds; let the palate not taſte, nor the noſe ſmell; and all colours, taſtes, odours, and ſounds, as they are ſuch particular ideas, vaniſh and ceaſe, and are reduced to their cauſes, i. e. bulk, figure, and motion of parts.

§. 18. A piece of manna of a ſenſible bulk is able to produce in us the idea of a round or ſquare figure, and, by being removed from one place to another, the idea of motion. This idea of motion repreſents it as it really is in the manna moving: a circle or ſquare are the ſame, whether in idea or exiſtence, in the mind, or in the manna; and this both motion and figure are really in the manna, whether we take notice of them or no: this every body is ready to agree to. Beſides, manna by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of its parts, has a power to produce the ſenſations of ſickneſs, and ſometimes of acute pains or gripings in us. That theſe ideas of ſickneſs and pain are not in the manna, but effects of its operations on us, and are nowhere when we feel them not: this alſo every one readily agrees to. And yet men are hardly to be brought to think, that ſweetneſs and whiteneſs are not really in manna; which are but the effects of the operations of manna, by the motion, ſize, and figure of its particles on the eyes and palate; as the pain and ſickneſs cauſed by manna, are confeſſedly nothing but the effects of its operations on the ſtomach and guts, by the ſize,

motion and figure of its inſenſible parts (for by nothing elſe can a body operate, as has been proved:) as if it could not operate on the eyes and palate, and thereby produce in the mind particular diſtinct ideas, which in itſelf it has not, as well as we allow it can operate on the guts and ſtomach, and thereby produce diſtinct ideas, which in itſelf it has not. Theſe ideas being all effects of the operations of manna, on ſeveral parts of our bodies, by the ſize, figure, number, and motion of its parts; why thoſe produced by the eyes and palate ſhould rather be thought to be really in the manna, than thoſe produced by the ſtomach and guts; or why the pain and ſickneſs, ideas that are the effect of manna, ſhould be thought to be no-where when they are not felt; and yet the ſweetneſs and whiteneſs, effects of the ſame manna on other parts of the body, by ways equally as unknown, ſhould be thought to exiſt in the manna, when they are not ſeen or taſted, would need ſome reaſon to explain.

Ideas of primary qualities, are reſemblances; of ſecondary, not.

§. 19. Let us conſider the red and white colours in porphyry: hinder light from ſtriking on it, and its colours vaniſh, it no longer produces any ſuch ideas in us; upon the return of light it produces theſe appearances on us again. Can any one think any real alterations are made in the porphyry, by the preſence or abſence of light; and that thoſe ideas of whiteneſs and redneſs are really in porphyry in the light, when it is plain it has no colour in the dark? it has, indeed, ſuch a configuration of particles, both night and day, as are apt, by the rays of light rebounding from ſome parts of that hard ſtone, to produce in us the idea of redneſs, and from others the idea of whiteneſs; but whiteneſs or redneſs are not in it at any time, but ſuch a texture, that hath the power to produce ſuch a ſenſation in us.

§. 20. Pound an almond, and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one, and the ſweet taſte into an oily one. What real alteration can the beating of the peſtle make in any body, but an alteration of the texture of it?

§. 21. Ideas being thus diſtinguiſhed and underſtood, we may be able to give an account how the ſame water, at the ſame time, may produce the idea of cold by one hand, and of heat by the other; whereas it is impoſſible that the ſame water, if thoſe ideas were really in it, ſhould at the ſame time be both hot and cold: for if we imagine warmth, as it is in our hands, to be nothing but a certain ſort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves, or animal ſpirits, we may underſtand how it is poſſible that the ſame water may, at the ſame time, produce the ſenſations of heat in one hand, and cold in the other; which yet figure never does, that never producing the idea of a ſquare by one hand, which has produced the idea of a globe by another. But if the ſenſation of heat and cold be nothing but the increaſe or diminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies, cauſed by the corpuſcles of any other body, it is eaſy to be underſtood, that if that motion be greater in one hand than in the other; if a body be applied to the two hands, which has in its minute particles a greater motion, than in thoſe of one of the hands, and a leſs than in thoſe of the other; it will increaſe the motion of the one hand, and leſſen it in the other, and ſo cauſe the different ſenſations of heat and cold that depend thereon.

§. 22. I have in what juſt goes before been engaged in phyſical inquiries a little farther than perhaps I intended. But it being neceſſary to make the nature of ſenſation a little underſtood, and to make the difference between the qualities in bodies, and the ideas produced by them in the mind, to be diſtinctly conceived, without which it were impoſſible to diſcourſe intelligibly of them; I hope I ſhall be pardoned this little excurſion into natural philoſophy, it being neceſſary in our preſent inquiry to diſtinguiſh the primary and real qualities of bodies, which are always in them (viz. ſolidity, extenſion, figure, number, and motion, or reſt; and are ſometimes perceived by us, viz. when the bodies they are in are big enough ſingly to be diſcerned) from thoſe ſecondary and imputed qualities, which are but the

powers of ſeveral combinations of thoſe primary ones, when they operate, without being diſtinctly diſcerned; whereby we may alſo come to know what ideas are, and what are not, reſemblances of ſomething really exiſting in the bodies we denominate from them.

Three ſorts of qualities in bodies.

§. 23. The qualities then that are in bodies, rightly conſidered, are of three ſorts.

Firſt, the bulk, figure, number, ſituation, and motion, or reſt of their ſolid parts; thoſe are in them, whether we perceive them or no; and when they are of that ſize, that we can diſcover them, we have by theſe an idea of the thing, as it is in itſelf, as is plain in artificial things. Theſe I call primary qualities.

Secondly, the power that is in any body, by reaſon of its inſenſible primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our ſenſes, and thereby produce in us the different ideas of ſeveral colours, ſounds, ſmells, taſtes, &c. Theſe are uſually called ſenſible qualities.

Thirdly, The power that is in any body, by reaſon of the particular conſtitution of its primary qualities, to make ſuch a change in the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of another body, as to make it operate on our ſenſes, differently from what it did before. Thus the ſun has a power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid. Theſe are uſually called powers.

The firſt of theſe, as has been ſaid, I think, may be properly called real, original, or primary qualities, becauſe they are in the things themſelves, whether they are perceived or no; and upon their different modifications it is, that the ſecondary qualities depend.

The other two are only powers to act differently upon other things, which powers reſult from the different modifications of thoſe primary qualities.

The firſt are reſemblances. The ſecond thought reſemblances, but are not. The third

§. 24. But though the two latter ſorts of qualities are powers barely, and nothing but powers, relating to ſeveral other bodies, and reſulting from the different modifications of the original qualities; yet they are generally otherwiſe thought of. For the

the ſecond ſort, viz. the powers to produce ſeveral ideas in us by our ſenſes, are looked upon as real qualities, in the things thus affecting us: but the third ſort are called and eſteemed barely powers, v. g. the idea of heat, or light, which we receive by our eyes or touch from the ſun, are commonly thought real qualities, exiſting in the ſun, and ſomething more than mere powers in it. But when we conſider the ſun, in reference to wax, which it melts or blanches, we look on the whiteneſs and ſoftneſs produced in the wax, not as qualities in the ſun, but effects produced by powers in it: whereas, if rightly conſidered, theſe qualities of light and warmth, which are perceptions in me when I am warmed, or enlightened by the ſun, are no otherwiſe in the ſun, than the changes made in the wax, when it is blanched or melted, are in the ſun. They are all of them equally powers in the ſun, depending on its primary qualities; whereby it is able, in the one caſe, ſo to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of ſome of the inſenſible parts of my eyes or hands, as thereby to produce in me the idea of light or heat; and in the other, it is able ſo to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of the inſenſible parts of the wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the diſtinct ideas of white and fluid.

neither are, nor are thought ſo,

§. 25. The reaſon why the one are ordinarily taken for real qualities, and the other only for bare powers, ſeems to be, becauſe the ideas we have of diſtinct colours, ſounds, &c. containing nothing at all in them of bulk, figure, or motion, we are not apt to think them the effects of theſe primary qualities, which appear not, to our ſenſes, to operate in their production; and with which they have not any apparent congruity, or conceivable connexion. Hence it is that we are ſo forward to imagine, that thoſe ideas are the reſemblances of ſomething really exiſting in the objects themſelves; ſince ſenſation diſcovers nothing of bulk, figure, or motion of parts in their production; nor can reaſon ſhow how bodies, by their bulk, figure, and mo-

tion, ſhould produce in the mind the ideas of blue or yellow, &c. But in the other caſe, in the operations of bodies, changing the qualities one of another, we plainly diſcover, that the quality produced hath commonly no reſemblance with any thing in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare effect of power. For though receiving the idea of heat, or light, from the ſun, we are apt to think it is a perception and reſemblance of ſuch a quality in the ſun; yet when we ſee wax, or a fair face, receive change of colour from the ſun, we cannot imagine that to be the reception or reſemblance of any thing in the ſun, becauſe we find not thoſe different colours in the ſun itſelf. For our ſenſes being able to obſerve a likeneſs or unlikeneſs of ſenſible qualities in two different external objects, we forwardly enough conclude the production of any ſenſible quality in any ſubject to be an effect of bare power, and not the communication of any quality, which was really in the efficient, when we find no ſuch ſenſible quality in the thing that produced it. But our ſenſes not being able to diſcover any unlikeneſs between the idea produced in us, and the quality of the object producing it; we are apt to imagine, that our ideas are reſemblances of ſomething in the objects, and not the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of their primary qualities; with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no reſemblance.

Secondary qualities twofold; firſt, immediately perceivable; ſecondly, mediately perceivable.

§. 26. To conclude, beſide thoſe beforementioned primary qualities in bodies, viz. bulk, figure, extenſion, number, and motion of their ſolid parts; all the reſt whereby we take notice of bodies, and diſtinguiſh them one from another, are nothing elſe but ſeveral powers in them depending on thoſe primary qualities; whereby they are fitted, either by immediately operating on our bodies, to produce ſeveral different ideas in us; or elſe by operating on other bodies, ſo to change their primary qualities, as to render them capable of producing ideas in us, different

ferent from what before they did. The former of theſe, I think, may be called ſecondary qualities, immediately perceivable: the latter, ſecondary qualities, mediately perceivable.

CHAP. IX.

Of Perception.

§. 1. PERCEPTION, as it is the firſt faculty of the mind, exerciſed about our ideas; ſo it is the firſt and ſimpleſt idea we have from reflection, and is by ſome called thinking in general. Though thinking, in the propriety of the Engliſh tongue, ſignifies that ſort of operation in the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active; where it, with ſome degree of voluntary attention, conſiders any thing. For in bare naked perception, the mind is, for the moſt part, only paſſive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.

Perception the firſt ſimple idea of reflection.

§. 2. What perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himſelf, what he ſees, hears, feels, &c. or thinks, than by any diſcourſe of mine. Whoever reflects on what paſſes in his own mind, cannot miſs it: and if he does not reflect, all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it.

Is only when the mind receives the impreſſion.

§. 3. This is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind; whatever impreſſions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within; there is no perception. Fire may burn our bodies, with no other effect, than it does a billet, unleſs the motion be continued to the brain, and there the ſenſe of heat, or idea of pain, be produced in the mind, wherein conſiſts actual perception.

§. 4. How

§. 4. How often may a man obſerve in himſelf, that whilſt his mind is intently employed in the contemplation of ſome objects, and curiouſly ſurveying ſome ideas that are there, it takes no notice of impreſſions of ſounding bodies made upon the organ of hearing, with the ſame alteration that uſes to be for the producing the idea of ſound? A ſufficient impulſe there may be on the organ; but if not reaching the obſervation of the mind, there follows no perception: and though the motion that uſes to produce the idea of ſound be made in the ear, yet no ſound is heard. Want of ſenſation, in this caſe, is not through any defect in the organ, or that the man's ears are leſs affected than at other times when he does hear: but that which uſes to produce the idea, though conveyed in by the uſual organ, not being taken notice of in the underſtanding, and ſo imprinting no idea in the mind, there follows no ſenſation. So that wherever there is ſenſe, or perception, there ſome idea is actually produced, and preſent in the underſtanding.

Children, though they have ideas in the womb, have none innate.

§. 5. Therefore I doubt not but children, by the exerciſe of their ſenſes about objects that affect them in the womb, receive ſome few ideas before they are born; as the unavoidable effects, either of the bodies that anviron them, or elſe of thoſe wants or diſeaſes they ſuffer: amongſt which (if one may conjecture concerning things not very capable of examination) I think the ideas of hunger and warmth are two; which probably are ſome of the firſt that children have, and which they ſcarce ever part with again.

§. 6. But though it be reaſonable to imagine that children receive ſome ideas before they come into the world, yet thoſe ſimple ideas are far from thoſe innate principles which ſome contend for, and we above have rejected. Theſe here mentioned being the effects of ſenſation, are only from ſome affections of the body, which happen to them there, and ſo depend on ſomething exterior to the mind: no otherwiſe differing in their manner of production from other ideas derived from ſenſe, but only in the precedency of time; whereas

thoſe innate principles are ſuppoſed to be quite of another nature; not coming into the mind by any accidental alterations in, or operations on the body; but, as it were, original characters impreſſed upon it, in the very firſt moment of its being and conſtitution.

Which ideas firſt, is not evident.

§. 7. As there are ſome ideas which we may reaſonably ſuppoſe may be introduced into the minds of children in the womb, ſubſervient to the neceſſities of their life and being there; ſo after they are born, thoſe ideas are the earlieſt imprinted, which happen to be the ſenſible qualities which firſt occur to them: amongſt which, light is not the leaſt conſiderable, nor of the weakeſt efficacy. And how covetous the mind is to be furniſhed with all ſuch ideas as have no pain accompanying them, may be a little gueſſed, by what is obſervable in children new-born, who always turn their eyes to that part from whence the light comes, lay them how you pleaſe. But the ideas that are moſt familiar at firſt being various, according to the divers circumſtances of children's firſt entertainment in the world; the order wherein the ſeveral ideas come at firſt into the mind is very various and uncertain alſo; neither is it much material to know it.

Ideas of ſenſation often changed by the judgment.

§. 8. We are further to conſider concerning perception, that the ideas we receive by ſenſation are often in grown people altered by the judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we ſet before our eyes a round globe, of any uniform colour, v. g. gold, alabaſter, or jet; it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted in our mind, is of a flat circle variouſly ſhadowed, with ſeveral degrees of light and brightneſs coming to our eyes. But we having by uſe been accuſtomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us, what alterations are made in the reflections of light by the difference of the ſenſible figures of bodies; the judgment preſently, by an habitual cuſtom, alters the appearances into their cauſes; ſo that from that which is truly variety of ſhadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it paſs for

for a mark of figure, and frames to itſelf the perception of a convex figure and an uniform colour; when the idea we receive from thence is only a plane variouſly coloured, as is evident in painting. To which purpoſe I ſhall here inſert a problem of that very ingenious and ſtudious promoter of real knowledge, the learned and worthy Mr. Molineaux, which he was pleaſed to ſend me in a letter ſome months ſince; and it is this: Suppoſe a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to diſtinguiſh between a cube and a ſphere of the ſame metal, and nighly of the ſame bigneſs, ſo as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the ſphere. Suppoſe then the cube and ſphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to ſee: quære, "whether by his ſight, before he touched "them, he could now diſtinguiſh and tell, which is "the globe, which the cube?" to which the acute and judicious propoſer anſwers: Not. For though he has obtained the experience of, how a globe, how a cube affects his touch; yet he has not yet obtained the experience, that what affects his touch ſo or ſo, muſt affect his ſight ſo or ſo: or that a protuberant angle in the cube, that preſſed his hand unequally, ſhall appear to his eye as it does in the cube. I agree with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his anſwer to this his problem; and am of opinion, that the blind man at firſt ſight, would not be able with certainty to ſay which was the globe, which the cube, whilſt he only ſaw them: though he could unerringly name them by his touch, and certainly diſtinguiſh them by the difference of their figures felt. This I have ſet down, and leave with my reader, as an occaſion for him to conſider how much he may be beholden to experience, improvement, and acquired notions, where he thinks he had not the leaſt uſe of, or help from them: and the rather, becauſe this obſerving gentleman further adds, that having upon the occaſion of my book, propoſed this to divers very ingenious men, he hardly ever met with one, that at firſt gave the anſwer to it which he thinks true, till by hearing his reaſons they were convinced.

§. 9. But

§. 9. But this is not, I think, uſual in any of our ideas, but thoſe received by ſight: becauſe ſight, the moſt comprehenſive of all our ſenſes, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to that ſenſe; and alſo the far different ideas of ſpace, figure, and motion, the ſeveral varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper object, viz. light and colours; we bring ourſelves by uſe to judge of the one by the other. This, in many caſes, by a ſettled habit, in things whereof we have frequent experience, is performed ſo conſtantly and ſo quick, that we take that for the perception of our ſenſation, which is an idea formed by our judgment; ſo that one, viz. that of ſenſation, ſerves only to excite the other, and is ſcarce taken notice of itſelf: as a man who reads or hears with attention and underſtanding, takes little notice of the characters, or ſounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them.

§. 10. Nor need we wonder that this is done with ſo little notice, if we conſider how very quick the actions of the mind are performed: for as itſelf is thought to take up no ſpace, to have no extenſion; ſo its actions ſeem to require no time, but many of them ſeem to be crouded into an inſtant. I ſpeak this in compariſon to the actions of the body. Any one may eaſily obſerve this in his own thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an inſtant, do our minds with one glance ſee all the parts of a demonſtration, which may very well be called a long one, if we conſider the time it will require to put it into words, and ſtep by ſtep ſhow it another? Secondly, we ſhall not be ſo much ſurprized, that this is done in us with ſo little notice, if we conſider how the facility which we get of doing things, by a cuſtom of doing, makes them often paſs in us without our notice. Habits, eſpecially ſuch as are begun very early, come at laſt to produce actions in us, which often eſcape our obſervation. How frequently do we, in a day, cover our eyes with our eye-lids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark? Men that by cuſtom have got the uſe of a by-word do almoſt in every ſentence pronounce

ſounds.

ſounds which, though taken notice of by others, they themſelves neither hear nor obſerve. And therefore it is not ſo ſtrange, that our mind ſhould often change the idea of its ſenſation into that of its judgment, and make one ſerve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.

Perception puts the difference between animals and inferior beings.

§. 11. This faculty of perception ſeems to me to be that, which puts the diſtinction betwixt the animal kingdom and the inferior parts of nature. For however vegetables have, many of them, ſome degrees of motion, and upon the different application of other bodies to them, do very briſkly alter their figures and motions, and ſo have obtained the name of ſenſitive plants, from a motion which has ſome reſemblance to that which in animals follows upon ſenſation: yet, I ſuppoſe, it is all bare mechaniſm; and no otherwiſe produced, than the turning of a wild oat-beard, by the inſinuation of the particles of moiſture; or the ſhortening of a rope, by the affuſion of water. All which is done without any ſenſation in the ſubject, or the having or receiving any ideas.

§. 12. Perception, I believe, is in ſome degree in all ſorts of animals; though in ſome, poſſibly, the avenues provided by nature for the reception of ſenſations are ſo few, and the perception they are received with ſo obſcure and dull, that it comes extremely ſhort of the quickneſs and variety of ſenſation which are in other animals: but yet it is ſufficient for, and wiſely adapted to, the ſtate and condition of that ſort of animals who are thus made. So that the wiſdom and goodneſs of the Maker plainly appear in all the parts of this ſtupendous fabric, and all the ſeveral degrees and ranks of creatures in it.

§. 13. We may, I think, from the make of an oyſter, or cockle, reaſonably conclude that it has not ſo many, nor ſo quick ſenſes, as a man, or ſeveral other animals; nor if it had, would it, in that ſtate and incapacity of transferring itſelf from one place to another, be bettered by them. What good would ſight and hearing do to a creature, that cannot move itſelf to, or from the objects

objects wherein at a diſtance it perceives good or evil? And would not quickneſs of ſenſation be an inconvenience to an animal that muſt lie ſtill, where chance has once placed it; and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or foul water, as it happens to come to it?

§. 14. But yet I cannot but think there is ſome ſmall dull perception, whereby they are diſtinguiſhed from perfect inſenſibility. And that this may be ſo, we have plain inſtances even in mankind itſelf. Take one, in whom decrepid old age has blotted out the memory of his paſt knowledge, and clearly wiped out the ideas his mind was formerly ſtored with; and has, by deſtroying his ſight, hearing, and ſmell quite, and his taſte to a great degree, ſtopped up almoſt all the paſſages for new ones to enter: or, if there be ſome of the inlets yet half open, the impreſſions made are ſcarce perceived, or not at all retained. How far ſuch an one (notwithſtanding all that is boaſted of innate principles) is in his knowledge, and intellectual faculties, above the condition of a cockle or an oyſter, I leave to be conſidered. And if a man had paſſed ſixty years in ſuch a ſtate, as it is poſſible he might, as well as three days; I wonder what difference there would have been, in any intellectual perfections, between him and the loweſt degree of animals.

Perception the inlet of knowledge.

§. 15. Perception then being the firſt ſtep and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it; the fewer ſenſes any man, as well as any other creature, hath, and the fewer and duller the impreſſions are that are made by them, and the duller the faculties are that are employed about them; the more remote are they from that knowledge, which is to be found in ſome men. But this being in great variety of degrees (as may be perceived amongſt men) cannot certainly be diſcovered in the ſeveral ſpecies of animals, much leſs in their particular individuals. It ſuffices me only to have remarked here, that perception is the firſt operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge in our minds. And I am apt too to imagine, that it is

perception

perception in the loweſt degree of it, which puts the boundaries between animals and the inferior ranks of creatures. But this I mention only as my conjecture by the by; it being indifferent to the matter in hand, which way the learned ſhall determine of it.

CHAP. X.

Of Retention.

Contemplation. §. 1. THE next faculty of the mind, whereby it makes a farther progreſs towards knowledge, is that which I call retention, or the keeping of thoſe ſimple ideas, which from ſenſation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways; firſt, by keeping the idea, which is brought into it, for ſome time actually in view; which is called contemplation.

Memory. §. 2. The other way of retention, is the power to revive again in our minds thoſe ideas, which after imprinting have diſappeared, or have been as it were laid aſide out of ſight; and thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or ſweet, the object being removed. This is memory, which is as it were the ſtore-houſe of our ideas. For the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view and conſideration at once, it was neceſſary to have a repoſitory to lay up thoſe ideas, which at another time it might have uſe of. But our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which ceaſe to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our ideas in the repoſitory of the memory, ſignifies no more but this, that the mind has a power in many caſes to revive perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. And in this ſenſe it is, that our ideas are ſaid to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually no-where, but only there is an ability

ability in the mind when it will to revive them again, and as it were paint them a-new on itſelf, though ſome with more, ſome with leſs difficulty; ſome more lively, and others more obſcurely. And thus it is, by the aſſiſtance of this faculty, that we are to have all thoſe ideas in our underſtandings, which though we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in ſight, and make appear again, and be the objects of our thoughts, without the help of thoſe ſenſible qualities which firſt imprinted them there.

Attention, repetition, pleaſure and pain, fix ideas.

§. 3. Attention and repetition help much to the fixing any ideas in the memory: but thoſe which naturally at firſt make the deepeſt and moſt laſting impreſſion, are thoſe which are accompanied with pleaſure or pain. The great buſineſs of the ſenſes being to make us take notice of what hurts or advantages the body, it is wiſely ordered by nature (as has been ſhown) that pain ſhould accompany the reception of ſeveral ideas; which ſupplying the place of conſideration and reaſoning in children, and acting quicker than conſideration in grown men, makes both the old and young avoid painful objects, with that haſte which is neceſſary for their preſervation; and, in both, ſettles in the memory a caution for the future.

Ideas fade in the memory.

§. 4. Concerning the ſeveral degrees of laſting, wherewith ideas are imprinted on the memory, we may obſerve, that ſome of them have been produced in the underſtanding, by an object affecting the ſenſes once only, and no more than once; others, that have more than once offered themſelves to the ſenſes, have yet been little taken notice of: the mind either heedleſs, as in children, or otherwiſe employed, as in men, intent only on one thing, not ſetting the ſtamp deep into itſelf. And in ſome, where they are ſet on with care and repeated impreſſions, either through the temper of the body, or ſome other fault, the memory is very weak. In all theſe caſes, ideas in the mind quickly fade, and often vaniſh quite out of the underſtanding, leaving no more footſteps or remaining

characters of themſelves, than ſhadows do flying over fields of corn; and the mind is as void of them, as if they had never been there.

§. 5. Thus many of thoſe ideas, which were produced in the minds of children, in the beginning of their ſenſation (ſome of which perhaps, as of ſome pleaſures and pains, were before they were born, and others in their infancy) if in the future courſe of their lives they are not repeated again, are quite loſt, without the leaſt glimpſe remaining of them. This may be obſerved in thoſe who by ſome miſchance have loſt their ſight when they were very young, in whom the ideas of colours having been but ſlightly taken notice of, and ceaſing to be repeated, do quite wear out: ſo that ſome years after there is no more notion nor memory of colours left in their minds, than in thoſe of people born blind. The memory of ſome, it is true, is very tenacious, even to a miracle: but yet there ſeems to be a conſtant decay of all our ideas, even of thoſe which are ſtruck deepeſt, and in minds the moſt retentive; ſo that if they be not ſometimes renewed by repeated exerciſe of the ſenſes, or reflection on thoſe kind of objects which at firſt occaſioned them, the print wears out, and at laſt there remains nothing to be ſeen. Thus the ideas, as well as children, of our youth, often die before us: and our minds repreſent to us thoſe tombs, to which we are approaching; where though the braſs and marble remain, yet the inſcriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our minds are laid in fading colours, and, if not ſometimes refreſhed, vaniſh and diſappear. How much the conſtitution of our bodies and the make of our animal ſpirits are concerned in this, and whether the temper of the brain makes this difference, that in ſome it retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like free-ſtone, and in others little better than ſand; I ſhall not here inquire: though it may ſeem probable, that the conſtitution of the body does ſometimes influence the memory; ſince we oftentimes find a diſeaſe quite ſtrip the mind of all its ideas, and the flames of a fever in a few days calcine

cine all thoſe images to duſt and confuſion, which ſeemed to be as laſting as if graved in marble.

Conſtantly repeated ideas can ſcarce be loſt.

§. 6. But concerning the ideas themſelves it is eaſy to remark, that thoſe that are oftenеſt refreſhed (amongſt which are thoſe that are conveyed into the mind by more ways than one) by a frequent return of the objects or actions that produce them, fix themſelves beſt in the memory, and remain cleareſt and longeſt there: and therefore thoſe which are of the original qualities of bodies, viz. ſolidity, extenſion, figure, motion, and reſt; and thoſe that almoſt conſtantly affect our bodies, as heat and cold; and thoſe which are the affections of all kinds of beings, as exiſtence, duration and number, which almoſt every object that affects our ſenſes, every thought which employs our minds, bring along with them: theſe, I ſay, and the like ideas, are ſeldom quite loſt, whilſt the mind retains any ideas at all.

In remembering, the mind is often active.

§. 7. In this ſecondary perception, as I may ſo call it, or viewing again the ideas that are lodged in the memory, the mind is oftentimes more than barely paſſive; the appearance of thoſe dormant pictures depending ſometimes on the will. The mind very often ſets itſelf on work in ſearch of ſome hidden idea, and turns as it were the eye of the ſoul upon it; though ſometimes too they ſtart up in our minds of their own accord, and offer themſelves to the underſtanding; and very often are rouſed and tumbled out of their dark cells into open day-light, by turbulent and tempeſtuous paſſions: our affections bringing ideas to our memory, which had otherwiſe lain quiet and unregarded. This farther is to be obſerved, concerning ideas lodged in the memory, and upon occaſion revived by the mind, that they are not only (as the word revive imports) none of them new ones; but alſo that the mind takes notice of them, as of a former impreſſion, and renews its acquaintance with them, as with ideas it had known before. So that though ideas formerly imprinted are not all conſtantly in view, yet in remembrance they are conſtantly known

to be ſuch as have been formerly imprinted; i. e. in view, and taken notice of before by the underſtanding:

Two defects in the memory, oblivion and flowneſs.

§. 8. Memory, in an intellectual creature, is neceſſary in the next degree to perception. It is of ſo great moment, that where it is wanting, all the reſt of our faculties are in a great meaſure uſeleſs: and we in our thoughts, reaſonings, and knowledge, could not proceed beyond preſent objects, were it not for the aſſiſtance of our memories, wherein there may be two defects.

Firſt, That it loſes the idea quite, and ſo far it produces perfect ignorance. For ſince we can know nothing farther than we have the idea of it, when that is gone, we are in perfect ignorance.

Secondly, That it moves ſlowly, and retrieves not the ideas that it has, and are laid up in ſtore, quick enough to ſerve the mind upon occaſion. This, if it be to a great degree, is ſtupidity; and he, who, through this default in his memory, has not the ideas that are really preſerved there, ready at hand when need and occaſion calls for them, were almoſt as good be without them quite, ſince they ſerve him to little purpoſe. The dull man, who loſes the opportunity whilſt he is ſeeking in his mind for thoſe ideas that ſhould ſerve his turn, is not much more happy in his knowledge than one that is perfectly ignorant. It is the buſineſs therefore of the memory to furniſh to the mind thoſe dormant ideas which it has preſent occaſion for; in the having them ready at hand on all occaſions, conſiſts that which we call invention, fancy, and quickneſs of parts.

§. 9. Theſe are defects, we may obſerve, in the memory of one man compared with another. There is another defect which we may conceive to be in the memory of man in general, compared with ſome ſuperior created intellectual beings, which in this faculty may ſo far excel man, that they may have conſtantly in view the whole ſcene of all their former actions, wherein no one of the thoughts they have ever had may ſlip out of

their

their ſight. The omniſcience of God, who knows all things, paſt, preſent, and to come, and to whom the thoughts of men's hearts always lie open, may ſatisfy us of the poſſibility of this. For who can doubt but God may communicate to thoſe glorious ſpirits, his immediate attendants, any of his perfections, in what proportions he pleaſes, as far as created finite beings can be capable? It is reported of that prodigy of parts, monſieur Paſcal, that till the decay of his health had impaired his memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or thought, in any part of his rational age. This is a privilege ſo little known to moſt men, that it ſeems almoſt incredible to thoſe, who, after the ordinary way, meaſure all others by themſelves; but yet, when conſidered, may help us to enlarge our thoughts towards greater perfection of it in ſuperior ranks of ſpirits. For this of Mr. Paſcal was ſtill with the narrowneſs that human minds are confined to here, of having great variety of ideas only by ſucceſſion, not all at once: whereas the ſeveral degrees of angels may probably have larger views, and ſome of them be endowed with capacities able to retain together, and conſtantly ſet before them, as in one picture, all their paſt knowledge at once. This, we may conceive, would be no ſmall advantage to the knowledge of a thinking man, if all his paſt thoughts and reaſonings could be always preſent to him. And therefore we may ſuppoſe it one of thoſe ways, wherein the knowledge of ſeparate ſpirits may exceedingly ſurpaſs ours.

Brutes have memory.

§. 10. This faculty of laying up and retaining the ideas that are brought into the mind, ſeveral other animals ſeem to have to a great degree, as well as man. For to paſs by other inſtances, birds learning of tunes, and the endeavours one may obſerve in them to hit the notes right, put it paſt doubt with me, that they have perception, and retain ideas in their memories, and uſe them for patterns. For it ſeems to me impoſſible, that they ſhould endeavour to conform their voices to notes (as it is plain they do) of which they had no ideas. For though I ſhould

grant ſound may mechanically cauſe a certain motion of the animal ſpirits, in the brains of thoſe birds, whilſt the tune is actually playing; and that motion may be continued on to the muſcles of the wings, and ſo the bird mechanically be driven away by certain noiſes, becauſe this may tend to the bird's preſervation: yet that can never be ſuppoſed a reaſon, why it ſhould cauſe mechanically, either whilſt the tune is playing, much leſs after it has ceaſed, ſuch a motion of the organs in the bird's voice, as ſhould conform it to the notes of a foreign ſound; which imitation can be of no uſe to the bird's preſervation. But which is more, it cannot with any appearance of reaſon be ſuppoſed (much leſs proved) that birds, without ſenſe and memory, can approach their notes nearer and nearer by degrees to a tune played yeſterday; which if they have no idea of in their memory, is no-where, nor can be a pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated eſſays can bring them nearer to. Since there is no reaſon why the ſound of a pipe ſhould leave traces in their brains, which not at firſt, but by their after-endeavours, ſhould produce the like ſounds; and why the ſounds they make themſelves, ſhould not make traces which they ſhould follow, as well as thoſe of the pipe, is impoſſible to conceive.

CHAP. XI.

Of Diſcerning, and other Operations of the Mind.

No knowledge without diſcernment.

§. 1. ANOTHER faculty we may take notice of in our minds, is that of diſcerning and diſtinguiſhing between the ſeveral ideas it has. It is not enough to have a confuſed perception of ſomething in general: unleſs the mind had a diſtinct perception of different objects

objects and their qualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge; though the bodies that affect us were as buſy about us as they are now, and the mind were continually employed in thinking. On this faculty of diſtinguiſhing one thing from another, depends the evidence and certainty of ſeveral, even very general propoſitions, which have paſſed for innate truths; becauſe men, overlooking the true cauſe why thoſe propoſitions find univerſal aſſent, impute it wholly to native uniform impreſſions: whereas it in truth depends upon this clear diſcerning faculty of the mind, whereby it perceives two ideas to be the ſame, or different. But of this more hereafter.

The difference of wit and judgment.

§. 2. How much the imperfection of accurately diſcriminating ideas one from another lies either in the dulneſs or faults of the organs of ſenſe; or want of acuteneſs, exerciſe, or attention, in the underſtanding; or haſtineſs and precipitancy, natural to ſome tempers, I will not here examine: it ſuffices to take notice, that this is one of the operations, that the mind may reflect on and obſerve in itſelf. It is of that conſequence to its other knowledge, that ſo far as this faculty is in itſelf dull, or not rightly made uſe of, for the diſtinguiſhing one thing from another; ſo far our notions are confuſed, and our reaſon and judgment diſturbed or miſled. If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand conſiſts quickneſs of parts; in this of having them unconfuſed, and being able nicely to diſtinguiſh one thing from another, where there is but the leaſt difference, conſiſts, in a great meaſure, the exactneſs of judgment, and clearneſs of reaſon, which is to be obſerved in one man above another. And hence perhaps may be given ſome reaſon of that common obſervation, that men, who have a great deal of wit, and prompt memories, have not always the cleareſt judgment, or deepeſt reaſon: for wit lying moſt in the aſſemblage of ideas, and putting thoſe together with quickneſs and variety, wherein can be found any reſemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleaſant pictures, and agree-

able viſions in the fancy; judgment on the contrary, lies quite on the other ſide, in ſeparating carefully, one from another, ideas, wherein can be found the leaſt difference; thereby to avoid being miſled by ſimilitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and alluſion, wherein for the moſt part lies that entertainment and pleaſantry of wit, which ſtrikes ſo lively on the fancy, and therefore is ſo acceptable to all people; becauſe its beauty appears at firſt ſight, and there is required no labour of thought to examine what truth or reaſon there is in it. The mind, without looking any farther, reſts ſatisfied with the agreeableneſs of the picture, and the gaiety of the fancy: and it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it by the ſevere rules of truth and good reaſon; whereby it appears, that it conſiſts in ſomething that is not perfectly conformable to them.

Clearneſs alone hinders confuſion.

§. 3. To the well diſtinguiſhing our ideas, it chiefly contributes, that they be clear and determinate: and where they are ſo, it will not breed any confuſion or miſtake about them, though the ſenſes ſhould (as ſometimes they do) convey them from the ſame object differently, on different occaſions, and ſo ſeem to err. For though a man in a fever ſhould from ſugar have a bitter taſte, which at another time would produce a ſweet one; yet the idea of bitter in that man's mind, would be as clear and diſtinct from the idea of ſweet, as if he had taſted only gall. Nor does it make any more confuſion between the two ideas of ſweet and bitter, that the ſame ſort of body produces at one time one, and at another time another idea by the taſte, than it makes a confuſion in two ideas of white and ſweet, or white and round, that the ſame piece of ſugar produces them both in the mind at the ſame time. And the ideas of orange-colour and azure, that are produced in the mind by the ſame parcel of the infuſion of lignum nephriticum, are no leſs diſtinct ideas, than thoſe of the ſame colours, taken from two very different bodies.

§. 4. The

§. 4. The comparing them one with another, in reſpect of extent, degrees, time, place, or any other circumſtances, is another operation of the mind about its ideas, and is that upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas, comprehended under relations; which of how vaſt an extent it is, I ſhall have occaſion to conſider hereafter. Comparing.

§. 5. How far brutes partake in this faculty, is not eaſy to determine; I imagine they have it not in any great degree: for though they probably have ſeveral ideas diſtinct enough, yet it ſeems to me to be the prerogative of human underſtanding, when it has ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed any ideas, ſo as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and ſo conſequently two, to caſt about and conſider in what circumſtances they are capable to be compared: and therefore, I think, beaſts compare not their ideas farther than ſome ſenſible circumſtances annexed to the objects themſelves. The other power of comparing, which may be obſerved in men, belonging to general ideas, and uſeful only to abſtract reaſonings, we may probably conjecture beaſts have not. Brutes compare but imperfectly.

§. 6. The next operation we may obſerve in the mind about its ideas, is compoſition; whereby it puts together ſeveral of thoſe ſimple ones it has received from ſenſation and reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of compoſition may be reckoned alſo that of enlarging; wherein though the compoſition does not ſo much appear as in more complex ones, yet it is nevertheleſs a putting ſeveral ideas together, though of the ſame kind. Thus by adding ſeveral units together, we make the idea of a dozen; and, putting together the repeated ideas of ſeveral perches, we frame that of a furlong. Compounding.

§. 7. In this alſo, I ſuppoſe, brutes come far ſhort of men: for though they take in, and retain together ſeveral combinations of ſimple ideas, as poſſibly the ſhape, ſmell, and voice of his maſter make up the complex idea a dog has of him, or rather are ſo many diſtinct marks whereby he knows him; Brutes compound but little.

him; yet I do not think they do of themſelves ever compound them, and make complex ideas. And perhaps even where we think they have complex ideas, it is only one ſimple one that directs them in the knowledge of ſeveral things, which poſſibly they diſtinguiſh leſs by their ſight than we imagine: for I have been credibly informed that a bitch will nurſe, play with, and be fond of young foxes, as much as, and in place of, her puppies; if you can but get them once to ſuck her ſo long, that her milk may go through them. And thoſe animals, which have a numerous brood of young ones at once, appear not to have any knowledge of their number: for though they are mightily concerned for any of their young that are taken from them whilſt they are in ſight or hearing; yet if one or two of them be ſtolen from them in their abſence, or without noiſe, they appear not to miſs them, or to have any ſenſe that their number is leſſened.

Naming. §. 8. When children have, by repeated ſenſations, got ideas fixed in their memories, they begin by degrees to learn the uſe of ſigns. And when they have got the ſkill to apply the organs of ſpeech to the framing of articulate ſounds, they begin to make uſe of words, to ſignify their ideas to others. Theſe verbal ſigns they ſometimes borrow from others, and ſometimes make themſelves, as one may obſerve among the new and unuſual names children often give to things in the firſt uſe of language.

Abſtraction. §. 9. The uſe of words then being to ſtand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and thoſe ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea that we take in ſhould have a diſtinct name, names muſt be endleſs. To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas, received from particular objects, to become general; which is done by conſidering them as they are in the mind, ſuch appearances, ſeparate from all other exiſtences, and the circumſtances of real exiſtence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called abſtraction, whereby ideas, taken from particular beings, become gen-

general repreſentatives of all of the ſame kind, and their names general names, applicable to whatever exiſts conformable to ſuch abſtract ideas. Such preciſe naked appearances in the mind, without conſidering how, whence, or with what others they came there, the underſtanding lays up (with names commonly annexed to them) as the ſtandard to rank real exiſtences into ſorts, as they agree with theſe patterns, and to denominate them accordingly. Thus the ſame colour being obſerved to-day in chalk or ſnow, which the mind yeſterday received from milk, it conſiders that appearance alone, makes it a repreſentative of all of that kind; and having given it the name whiteneſs, it by that ſound ſignifies the ſame quality, whereſoever to be imagined or met with: and thus univerſals, whether ideas or terms, are made.

Brutes abſtract not.

§. 10. If it may be doubted, whether beaſts compound and enlarge their ideas that way to any degree; this, I think, I may be poſitive in, that the power of abſtracting is not at all in them; and that the having of general ideas, is that which puts a perfect diſtinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to. For it is evident we obſerve no footſteps in them of making uſe of general ſigns for univerſal ideas; from which we have reaſon to imagine, that they have not the faculty of abſtracting, or making general ideas, ſince they have no uſe of words, or any other general ſigns.

§. 11. Nor can it be imputed to their want of fit organs to frame articulate ſounds, that they have no uſe or knowledge of general words; ſince many of them, we find, can faſhion ſuch ſounds, and pronounce words diſtinctly enough, but never with any ſuch application. And on the other ſide, men, who through ſome defect in the organs want words, yet fail not to expreſs their univerſal ideas by ſigns, which ſerve them inſtead of general words; a faculty which we ſee beaſts come ſhort in. And therefore I think we may ſuppoſe, that it is in this that the ſpecies of brutes are diſcriminated from

from man; and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly ſeparated, and which at laſts widens to ſo vaſt a diſtance: for if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as ſome would have them) we cannot deny them to have ſome reaſon. It ſeems as evident to me, that they do ſome of them in certain inſtances reaſon, as that they have ſenſe; but it is only in particular ideas, juſt as they received them from their ſenſes. They are the beſt of them tied up within thoſe narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abſtraction.

Idiots and madmen.

§. 12. How far ideots are concerned in the want or weakneſs of any, or all of the foregoing faculties, an exact obſervation of their ſeveral ways of faltering would no doubt diſcover: for thoſe who either perceive but dully, or retain the ideas that come into their minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little matter to think on. Thoſe who cannot diſtinguiſh, compare, and abſtract, would hardly be able to underſtand and make uſe of language, or judge or reaſon to any tolerable degree; but only a little and imperfectly about things preſent, and very familiar to their ſenſes. And indeed any of the forementioned faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce ſuitable effects in men's underſtandings and knowledge.

§. 13. In fine, the defect in naturals ſeems to proceed from want of quickneſs, activity, and motion in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of reaſon; whereas madmen, on the other ſide, ſeem to ſuffer by the other extreme: for they do not appear to me to have loſt the faculty of reaſoning; but having joined together ſome ideas very wrongly, they miſtake them for truths, and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles. For by the violence of their imaginations, having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deductions from them. Thus you ſhall find a diſtracted man fancying himſelf a king, with a right inference require ſuitable attendance, reſpect and obedience; others, who have thought themſelves made

of glaſs, have uſed the caution neceſſary to preſerve ſuch brittle bodies. Hence it comes to paſs that a man, who is very ſober, and of a right underſtanding in all other things, may in one particular be as frantick as any in Bedlam; if either by any ſudden very ſtrong impreſſion, or long fixing his fancy upon one ſort of thoughts, incoherent ideas have been cemented together ſo powerfully, as to remain united. But there are degrees of madneſs, as of folly; the diſorderly jumbling ideas together, is in ſome more, ſome leſs. In ſhort, herein ſeems to lie the difference between idiots and madmen, that madmen put wrong ideas together, and ſo make wrong propoſitions, but argue and reaſon right from them; but idiots make very few or no propoſitions, and reaſon ſcarce at all.

Method.

§. 14. Theſe, I think, are the firſt faculties and operations of the mind, which it makes uſe of in underſtanding: and though they are exerciſed about all its ideas in general, yet the inſtances I have hitherto given have been chiefly in ſimple ideas; and I have ſubjoined the explication of theſe faculties of the mind to that of ſimple ideas, before I come to what I have to ſay concerning complex ones, for theſe following reaſons.

Firſt, Becauſe ſeveral of theſe faculties being exerciſed at firſt principally about ſimple ideas, we might, by following nature in its ordinary method, trace and diſcover them in their riſe, progreſs, and gradual improvements.

Secondly, Becauſe obſerving the faculties of the mind how they operate about ſimple ideas, which are uſually, in moſt men's minds, much more clear, preciſe, and diſtinct than complex ones; we may the better examine and learn how the mind abſtracts, denominates, compares, and exerciſes its other operations about thoſe which are complex, wherein we are much more liable to miſtake.

Thirdly, Becauſe theſe very operations of the mind about ideas, received from ſenſations, are themſelves, when reflected on, another ſet of ideas, derived from that other ſource of our knowledge which I call re-

flection, and therefore fit to be conſidered in this place after the ſimple ideas of ſenſation. Of compounding, comparing, abſtracting, &c., I have but juſt ſpoken, having occaſion to treat of them more at large in other places.

Theſe are the beginnings of human knowledge.

§. 15. And thus I have given a ſhort, and, I think, true hiſtory of the firſt beginnings of human knowledge, whence the mind has its firſt objects, and by what ſteps it makes its progreſs to the laying in and ſtoring up thoſe ideas, out of which is to be framed all the knowledge it is capable of; wherein I muſt appeal to experience and obſervation, whether I am in the right: the beſt way to come to truth, being to examine things as really they are, and not to conclude they are, as we fancy of ourſelves, or have been taught by others to imagine.

Appeal to experience.

§. 16. To deal truly, this is the only way that I can diſcover, whereby the ideas of things are brought into the underſtanding; if other men have either innate ideas, or infuſed principles, they have reaſon to enjoy them; and if they are ſure of it, it is impoſſible for others to deny them the privilege that they have above their neighbours. I can ſpeak but of what I find in myſelf, and is agreeable to thoſe notions; which, if we will examine the whole courſe of men in their ſeveral ages, countries, and educations, ſeem to depend on thoſe foundations which I have laid, and to correſpond with this method in all the parts and degrees thereof.

Dark room.

§. 17. I pretend not to teach, but to inquire, and therefore cannot but confeſs here again, that external and internal ſenſation are the only paſſages that I can find of knowledge to the underſtanding. Theſe alone as far as I can diſcover, are the windows by which light is let into this dark room: for methinks the underſtanding is not much unlike a cloſet wholly ſhut from light, with only ſome little opening left, to let in external viſible reſemblances, or ideas of things without: would the pictures coming into ſuch a dark room but ſtay there, and lie ſo orderly

as

as to be found upon occaſion, it would very much reſemble the underſtanding of a man, in reference to all objects of ſight, and the ideas of them.

Theſe are my gueſſes concerning the means whereby the underſtanning comes to have and retain ſimple ideas, and the modes of them, with ſome other operations about them. I proceed now to examine ſome of theſe ſimple ideas, and their modes, a little more particularly.

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex Ideas.

§. 1. WE have hitherto conſidered thoſe ideas, in the reception whereof the mind is only paſſive, which are thoſe ſimple ones received from ſenſation and reflection before mentioned, whereof the mind cannot make one to itſelf, nor have any idea which does not wholly conſiſt of them. But as the mind is wholly paſſive in the reception of all its ſimple ideas, ſo it exerts ſeveral acts of its own, whereby out of its ſimple ideas as the materials and foundations of the reſt, the other are framed. The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its ſimple ideas, are chiefly theſe three: 1. Combining ſeveral ſimple ideas into one compound one, and thus all complex ideas are made. 2. The ſecond is bringing two ideas, whether ſimple or complex, together, and ſetting them by one another, ſo as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one; by which way it gets all its ideas of relations. 3. The third is ſeparating them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real exiſtence; this is called abſtraction: and thus all its general ideas are made. This ſhows man's power, and its ways of operation, to be much what the ſame in the material

Made by the mind out of ſimple ones.

and intellectual world. For the materials in both being ſuch as he has no power over, either to make or deſtroy, all that man can do is either to unite them together, or to ſet them by one another, or wholly ſeparate them. I ſhall here begin with the firſt of theſe in the conſideration of complex ideas, and come to the other two in their due places. As ſimple ideas are obſerved to exiſt in ſeveral combinations united together, ſo the mind has a power to conſider ſeveral of them united together as one idea; and that not only as they are united in external objects, but as itſelf has joined them. Ideas thus made up of ſeveral ſimple ones put together, I call complex; ſuch as are beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the univerſe; which though compli-cated of various ſimple ideas, or complex ideas made up of ſimple ones, yet are, when the mind pleaſes, conſidered each by itſelf as one entire thing, and ſignified by one name.

Made voluntarily.

§. 2. In this faculty of repeating and joining together its ideas, the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts, infinitely beyond what ſenſation or reflection furniſhed it with; but all this ſtill confined to thoſe ſimple ideas which it received from thoſe two ſources, and which are the ultimate materials of all its compoſitions: for ſimple ideas are all from things themſelves, and of theſe the mind can have no more, nor other than what are ſuggeſted to it. It can have no other ideas of ſenſible qualities than what come from without by the ſenſes, nor any ideas of other kind of operations of a thinking ſubſtance, than what it finds in itſelf; but when it has once got theſe ſimple ideas, it is not confined barely to obſervation, and what offers itſelf from without: it can, by its own power, put together thoſe ideas it has, and make new complex ones, which it never received ſo united.

Are either modes, ſubſtances or relations.

§. 3. Complex ideas, however compounded and decompounded, though their number be infinite, and the variety endleſs, wherewith they fill and entertain the

thoughts

thoughts of men; yet, I think, they may be all reduced under theſe three heads: 1. Modes. 2. Subſtances. 3. Relations.

Modes.

§. 4. Firſt, Modes I call ſuch complex ideas, which, however compounded, contain not in them the ſuppoſition of ſubſiſting by themſelves, but are conſidered as dependences on, or affections of ſubſtances; ſuch as are ideas ſignified by the words triangle, gratitude, murder, &c. And if in this I uſe the word mode in ſomewhat a different ſenſe from its ordinary ſignification, I beg pardon; it being unavoidable in diſcourſes, differing from the ordinary received notions, either to make new words, or to uſe old words in ſomewhat a new ſignification: the latter whereof, in our preſent caſe, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two.

Simple and mixed modes.

§. 5. Of theſe modes, there are two ſorts which deſerve diſtinct conſideration. Firſt, there are ſome which are only variations, or different combinations of the ſame ſimple idea, without the mixture of any other; as a dozen or ſcore; which are nothing but the ideas of ſo many diſtinct units added together: and theſe I call ſimple modes, as being contained within the bounds of one ſimple idea.

Secondly, there are others compounded of ſimple ideas of ſeveral kinds, put together to make one complex one; v. g. beauty, conſiſting of a certain compoſition of colour and figure, cauſing delight in the beholder; theft, which being the concealed change of the poſſeſſion of any thing, without the conſent of the proprietor, contains, as is viſible, a combination of ſeveral ideas of ſeveral kinds: and theſe I call mixed modes.

Subſtances ſingle or collective.

§. 6. Secondly, the ideas of ſubſtances are ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas, as are taken to repreſent diſtinct particular things ſubſiſting by themſelves; in which the ſuppoſed or confuſed idea of ſubſtance, ſuch as it is, is always the firſt and chief. Thus if to ſubſtance be joined the ſimple idea of a certain dull whitiſh colour,

lour, with certain degrees of weight, hardneſs, ductility, and fuſibility, we have the idea of lead, and a combination of the ideas of a certain ſort of figure, with the powers of motion. Thought and reaſoning, joined to ſubſtance, make the ordinary idea of a man. Now of ſubſtances alſo there are two ſorts of ideas; one of ſingle ſubſtances, as they exiſt ſeparately, as of a man or a ſheep; the other of ſeveral of thoſe put together, as an army of men, or flock of ſheep: which collective ideas of ſeveral ſubſtances thus put together, are as much each of them one ſingle idea, as that of a man, or an unit.

Relation.

§. 7. Thirdly, the laſt ſort of complex ideas, is that we call relation, which conſiſts in the conſideration and comparing one idea with another. Of theſe ſeveral kinds we ſhall treat in their order.

The abſtruſeſt ideas from the two ſources.

§. 8. If we trace the progreſs of our minds, and with attention obſerve how it repeats, adds together, and unites its ſimple ideas received from ſenſation or reflection, it will lead us farther than at firſt perhaps we ſhould have imagined. And I believe we ſhall find, if we warily obſerve the originals of our notions, that even the moſt abſtruſe ideas, how remote ſoever they may ſeem from ſenſe, or from any operations of our own minds, are yet only ſuch as the underſtanding frames to itſelf, by repeating and joining together ideas, that it had either from objects of ſenſe, or from its own operations about them: ſo that thoſe even large and abſtract ideas are derived from ſenſation or reflection, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary uſe of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from objects of ſenſe, or from the operations it obſerves in itſelf about them, may and does attain unto. This I ſhall endeavour to ſhow in the ideas we have of ſpace, time, and infinity, and ſome few others, that ſeem the moſt remote from thoſe originals.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Simple Modes, and firſt of the Simple Modes of Space.

§. 1. THOUGH in the foregoing part I have often mentioned ſimple ideas, which are truly the materials of all our knowledge; yet having treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the mind, than as diſtinguiſhed from others more compounded, it will not be perhaps amiſs to take a view of ſome of them again under this conſideration, and examine thoſe different modifications of the ſame idea: which the mind either finds in things exiſting, or is able to make within itſelf, without the help of any extrinſecal object, or any foreign ſuggeſtion. Simple Modes.

Thoſe modifications of any one ſimple idea (which, as has been ſaid, I call ſimple modes) are as perfectly different and diſtinct ideas in the mind, as thoſe of the greateſt diſtance or contrariety. For the idea of two is as diſtinct from that of one, as blueneſs from heat, or either of them from any number: and yet it is made up only of that ſimple idea of an unit repeated; and repetitions of this kind joined together, make thoſe diſtinct ſimple modes, of a dozen, a groſs, a million.

§. 2. I ſhall begin with the ſimple idea of ſpace. I have ſhowed above, chap. 4. that we get the idea of ſpace, both by our ſight and touch; which, I think, is ſo evident, that it would be as needleſs to go to prove that men perceive, by their ſight, a diſtance between bodies of different colours, or between the parts of the ſame body, as that they ſee colours themſelves; nor is it leſs obvious, that they can do ſo in the dark by feeling and touch. Idea of ſpace.

§. 3. This ſpace conſidered barely in length between any two beings, without conſidering any thing elſe between them, Space and extenſion.

is called diſtance; if conſidered in length, breadth, and thickneſs, I think it may be called capacity. The term extenſion is uſually applied to it in what manner ſoever conſidered.

Immenſity. §. 4. Each different diſtance is a different modification of ſpace; and each idea of any different diſtance, or ſpace, is a ſimple mode of this idea. Men for the uſe, and by the cuſtom of meaſuring, ſettle in their minds the ideas of certain ſtated lengths, ſuch as are an inch, foot, yard, fathom, mile, diameter of the earth, &c. which are ſo many diſtinct ideas made up only of ſpace. When any ſuch ſtated lengths or meaſures of ſpace are made familiar to men's thoughts, they can in their minds repeat them as often as they will, without mixing or joining to them the idea of body, or any thing elſe; and frame to themſelves the ideas of long, ſquare, or cubic, feet, yards, or fathoms, here amongſt the bodies of the univerſe, or elſe beyond the utmoſt bounds of all bodies; and by adding theſe ſtill one to another, enlarge their ideas of ſpace as much as they pleaſe. The power of repeating, or doubling any idea we have of any diſtance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any ſtop or ſtint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the idea of immenſity.

Figure. §. 5. There is another modification of this idea, which is nothing but the relation which the parts of the termination of extenſion, or circumſcribed ſpace, have amongſt themſelves. This the touch diſcovers in ſenſible bodies, whoſe extremities come within our reach; and the eye takes both from bodies and colours, whoſe boundaries are within its view: where obſerving how the extremities terminate either in ſtraight lines, which meet at diſcernible angles; or in crooked lines, wherein no angles can be perceived; by conſidering theſe as they relate to one another, in all parts of the extremities of any body or ſpace, it has that idea we call figure, which affords to the mind infinite variety. For beſides the vaſt number of different figures, that do really exiſt in the coherent

coherent maſſes of matter, the ſtock that the mind has in its power, by varying the idea of ſpace, and thereby making ſtill new compoſitions, by repeating its own ideas, and joining them as it pleaſes, is perfectly inexhauſtible; and ſo it can multiply figures in infinitum.

§. 6. For the mind having a power to repeat the idea of any length directly ſtretched out, and join it to another in the ſame direction, which is to double the length of that ſtraight line, or elſe join another with what inclination it thinks fit, and ſo make what ſort of angle it pleaſes; and being able alſo to ſhorten any line it imagines, by taking from it one half, or one fourth, or what part it pleaſes, without being able to come to an end of any ſuch diviſions, it can make an angle of any bigneſs: ſo alſo the lines that are its ſides, of what length it pleaſes; which joining again to other lines of different lengths, and at different angles, till it has wholly incloſed any ſpace, it is evident, that it can multiply figures both in their ſhape and capacity, in infinitum; all which are but ſo many different ſimple modes of ſpace. Figure.

The ſame that it can do with ſtraight lines, it can alſo do with crooked, or crooked and ſtraight together; and the ſame it can do in lines, it can alſo in ſuperficies: by which we may be led into farther thoughts of the endleſs variety of figures, that the mind has a power to make, and thereby to multiply the ſimple modes of ſpace.

§. 7. Another idea coming under this head, and belonging to this tribe, is that we call place. As in ſimple ſpace, we conſider the relation of diſtance between any two bodies or points; ſo in our idea of place, we conſider the relation of diſtance betwixt any thing, and any two or more points, which are conſidered as keeping the ſame diſtance one with another, and ſo conſidered as at reſt: for when we find any thing at the ſame diſtance now, which it was yeſterday, from any two or more points, which have not ſince changed their diſtance one with another, and with which we then compared it, we ſay it hath kept Place.

the ſame place; but if it hath ſenſibly altered its diſtance with either of thoſe points, we ſay it hath changed its place: though vulgarly ſpeaking, in the common notion of place, we do not always exactly obſerve the deſtance from theſe preciſe points; but from larger portions of ſenſible objects, to which we conſider the thing placed to bear relation, and its diſtance from which we have ſome reaſon to obſerve.

§. 8. Thus a company of cheſs-men ſtanding on the ſame ſquares of the cheſs-board, where we left them, we ſay they are all in the ſame place, or unmoved; though perhaps the cheſs-board hath been in the mean time carried out of one room into another; becauſe we compared them only to the parts of the cheſs-board, which keep the ſame diſtance one with another. The cheſs-board, we alſo ſay, is in the ſame place it was, if it remain in the ſame part of the cabin, though perhaps the ſhip, which it is in, ſails all the while: and the ſhip is ſaid to be in the ſame place, ſuppoſing it kept the ſame diſtance with the parts of the neighbouring land; though perhaps the earth hath turned round; and ſo both cheſs-men, and board, and ſhip, have every one changed place, in reſpect of remoter bodies, which have kept the ſame diſtance one with another. But yet the diſtance from certain parts of the board, being that which determines the place of the cheſs-men; and the diſtance from the fixed parts of the cabin (with which we made the compariſon) being that which determined the place of the cheſs-board; and the fixed parts of the earth, that by which we determined the place of the ſhip; theſe things may be ſaid to be in the ſame place in thoſe reſpects: though their diſtance from ſome other things, which in this matter we did not conſider, being varied, they have undoubtedly changed place in that reſpect; and we ourſelves ſhall think ſo, when we have occaſion to compare them with thoſe other.

§. 9. But this modification of diſtance we call place, being made by men, for their common uſe, that by it they might be able to deſign the particular poſition of things, where they had occaſion for ſuch deſignation:

men

men conſider and determine of this place, by reference to thoſe adjacent things which beſt ſerved to their preſent purpoſe, without conſidering other things, which to anſwer another purpoſe would better determine the place of the ſame thing. Thus in the cheſs-board, the uſe of the deſignation of the place of each cheſs-man, being determined only within that chequered piece of wood, it would croſs that purpoſe, to meaſure it by any thing elſe: but when theſe very cheſs-men are put up in a bag, if any one ſhould aſk where the black king is, it would be proper to determine the place by the parts of the room it was in, and not by the cheſs-board; there being another uſe of deſigning the place it is now in, than when in play it was on the cheſs-board, and ſo muſt be determined by other bodies. So if any one ſhould aſk, in what place are the verſes, which report the ſtory of Niſus and Euryalus, it would be very improper to determine this place, by ſaying, they were in ſuch a part of the earth, or in Bodley's library: but the right deſignation of the place would be by the parts of Virgil's works; and the proper anſwer would be, that theſe verſes were about the middle of the ninth book of his Æneid; and that they have been always conſtantly in the ſame place ever ſince Virgil was printed; which is true, though the book itſelf hath moved a thouſand times; the uſe of the idea of place here being to know in what part of the book that ſtory is, that ſo upon occaſion we may know where to find it, and have recourſe to it for uſe.

§. 10. That our idea of place is nothing elſe but ſuch a relative poſition of any thing, as I have before mentioned, I think is plain, and will be eaſily admitted, when we conſider that we can have no idea of the place of the univerſe, though we can of all the parts of it; becauſe beyond that we have not the idea of any fixed, diſtinct, particular beings, in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of diſtance; but all beyond it is one uniform ſpace or expanſion, wherein the mind finds no variety, no marks. For to ſay, that the world is ſomewhere, means no more than that it does exiſt: this, though a Place.

phraſe borrowed from place, ſignifying only its exiſtence, not location; and when one can find out, and frame in his mind, clearly and diſtinctly, the place of the univerſe, he will be able to tell us, whether it moves or ſtands ſtill in the undiſtinguiſhable inane of infinite ſpace: though it be true, that the word place has ſometimes a more confuſed ſenſe, and ſtands for that ſpace which any body takes up; and ſo the univerſe is in a place. The idea therefore of place we have by the ſame means that we get the idea of ſpace, (whereof this is but a particular limited conſideration) viz. by our ſight and touch; by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of extenſion or diſtance.

Extenſion and body, not the ſame.

§. 11. There are ſome that would perſuade us, that body and extenſion are the ſame thing; who either change the ſignification of words, which I would not ſuſpect them of, they having ſo ſeverely condemned the philoſophy of others, becauſe it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obſcurity of doubtful or inſignificant terms. If therefore they mean by body and extenſion the ſame that other people do, viz. by body, ſomething that is ſolid and extended, whoſe parts are ſeparable and moveable different ways; and by extenſion, only the ſpace that lies between the extremities of thoſe ſolid coherent parts, and which is poſſeſſed by them: they confound very different ideas one with another. For I appeal to every man's own thoughts, whether the idea of ſpace be not as diſtinct from that of ſolidity, as it is from the idea of ſcarlet colour? It is true, ſolidity cannot exiſt without extenſion, neither can ſcarlet colour exiſt without extenſion: but this hinders not, but that they are diſtinct ideas. Many ideas require others as neceſſary to their exiſtence or conception, which yet are very diſtinct ideas. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived without ſpace; and yet motion is not ſpace, nor ſpace motion: ſpace can exiſt without it, and they are very diſtinct ideas; and ſo, I think, are thoſe of ſpace and ſolidity. Solidity is ſo inſeparable an idea from body, that upon that depends its filling of ſpace, its contact, impulſe, and com-

communication of motion upon impulſe. And if it be a reaſon to prove, that ſpirit is different from body, becauſe thinking includes not the idea of extenſion in it; the ſame reaſon will be as valid, I ſuppoſe, to prove that ſpace is not body, becauſe it includes not the idea of ſolidity in it: ſpace and ſolidity being as diſtinct ideas, as thinking and extenſion, and as wholly ſeparable in the mind one from another. Body then and extenſion, it is evident, are two diſtinct ideas. For,

§. 12. Firſt, Extenſion includes no ſolidity, nor reſiſtance to the motion of body, as body does.

§. 13. Secondly, The parts of pure ſpace are inſeparable one from the other; ſo that the continuity cannot be ſeparated neither really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continued, even ſo much as in thought. To divide and ſeparate actually, is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two ſuperficies, where before there was a continuity; and to divide mentally, is to make in the mind two ſuperfices, where before there was a continuity, and conſider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done in things conſidered by the mind as capable of being ſeparated; and by ſeparation, of acquiring new diſtinct ſuperficies, which they then have not, but are capable of; but neither of theſe ways of ſeparation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure ſpace.

It is true, a man may conſider ſo much of ſuch a ſpace, as is anſwerable or commenſurate to a foot, without conſidering the reſt; which is indeed a partial conſideration, but not ſo much as mental ſeparation, or diviſion; ſince a man can no more mentally divide, without conſidering two ſuperficies ſeparate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two ſuperficies disjoined one from the other: but a partial conſideration is not ſeparating. A man may conſider light in the ſun, without its heat; or mobility in body, without its extenſion, without thinking of their ſeparation. One is only a partial conſideration, terminating

terminating in one alone; and the other is a conſideration of both, as exiſting ſeparately.

§. 14. Thirdly. The parts of pure ſpace are immoveable, which follows from their inſeparability; motion being nothing but change of diſtance between any two things: but this cannot be between parts that are inſeparable; which therefore muſt needs be at perpetual reſt one amongſt another.

Thus the determined idea of ſimple ſpace diſtinguiſhes it plainly and ſufficiently from body; ſince its parts are inſeparable, immoveable, and without reſiſtance to the motion of body.

The definition of extenſion explains it not.

§. 15. If any one aſk me, what this ſpace, I ſpeak of, is? I will tell him, when he tells me what his extenſion is. For to ſay, as is uſually done, that extenſion is to have partes extra partes, is to ſay only, that extenſion is extenſion: for what am I the better informed in the nature of extenſion, when I am told, that extenſion is to have parts that are extended, exterior to parts that are extended, i. e. extenſion conſiſts of extended parts? As if one aſking, what a fibre was? I ſhould anſwer him, that it was a thing made up of ſeveral fibres: would he thereby be enabled to underſtand what a fibre was better than he did before? Or rather, would he not have reaſon to think, that my deſign was to make ſport with him, rather than ſeriouſly to inſtruct him?

Diviſion of beings into bodies and ſpirits, proves not ſpace and body the ſame.

§. 16. Thoſe who contend that ſpace and body are the ſame, bring this dilemma: either this ſpace is ſomething or nothing; if nothing be between two bodies, they muſt neceſſarily touch: if it be allowed to be ſomething, they aſk, whether it be body or ſpirit? To which I anſwer, by another queſtion, who told them that there was, or could be nothing but ſolid beings, which could not think, and thinking beings that were not extended? which is all they mean by the terms body and ſpirit.

§. 17.

§. 17. If it be demanded (as uſually it is) whether this ſpace, void of body, be ſubſtance or accident; I ſhall readily anſwer, I know not; nor ſhall be aſhamed to own my ignorance, till they that aſk ſhow me a clear diſtinct idea of ſubſtance.

Subſtance which we know not, no proof againſt ſpace without body.

§. 18. I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver myſelf from thoſe fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourſelves, by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance, to feign a knowledge where we have none, by making a noiſe with ſounds, without clear and diſtinct ſignifications. Names made at pleaſure neither alter the nature of things, nor make us underſtand them but as they are ſigns of and ſtand for determined ideas. And I deſire thoſe who lay ſo much ſtreſs on the ſound of theſe two ſyllables, ſubſtance, to conſider whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incomprehenſible God, to finite ſpirit, and to body, it be in the ſame ſenſe; and whether it ſtands for the ſame idea, when each of thoſe three ſo different beings are called ſubſtances. If ſo, whether it will thence follow, that God, ſpirits, and body, agreeing in the ſame common nature of ſubſtance, differ not any otherwiſe, than in a bare different modification of that ſubſtance; as a tree and a pebble being in the ſame ſenſe body, and agreeing in the common nature of body, differ only in a bare modification of that common matter: which will be a very harſh doctrine. If they ſay, that they apply it to God, finite ſpirit, and matter, in three different ſignifications; and that it ſtands for one idea, when God is ſaid to be a ſubſtance: for another, when the ſoul is called ſubſtance; and for a third, when a body is called ſo; if the name ſubſtance ſtands for three ſeveral diſtinct ideas, they would do well to make known thoſe diſtinct ideas, or at leaſt to give three diſtinct names to them, to prevent in ſo important a notion the confuſion and errors that will naturally follow from the promiſcuous uſe of ſo doubtful a term; which is ſo far from being ſuſpected to have three diſtinct, that in ordinary uſe it has ſcarce one clear diſtinct ſignification; and if they can thus

make

make three diſtinct ideas of ſubſtance, what hinders why another may not make a fourth?

Subſtance and accidents, of little uſe in philoſophy.

§. 19. They who firſt ran into the notion of accidents, as a ſort of real beings that needed ſomething to inhere in, were forced to find out the word ſubſtance to ſupport them. Had the poor Indian philoſopher (who imagined that the earth alſo wanted ſomething to bear it up) but thought of this word ſubſtance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to ſupport it, and a tortoiſe to ſupport his elephant: the word ſubſtance would have done it effectually. And he that inquired, might have taken it for as good an anſwer from an Indian philoſopher, that ſubſtance, without knowing what it is, is that which ſupports the earth; as we take it for a ſufficient anſwer, and good doctrine, from our European philoſophers, that ſubſtance, without knowing what it is, is that which ſupports accidents. So that of ſubſtance, we have no idea of what it is, but only a confuſed obſcure one of what it does.

§. 20. Whatever a learned man may do here, an intelligent American, who inquired into the nature of things, would ſcarce take it for a ſatisfactory account, if deſiring to learn our architecture, he ſhould be told, that a pillar was a thing ſupported by a baſis, and a baſis ſomething that ſupported a pillar. Would he not think himſelf mocked, inſtead of taught, with ſuch an account as this? And a ſtranger to them would be very liberally inſtructed in the nature of books, and the things they contained, if he ſhould be told, that all learned books conſiſted of paper and letters, and that letters were things inhering in paper, and paper a thing that held forth letters: a notable way of having clear ideas of letters and papers! But were the Latin words inhærentia and ſubſtantia, put into the plain Engliſh ones that anſwer them, and were called ſticking on and under-propping, they would better diſcover to us the very great clearneſs there is in the doctrine of ſubſtance and accidents, and ſhow of what uſe they are in deciding of queſtions in philoſophy.

§. 21.

§. 21. But to return to our idea of ſpace. If body be not ſuppoſed infinite, which I think no one will affirm, I would aſk, Whether, if God placed a man at the extremity of corporeal beings, he could not ſtretch his hand beyond his body? If he could, then he would put his arm where there was before ſpace without body; and if there he ſpread his fingers, there would ſtill be ſpace between them without body. If he could not ſtretch out his hand, it muſt be becauſe of ſome external hindrance; for we ſuppoſe him alive, with ſuch a power of moving the parts of his body that he hath now, which is not in itſelf impoſſible, if God ſo pleaſed to have it; or at leaſt it is not impoſſible for God ſo to move him:) and then I aſk, Whether that which hinders his hand from moving outwards be ſubſtance or accident, ſomething or nothing? And when they have reſolved that, they will be able to reſolve themſelves what that is, which is or may be between two bodies at a diſtance, that is not body, and has no ſolidity. In the mean time, the argument is at leaſt as good, that where nothing hinders (as beyond the utmoſt bounds of all bodies) a body put in motion may move on; as where there is nothing between, there two bodies muſt neceſſarily touch; for pure ſpace between, is ſufficient to take away the neceſſity of mutual contact: but bare ſpace in the way, is not ſufficient to ſtop motion. The truth is, theſe men muſt either own that they think body infinite, though they are loth to ſpeak it out, or elſe affirm that ſpace is not body. For I would fain meet with that thinking man, that can in his thoughts ſet any bounds to ſpace, more than he can to duration; or by thinking hope to arrive at the end of either: and therefore, if his idea of eternity be infinite, ſo is his idea of immenſity; they are both finite or infinite alike.

A vacuum beyond the utmoſt bounds of body.

§. 22. Farther, thoſe who aſſert the impoſſibility of ſpace exiſting without matter, muſt not only make body infinite, but muſt alſo deny a power in God to annihilate any part of matter. No one, I ſuppoſe, will deny that God

The power of annihilation proves a vacuum.

can put an end to all motion that is in matter, and fix all the bodies of the univerſe in a perfect quiet and reſt, and continue them ſo long as he pleaſes. Whoever then will allow, that God can, during ſuch a general reſt, annihilate either this book, or the body of him that reads it, muſt neceſſarily admit the poſſibility of a vacuum; for it is evident, that the ſpace that was filled by the parts of the annihilated body, will ſtill remain, and be a ſpace without body. For the circumambient bodies being in perfect reſt, are a wall of adamant, and in that ſtate make it a perfect impoſſibility for any other body to get into that ſpace. And indeed the neceſſary motion of one particle of matter into the place from whence another particle of matter is removed, is but a conſequence from the ſuppoſition of plenitude: which will therefore need ſome better proof than a ſuppoſed matter of fact, which experiment can never make out: our own clear and diſtinct ideas plainly ſatisfying us, that there is no neceſſary connexion between ſpace and ſolidity, ſince we can conceive the one without the other. And thoſe who diſpute for or againſt a vacuum, do thereby confeſs they have diſtinct ideas of vacuum and plenum, i. e. that they have an idea of extenſion void of ſolidity, though they deny its exiſtence: or elſe they diſpute about nothing at all. For they who ſo much alter the ſignification of words, as to call extenſion body, and conſequently make the whole eſſence of body to be nothing but pure extenſion without ſolidity, muſt talk abſurdly whenever they ſpeak of vacuum, ſince it is impoſſible for extenſion to be without extenſion. For vacuum, whether we affirm or deny its exiſtence, ſignifies ſpace without body, whoſe very exiſtence no one can deny to be poſſible, who will not make matter infinite, and take from God a power to annihilate any particle of it.

Motion proves a vacuum.

§. 23. But not to go ſo far as beyond the utmoſt bounds of body in the univerſe, nor appeal to God's omnipotency, to find a vacuum, the motion of bodies that are in our view and neighbourhood ſeems to me plainly to evince it. For

For I deſire any one ſo to divide a ſolid body, of any dimenſion he pleaſes, as to make it poſſible for the ſolid parts to move up and down freely every way within the bounds of that ſuperficies, if there be not left in it a void ſpace, as big as the leaſt part into which he has divided the ſaid ſolid body. And if where the leaſt particle of the body divided is as big as a muſtard-ſeed, a void ſpace equal to the bulk of a muſtard-ſeed be requiſite to make room for the free motion of the parts of the divided body within the bounds of its ſuperficies, where the particles of matter are 100,000,000 leſs than a muſtard-ſeed; there muſt alſo be a ſpace void of ſolid matter, as big as 100,000,000 part of a muſtard-ſeed; for if it hold in one, it will hold in the other, and ſo on in infinitum. And let this void ſpace be as little as it will, it deſtroys the hypotheſis of plenitude. For if there can be a ſpace void of body equal to the ſmalleſt ſeparate particle of matter now exiſting in nature, it is ſtill ſpace without body; and makes as great a difference between ſpace and body, as if it were μέγα χάσμα, a diſtance as wide as any in nature. And therefore, if we ſuppoſe not the void ſpace neceſſary to motion equal to the leaſt parcel of the divided ſolid matter, but to $\frac{1}{10}$ or $\frac{1}{1000}$ of it; the ſame conſequence will always follow of ſpace without matter.

The ideas of ſpace and body diſtinct.

§. 24. But the queſtion being here, "whether the idea of ſpace or extenſion be "the ſame with the idea of body," it is not neceſſary to prove the real exiſtence of a vacuum, but the idea of it; which it is plain men have, when they inquire and diſpute, whether there be a vacuum or no. For if they had not the idea of ſpace without body, they could not make a queſtion about its exiſtence: and if their idea of body did not include in it ſomething more than the bare idea of ſpace, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world: and it would be as abſurd to demand, whether there were ſpace without body, as whether there were ſpace without ſpace, or body without body, ſince theſe were but different names of the ſame idea.

§. 25.

Extenſion being inſeparable from body, proves it not the ſame.

§. 25. It is true, the idea of extenſion joins itſelf ſo inſeparably with all viſible, and moſt tangible qualities, that it ſuffers us to ſee no one, or feel very few external objects, without taking in impreſſions of extenſion too. This readineſs of extenſion to make itſelf be taken notice of ſo conſtantly with other ideas, has been the occaſion, I gueſs, that ſome have made the whole eſſence of body to conſiſt in extenſion; which is not much to be wondered at, ſince ſome have had their minds, by their eyes and touch (the buſieſt of all our ſenſes) ſo filled with the idea of extenſion, and as it were wholly poſſeſſed with it, that they allowed no exiſtence to any thing that had not extenſion. I ſhall not now argue with thoſe men, who take the meaſure and poſſibility of all being, only from their narrow and groſs imaginations: but having here to do only with thoſe who conclude the eſſence of body to be extenſion, becauſe they ſay they cannot imagine any ſenſible quality of any body without extenſion; I ſhall deſire them to conſider, that had they reflected on their ideas of taſtes and ſmells, as much as on thoſe of ſight and touch; nay, had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirſt, and ſeveral other pains, they would have found, that they included in them no idea of extenſion at all; which is but an affection of body, as well as the reſt, diſcoverable by our ſenſes, which are ſcarce acute enough to look into the pure eſſences of things.

§. 26. If thoſe ideas, which are conſtantly joined to all others, muſt therefore be concluded to be the eſſence of thoſe things which have conſtantly thoſe ideas joined to them, and are inſeparable from them; then unity is without doubt the eſſence of every thing. For there is not any object of ſenſation or reflection, which does not carry with it the idea of one: but the weakneſs of this kind of argument we have already ſhown ſufficiently.

Ideas of ſpace and ſolidity diſtinct.

§. 27. To conclude, whatever men ſhall think concerning the exiſtence of a vacuum, this is plain to me, that we have as clear an idea of ſpace diſtinct from ſolidity, as we

we have of ſolidity diſtinct from motion, or motion from ſpace. We have not any two more diſtinct ideas, and we can as eaſily conceive ſpace without ſolidity, as we can conceive body or ſpace without motion; though it be ever ſo certain, that neither body nor motion can exiſt without ſpace. But whether any one will take ſpace to be only a relation reſulting from the exiſtence of other beings at a diſtance, or whether they will think the words of the moſt knowing king Solomon, "The "heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain "thee;" or thoſe more emphatical ones of the inſpired philoſopher St. Paul, "In him we live, move, "and have our being;" are to be underſtood in a literal ſenſe, I leave every one to conſider: only our idea of ſpace is, I think, ſuch as I have mentioned, and diſtinct from that of body. For whether we conſider in matter itſelf the diſtance of its coherent ſolid parts, and call it, in reſpect of thoſe ſolid parts, extenſion; or whether, conſidering it as lying between the extremities of any body in its ſeveral dimenſions, we call it length, breadth, and thickneſs; or elſe conſidering it as lying between any two bodies, or poſitive beings, without any conſideration whether there be any matter or no between, we call it diſtance: however named or conſidered, it is always the ſame uniform ſimple idea of ſpace, taken from objects about which our ſenſes have been converſant; whereof having ſettled ideas in our minds, we can revive, repeat and add them one to another as often as we will, and conſider the ſpace or diſtance ſo imagined, either as filled with ſolid parts, ſo that another body cannot come there, without diſplacing and thruſting out the body that was there before; or elſe as void of ſolidity, ſo that a body of equal dimenſions to that empty or pure ſpace may be placed in it, without the removing or expulſion of any thing that was there. But, to avoid confuſion in diſcourſes concerning this matter, it were poſſibly to be wiſhed that the name extenſion were applied only to matter, or the diſtance of the extremities of particular bodies; and the term expanſion to ſpace in general, with or without ſolid matter poſſeſſing it, ſo as to ſay

ſpace is expanded, and body extended. But in this every one has liberty: I propoſe it only for the more clear and diſtinct way of ſpeaking.

Men differ little in clear ſimple ideas.

§. 28. The knowing preciſely what our words ſtand for, would, I imagine, in this as well as a great many other caſes, quickly end the diſpute. For I am apt to think that men, when they come to examine them, find their ſimple ideas all generally to agree, though in diſcourſe with one another they perhaps confound one another with different names. I imagine that men who abſtract their thoughts, and do well examine the ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however they may perplex themſelves with words, according to the way of ſpeaking of the ſeveral ſchools or ſects they have been bred up in: though amongſt unthinking men, who examine not ſcrupulouſly and carefully their own ideas, and ſtrip them not from the marks men uſe for them, but confound them with words, there muſt be endleſs diſpute, wrangling, and jargon; eſpecially if they be learned bookiſh men, devoted to ſome ſect, and accuſtomed to the language of it, and have learned to talk after others. But if it ſhould happen, that any two thinking men ſhould really have different ideas, I do not ſee how they could diſcourſe or argue one with another. Here I muſt not be miſtaken, to think that every floating imagination in men's brains, is preſently of that ſort of ideas I ſpeak of. It is not eaſy for the mind to put off thoſe confuſed notions and prejudices it has imbibed from cuſtom, inadvertency, and common converſation: It requires pains and aſſiduity to examine its ideas, till it reſolves them into thoſe clear and diſtinct ſimple ones, out of which they are compounded; and to ſee which, amongſt its ſimple ones, have or have not a neceſſary connexion and dependence one upon another. Till a man doth this in the primary and orignal notion of things, he builds upon floating and uncertain principles, and will often find himſelf at a loſs.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration, and its ſimple Modes.

§. 1. THERE is another ſort of diſtance or length, the idea whereof we get not from the permanent parts of ſpace, but from the fleeting and perpetually periſhing parts of ſucceſſion. This we call duration, the ſimple modes whereof are any different lengths of it, whereof we have diſtinct ideas, as hours, days, years, &c. time and eternity.

Duration is fleeting extenſion.

§. 2. The anſwer of a great man, to one who aſked what time was, "Si non rogas "intelligo," (which amounts to this; the more I ſet myſelf to think of it, the leſs I underſtand it) might perhaps perſuade one, that time, which reveals all other things, is itſelf not to be diſcovered. Duration, time, and eternity, are not without reaſon thought to have ſomething very abſtruſe in their nature. But however remote theſe may ſeem from our comprehenſion, yet if we trace them right to their originals, I doubt not but one of thoſe ſources of all our knowledge, viz. ſenſation and reflection, will be able to furniſh us with theſe ideas, as clear and diſtinct as many other which are thought much leſs obſcure; and we ſhall find, that the idea of eternity itſelf is derived from the ſame common original with the reſt of our ideas.

Its idea from reflection on the train of our ideas.

§. 3. To underſtand time and eternity aright, we ought with attention to conſider what idea it is we have of duration, and how we came by it. It is evident to any one, who will but obſerve what paſſes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas which conſtantly ſucceed one another in his underſtanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on theſe appearances of ſeveral ideas, one after another, in our minds, is that which furniſhes us with the idea of ſucceſſion; and the diſtance between any parts of that ſucceſſion, or between the

appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call duration. For whilſt we are thinking, or whilſt we receive ſucceſſively ſeveral ideas in our minds, we know that we do exiſt; and ſo we call the exiſtence, or the continuation of the exiſtence of ourſelves, or any thing elſe, commenſurate to the ſucceſſion of any ideas in our minds, the duration of ourſelves, or any ſuch other thing coexiſtent with our thinking.

§. 4. That we have our notion of ſucceſſion and duration from this original, viz. from reflection on the train of ideas which we find to appear one after another in our own minds, ſeems plain to me, in that we have no perception of duration, but by conſidering the train of ideas that take their turns in our underſtandings. When that ſucceſſion of ideas ceaſes, our perception of duration ceaſes with it; which every one clearly experiments in himſelf, whilſt he ſleeps ſoundly, whether an hour or a day, a month or a year: of which duration of things, while he ſleeps or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite loſt to him; and the moment wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think again, ſeems to him to have no diſtance. And ſo I doubt not it would be to a waking man, if it were poſſible for him to keep only one idea in his mind, without variation and the ſucceſſion of others. And we ſee, that one who fixes his thoughts very intently on one thing, ſo as to take but little notice of the ſucceſſion of ideas that paſs in his mind, whilſt he is taken up with that earneſt contemplation, lets ſlip out of his account a good part of that duration, and thinks that time ſhorter than it is. But if ſleep commonly unites the diſtant parts of duration, it is becauſe during that time we have no ſucceſſion of ideas in our minds. For if a man, during his ſleep, dreams, and variety of ideas make themſelves perceptible in his mind one after another; he hath then, during ſuch dreaming, a ſenſe of duration, and of the length of it. By which it is to me very clear, that men derive their ideas of duration from their reflections on the train of the ideas they obſerve to ſucceed one another in their own underſtandings; without

without which obſervation they can have no notion of duration, whatever may happen in the world.

The idea of duration applicable to things whilſt we ſleep.

§. 5. Indeed, a man having, from reflecting on the ſucceſſion and number of his own thoughts, got the notion or idea of duration, he can apply that notion to things which exiſt while he does not think; as he that has got the idea of extenſion from bodies by his ſight or touch, can apply it to diſtances, where no body is ſeen or felt. And therefore though a man has no perception of the length of duration, which paſſed whilſt he ſlept or thought not; yet having obſerved the revolution of days and nights, and found the length of their duration to be in appearance regular and conſtant, he can, upon the ſuppoſition that that revolution has proceeded after the ſame manner, whilſt he was aſleep or thought not, as it uſed to do at other times; he can, I ſay, imagine and make allowance for the length of duration, whilſt he ſlept. But if Adam and Eve (when they were alone in the world) inſtead of their ordinary night's ſleep, had paſſed the whole twenty-four hours in one continued ſleep, the duration of that twenty-four hours had been irrecoverably loſt to them, and been for ever left out of their account of time.

The idea ſucceſſion not from motion.

§. 6. Thus by reflecting on the appearing of various ideas one after another in our underſtandings, we get the notion of ſucceſſion; which, if any one would think we did rather get from our obſervation of motion by our ſenſes, he will perhaps be of my mind, when he conſiders that even motion produces in his mind an idea of ſucceſſion, no otherwiſe than as it produces there a continued train of diſtinguiſhable ideas. For a man looking upon a body really moving, perceives yet no motion at all, unleſs that motion produces a conſtant train of ſucceſſive ideas: v. g. a man becalmed at ſea, out of ſight of land, in a fair day, may look on the ſun, or ſea, or ſhip, a whole hour together, and perceive no motion at all in either; though it be certain that two, and perhaps all of them, have moved during that time a great way. But as ſoon as he per-

ceives either of them to have changed diſtance with ſome other body, as ſoon as this motion produces any new idea in him, then he perceives that there has been motion. But wherever a man is, with all things at reſt about him, without perceiving any motion at all; if during this hour of quiet he has been thinking, he will perceive the various ideas of his own thoughts in his own mind, appearing one after another, and thereby obſerve and find ſucceſſion where he could obſerve no motion.

§. 7. And this, I think, is the reaſon why motions very ſlow, though they are conſtant, are not perceived by us; becauſe in their remove from one ſenſible part towards another, their change of diſtance is ſo ſlow, that it cauſes no new ideas in us, but a good while one after another: and ſo not cauſing a conſtant train of new ideas to follow one another immediately in our minds, we have no perception of motion; which conſiſting in a conſtant ſucceſſion, we cannot perceive that ſucceſſion without a conſtant ſucceſſion of varying ideas ariſing from it.

§. 8. On the contrary, things that move ſo ſwift, as not to affect the ſenſes diſtinctly with ſeveral diſtinguiſhable diſtances of their motion, and ſo cauſe not any train of ideas in the mind, are not alſo perceived to move: For any thing that moves round about in a circle, in leſs time than our ideas are wont to ſucceed one another in our minds, is not perceived to move; but ſeems to be a perfect entire circle of that matter or colour, and not a part of a circle in motion.

The train of ideas has a certain degree of quickneſs.

§. 9. Hence I leave it to others to judge, whether it be not probable, that our ideas do, whilſt we are awake, ſucceed one another in our minds at certain diſtances, not much unlike the images in the inſide of a lanthorn, turned round by the heat of a candle. This appearance of theirs in train, though perhaps it may be ſometimes faſter, and ſometimes ſlower, yet, I gueſs, varies not very much in a waking man: there ſeem to be certain bounds to the quickneſs and ſlowneſs of the ſucceſſion of thoſe ideas one to another in

our

our minds, beyond which they can neither delay nor haſten.

§. 10. The reaſon I have for this odd conjecture, is from obſerving that in the impreſſions made upon any of our ſenſes, we can but to a certain degree perceive any ſucceſſion; which, if exceeding quick, the ſenſe of ſucceſſion is loſt, even in caſes where it is evident that there is a real ſucceſſion. Let a cannon-bullet paſs through a room, and in its way take with it any limb, or fleſhy parts of a man; it is as clear as any demonſtration can be, that it muſt ſtrike ſucceſſively the two ſides of the room. It is alſo evident, that it muſt touch one part of the fleſh firſt, and another after, and ſo in ſucceſſion: And yet I believe no-body, who ever felt the pain of ſuch a ſhot, or heard the blow againſt the two diſtant walls, could perceive any ſucceſſion either in the pain or ſound of ſo ſwift a ſtroke. Such a part of duration as this, wherein we perceive no ſucceſſion, is that which we call an inſtant, and is that which takes up the time of only one idea in our minds, without the ſucceſſion of another, wherein therefore we perceive no ſucceſſion at all.

§. 11. This alſo happens, where the motion is ſo ſlow, as not to ſupply a conſtant train of freſh ideas to the ſenſes, as faſt as the mind is capable of receiving new ones into it; and ſo other ideas of our own thoughts, having room to come into our minds, between thoſe offered to our ſenſes by the moving body, there the ſenſe of motion is loſt; and the body, though it really moves, yet not changing perceivable diſtance with ſome other bodies, as faſt as the ideas of our own minds do naturally follow one another in train, the thing ſeems to ſtand ſtill, as is evident in the hands of clocks and ſhadows of ſun-dials, and other conſtant but ſlow motions; where, though after certain intervals, we perceive by the change of diſtance that it it hath moved, yet the motion itſelf we perceive not.

§. 12. So that to me it ſeems, that the conſtant and regular ſucceſſion of ideas in a waking man is, as it were, the meaſure and ſtandard of all other ſucceſſions: whereof

This train the meaſure of other ſucceſſions.

if any one either exceeds the pace of our ideas, as where two ſounds or pains, &c. take up in their ſucceſſion the duration of but one idea, or elſe where any motion or ſucceſſion is ſo ſlow, as that it keeps not pace with the ideas in our minds, or the quickneſs in which they take their turns; as when any one or more ideas, in their ordinary courſe, come into our mind, between thoſe which are offered to the ſight by the different perceptible diſtances of a body in motion, or between ſounds or ſmells following one another; there alſo the ſenſe of a conſtant continued ſucceſſion is loſt, and we perceive it not but with certain gaps of reſt between.

The mind cannot fix long on one invariable idea.

§. 13. If it be ſo that the ideas of our minds, whilſt we have any there, do conſtantly change and ſhift in a continual ſucceſſion, it would be impoſſible, may any one ſay, for a man to think long of any one thing. By which, if it be meant, that a man may have one ſelf-ſame ſingle idea a long time alone in his mind, without any variation at all, I think, in matter of fact, it is not poſſible; for which (not knowing how the ideas of our minds are framed, of what materials they are made, whence they have their light, and how they come to make their appearances) I can give no other reaſon but experience: And I would have any one try whether he can keep one unvaried ſingle idea in his mind, without any other, for any conſiderable time together.

§. 14. For trial, let him take any figure, any degree of light or whiteneſs, or what other he pleaſes; and he will, I ſuppoſe, find it difficult to keep all other ideas out of his mind: But that ſome, either of another kind, or various conſiderations of that idea (each of which conſiderations is a new idea) will conſtantly ſucceed one another in his thoughts, let him be as wary as he can.

§. 15. All that is in a man's power in this caſe, I think, is only to mind and obſerve what the ideas are that take their turns in his underſtanding; or elſe to direct the ſort, and call in ſuch as he hath a deſire or uſe of: but hinder the conſtant ſucceſſion of freſh ones, I think, he cannot, though he may commonly chooſe whether he will heedfully obſerve and conſider them.

§. 16.

§. 16. Whether theſe ſeveral ideas in a man's mind be made by certain motions, I will not here diſpute: but this I am ſure, that they include no idea of motion in their appearance; and if a man had not the idea of motion otherwiſe, I think he would have none at all: which is enough to my preſent purpoſe, and ſufficiently ſhows, that the notice we take of the ideas of our own minds, appearing there one after another, is that which gives us the idea of ſucceſſion and duration, without which we ſhould have no ſuch ideas at all. It is not then motion, but the conſtant train of ideas in our minds, whilſt we are waking, that furniſhes us with the idea of duration: whereof motion no otherwiſe gives us any perception, than as it cauſes in our minds a conſtant ſucceſſion of ideas, as I have before ſhowed: And we have as clear an idea of ſucceſſion and duration, by the train of other ideas ſucceeding one another in our minds, without the idea of any motion, as by the train of ideas cauſed by the uninterrupted ſenſible change of diſtance between two bodies, which we have from motion; and therefore we ſhould as well have the idea of duration, were there no ſenſe of motion at all.

Ideas, however made, include no ſenſe of motion.

§. 17. Having thus got the idea of duration, the next thing natural for the mind to do, is to get ſome meaſure of this common duration, whereby it might judge of its different lengths, and conſider the diſtinct order wherein ſeveral things exiſt, without which a great part of our knowledge would be confuſed, and a great part of hiſtory be rendered very uſeleſs. This conſideration of duration, as ſet out by certain periods, and marked by certain meaſures or epochs, is that, I think, which moſt properly we call time.

Time is duration ſet out by meaſures.

§. 18. In the meaſuring of extenſion, there is nothing more required but the application of the ſtandard or meaſure we make uſe of to the thing, of whoſe extenſion we would be informed. But in the meaſuring of duration, this cannot be done, becauſe no two different parts of ſucceſſion can be put together

A good meaſure of time muſt divide its whole duration into equal periods.

together to meaſure one another: and nothing being a meaſure of duration but duration, as nothing is of extenſion but extenſion, we cannot keep by us any ſtanding unvarying meaſure of duration, which conſiſts in a conſtant fleeting ſucceſſion, as we can of certain lengths of extenſion, as inches, feet, yards, &c. marked out in permanent parcels of matter. Nothing then could ſerve well for a convenient meaſure of time, but what has divided the whole length of its duration into apparently equal portions, by conſtantly repeated periods. What portions of duration are not diſtinguiſhed, or conſidered as diſtinguiſhed and meaſured by ſuch periods, come not ſo properly under the notion of time, as appears by ſuch phraſes as theſe, viz. before all time, and when time ſhall be no more.

The revolutions of the ſun and moon, the propereſt meaſures of time.

§. 19. The diurnal and annual revolutions of the ſun, as having been, from the beginning of nature, conſtant, regular, and univerſally obſervable by all mankind, and ſuppoſed equal to one another, have been with reaſon made uſe of for the meaſure of duration. But the diſtinction of days and years having depended on the motion of the ſun, it has brought this miſtake with it, that it has been thought that motion and duration were the meaſure one of another: for men, in the meaſuring of the length of time, having been accuſtomed to the ideas of minutes, hours, days, months, years, &c. which they found themſelves upon any mention of time or duration preſently to think on, all which portions of time were meaſured out by the motion of thoſe heavenly bodies: they were apt to confound time and motion, or at leaſt to think that they had a neceſſary connexion one with another: whereas any conſtant periodical appearance, or alteration of ideas in ſeemingly equidiſtant ſpaces of duration, if conſtant and univerſally obſervable, would have as well diſtinguiſhed the intervals of time, as thoſe that have been made uſe of. For ſuppoſing the ſun, which ſome have taken to be a fire, had been lighted up at the ſame diſtance of time that it now every day comes about to the ſame meridian, and then gone out again about

about twelve hours after, and that in the ſpace of an annual revolution, it had ſenſibly increaſed in brightneſs and heat, and ſo decreaſed again; would not ſuch regular appearances ſerve to meaſure out the diſtances of duration to all that could obſerve it, as well without as with motion? For if the appearances were conſtant, univerſally obſervable, and in equidiſtant periods, they would ſerve mankind for meaſure of time as well, were the motion away.

But not by their motion, but periodical appearances.

§. 20. For the freezing of water, or the blowing of a plant, returning at equidiſtant periods in all parts of the earth, woud as well ſerve men to reckon their years by, as the motions of the ſun: and in effect we ſee, that ſome people in America counted their years by the coming of certain birds amongſt them at their certain ſeaſons, and leaving them at others. For a fit of an ague, the ſenſe of hunger or thirſt, a ſmell or a taſte, or any other idea returning conſtantly at equidiſtant periods, and making itſelf univerſally be taken notice of, would not fail to meaſure out the courſe of ſucceſſion, and diſtinguiſh the diſtances of time. Thus we ſee that men born blind count time well enough by years, whoſe revolutions yet they cannot diſtinguiſh by motions, that they perceive not: and I aſk whether a blind man, who diſtinguiſhed his years either by the heat of ſummer, or cold of winter; by the ſmell of any flower of the ſpring, or taſte of any fruit of the autumn; would not have a better meaſure of time than the Romans had before the reformation of their calendar by Julius Cæſar, or many other people, whoſe years, notwithſtanding the motion of the ſun, which they pretend to make uſe of, are very irregular? And it adds no ſmall difficuly to chronology, that the exact lengths of the years that ſeveral nations counted by, are hard to be known, they differing very much one from another, and I think I may ſay all of them from the preciſe motion of the ſun. And if the ſun moved from the creation to the flood conſtantly in the equator, and ſo equally diſperſed its light and heat to all the habitable parts of the earth, in days all of the ſame length, with-

out its annual variations to the tropicks, as a late ingenious author ſuppoſes *; I do not think it very eaſy to imagine, that (notwithſtanding the motion of the ſun) men ſhould in the antediluvian world from the beginning, count by years, or meaſure their time by periods, that had no ſenſible marks very obvious to diſtinguiſh them by.

No two parts of duration can be certainly known to be equal.

§. 21. But perhaps it will be ſaid, without a regular motion, ſuch as of the ſun, or ſome other, how could it ever be known that ſuch periods were equal? To which I anſwer, the equality of any other returning appearances might be known by the ſame way that that of days was known, or preſumed to be ſo at firſt; which was only by judging of them by the train of ideas which had paſſed in men's minds in the intervals: by which train of ideas diſcovering inequality in the natural days, but none in the artificial days, the artificial days or νυχθήμερα were gueſſed to be equal, which was ſufficient to make them ſerve for a meaſure: though exacter ſearch has ſince diſcovered inequality in the diurnal revolutions of the ſun, and we know not whether the annual alſo be not unequal. Theſe yet, by their preſumed and apparent equality, ſerve as well to reckon time by (though not to meaſure the parts of duration exactly) as if they could be proved to be exactly equal. We muſt therefore carefully diſtinguiſh betwixt duration itſelf, and the meaſures we make uſe of to judge of its length. Duration in itſelf is to be conſidered as going on in one conſtant, equal, uniform courſe: but none of the meaſures of it, which we make uſe of, can be known to do ſo; nor can we be aſſured, that their aſſigned parts or periods are equal in duration one to another; for two ſucceſſive lengths of duration, however meaſured, can never be demonſtrated to be equal. The motion of the ſun, which the world uſed ſo long and ſo confidently for an exact meaſure of duration, has, as I ſaid, been found in its ſeveral parts unequal: And though men have of late made uſe of a

* Dr. Burnet's Theory of the Earth.

pendulum,

pendulum, as a more ſteady and regular motion than that of the ſun, or (to ſpeak more truly) of the earth; yet if any one ſhould be aſked how he certainly knows that the two ſucceſſive ſwings of a pendulum are equal, it would be very hard to ſatisfy him that they are infallibly ſo: ſince we cannot be ſure, that the cauſe of that motion, which is unknown to us, ſhall always operate equally; and we are ſure that the medium in which the pendulum moves, is not conſtantly the ſame: Either of which varying, may alter the equality of ſuch periods, and thereby deſtroy the certainty and exactneſs of the meaſure by motion, as well as any other periods of other appearances; the notion of duration ſtill remaining clear, though our meaſures of it cannot any of them be demonſtrated to be exact. Since then no two portions of ſucceſſion can be brought together, it is impoſſible ever certainly to know their equality. All that we can do for a meaſure of time is to take ſuch as have continual ſucceſſive appearances at ſeemingly equidiſtant periods; of which ſeeming equality we have no other meaſure, but ſuch as the train of our own ideas have lodged in our memories, with the concurrence of other probable reaſons, to perſuade us of their equality.

Time not the meaſure of motion.

§. 22. One thing ſeems ſtrange to me, that whilſt all men manifeſtly meaſured time by the motion of the great and viſible bodies of the world, time yet ſhould be defined to be the "meaſure of motion;" whereas it is obvious to every one who reflects ever ſo little on it, that to meaſure motion, ſpace is as neceſſary to be conſidered as time: and thoſe who look a little farther, will find alſo the bulk of the thing moved neceſſary to be taken into the computation, by any one who will eſtimate or meaſure motion, ſo as to judge right of it. Nor indeed does motion any otherwiſe conduce to the meaſuring of duration, than as it conſtantly brings about the return of certain ſenſible ideas, in ſeeming equidiſtant periods. For if the motion of the ſun were as unequal as of a ſhip driven by unſteady winds, ſometimes very ſlow, and at others irregularly very ſwift;

or

or if being conſtantly equally ſwift, it yet was not circular, and produced not the ſame appearances, it would not at all help us to meaſure time, any more than the ſeeming unequal motion of a comet does.

Minutes, hours, days, and years, not neceſſary meaſures of duration.

§. 23. Minutes, hours, days, and years, are then no more neceſſary to time or duration, than inches, feet, yards, and miles, marked out in any matter, are to extenſion: For though we in this part of the univerſe, by the conſtant uſe of them, as of periods ſet out by the revolutions of the ſun, or as known parts of ſuch periods, have fixed the ideas of ſuch lengths of duration in our minds, which we apply to all parts of time, whoſe lengths we would conſider; yet there may be other parts of the univerſe, where they no more uſe theſe meaſures of ours, than in Japan they do our inches, feet, or miles; but yet ſomething analagous to them there muſt be. For without ſome regular periodical returns, we could not meaſure ourſelves, or ſignify to others, the length of any duration, though at the ſame time the world were as full of motion as it is now, but no part of it diſpoſed into regular and apparently equidiſtant revolutions. But the different meaſures that may be made uſe of for the account of time, do not at all alter the notion of duration, which is the thing to be meaſured; no more than the different ſtandards of a foot and a cubit alter the notion of extenſion to thoſe who make uſe of thoſe different meaſures.

Our meaſure of time applicable to duration before time.

§. 24. The mind having once got ſuch a meaſure of time as the annual revolution of the ſun, can apply that meaſure to duration, wherein that meaſure itſelf did not exiſt, and with which, in the reality of its being, it had nothing to do: for ſhould one ſay, that Abraham was born in the two thouſand ſeven hundred and twelfth year of the Julian period, it is altogether as intelligible, as reckoning from the beginning of the world, though there were ſo far back no motion of the ſun, nor any motion at all. For though the Julian period be ſuppoſed to begin ſeveral hundred years before

fore there were really either days, nights, or years, marked out by any revolutions of the ſun: yet we reckon as right, and thereby meaſure durations as well, as if really at that time the ſun had exiſted, and kept the ſame ordinary motion it doth now. The idea of duration equal to an annual revolution of the ſun, is as eaſily applicable in our thoughts to duration, where no ſun nor motion was, as the idea of a foot or yard, taken from bodies here, can be applied in our thoughts to diſtances beyond the confines of the world, where are no bodies at all.

§. 25. For ſuppoſing it were five thouſand ſix hundred and thirty-nine miles, or millions of miles, from this place to the remoteſt body of the univerſe (for, being finite, it muſt be at a certain diſtance) as we ſuppoſe it to be five thouſand ſix hundred and thirty-nine years from this time to the firſt exiſtence of any body in the beginning of the world; we can, in our thoughts, apply this meaſure of a year to duration before the creation, or beyond the duration of bodies or motion, as we can this meaſure of a mile to ſpace beyond the utmoſt bodies; and by the one meaſure duration where there was no motion, as well as by the other meaſure ſpace in our thoughts, where there is no body.

§. 26. If it be objected to me here, that, in this way of explaining of time, I have begged what I ſhould not, viz. that the world is neither eternal nor infinite; I anſwer, that to my preſent purpoſe it is not needful, in this place, to make uſe of arguments, to evince the world to be finite, both in duration and extenſion; but it being at leaſt as conceivable as the contrary, I have certainly the liberty to ſuppoſe it, as well as any one hath to ſuppoſe the contrary: and I doubt not but that every one that will go about it, may eaſily conceive in his mind the beginning of motion, though not of all duration, and ſo may come to a ſtop and non ultra in his conſideration of motion. So alſo in his thoughts he may ſet limits to body, and the extenſion belonging to it, but not to ſpace where no body is; the utmoſt bounds of ſpace and duration being beyond the reach of thought, as well as the utmoſt bounds of number

ber are beyond the largeſt comprehenſion of the mind; and all for the ſame reaſon, as we ſhall ſee in another place.

Eternity. §. 27. By the ſame means therefore, and from the ſame original that we come to have the idea of time, we have alſo that idea which we call eternity; viz. having got the idea of ſucceſſion and duration, by reflecting on the train of our own ideas, cauſed in us either by the natural appearances of thoſe ideas coming conſtantly of themſelves into our waking thoughts, or elſe cauſed by external objects ſucceſſively affecting our ſenſes; and having from the revolutions of the ſun got the ideas of certain lengths of duration, we can in our thoughts, and ſuch lengths of duration to one another, as often as we pleaſe, and apply them, ſo added, to durations paſt or to come: and this we can continue to do on, without bounds or limits, and proceed in infinitum, and apply thus the length of the annual motion of the ſun to duration, ſuppoſed before the ſun's, or any other motion had its being; which is no more difficult or abſurd, than to apply the notion I have of the moving of a ſhadow one hour to-day upon the ſun-dial to the duration of ſomething laſt night, v. g. the burning of a candle, which is now abſolutely ſeparate from all actual motion: and it is as impoſſible for the duration of that flame for an hour laſt night to co-exiſt with any motion that now is, or for ever ſhall be, as for any part of duration, that was before the beginning of the world, to co-exiſt with the motion of the ſun now. But yet this hinders not, but that having the idea of the length of the motion of the ſhadow on a dial between the marks of two hours, I can as diſtinctly meaſure in my thoughts the duration of that candle-light laſt night, as I can the duration of any thing that does now exiſt: And it is no more than to think, that had the ſun ſhone then on the dial, and moved after the ſame rate it doth now, the ſhadow on the dial would have paſſed from one hour-line to another, whilſt that flame of the candle laſted.

§. 28. The notion of an hour, day, or year, being only the idea I have of the length of certain periodical

regular motions, neither of which motions do ever all at once exiſt, but only in the ideas I have of them in my memory derived from my ſenſes or reflection; I can with the ſame eaſe, and for the ſame reaſon, apply it in my thoughts to duration antecedent to all manner of motion, as well as to any thing that is but a minute, or a day, antecedent to the motion, that at this very moment the ſun is in. All things paſt are equally and perfectly at reſt; and to this way of conſideration of them are all one, whether they were before the beginning of the world, or but yeſterday: the meaſuring of any duration by ſome motion depending not at all on the real co-exiſtence of that thing to that motion, or any other periods of revolution, but the having a clear idea of the length of ſome periodical known motion, or other intervals of duration in my mind, and applying that to the duration of the thing I would meaſure.

§. 29. Hence we ſee, that ſome men imagine the duration of the world, from its firſt exiſtence to this preſent year 1689, to have been five thouſand ſix hundred and thirty-nine years, or equal to five thouſand ſix hundred and thirty-nine annual revolutions of the ſun, and others a great deal more; as the Egyptians of old, who in the time of Alexander counted twenty-three thouſand years from the reign of the ſun; and the Chineſe now, who account the world three millions, two hundred and ſixty-nine thouſand years old, or more: which longer duration of the world, according to their computation, though I ſhould not believe to be true, yet I can equally imagine it with them, and as truly underſtand, and ſay one is longer than the other, as I underſtand, that Methuſalem's life was longer than Enoch's. And if the common reckoning of five thouſand ſix hundred and thirty-nine ſhould be true (as it may be as well as any other aſſigned) it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean when they make the world one thouſand years older, ſince every one may with the ſame facility imagine (I do not ſay believe) the world to be fifty thouſand years old, as five thouſand ſix hundred and thirty-nine: and may as well conceive the duration of fifty thouſand years, as five thouſand ſix hundred and thirty-nine. Whereby it appears, that

to the meaſuring the duration of any thing by time, it is not requiſite that that thing ſhould be co-exiſtent to the motion we meaſure by, or any other periodical revolution; but it ſuffices to this purpoſe, that we have the idea of the length of any regular periodical appearances, which we can in our minds apply to duration, with which the motion or appearance never co-exiſted.

§. 30. For as in the hiſtory of the creation, delivered by Moſes, I can imagine that light exiſted three days before the ſun was, or had any motion, barely by thinking, that the duration of light, before the ſun was created, was ſo long as (if the ſun had moved then, as it doth now) would have been equal to three of his diurnal revolutions; ſo by the ſame way I can have an idea of the chaos, or angels being created, before there was either light, or any continued motion, a minute, an hour, a day, a year, or one thouſand years. For if I can but conſider duration equal to one minute, before either the being or motion of any body, I can add one minute more till I come to ſixty; and by the ſame way of adding minutes, hours, or years (i. e. ſuch or ſuch parts of the ſun's revolutions, or any other period, whereof I have the idea) proceed in infinitum, and ſuppoſe a duration exceeding as many ſuch periods as I can reckon, let me add whilſt I will: which I think is the notion we have of eternity, of whoſe infinity we have no other notion, than we have of the infinity of number, to which we can add for ever without end.

§. 31. And thus I think it is plain, that from thoſe two fountains of all knowledge before-mentioned, viz. reflection and ſenſation, we get ideas of duration, and the meaſures of it.

For, firſt, by obſerving what paſſes in our minds, how our ideas there in train conſtantly ſome vaniſh, and others begin to appear, we come by the idea of ſucceſſion.

Secondly, by obſerving a diſtance in the parts of this ſucceſſion, we get the idea of duration.

Thirdly, By ſenſation obſerving certain appearances, at certain regular and ſeeming equidiſtant periods, we get the ideas of certain lengths or meaſures of duration, as minutes, hours, days, years, &c.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, by being able to repeat thoſe meaſures of time, or ideas of ſtated length of duration in our minds, as often as we will, we can come to imagine duration, where nothing does really endure or exiſt; and thus we imagine to-morrow, next year, or ſeven years hence.

Fifthly, By being able to repeat ideas of any length of time as of a minute, a year, or an age, as often as we will in our own thoughts, and adding them one to another, without ever coming to the end of ſuch addition any nearer than we can to the end of number, to which we can always add; we come by the idea of eternity, as the future eternal duration of our ſouls, as well as the eternity of that infinite Being, which muſt neceſſarily have always exiſted.

Sixthly, By conſidering any part of infinite duration, as ſet out by periodical meaſures, we come by the idea of what we call time in general.

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expanſion, conſidered together.

§. 1. THOUGH we have in the precedent chapters dwelt pretty long on the conſiderations of ſpace and duration; yet they being ideas of general concernment, that have ſomething very abſtruſe and peculiar in their nature, the comparing them one with another may perhaps be of uſe for their illuſtration; and we may have the more clear and diſtinct conception of them, by taking a view of them together. Diſtance or ſpace, in its ſimple abſtract conception, to avoid confuſion, I call expanſion, to diſtinguiſh it from extenſion, which by ſome is uſed to expreſs this diſtance only as it is in the ſolid parts of matter, and ſo includes, or at leaſt intimates the idea of body: whereas the idea of pure diſtance includes no ſuch thing. I prefer alſo the word expanſion to ſpace, becauſe ſpace is often applied to diſtance of fleeting ſucceſſive parts, which never exiſt together, as well as

Both capable of greater and leſs.

to thoſe which are permanent. In both theſe (viz. expanſion and duration) the mind has this common idea of continued lengths, capable of greater or leſs quantities: for a man has as clear an idea of the difference of the length of an hour and a day, as of an inch and a foot.

Expanſion not bounded by matter.

§. 2. The mind, having got the idea of the length of any part of expanſion, let it be a ſpan, or a pace, or what length you will, can, as has been ſaid, repeat that idea; and ſo, adding it to the former, enlarge its idea of length, and make it equal to two ſpans, or two paces, and ſo as often as it will, till it equals the diſtance of any parts of the earth one from another, and increaſe thus, till it amounts to the diſtance of the ſun, or remoteſt ſtar. By ſuch a progreſſion as this, ſetting out from the place where it is, or any other place, it can proceed and paſs beyond all thoſe lengths, and find nothing to ſtop its going on, either in, or without body. It is true, we can eaſily in our thoughts come to the end of ſolid extenſion; the extremity and bounds of all body we have no difficulty to arrive at: but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progreſs into this endleſs expanſion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end. Nor let any one ſay, that beyond the bounds of body, there is nothing at all, unleſs he will confine God within the limits of matter. Solomon, whoſe underſtanding was filled and enlarged with wiſdom, ſeems to have other thoughts, when he ſays, "heaven, and "the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee:" and he, I think, very much magnifies to himſelf the capacity of his own underſtanding, who perſuades himſelf, that he can extend his thoughts farther than God exiſts, or imagine any expanſion where he is not.

Nor duration by motion.

§. 3. Juſt ſo is it in duration. The mind, having got the idea of any length of duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it, not only beyond its own, but beyond the exiſtence of all corporeal beings, and all the meaſures of time, taken from the great bodies of the world, and their motions. But yet every one eaſily admits, that though we make duration

duration boundleſs, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all being. God, every one eaſily allows, fills eternity; and it is hard to find a reaſon, why any one ſhould doubt, that he likewiſe fills immenſity. His infinite being is certainly as boundleſs one way as another; and methinks it aſcribes a little too much to matter, to ſay, where there is no body, there is nothing.

Why men more eaſily admit infinite duration than infinite expanſion.

§. 4. Hence, I think, we may learn the reaſon why every one familiarly, and without the leaſt heſitation, ſpeaks of, and ſuppoſes eternity, and ſticks not to aſcribe infinity to duration; but it is with more doubting and reſerve, that many admit, or ſuppoſe the infinity of ſpace. The reaſon whereof ſeems to me to be this, that duration and extenſion being uſed as names of affections belonging to other beings, we eaſily conceive in God infinite duration, and we cannot avoid doing ſo: but not attributing to him extenſion, but only to matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the exiſtence of expanſion without matter; of which alone we commonly ſuppoſe it an attribute. And therefore when men purſue their thoughts of ſpace, they are apt to ſtop at the confines of body; as if ſpace were there at an end too, and reached no farther. Or if their ideas upon conſideration carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the limits of the univerſe imaginary ſpace; as if it were nothing, becauſe there is no body exiſting in it. Whereas duration, antecedent to all body, and to the motions which it is meaſured by, they never term imaginary; becauſe it is never ſuppoſed void of ſome other real exiſtence. And if the names of things may at all direct our thoughts towards the originals of men's ideas (as I am apt to think they may very much) one may have occaſion to think by the name duration, that the continuation of exiſtence, with a kind of reſiſtance to any deſtructive force, and the continuation of ſolidity (which is apt to be confounded with, and, if we will look into the minute anatomical parts of matter, is little different from, hardneſs) were thought to have ſome analogy, and gave occaſion to words, ſo near of kin as durare and durum eſſe. And

that durare is applied to the idea of hardneſs, as well as that of exiſtence, we ſee in Horace, epod. xvi. "ferro duravit ſecula." But be that as it will, this is certain, that whoever purſues his own thoughts, will find them ſometimes launch out beyond the extent of body into the infinity of ſpace or expanſion; the idea whereof is diſtinct and ſeparate from body, and all other things; which may (to thoſe who pleaſe) be a ſubject of farther meditation.

Time to duration is as place to expanſion.

§. 5. Time in general is to duration, as place to expanſion. They are ſo much of thoſe boundleſs oceans of eternity and immenſity, as is ſet out and diſtinguiſhed from the reſt, as it were by land-marks; and ſo are made uſe of to denote the poſition of finite real beings, in reſpect one to another, in thoſe uniform infinite oceans of duration and ſpace. Theſe rightly conſidered are only ideas of determinate diſtances, from certain known points fixed in diſtinguiſhable ſenſible things, and ſuppoſed to keep the ſame diſtance one from another. From ſuch points fixed in ſenſible beings we reckon, and from them we meaſure our portions of thoſe infinite quantities; which, ſo conſidered, are that which we call time and place. For duration and ſpace being in themſelves uniform and boundleſs, the order and poſition of things, without ſuch known ſettled points, would be loſt in them; and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable confuſion.

Time and place are taken for ſo much of either, as are ſet out by the exiſtence and motion of bodies.

§. 6. Time and place, taken thus for determinate diſtinguiſhable portions of thoſe infinite abyſſes of ſpace and duration, ſet out, or ſuppoſed to be diſtinguiſhed from the reſt by marks, and known boundaries, have each of them a two-fold acceptation.

Firſt, Time in general is commonly taken for ſo much of infinite duration, as is meaſured by, and co-exiſtent with the exiſtence and motions of the great bodies of the univerſe, as far as we know any thing of them: and in this ſenſe time begins and ends with the frame of

of this ſenſible world, as in theſe phraſes before-mentioned, before all time, or when time ſhall be no more. Place likewiſe is taken ſometimes for that portion of infinite ſpace, which is poſſeſſed by, and comprehended within the material world; and is thereby diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of expanſion; though this may more properly be called extenſion, than place. Within theſe two are confined, and by the obſervable parts of them are meaſured and determined, the particular time or duration, and the particular extenſion and place, of all corporeal beings.

Sometimes for ſo much of either, as we deſign by meaſures taken from the bulk or motion of bodies.

§. 7. Secondly, Sometimes the word time is uſed in a larger ſenſe, and is applied to parts of that infinite duration, not that were really diſtinguiſhed and meaſured out by this real exiſtence, and periodical motions of bodies that were appointed from the beginning to be for ſigns, and for ſeaſons, and for days, and years, and are accordingly our meaſures of time: but ſuch other portions too of that infinite uniform duration, which we, upon any occaſion, do ſuppoſe equal to certain lengths of meaſured time; and ſo conſider them as bounded and determined. For if we ſhould ſuppoſe the creation, or fall of the angels, was at the beginning of the Julian period, we ſhould ſpeak properly enough, and ſhould be underſtood, if we ſaid, it is a longer time ſince the creation of angels, than the creation of the world, by ſeven thouſand ſix hundred and forty years: whereby we would mark out ſo much of that undiſtinguiſhed duration, as we ſuppoſe equal to, and would have admitted ſeven thouſand ſix hundred and forty annual revolutions of the ſun, moving at the rate it now does. And thus likewiſe we ſometimes ſpeak of place, diſtance, or bulk, in the great inane beyond the confines of the world, when we conſider ſo much of that ſpace as is equal to, or capable to receive a body of any aſſigned dimenſions, as a cubick foot; or do ſuppoſe a point in it at ſuch a certain diſtance from any part of the univerſe.

They belong to all beings.

§. 8. Where and when are queſtions belonging to all finite exiſtences, and are by us always reckoned from ſome known parts of this ſenſible world, and from ſome certain epochs marked out to us by the motions obſervable in it. Without ſome ſuch fixed parts or periods, the order of things would be loſt to our finite underſtandings, in the boundleſs invariable oceans of duration and expanſion; which comprehend in them all finite beings, and in their full extent belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are not to wonder that we comprehend them not, and do ſo often find our thoughts at a loſs, when we would conſider them either abſtractly in themſelves, or as any way attributed to the firſt incomprehenſible being. But when applied to any particular finite beings, the extenſion of any body is ſo much of that infinite ſpace, as the bulk of the body takes up. And place is the poſition of any body, when conſidered at a certain diſtance from ſome other. As the idea of the particular duration of any thing is an idea of that portion of infinite duration, which paſſes during the exiſtence of that thing; ſo the time when the thing exiſted is the idea of that ſpace of duration which paſſed between ſome known and fixed period of duration, and the being of that thing. One ſhows the diſtance of the extremities of the bulk or exiſtence of the ſame thing, as that it is a foot ſquare, or laſted two years; the other ſhows the diſtance of it in place, or exiſtence, from other fixed points of ſpace or duration, as that it was in the middle of Lincoln's-inn-fields, or the firſt degree of Taurus, and in the year of our Lord 1671, or the 1000 year of the Julian period: all which diſtances we meaſure by pre-conceived ideas of certain lengths of ſpace and duration, as inches, feet, miles, and degrees; and in the other, minutes, days, and years, &c.

All the parts of extenſion are extenſion: and all the parts of duration are duration.

§. 9. There is one thing more wherein ſpace and duration have a great conformity; and that is, though they are juſtly reckoned amongſt our ſimple ideas, yet none of the diſtinct ideas we have of either is without all manner of compoſition;

poſition *; it is the very nature of both of them to conſiſt of parts: but their parts being all of the ſame kind, and without the mixture of any other idea, hinder them not from having a place amongſt ſimple ideas. Could the mind, as in number, come to ſo ſmall a part of extenſion or duration, as excluded diviſibility, that would be, as it were, the indiviſible unit, or idea; by repetition of which it would make its more enlarged ideas of extenſion and duration. But ſince the mind is not able to frame an idea of any ſpace without parts; inſtead thereof it makes uſe of the common meaſures, which by familiar uſe, in each country, have imprinted themſelves on the memory (as inches and feet; or cubits and paraſangs; and ſo ſeconds, minutes, hours, days, and years in duration:) the mind makes uſe, I ſay, of ſuch ideas as theſe, as ſimple ones; and theſe are the component parts of larger ideas, which the mind, upon occaſion, makes by the addition of ſuch known lengths

* It has been objected to Mr. Locke, that if ſpace conſiſts of parts, as it is confeſſed in this place, he ſhould not have reckoned it in the number of ſimple ideas: becauſe it ſeems to be inconſiſtent with what he ſays elſewhere, that a ſimple idea is uncompounded, and contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception of the mind, and is not diſtinguiſhable into different ideas. It is farther objected, that Mr. Locke has not given in the eleventh chapter of the ſecond book, where he begins to ſpeak of ſimple ideas, an exact definition of what he underſtands by the word ſimple ideas. To theſe difficulties Mr. Locke anſwers thus: To begin with the laſt, he declares, that he has not treated his ſubject in an order perfectly ſcholaſtic, having not had much familiarity with thoſe ſort of books during the writing of his, and not remembering at all the method in which they are written; and therefore his readers ought not to expect definitions regularly placed at the beginning of each new ſubject. Mr. Locke contents himſelf to employ the principal terms that he uſes, ſo that from his uſe of them the reader may eaſily comprehend what he means by them. But with reſpect to the term ſimple idea, he has had the good luck to define that in the place cited in the objection; and therefore there is no reaſon to ſupply that defect. The queſtion then is to know, whether the idea of extenſion agrees with this definition? which will effectually agree to it, if it be underſtood in the ſenſe which Mr. Locke had principally in his view: for that compoſition which he deſigned to exclude in that definition, was a compoſition of different ideas in the mind, and not a compoſition of the ſame kind in a thing whoſe eſſence conſiſts in having parts of the ſame kind, where you can never come to a part entirely exempted from this compoſition. So that

lengths which it is acquainted with. On the other ſide, the ordinary ſmalleſt meaſure we have of either is looked on as an unit in number, when the mind by diviſion would reduce them into leſs fractions. Though on both ſides, both in addition and diviſion, either of ſpace or duration, when the idea under conſideration becomes very big or very ſmall, its preciſe bulk becomes very obſcure and confuſed; and it is the number of its repeated additions or diviſions, that alone remains clear and diſtinct, as will eaſily appear to any one who will let his thoughts looſe in the vaſt expanſion of ſpace, or diviſibility of matter. Every part of duration is duration too; and every part of extenſion is extenſion, both of them capable of addition or diviſion in infinitum. But the leaſt portions of either of them, whereof we have clear and diſtinct ideas, may perhaps be fitteſt to be conſidered by us, as the ſimple ideas of that kind, out of which our complex modes of ſpace,

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that if the idea of extenſion conſiſts in having partes extra partes, (as the ſchools ſpeak) it is always, in the ſenſe of Mr. Locke, a ſimple idea; becauſe the idea of having partes extra partes cannot be reſolved into two other ideas. For the remainder of the objection made to Mr. Locke, with reſpect to the nature of extenſion, Mr. Locke was aware of it, as may be ſeen in §. 9. chap. 15. of the ſecond book, where he ſays, that "the leaſt portion of ſpace or extenſion, whereof we have a clear and "diſtinct idea, may perhaps be the fitteſt to be conſidered by us as a ſim-"ple idea of that kind, out of which our complex modes of ſpace and "extenſion are made up." So that, according to Mr. Locke, it may very fitly be called a ſimple idea, ſince it is the leaſt idea of ſpace that the mind can form to itſelf, and that cannot be divided by the mind into any leſs, whereof it has in itſelf any determined perception. From whence it follows, that it is to the mind one ſimple idea; and that is ſufficient to take away this objection: for it is not the deſign of Mr. Locke, in this place, to diſcourſe of any thing but concerning the idea of the mind. But if this is not ſufficient to clear the difficulty, Mr. Locke hath nothing more to add, but that if the idea of extenſion is ſo peculiar that it cannot exactly agree with the definition that he has given of thoſe ſimple ideas, ſo that it differs in ſome manner from all others of that kind, he thinks it is better to leave it there expoſed to this difficulty, than to make a new diviſion in his favour. It is enough for Mr. Locke that his meaning can be underſtood. It is very common to obſerve intelligible diſcourſes ſpoiled by too much ſubtilty in nice diviſions. We ought to put things together as well as we can, doctrinæ causâ; but, after all, ſeveral things will not be bundled up together under our terms and ways of ſpeaking.

extenſion,

extenſion, and duration, are made up, and into which they can again be diſtinctly reſolved. Such a ſmall part in duration may be called a moment, and is the time of one idea in our minds in the train of their ordinary ſucceſſion there. The other, wanting a proper name, I know not whether I may be allowed to call a ſenſible point, meaning thereby the leaſt particle of matter or ſpace we can diſcern, which is ordinarily about a minute, and to the ſharpeſt eyes ſeldom leſs than thirty ſeconds of a circle, whereof the eye is the centre.

Their parts inſeparable.

§. 10. Expanſion and duration have this farther agreement, that though they are both conſidered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not ſeparable one from another, no not even in thought: though the parts of bodies from whence we take our meaſure of the one, and the parts of motion, or rather the ſucceſſion of ideas in our minds, from whence we take the meaſure of the other, may be interrupted and ſeparated; as the one is often by reſt, and the other is by ſleep, which we call reſt too.

Duration is as a line, expanſion as a ſolid.

§. 11. But there is this manifeſt difference between them, that the ideas of length, which we have of expanſion, are turned every way, and ſo make figure, and breadth, and thickneſs; but duration is but as it were the length of one ſtraight line, extended in infinitum, not capable of inultiplicity, variation, or figure; but is one common meaſure of all exiſtence whatſoever, wherein all things, whilſt they exiſt, equally partake. For this preſent moment is common to all things that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part of their exiſtence, as much as if they were all but one ſingle being; and we may truly ſay, they all exiſt in the ſame moment of time. Whether angels and ſpirits have any analogy to this, in reſpect to expanſion, is beyond my comprehenſion: and perhaps for us, who have underſtandings and comprehenſions ſuited to our own preſervation, and the ends of our own being, but not to the reality and extent of all other beings; it is near as hard to conceive any exiſtence, or to have an idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all manner of expanſion;

ſion; as it is to have the idea of any real exiſtence, with a perfect negation of all manner of duration; and therefore what ſpirits have to do with ſpace, or how they communicate in it, we know not. All that we know is, that bodies do each ſingly poſſeſs its proper portion of it, according to the extent of ſolid parts; and thereby exclude all other bodies from having any ſhare in that particular portion of ſpace, whilſt it remains there.

Duration has never two parts together, expanſion all together.

§. 12. Duration, and time which is a part of it, is the idea we have of periſhing diſtance, of which no two parts exiſt together, but follow each other in ſucceſſion; as expanſion is the idea of laſting diſtance, all whoſe parts exiſt together, and are not capable of ſucceſſion. And therefore though we cannot conceive any duration without ſucceſſion, nor can put it together in our thoughts, that any being does now exiſt to-morrow, or poſſeſs at once more than the preſent moment of duration; yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the Almighty far different from that of man, or any other finite being. Becauſe man comprehends not in his knowledge, or power, all paſt and future things; his thoughts are but of yeſterday, and he knows not what to-morrow will bring forth. What is once paſt he can never recall; and what is yet to come he cannot make preſent. What I ſay of man I ſay of all finite beings; who, though they may far exceed man in knowledge and power, yet are no more than the meaneſt creature, in compariſon with God himſelf. Finite of any magnitude holds not any proportion to infinite. God's infinite duration being accompanied with infinite knowledge, and infinite power, he ſees all things paſt and to come; and they are no more diſtant from his knowledge, no farther removed from his ſight, than the preſent: they all lie under the ſame view; and there is nothing which he cannot make exiſt each moment he pleaſes. For the exiſtence of all things depending upon his good-pleaſure, all things exiſt every moment that he thinks fit to have them exiſt. To conclude, expanſion and duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every part of ſpace being in every part of duration,

ration, and every part of duration in every part of expanſion. Such a combination of two diſtinct ideas is, I ſuppoſe, ſcarce to be found in all that great variety we do or can conceive, and may afford matter to farther ſpeculation.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Number.

§. 1. AMONGST all the ideas we have, as there is none ſuggeſted to the mind by more ways, ſo there is none more ſimple, than that of unity, or one. It has no ſhadow of variety or compoſition in it; every object our ſenſes are employed about, every idea in our underſtandings, every thought of our minds, brings this idea along with it. And therefore it is the moſt intimate to our thoughts, as well as it is, in its agreement to all other things, the moſt univerſal idea we have. For number applies itſelf to men, angels, actions, thoughts, every thing that either doth exiſt, or can be imagined. Number the ſimpleſt and moſt univerſal idea.

§. 2. By repeating this idea in our minds, and adding the repetitions together, we come by the complex ideas of the modes of it. Thus by adding one to one, we have the complex idea of a couple; by putting twelve units together, we have the complex idea of a dozen; and ſo of a ſcore, or a million, or any other number. Its modes made by addition.

§. 3. The ſimple modes of numbers are of all other the moſt diſtinct; every the leaſt variation, which is an unit, making each combination as clearly different from that which approacheth neareſt to it, as the moſt remote: two being as diſtinct from one, as two hundred; and the idea of two as diſtinct from the idea of three, as the magnitude of the whole earth is from that of a mite. This is not ſo in other ſimple modes, in which it is not ſo eaſy, Each mode diſtinct.

nor

nor perhaps poſſible for us to diſtinguiſh betwixt two approaching ideas, which yet are really different. For who will undertake to find a difference between the white of this paper, and that of the next degree to it; or can form diſtinct ideas of every the leaſt exceſs in extenſion?

Therefore demonſtrations in numbers the moſt preciſe.

§. 4. The clearneſs and diſtinctneſs of each mode of number from all others, even thoſe that approach neareſt, makes me apt to think that demonſtrations in numbers, if they are not more evident and exact than in extenſion, yet they are more general in their uſe, and more determinate in their application. Becauſe the ideas of numbers are more preciſe and diſtinguiſhable than in extenſion, where every equality and exceſs are not ſo eaſy to be obſerved or meaſured; becauſe our thoughts cannot in ſpace arrive at any determined ſmallneſs, beyond which it cannot go, as an unit; and therefore the quantity or proportion of any the leaſt exceſs cannot be diſcovered: which is clear otherwiſe in number, where, as has been ſaid, ninety-one is as diſtinguiſhable from ninety, as from nine thouſand, though ninety-one be the next immediate exceſs to ninety. But it is not ſo in extenſion, where whatſoever is more than juſt a foot or an inch, is not diſtinguiſhable from the ſtandard of a foot or an inch; and in lines which appear of an equal length, one may be longer than the other by innumerable parts; nor can any one aſſign an angle, which ſhall be the next biggeſt to a right one.

Names neceſſary to numbers.

§. 5. By the repeating, as has been ſaid, the idea of an unit, and joining it to another unit, we make thereof one collective idea, marked by the name two. And whoſoever can do this, and proceed on ſtill, adding one more to the laſt collective idea which he had of any number, and give a name to it, may count, or have ideas for ſeveral collections of units, diſtinguiſhed one from another, as far as he hath a ſeries of names for following numbers, and a memory to retain that ſeries, with their ſeveral names: all numeration being but ſtill the adding of one unit more, and giving to the whole together, as comprehended

prehended in one idea, a new or diſtinct name or ſign, whereby to know it from thoſe before and after, and diſtinguiſh it from every ſmaller or greater multitude of units. So that he that can add one to one, and ſo to two, and ſo go on with his tale, taking ſtill with him the diſtinct names belonging to every progreſſion; and ſo again, by ſubtracting an unit from each collection, retreat and leſſen them; is capable of all the ideas of numbers within the compaſs of his language, or for which he hath names, though not perhaps of more. For the ſeveral ſimple modes of numbers, being in our minds but ſo many combinations of units, which have no variety, nor are capable of any other difference but more or leſs, names or marks for each diſtinct combination ſeem more neceſſary than in any other ſort of ideas. For without ſuch names or marks we can hardly well make uſe of numbers in reckoning, eſpecially where the combination is made up of any great multitude of units; which put together without a name or mark, to diſtinguiſh that preciſe collection, will hardly be kept from being a heap in confuſion.

§. 6. This I think to be the reaſon, why ſome Americans I have ſpoken with, (who were otherwiſe of quick and rational parts enough) could not, as we do, by any means count to one thouſand; nor had any diſtinct idea of that number, though they could reckon very well to twenty. Becauſe their language being ſcanty, and accommodated only to the few neceſſaries of a needy ſimple life, unacquainted either with trade or mathematics, had no words in it to ſtand for one thouſand; ſo that when they were diſcourſed with of thoſe greater numbers, they would ſhow the hairs of their head, to expreſs a great multitude which they could not number: which inability, I ſuppoſe, proceeded from their want of names. The Tououpinambos had no names for numbers above five; any number beyond that they made out by ſhowing their fingers, and the fingers of others who were preſent *. And I doubt

* Hiſtoire d'un voyage, fait en la terre du Brafil, par Jean de Lery, c. 20. 407.

not

not but we ourſelves might diſtinctly number in words a great deal farther than we uſually do, would we find out but ſome fit denomination to ſignify them by; whereas in the way we take now to name them by millions of millions of millions, &c. it is hard to go beyond eighteen, or at moſt four and twenty decimal progreſſions, without confuſion. But to ſhow how much diſtinct names conduce to our well reckoning, or having uſeful ideas of numbers, let us ſet all theſe following figures in one continued line, as the marks of one number; v. g.

Nonillions.	*Octillions.*	*Septillions.*	*Sextillions.*	*Quintrillions.*
857324	162486	345896	437918	423147
Quatrillions.	*Trillions.*	*Billions.*	*Millions.*	*Units.*
248106	235421	261734	368149	623137

The ordinary way of naming this number in Engliſh, will be the often repeating of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, (which is the denomination of the ſecond ſix figures.) In which way, it will be very hard to have any diſtinguiſhing notions of this number: but whether, by giving every ſix figures a new and orderly denomination, theſe, and perhaps a great many more figures in progreſſion, might not eaſily be counted diſtinctly, and ideas of them both got more eaſily to ourſelves, and more plainly ſignified to others, I leave it to be conſidered. This I mention only to ſhow how neceſſary diſtinct names are to numbering, without pretending to introduce new ones of my invention.

Why children number not earlier.

§. 7. Thus children, either for want of names to mark the ſeveral progreſſions of numbers, or not having yet the faculty to collect ſcattered ideas into complex ones, and range them in a regular order, and ſo retain them in their memories, as is neceſſary to reckoning: do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it very far or ſteadily, till a good while after they are well furniſhed with good ſtore of other ideas: and one may often obſerve them diſcourſe and reaſon pretty well, and have very clear conceptions of ſeveral other things, before

they can tell twenty. And ſome, through the default of their memories, who cannot retain the ſeveral combinations of numbers, with their names annexed in their diſtinct orders, and the dependence of ſo long a train of numeral progreſſions, and their relation one to another, are not able all their life-time to reckon, or regularly go over any moderate ſeries of numbers. For he that will count twenty, or have any idea of that number, muſt know that nineteen went before, with the diſtinct name or ſign of every one of them, as they ſtand marked in their order; for wherever this fails, a gap is made, the chain breaks, and the progreſs in numbering can go no farther. So that to reckon right, it is required, 1. That the mind diſtinguiſh carefully two ideas, which are different one from another only by the addition or ſubtraction of one unit. 2. That it retain in memory the names or marks of the ſeveral combinations, from an unit to that number; and that not confuſedly, and at random, but in that exact order, that the numbers follow one another: in either of which, if it trips, the whole buſineſs of numbering will be diſturbed, and there will remain only the confuſed idea of multitude, but the ideas neceſſary to diſtinct numeration will not be attained to.

Number meaſures all meaſurables.

§. 8. This farther is obſervable in numbers, that it is that which the mind makes uſe of in meaſuring all things that by us are meaſurable, which principally are expanſion and duration; and our idea of infinity, even when applied to thoſe, ſeems to be nothing but the infinity of number. For what elſe are our ideas of eternity and immenſity, but the repeated additions of certain ideas of imagined parts of duration and expanſion, with the infinity of number, in which we can come to no end of addition? For ſuch an inexhauſtible ſtock, number (of all other our ideas) moſt clearly furniſhes us with, as is obvious to every one. For let a man collect into one ſum as great a number as he pleaſes, this multitude, how great ſoever, leſſens not one jot the power of adding to it, or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhauſtible ſtock of number,

where ſtill there remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And this endleſs addition or addibility (if any one like the word better) of numbers, ſo apparent to the mind, is that, I think, which gives us the cleareſt and moſt diſtinct idea of infinity: of which more in the following chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Infinity.

Infinity, in its original intention, attributed to ſpace, duration and number.

§. 1. HE that would know what kind of idea it is to which we give the name of infinity, cannot do it better, than by conſidering to what infinity is by the mind more immediately attributed, and then how the mind comes to frame it.

Finite and infinite ſeem to me to be looked upon by the mind as the modes of quantity, and to be attributed primarily in their firſt deſignation only to thoſe things which have parts, and are capable of increaſe or diminution, by the addition or ſubtraction of any the leaſt part: and ſuch are the ideas of ſpace, duration, and number, which we have conſidered in the foregoing chapters. It is true, that we cannot but be aſſured, that the great God, of whom and from whom are all things, is incomprehenſibly infinite: but yet when we apply to that firſt and ſupreme being our idea of infinite, in our weak and narrow thoughts, we do it primarily in reſpect to his duration and ubiquity; and, I think, more figuratively to his power, wiſdom, and goodneſs, and other attributes, which are properly inexhauſtible and incomprehenſible, &c. For, when we call them infinite, we have no other idea of this infinity, but what carries with it ſome reflection on, and imitation of, that number or extent of the acts or objects of God's power, wiſdom, and goodneſs, which can never be ſuppoſed ſo great or ſo many, which theſe attributes will not always ſurmount and exceed, let us multi-

multiply them in our thoughts as far as we can, with all the infinity of endleſs number. I do not pretend to ſay how theſe attributes are in God, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities. They do, without doubt, contain in them all poſſible perfection: but this, I ſay, is our way of conceiving them, and theſe our ideas of their infinity.

The idea of finite eaſily got.

§. 2. Finite then, and infinite, being by the mind looked on as modifications of expanſion and duration, the next thing to be conſidered, is, how the mind comes by them. As for the idea of finite, there is no great difficulty. The obvious portions of extenſion that affect our ſenſes, carry with them into the mind the idea of finite: and the ordinary periods of ſucceſſion, whereby we meaſure time and duration, as hours, days, and years, are bounded lengths. The difficulty is, how we come by thoſe boundleſs ideas of eternity and immenſity, ſince the objects we converſe with, come ſo much ſhort of any approach or proportion to that largeneſs.

How we come by the idea of infinity.

§. 3. Every one that has any idea of any ſtated lengths of ſpace, as a foot, finds that he can repeat that idea; and, joining it to the former, make the idea of two feet; and by the addition of a third, three feet; and ſo on, without ever coming to an end of his addition, whether of the ſame idea of a foot, or if he pleaſes of doubling it, or any other idea he has of any length, as a mile, or diameter of the earth or of the orbis magnus: for whichſoever of theſe he takes, and how often ſoever he doubles, or any otherwiſe multiplies it, he finds that after he has continued his doubling in his thoughts, and enlarged his idea as much as he pleaſes, he has no more reaſon to ſtop, nor is one jot nearer the end of ſuch addition, than he was at firſt ſetting out. The power of enlarging his idea of ſpace by farther additions remaining ſtill the ſame, he hence takes the idea of infinite ſpace.

Our idea of ſpace boundleſs.

§. 4. This, I think, is the way whereby the mind gets the idea of infinite ſpace. It is a quite different conſideration, to examine whether the mind has the idea of ſuch a bound-

a boundleſs ſpace actually exiſting, ſince our ideas are not always proofs of the exiſtence of things; but yet, ſince this comes here in our way, I ſuppoſe I may ſay, that we are apt to think that ſpace in itſelf is actually boundleſs; to which imagination, the idea of ſpace or expanſion of itſelf naturally leads us. For it being conſidered by us, either as the extenſion of body, or as exiſting by itſelf, without any ſolid matter taking it up (for of ſuch a void ſpace we have not only the idea, but I have proved as I think, from the motion of body, its neceſſary exiſtence) it is impoſſible the mind ſhould be ever able to find or ſuppoſe any end of it, or be ſtopped any where in its progreſs in this ſpace, how far ſoever it extends its thoughts. Any bounds made with body, even adamantine walls, are ſo far from putting a ſtop to the mind in its farther progreſs in ſpace and extenſion, that it rather facilitates and enlarges it; for ſo far as that body reaches, ſo far no one can doubt of extenſion: and when we are come to the utmoſt extremity of body, what is there that can there put a ſtop, and ſatisfy the mind that it is at the end of ſpace, when it perceives that it is not; nay, when it is ſatisfied that body itſelf can move into it? For if it be neceſſary for the motion of body, that there ſhould be an empty ſpace, though ever ſo little, here amongſt bodies; and if it be poſſible for body to move in or through that empty ſpace; nay it is impoſſible for any particle of matter to move but into an empty ſpace; the ſame poſſibility of a body's moving into a void ſpace, beyond the utmoſt bounds of body, as well as into a void ſpace interſperſed amongſt bodies, will always remain clear and evident: the idea of empty pure ſpace, whether within or beyond the confines of all bodies, being exactly the ſame, differing not in nature, though in bulk; and there being nothing to hinder body from moving into it. So that wherever the mind places itſelf by any thought, either amongſt or remote from all bodies, it can in this uniform idea of ſpace no-where find any bounds, any end; and ſo muſt neceſſarily conclude it, by the very nature and idea of each part of it, to be actually infinite.

§. 5.

§. 5. As by the power we find in ourſelves of repeating, as often as we will, any idea of ſpace, we get the idea of immenſity; ſo, by being able to repeat the idea of any length of duration we have in our minds, with all the endleſs addition of number, we come by the idea of eternity. For we find in ourſelves, we can no more come to an end of ſuch repeated ideas, than we can come to the end of number, which every one perceives he cannot. But here again it is another queſtion, quite different from our having an idea of eternity, to know whether there were any real being, whoſe duration has been eternal. And as to this, I ſay, he that conſiders ſomething now exiſting, muſt neceſſarily come to ſomething eternal. But having ſpoke of this in another place, ſhall ſay here no more of it, but proceed on to ſome other conſiderations of our idea of infinity. And ſo of duration.

§. 6. If it be ſo, that our idea of infinity be got from the power we obſerve in ourſelves of repeating without end our own ideas; it may be demanded, "why we do "not attribute infinite to other ideas, as well as thoſe "of ſpace and duration;" ſince they may be as eaſily, and as often repeated in our minds, as the other; and yet no-body ever thinks of infinite ſweetneſs, or infinite whiteneſs, though he can repeat the idea of ſweet or white, as frequently as thoſe of a yard, or a day? To which I anſwer, all the ideas that are conſidered as having parts, and are capable of increaſe by the addition of any equal or leſs parts, afford us by their repetition the idea of infinity; becauſe with this endleſs repetition, there is continued an enlargement, of which there can be no end. But in other ideas it is not ſo; for to the largeſt idea of extenſion or duration that I at preſent have, the addition of any the leaſt part makes an increaſe; but to the perfecteſt idea I have of the whiteſt whiteneſs, if I add another of a leſs or equal whiteneſs, (and of a whiter than I have, I cannot add the idea) it makes no increaſe, and enlarges not my idea at all: and therefore the different ideas of whiteneſs, &c. are called degrees. For thoſe ideas that conſiſt of parts are capa- Why other ideas are not capable of infinity.

ble of being augmented by every addition of the leaſt part; but if you take the idea of white, which one parcel of ſnow yielded yeſterday to our ſight, and another idea of white from another parcel of ſnow you ſee to-day, and put them together in your mind, they embody, as it were, and run into one, and the idea of whiteneſs is not at all increaſed, and if we add a leſs degree of whiteneſs to a greater, we are ſo far from increaſing that we diminiſh it. Thoſe ideas that conſiſt not of parts cannot be augmented to what proportion men pleaſe, or be ſtretched beyond what they have received by their ſenſes; but ſpace, duration, and number, being capable of increaſe by repetition, leave in the mind an idea of endleſs room for more: nor can we conceive any where a ſtop to a farther addition or progreſſion, and ſo thoſe ideas alone lead our minds towards the thought of infinity.

Difference between infinity of ſpace, and ſpace infinite.

§. 7. Though our idea of infinity ariſe from the contemplation of quantity, and the endleſs increaſe the mind is able to make in quantity, by the repeated additions of what portions thereof it pleaſes; yet I gueſs we cauſe great confuſion in our thoughts, when we join infinity to any ſuppoſed idea of quantity the mind can be thought to have, and ſo diſcourſe or reaſon about an infinite quantity, viz. an infinite ſpace, or an infinite duration. For our idea of infinity being as I think, an endleſs growing idea, by the idea of any quantity the mind has, being at that time terminated in that idea, (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is) to join infinity to it, is to adjuſt a ſtanding meaſure to a growing bulk; and therefore I think it is not an inſignificant ſubtilty, if I ſay that we are carefully to diſtinguiſh between the idea of the infinity of ſpace, and the idea of a ſpace infinite: the firſt is nothing but a ſuppoſed endleſs progreſſion of the mind, over what repeated ideas of ſpace it pleaſes; but to have actually in the mind the idea of a ſpace infinite, is to ſuppoſe the mind already paſſed over, and actually to have a view of all thoſe repeated ideas of ſpace, which

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an endleſs repetition can never totally repreſent to it; which carries in it a plain contradiction.

We have no idea of infinite ſpace.

§. 8. This, perhaps, will be a little plainer, if we conſider it in numbers. The infinity of numbers, to the end of whoſe addition every one perceives there is no approach, eaſily appears to any one that reflects on it: but how clear ſoever this idea of the infinity of number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the abſurdity of the actual idea of an infinite number. Whatſoever poſitive ideas we have in our minds of any ſpace, duration, or number, let them be ever ſo great, they are ſtill finite; but when we ſuppoſe an inexhauſtible remainder, from which we remove all bounds, and wherein we allow the mind an endleſs progreſſion of thought, without ever compleating the idea, there we have our idea of infinity; which though it ſeems to be pretty clear when we conſider nothing elſe in it but the negation of an end, yet when we would frame in our minds the idea of an infinite ſpace or duration, that idea is very obſcure and confuſed, becauſe it is made up of two parts, very different, if not inconſiſtent. For let a man frame in his mind an idea of any ſpace or number, as great as he will: it is plain the mind reſts and terminates in that idea, which is contrary to the idea of infinity, which conſiſts in a ſuppoſed endleſs progreſſion. And therefore I think it is, that we are ſo eaſily confounded, when we come to argue and reaſon about infinite ſpace or duration, &c. Becauſe the parts of ſuch an idea not being perceived to be, as they are, inconſiſtent, the one ſide or other always perplexes, whatever conſequences we draw from the other; as an idea of motion not paſſing on would perplex any one, who ſhould argue from ſuch an idea, which is not better than an idea of motion at reſt: and ſuch another ſeems to me to be the idea of a ſpace, or (which is the ſame thing) a number infinite, i. e. of a ſpace or number which the mind actually has, and ſo views and terminates in; and of a ſpace or number, which in a conſtant and endleſs enlarging and progreſſion, it can in thought never attain to. For how large ſoever an idea of ſpace I have in my mind, it is

no larger than it is that inſtant that I have it, though I be capable the next inſtant to double it, and ſo on in infinitum: for that alone is infinite which has no bounds; and that the idea of infinity, in which our thoughts can find none.

Number affords us the cleareſt idea of infinity.

§. 9. But of all other ideas, it is number, as I have ſaid, which I think furniſhes us with the cleareſt and moſt diſtinct idea of infinity we are capable of. For even in ſpace and duration, when the mind purſues the idea of infinity, it there makes uſe of the ideas and repetitions of numbers, as of millions and millions of miles, or years, which are ſo many diſtinct ideas, kept beſt by number from running into a confuſed heap, wherein the mind loſes itſelf; and when it has added together as many millions, &c. as it pleaſes, of known lengths of ſpace or duration, the cleareſt idea it can get of infinity, is the confuſed incomprehenſible remainder of endleſs addible numbers, which affords no proſpect of ſtop or boundary.

Our different conception of the infinity of number, duration, and expanſion.

§. 10. It will, perhaps, give us a little farther light into the idea we have of infinity, and diſcover to us that it is nothing but the infinity of number applied to determinate parts, of which we have in our minds the diſtinct ideas, if we conſider, that number is not generally thought by us infinite, whereas duration and extenſion are apt to be ſo; which ariſes from hence, that in number we are at one end as it were: for there being in number nothing leſs than an unit, we there ſtop, and are at an end; but in addition or increaſe of number, we can ſet no bounds. And ſo it is like a line, whereof one end terminating with us, the other is extended ſtill forwards beyond all that we can conceive; but in ſpace and duration it is otherwiſe. For in duration we conſider it, as if this line of number were extended both ways to an unconceivable, undeterminate, and infinite length; which is evident to any one that will but reflect on what conſideration he hath of eternity; which, I ſuppoſe, he will find to be nothing elſe, but the turning this infinity of

number both ways, à parte ante and à parte poſt, as they ſpeak. For when we would conſider eternity, à parte ante, what do we but, beginning from ourſelves and the preſent time we are in, repeat in our minds the ideas of years, or ages, or any other aſſignable portion of duration paſt, with a proſpect of proceeding in ſuch addition, with all the infinity of number? and when we would conſider eternity, à parte poſt, we juſt after the ſame rate begin from ourſelves, and reckon by multiplied periods yet to come, ſtill extending that line of number, as before. And theſe two being put together, are that infinite duration we call eternity: which, as we turn our view either way, forwards or backwards, appears infinite, becauſe we ſtill turn that way the infinite end of number, i. e. the power ſtill of adding more.

§. 11. The ſame happens alſo in ſpace, wherein conceiving ourſelves to be as it were in the centre, we do on all ſides purſue thoſe indeterminable lines of number; and reckoning any way from ourſelves, a yard, mile, diameter of the earth, or orbis magnus, by the infinity of number, we add others to them as often as we will; and having no more reaſon to ſet bounds to thoſe repeated ideas than we have to ſet bounds to number, we have that indeterminable idea of immenſity.

Infinite diviſibility.

§. 12. And ſince in any bulk of matter our thoughts can never arrive at the utmoſt diviſibility, therefore there is an apparent infinity to us alſo in that, which has the infinity alſo of number; but with this difference, that, in the former conſiderations of the infinity of ſpace and duration, we only uſe addition of numbers; whereas this is like the diviſion of an unit into its fractions, wherein the mind alſo can proceed in infinitum, as well as in the former additions; it being indeed but the addition ſtill of new numbers: Though in the addition of the one we can have no more the poſitive idea of a ſpace infinitely great, than, in the diviſion of the other, we can have the idea of a body infinitely little; our idea of infinity being, as I may ſay, a growing or fugitive idea, ſtill in a boundleſs progreſſion, that can ſtop nowhere.

§. 13.

No poſitive idea of infinity.

§. 13. Though it be hard, I think, to find any one ſo abſurd as to ſay, he has the poſitive idea of an actual infinite number; the infinity whereof lies only in a power ſtill of adding any combination of units to any former number, and that as long and as much as one will; the like alſo being in the infinity of ſpace and duration, which power leaves always to the mind room for endleſs additions; yet there be thoſe who imagine they have poſitive ideas of infinite duration and ſpace. It would, I think, be enough to deſtroy any ſuch poſitive idea of infinite, to aſk him that has it, whether he could add to it or no; which would eaſily ſhow the miſtake of ſuch a poſitive idea. We can, I think, have no poſitive idea of any ſpace or duration which is not made up, and commenſurate to repeated numbers of feet or yards, or days and years, which are the common meaſures, whereof we have the ideas in our minds, and whereby we judge of the greatneſs of this ſort of quantities. And therefore, ſince an infinite idea of ſpace or duration muſt needs be made up of infinite parts, it can have no other infinity than that of number, capable ſtill of farther addition; but not an actual poſitive idea of a number infinite. For, I think, it is evident that the addition of finite things together (as are all lengths, whereof we have the poſitive ideas) can never otherwiſe produce the idea of infinite, than as number does; which conſiſting of additions of finite units one to another, ſuggeſts the idea of infinite, only by a power we find we have of ſtill increaſing the ſum, and adding more of the ſame kind, without coming one jot nearer the end of ſuch progreſſion.

§. 14. They who would prove their idea of infinite to be poſitive, ſeem to me to do it by a pleaſant argument, taken from the negation of an end; which being negative, the negation of it is poſitive. He that conſiders that the end is, in body, but the extremity or ſuperficies of that body, will not perhaps be forward to grant that the end is a bare negative: and he that perceives the end of his pen is black or white, will be apt to think that the end is ſomething more than a pure nega-

negation. Nor is it, when applied to duration, the bare negation of exiſtence, but more properly the laſt moment of it. But if they will have the end to be nothing but the bare negation of exiſtence, I am ſure they cannot deny but the beginning is the firſt inſtant of being, and is not by any body conceived to be a bare negation; and therefore by their own argument, the idea of eternal, à parte ante, or of a duration without a beginning, is but a negative idea.

What is poſitive, what negative, in our idea of infinite.

§. 15. The idea of infinite has, I confeſs, ſomething of poſitive in all thoſe things we apply to it. When we would think of infinite ſpace or duration, we at firſt ſtep uſually make ſome very large idea, as perhaps of millions of ages, or miles, which poſſibly we double and multiply ſeveral times. All that we thus amaſs together in our thoughts is poſitive, and the aſſemblage of a great number of poſitive ideas of ſpace or duration. But what ſtill remains beyond this, we have no more a poſitive diſtinct notion of, than a mariner has of the depth of the ſea; where having let down a large portion of his ſounding-line, he reaches no bottom: whereby he knows the depth to be ſo many fathoms, and more; but how much the more is, he hath no diſtinct notion at all: And could he always ſupply new line, and find the plummet always ſink, without ever ſtopping, he would be ſomething in the poſture of the mind reaching after a complete and poſitive idea of infinity. In which caſe let this line be ten, or one thouſand fathoms long, it equally diſcovers what is beyond it; and gives only this confuſed and comparative idea, that this is not all, but one may yet go farther. So much as the mind comprehends of any ſpace, it has a poſitive idea of; but in endeavouring to make it infinite, it being always enlarging, always advancing, the idea is ſtill imperfect and incomplete. So much ſpace as the mind takes a view of in its contemplation of greatneſs, is a clear picture, and poſitive in the underſtanding: but infinite is ſtill greater. 1. Then the idea of ſo much is poſitive and clear. 2. The idea of greater is alſo clear, but it is

but a comparative idea, viz. the idea of ſo much greater as cannot be comprehended; and this is plainly negative, not poſitive. For he has no poſitive clear idea of the largeneſs of any extenſion, (which is that ſought for in the idea of infinite) that has not a comprehenſive idea of the dimenſions of it; and ſuch no-body, I think, pretends to in what is infinite. For to ſay a man has a poſitive clear idea of any quantity, without knowing how great it is, is as reaſonable as to ſay, he has the poſitive clear idea of the number of the ſands on the ſea-ſhore, who knows not how many there be; but only that they are more than twenty. For juſt ſuch a perfect and poſitive idea has he of an infinite ſpace or duration, who ſays it is larger than the extent or duration of ten, one hundred, one thouſand, or any other number of miles, or years, whereof he has, or can have a poſitive idea; which is all the idea, I think, we have of infinite. So that what lies beyond our poſitive idea towards infinity, lies in obſcurity; and has the indeterminate confuſion of a negative idea, wherein I know I neither do nor can comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and narrow capacity: and that cannot but be very far from a poſitive complete idea, wherein the greateſt part of what I would comprehend is left out, under the undeterminate intimation of being ſtill greater: for to ſay, that having in any quantity meaſured ſo much, or gone ſo far, you are not yet at the end; is only to ſay, that that quantity is greater. So that the negation of an end in any quantity is, in other words, only to ſay, that it is bigger: and a total negation of an end is but carrying this bigger ſtill with you, in all the progreſſions your thoughts ſhall make in quantity; and adding this idea of ſtill greater, to all the ideas you have, or can be ſuppoſed to have, of quantity. Now whether ſuch an idea as that be poſitive, I leave any one to conſider.

We have no poſitive idea of an infinite duration.

§. 16. I aſk thoſe who ſay they have a poſitive idea of eternity, whether their idea of duration includes in it ſucceſſion, or not? if it does not, they ought to ſhow the difference of their notion of duration, when applied

plied to an eternal being, and to a finite: ſince perhaps, there may be others, as well as I, who will own to them their weakneſs of underſtanding in this point; and acknowledge, that the notion they have of duration forces them to conceive, that whatever has duration, is of a longer continuance to-day than it was yeſterday. If, to avoid ſucceſſion in external exiſtence, they return to the punctum ſtans of the ſchools, I ſuppoſe they will thereby very little mend the matter, or help us to a more clear and poſitive idea of infinite duration, there being nothing more inconceivable to me than duration without ſucceſſion. Beſides, that punctum ſtans, if it ſignify any thing, being not quantum, finite or infinite cannot belong to it. But if our weak apprehenſions cannot ſeparate ſucceſſion from any duration whatſoever, our idea of eternity can be nothing but of infinite ſucceſſion of moments of duration, wherein any thing does exiſt; and whether any one has or can have a poſitive idea of an actual infinite number, I leave him to conſider, till his infinite number be ſo great that he himſelf can add no more to it; and as long as he can increaſe it, I doubt he himſelf will think the idea he hath of it a little too ſcanty for poſitive infinity.

§. 17. I think it unavoidable for every conſidering rational creature, that will but examine his own or any other exiſtence, to have the notion of an eternal wiſe Being, who had no beginning: and ſuch an idea of infinite duration I am ſure I have. But this negation of a beginning being but the negation of a poſitive thing, ſcarce gives me a poſitive idea of infinity; which whenever I endeavoured to extend my thoughts to, I confeſs myſelf at a loſs, and I find I cannot attain any clear comprehenſion of it.

No poſitive idea of infinite ſpace.

§. 18. He that thinks he has a poſitive idea of infinite ſpace, will, when he conſiders it, find that he can no more have a poſitive idea of the greateſt, than he has of the leaſt ſpace. For in this latter, which ſeems the eaſier of the two, and more within our comprehenſion, we are capable only of a comparative idea of ſmallneſs, which

which will always be leſs than any one whereof we have the poſitive idea. All our poſitive ideas of any quantity, whether great or little, have always bounds; though our comparative idea, whereby we can always add to the one, and take from the other, hath no bounds: for that which remains either great or little, not being comprehended in that poſitive idea which we have, lies in obſcurity; and we have no other idea of it, but of the power of enlarging the one, and diminiſhing the other, without ceaſing. A peſtle and mortar will as ſoon bring any particle of matter to indiviſibility, as the acuteſt thought of a mathematician; and a ſurveyor may as ſoon with his chain meaſure our infinite ſpace, as a philoſopher by the quickeſt flight of mind reach it, or by thinking comprehend it; which is to have a poſitive idea of it. He that thinks on a cube of an inch diameter, has a clear and poſitive idea of it in his mind, and ſo can frame one of $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, and ſo on till he has the idea in his thoughts of ſomething very little; but yet reaches not the idea of that incomprehenſible littleneſs which diviſion can produce. What remains of ſmallneſs, is as far from his thoughts as when he firſt began; and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and poſitive idea of that ſmallneſs, which is conſequent to infinite diviſibility.

What is poſitive, what negative, in our idea of infinite.

§. 19. Every one that looks towards infinity does, as I have ſaid, at firſt glance make ſome very large idea of that which he applies it to, let it be ſpace or duration; and poſſibly he wearies his thoughts, by multiplying in his mind that firſt large idea: but yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a poſitive clear idea of what remains to make up a poſitive infinite, than the country-fellow had of the water, which was yet to come and paſs the channel of the river where he ſtood:

> Ruſticus expectat dum tranſeat amnis, at ille
> Labitur, & labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

§. 20.

§. 20. There are ſome I have met with, that put ſo much difference between infinite duration and infinite ſpace that they perſuade themſelves that they have a poſitive idea of eternity; but that they have not, nor can have any idea of infinite ſpace. The reaſon of which miſtake I ſuppoſe to be this, that finding by a due contemplation of cauſes and effects, that it is neceſſary to admit ſome eternal being, and ſo to conſider the real exiſtence of that being, as taken up and commenſurate to their idea of eternity; but on the other ſide, not finding it neceſſary, but on the contrary apparently abſurd, that body ſhould be infinite; they forwardly conclude, that they have no idea of infinite ſpace, becauſe they can have no idea of infinite matter. Which conſequence, I conceive, is very ill collected; becauſe the exiſtence of matter is no ways neceſſary to the exiſtence of ſpace, no more than the exiſtence of motion, or the ſun, is neceſſary to duration, though duration uſes to be meaſured by it: and I doubt not but that a man may have the idea of ten thouſand miles ſquare, without any body ſo big, as well as the idea of ten thouſand years, without any body ſo old. It ſeems as eaſy to me to have the idea of ſpace empty of body, as to think of the capacity of a buſhel without corn, or the hollow of a nut-ſhell without a kernel in it: it being no more neceſſary that there ſhould be exiſting a ſolid body infinitely extended, becauſe we have an idea of the infinity of ſpace, than it is neceſſary that the world ſhould be eternal, becauſe we have an idea of infinite duration. And why ſhould we think our idea of infinite ſpace requires the real exiſtence of matter to ſupport it, when we find that we have as clear an idea of an infinite duration to come, as we have of infinite duration paſt? Though, I ſuppoſe nobody thinks it conceivable, that any thing does, or has exiſted in that future duration. Nor is it poſſible to join our idea of future duration with preſent or paſt exiſtence, any more than it is poſſible to make the ideas of yeſterday, to-day, and to-morrow, to be the ſame; or bring ages paſt and future together, and make them contem-

Some think they have a poſitive idea of eternity, and not of infinite ſpace.

contemporary. But if theſe men are of the mind, that they have clearer ideas of infinite duration than of infinite ſpace, becauſe it is paſt doubt that God has exiſted from all eternity, but there is no real matter co-extended with infinite ſpace; yet thoſe philoſophers who are of opinion, that infinite ſpace is poſſeſſed by God's infinite omnipreſence, as well as infinite duration by his external exiſtence, muſt be allowed to have as clear an idea of infinite ſpace as of infinite duration; though neither of them, I think, has any poſitive idea of infinity in either caſe. For whatſoever poſitive idea a man has in his mind of any quantity, he can repeat it, and add it to the former as eaſy as he can add together the ideas of two days, or two paces, which are poſitive ideas of lengths he has in his mind, and ſo on as long as he pleaſes: whereby if a man had a poſitive idea of infinite, either duration or ſpace, he could add two infinites together; nay, make one infinite infinitely bigger than another: abſurdities too groſs to be confuted.

Suppoſed poſitive ideas of infinity, cauſe of miſtakes.

§. 21. But yet after all this, there being men who perſuade themſelves that they have clear poſitive comprehenſive ideas of infinity, it is fit they enjoy their privilege: and I ſhould be very glad (with ſome others that I know, who acknowledge they have none ſuch) to be better informed by their communication. For I have been hitherto apt to think that the great and inextricable difficulties which perpetually involve all diſcourſes concerning infinity, whether of ſpace, duration, or diviſibility, have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity, and the diſproportion the nature thereof has to the comprehenſion of our narrow capacities. For whilſt men talk and diſpute of infinite ſpace or duration, as if they had as complete and poſitive ideas of them, as they have of the names they uſe for them, or as they have of a yard, or an hour, or any other determinate quantity; it is no wonder if the incomprehenſible nature of the thing they diſcourſe of, or reaſon about, leads them into perplexities and contradictions: and their minds be overlaid by an ob-

ject too large and mighty to be ſurveyed and managed by them.

All theſe ideas from ſenſation and reflection.

§. 22. If I have dwelt pretty long on the conſideration of duration, ſpace, and number, and what ariſes from the contemplation of them, infinity; it is poſſibly no more than the matter requires, there being few ſimple ideas, whoſe modes give more exerciſe to the thoughts of men than theſe do. I pretend not to treat of them in their full latitude; it ſuffices to my deſign, to ſhow how the mind receives them, ſuch as they are, from ſenſation and reflection; and how even the idea we have of infinity, how remote ſoever it may ſeem to be from any object of ſenſe, or operation of our mind, has nevertheleſs, as all our other ideas, its original there. Some mathematicians perhaps of advanced ſpeculations, may have other ways to introduce into their minds ideas of infinity; but this hinders not, but that they themſelves, as well as all other men, got the firſt ideas which they had of infinity, from ſenſation and reflection, in the method we have here ſet down.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of other Simple Modes.

Modes of motion.

§ 1. THOUGH I have in the foregoing chapters ſhown, how from ſimple ideas, taken in by ſenſation, the mind comes to extend itſelf even to infinity; which however it may, of all others, ſeem moſt remote from any ſenſible perception, yet at laſt hath nothing in it but what is made out of ſimple ideas, received into the mind by the ſenſes, and afterwards there put together by the faculty the mind has to repeat its own ideas: though, I ſay, theſe might be inſtances enough of ſimple modes of the ſimple ideas of ſenſation, and ſuffice to ſhow how the mind comes by them; yet I ſhall for method's ſake,

though briefly, give an account of ſome few more, and then proceed to more complex ideas.

§. 2. To ſlide, roll, tumble, walk, creep, run, dance, leap, ſkip, and abundance of others that might be named, are words which are no ſooner heard, but every one who underſtands Engliſh, has preſently in his mind diſtinct ideas, which are all but the different modifications of motion. Modes of motion anſwer thoſe of extenſion: ſwift and ſlow are two different ideas of motion, the meaſures whereof are made of the diſtances of time and ſpace put together; ſo they are complex ideas comprehending time and ſpace with motion.

Modes of ſounds. §. 3. The like variety have we in ſounds. Every articulate word is a different modification of ſound: by which we ſee, that from the ſenſe of hearing, by ſuch modifications the mind may be furniſhed with diſtinct ideas to almoſt an infinite number. Sounds alſo, beſides the diſtinct cries of birds and beaſts, are modified by diverſity of notes of different length put together, which make that complex idea called a tune, which a muſician may have in his mind when he hears or makes no ſound at all, by reflecting on the ideas of thoſe ſounds, ſo put together ſilently in his own fancy.

Modes of colours. §. 4. Thoſe of colours are alſo very various: ſome we take notice of as the different degrees, or, as they are termed, ſhades of the ſame colour. But ſince we very ſeldom make aſſemblages of colours either for uſe or delight, but figure is taken in alſo and has its part in it, as in painting, weaving, needle-works, &c. thoſe which are taken notice of do moſt commonly belong to mixed modes, as being made up of ideas of divers kinds, viz. figure and colour, ſuch as beauty, rainbow, &c.

Modes of taſte. §. 5. All compounded taſtes and ſmells are alſo modes made up of the ſimple ideas of thoſe ſenſes. But they being ſuch as generally we have no names for, are leſs taken notice of, and cannot be ſet down in writing; and therefore muſt be left without enumeration to the thoughts and experience of my reader.

§. 6. In general it may be obſerved, that thoſe ſimple modes which are conſidered but as different degrees of the ſame ſimple idea, though they are in themſelves many of them very diſtinct ideas, yet have ordinarily no diſtinct names, nor are much taken notice of as diſtinct ideas, where the difference is but very ſmall between them. Whether men have neglected theſe modes, and given no names to them, as wanting meaſures nicely to diſtinguiſh them; or becauſe, when they were ſo diſtinguiſhed, that knowledge would not be of general or neceſſary uſe; I leave it to the thoughts of others: it is ſufficient to my purpoſe to ſhow, that all our ſimple ideas come to our minds only by ſenſation and reflection; and that when the mind has them, it can variouſly repeat and compound them, and ſo make new complex ideas. But though white, red, or ſweet, &c. have not been modified or made into complex ideas, by ſeveral combinations, ſo as to be named, and thereby ranked into ſpecies; yet ſome others of the ſimple ideas, viz. thoſe of unity, duration, motion, &c. above inſtanced in, as alſo power and thinking, have been thus modified to a great variety of complex ideas, with names belonging to them.

Some ſimple modes have no names.

§. 7. The reaſon whereof, I ſuppoſe, has been this, that, the great concernment of men being with men one amongſt another, the knowledge of men and their actions, and the ſignifying of them to one another, was moſt neceſſary; and therefore they made ideas of actions very nicely modified, and gave thoſe complex ideas names, that they might the more eaſily record, and diſcourſe of thoſe things they were daily converſant in, without long ambages and circumlocutions; and that the things they were continually to give and receive information about, might be the eaſier and quicker underſtood. That this is ſo, and that men in framing different complex ideas, and giving them names, have been much governed by the end of ſpeech in general (which is a very ſhort and expedite way of conveying their thoughts one to another) is evident in

Why ſome modes have, and others have not, names.

the names, which in ſeveral arts have been found out, and applied to ſeveral complex ideas of modified actions belonging to their ſeveral trades, for diſpatch ſake, in their direction or diſcourſes about them. Which ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men not converſant about theſe operations. And thence the words that ſtand for them, by the greateſt part of men of the ſame language, are not underſtood: v. g. colſhire, drilling, filtration, cohobation, are words ſtanding for certain complex ideas, which being ſeldom in the minds of any but thoſe few whoſe particular employments do at every turn ſuggeſt them to their thoughts, thoſe names of them are not generally underſtood but by ſmiths and chymiſts; who having framed the complex ideas which theſe words ſtand for, and having given names to them, or received them from others, upon hearing of theſe names in communication, readily conceive thoſe ideas in their minds; as by cohobation all the ſimple ideas of diſtilling, and the pouring the liquor diſtilled from any thing, back upon the remaining matter, and diſtilling it again. Thus we ſee that there are great varieties of ſimple ideas, as of taſtes and ſmells, which have no names; and of modes many more. Which either not having been generally enough obſerved, or elſe not being of any great uſe to be taken notice of in the affairs and converſe of men, they have not had names given to them, and ſo paſs not for ſpecies. This we ſhall have occaſion hereafter to conſider more at large, when we come to ſpeak of words.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

Senſation, remembrance, contemplation, &c.

§. 1. WHEN the mind turns its view inwards upon itſelf, and contemplates its own actions, thinking is the firſt that occurs. In it the mind obſerves

great

great variety of modifications, and from thence receives diſtinct ideas. Thus the perception which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any impreſſion on the body, made by an external object, being diſtinct from all other modifications of thinking, furniſhes the mind with a diſtinct idea, which we call ſenſation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the underſtanding by the ſenſes. The ſame idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external ſenſory, is remembrance; if it be ſought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is recollection; if it be held there long under attentive conſideration, it is contemplation. When ideas float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the underſtanding, it is that which the French call reverie, our language has ſcarce a name for it. When the ideas that offer themſelves (for, as I have obſerved in another place, whilſt we are awake, there will always be a train of ideas ſucceeding one another in our minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, regiſtered in the memory, it is attention. When the mind with great earneſtneſs, and of choice, fixes its view on any idea, conſiders it on all ſides, and will not be called off by the ordinary ſolicitation of other ideas, it is that we call intention, or ſtudy. Sleep, without dreaming, is reſt from all theſe: and dreaming itſelf, is the having of ideas (whilſt the outward ſenſes are ſtopped, ſo that they receive not outward objects with their uſual quickneſs) in the mind, not ſuggeſted by any external objects, or known occaſion, nor under any choice or conduct of the underſtanding at all. And whether that, which we call extaſy, be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined.

§. 2. Theſe are ſome few inſtances of thoſe various modes of thinking, which the mind may obſerve in itſelf, and ſo have as diſtinct ideas of, as it hath of white and red, a ſquare or a circle. I do not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this ſet of ideas, which are got from reflection: that would be to make a volume. It ſuffices to my preſent purpoſe

to have ſhown here, by ſome few examples, of what ſort theſe ideas are, and how the mind comes by them; eſpecially ſince I ſhall have occaſion hereafter to treat more at large of reaſoning, judging, volition, and knowledge, which are ſome of the moſt conſiderable operations of the mind, and modes of thinking.

The various attention of the mind in thinking.

§. 3. But perhaps it may not be an unpardonable digreſſion, nor wholly impertinent to our preſent deſign, if we reflect here upon the different ſtate of the mind in thinking, which thoſe inſtances of attention, reverie, and dreaming, &c. before-mentioned, naturally enough ſuggeſt. That there are ideas, ſome or other, always preſent in the mind of a waking man, every one's experience convinces him, though the mind employs itſelf about them with ſeveral degrees of attention. Sometimes the mind fixes itſelf with ſo much earneſtneſs on the contemplation of ſome objects, that it turns their ideas on all ſides, remarks their relations and circumſtances, and views every part ſo nicely, and with ſuch intention, that it ſhuts out all other thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary impreſſions made then on the ſenſes, which at another ſeaſon would produce very ſenſible perceptions: at other times it barely obſerves the train of ideas that ſucceed in the underſtanding, without directing and purſuing any of them: and at other times it lets them paſs almoſt quite unregarded, as faint ſhadows that make no impreſſion.

Hence it is probable that thinking is the action, not eſſence of the ſoul.

§. 4. This difference of intention, and remiſſion of the mind in thinking, with a great variety of degrees between earneſt ſtudy, and very near minding nothing at all, every one, I think, has experienced in himſelf. Trace it a little farther, and you find the mind in ſleep retired as it were from the ſenſes, and out of the reach of thoſe motions made on the organs of ſenſe, which at other times produce very vivid and ſenſible ideas. I need not for this, inſtance in thoſe who ſleep out whole ſtormy nights, without hearing the thunder, or ſeeing the lightning, or feeling the ſhaking of the houſe, which are ſenſible enough to

thoſe

thoſe who are waking: but in this retirement of the mind from the ſenſes, it often retains a yet more looſe and incoherent manner of thinking, which we call dreaming: and, laſt of all, ſound ſleep cloſes the ſcene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think, almoſt every one has experience of in himſelf, and his own obſervation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence, is, that ſince the mind can ſenſibly put on, at ſeveral times, ſeveral degrees of thinking, and be ſometimes even in a waking man ſo remiſs, as to have thoughts dim and obſcure to that degree, that they are very little removed from none at all; and at laſt, in the dark retirements of ſound ſleep, loſes the ſight perfectly of all ideas whatſoever: ſince, I ſay, this is evidently ſo in matter of fact, and conſtant experience, I aſk whether it be not probable that thinking is the action, and not the eſſence of the ſoul? ſince the operations of agents will eaſily admit of intention and remiſſion, but the eſſences of things are not conceived capable of any ſuch variation. But this by the by.

CHAP. XX.

Of Modes of Pleaſure and Pain.

§. 1. AMONGST the ſimple ideas, which we receive both from ſenſation and reflection, pain and pleaſure are two very conſiderable ones. For as in the body there is ſenſation barely in itſelf, or accompanied with pain or pleaſure; ſo the thought or perception of the mind is ſimply ſo, or elſe accompanied alſo with pleaſure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you pleaſe. Theſe, like other ſimple ideas, cannot be deſcribed, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the ſimple ideas of the ſenſes, only by experience. For to define them by the preſence of good or evil, is no otherwiſe to make them known to us, than

Pleaſure and pain ſimple ideas.

by making us reflect on what we feel in ourſelves, upon the ſeveral and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to or conſidered by us.

Good and evil, what.

§. 2. Things then are good or evil, only in reference to pleaſure or pain. That we call good, which is apt to cauſe or increaſe pleaſure, or diminiſh pain in us; or elſe to procure or preſerve us the poſſeſſion of any other good, or abſenſe of any evil. And on the contrary, we name that evil, which is apt to produce or increaſe any pain, or diminiſh any pleaſure in us; or elſe to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleaſure and pain, I muſt be underſtood to mean of body or mind, as they are commonly diſtinguiſhed; though in truth they be only different conſtitutions of the mind, ſometimes occaſioned by diſorder in the body, ſometimes by thoughts of the mind.

Our paſſions moved by good and evil.

§. 3. Pleaſure and pain, and that which cauſes them, good and evil, are the hinges on which our paſſions turn: and if we reflect on ourſelves, and obſerve how theſe, under various conſiderations, operate in us; what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal ſenſations (if I may ſo call them) they produce in us, we may thence form to ourſelves the ideas of our paſſions.

Love.

§. 4. Thus any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight, which any preſent or abſent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call love. For when a man declares in autumn, when he is eating them, or in ſpring, when there are none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but that the taſte of grapes delights him; let an alteration of health or conſtitution deſtroy the delight of their taſte, and he then can be ſaid to love grapes no longer.

Hatred.

§. 5. On the contrary, the thought of the pain, which any thing preſent or abſent is apt to produce in us, is what we call hatred. Were it my buſineſs here to inquire any farther than into the bare ideas of our paſſions, as they depend on different modifications of pleaſure and pain, I ſhould remark, that

that our love and hatred of inanimate inſenſible beings, is commonly founded on that pleaſure and pain which we receive from their uſe and application any way to our ſenſes, though with their deſtruction: but hatred or love, to beings capable of happineſs or miſery, is often the uneaſineſs or delight, which we find in ourſelves ariſing from a conſideration of their very being or happineſs. Thus the being and welfare of a man's children or friends, producing conſtant delight in him, he is ſaid conſtantly to love them. But it ſuffices to note, that our ideas of love and hatred are but the diſpoſitions of the mind, in reſpect of pleaſure and pain in general, however cauſed in us.

Deſire.

§. 6. The uneaſineſs a man finds in himſelf upon the abſence of any thing, whoſe preſent enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that we call deſire; which is greater or leſs, as that uneaſineſs is more or leſs vehement. Where, by the by, it may perhaps be of ſome uſe to remark, that the chief, if not only ſpur to human induſtry and action, is uneaſineſs. For whatſoever good is propoſed, if its abſence carries no diſpleaſure or pain with it, if a man be eaſy and content without it, there is no deſire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare velleity, the term uſed to ſignify the loweſt degree of deſire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is ſo little uneaſineſs in the abſence of any thing, that it carries a man no farther than ſome faint wiſhes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous uſe of the means to attain it. Deſire alſo is ſtopped or abated by the opinion of the impoſſibility or unattainableneſs of the good propoſed, as far as the uneaſineſs is cured or allayed by that conſideration. This might carry our thoughts farther, were it ſeaſonable in this place.

Joy.

§. 7. Joy is a delight of the mind, from the conſideration of the preſent or aſſured approaching poſſeſſion of a good: and we are then poſſeſſed of any good when we have it ſo in our power, that we can uſe it when we pleaſe. Thus a man almoſt ſtarved has joy at the arrival of relief, even before he has the pleaſure of uſing it: and a father, in whom the

very well-being of his children cauſes delight, is always as long as his children are in ſuch a ſtate, in the poſſeſſion of that good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that pleaſure.

Sorrow. §. 8. Sorrow is uneaſineſs in the mind, upon the thought of a good loſt, which might have been enjoyed longer; or the ſenſe of a preſent evil.

Hope. §. 9. Hope is that pleaſure in the mind, which every one finds in himſelf, upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight him.

Fear. §. 10. Fear is an uneaſineſs of the mind, upon the thought of future evil likely to befal us.

Deſpair. §. 11. Deſpair is the thought of the unattainableneſs of any good, which works differently in men's minds, ſometimes producing uneaſineſs or pain, ſometimes reſt and indolency.

Anger. §. 12. Anger is uneaſineſs or diſcompoſure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a preſent purpoſe of revenge.

Envy. §. 13. Envy is an uneaſineſs of the mind, cauſed by the conſideration of a good we deſire, obtained by one we think ſhould not have had it before us.

What paſſions all men have. §. 14. Theſe two laſt, envy and anger, not being cauſed by pain and pleaſure, ſimply in themſelves, but having in them ſome mixed conſiderations of ourſelves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, becauſe thoſe other parts of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them: but all the reſt terminating purely in pain and pleaſure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we love, deſire, rejoice, and hope, only in reſpect of pleaſure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in reſpect of pain ultimately: in fine, all theſe paſſions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the cauſes of pleaſure and pain, or to have pleaſure or pain ſome way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred uſually to the ſubject (at leaſt if a ſenſible or voluntary

voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us, becauſe the fear it leaves is a conſtant pain: but we do not ſo conſtantly love what has done us good; becauſe pleaſure operates not ſo ſtrongly on us as pain, and becauſe we are not ſo ready to have hope it will do ſo again. But this by the by.

Pleaſure and pain, what.

§. 15. By pleaſure and pain, delight and uneaſineſs, I muſt all along be underſtood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleaſure, but whatſoever delight or uneaſineſs is felt by us, whether ariſing from any grateful or unacceptable ſenſation or reflection.

§. 16. It is farther to be conſidered, that in reference to the paſſions, the removal or leſſening of a pain is conſidered, and operates as a pleaſure: and the loſs or diminiſhing of a pleaſure, as a pain.

Shame.

§. 17. The paſſions too have moſt of them in moſt perſons operations on the body, and cauſe various changes in it; which not being always ſenſible, do not make a neceſſary part of the idea of each paſſion. For ſhame, which is an uneaſineſs of the mind upon the thought of having done ſomething which is indecent, or will leſſen the valued eſteem which others have for us, has not always bluſhing accompanying it.

Theſe inſtances to ſhow how our ideas of the paſſions are got from ſenſation and reflection.

§. 18. I would not be miſtaken here, as if I meant this as a diſcourſe of the paſſions; they are many more than thoſe I have here named: and thoſe I have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger, and more accurate diſcourſe. I have only mentioned theſe here as ſo many inſtances of modes of pleaſure and pain reſulting in our minds from various conſiderations of good and evil. I might perhaps have inſtanced in other modes of pleaſure and pain more ſimple than theſe, as the pain of hunger and thirſt, and the pleaſure of eating and drinking to remove them; the pain of tender eyes, and the pleaſure of muſick; pain from captious uninſtructive wrangling, and the pleaſure of rational converſation with a friend, or of well-directed ſtudy in the ſearch and diſcovery of truth.

But

But the paſſions being of much more concernment to us, I rather made choice to inſtance in them, and ſhow how the ideas we have of them are derived from ſenſation and reflection.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Power.

This idea how got.

§. 1. THE mind being every day informed, by the ſenſes, of the alteration of thoſe ſimple ideas it obſerves in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceaſes to be, and another begins to exiſt which was not before; reflecting alſo on what paſſes within himſelf, and obſerving a conſtant change of its ideas, ſometimes by the impreſſion of outward objects on the ſenſes, and ſometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding from what it has ſo conſtantly obſerved to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the ſame things by like agents, and by the like ways; conſiders in one thing the poſſibility of having any of its ſimple ideas changed, and in another the poſſibility of making that change: and ſo comes by that idea which we call power. Thus we ſay, fire has a power to melt gold, i. e. to deſtroy the conſiſtency of its inſenſible parts, and conſequently its hardneſs, and make it fluid; and gold has a power to be melted: that the ſun has a power to blanch wax, and wax a power to be blanched by the ſun, whereby the yellowneſs is deſtroyed, and whiteneſs made to exiſt in its room. In which, and the like caſes, the power we conſider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas: for we cannot obſerve any alteration to be made in, or operation upon, any thing, but by the obſervable change of its ſenſible ideas; nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a change of ſome of its ideas.

§. 2.

§. 2. Power, thus conſidered, is two-fold, viz. as able to make, or able to receive, any change: the one may be called active, and the other paſſive power. Whether matter be not wholly deſtitute of active power, as its author God is truly above all paſſive power; and whether the intermediate ſtate of created ſpirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and paſſive power, may be worth conſideration. I ſhall not now enter into that inquiry; my preſent buſineſs being not to ſearch into the original of power, but how we come by the idea of it. But ſince active powers make ſo great a part of our complex ideas of natural ſubſtances (as we ſhall ſee hereafter) and I mention them as ſuch according to common apprehenſion; yet they being not perhaps ſo truly active powers, as our haſty thoughts are apt to repreſent them, I judge it not amiſs, by this intimation, to direct our minds to to the conſideration of God and ſpirits, for the cleareſt idea of active powers.

Power active and paſſive.

§. 3. I confeſs power includes in it ſome kind of relation, (a relation to action or change) as indeed which of our ideas, of what kind ſoever, when attentively conſidered, does not? For our ideas of extenſion, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a ſecret relation of the parts? Figure and motion have ſomething relative in them much more viſibly: and ſenſible qualities, as colours and ſmells, &c. what are they but the powers of different bodies, in relation to our perception? &c. And if conſidered in the things themſelves, do they not depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts? All which include ſome kind of relation in them. Our idea therefore of power, I think may well have a place amongſt other ſimple ideas, and be conſidered as one of them, being one of thoſe that make a principle ingredient in our complex ideas of ſubſtances, as we ſhall hereafter have occaſion to obſerve.

Power includes relation.

§. 4. We are abundantly furniſhed with the idea of paſſive power by almoſt all ſorts of ſenſible things. In moſt of them we

The cleareſt idea of active power had from ſpirit.

cannot

cannot avoid obſerving their ſenſible qualities, nay, their very ſubſtances, to be in a continual flux: and therefore with reaſon we look on them as liable ſtill to the ſame change. Nor have we of active power (which is the more proper ſignification of the word power) fewer inſtances: ſince whatever change is obſerved, the mind muſt collect a power ſomewhere able to make that change, as well as a poſſibility in the thing itſelf to receive it. But yet, if we will conſider it attentively, bodies, by our ſenſes, do not afford us ſo clear and diſtinct an idea of active power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds. For all power relating to action, and there being but two ſorts of action, whereof we have any idea, viz. thinking and motion; let us conſider whence we have the cleareſt ideas of the powers which produce theſe actions. 1. Of thinking, body affords us no idea at all, it is only from reflection that we have that. 2. Neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion. A body at reſt affords us no idea of any active power to move; and when it is ſet in motion itſelf, that motion is rather a paſſion, than an action in it. For when the ball obeys the motion of a billiard-ſtick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare paſſion: alſo when by impulſe it ſets another ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the motion it had received from another, and loſes in itſelf ſo much as the other received: which gives us but a very obſcure idea of an active power of moving in body, whilſt we obſerve it only to tranſfer, but not produce any motion. For it is but a very obſcure idea of power, which reaches not the production of the action, but the continuation of the paſſion. For ſo is motion in a body impelled by another; the continuation of the alteration made in it from reſt to motion being little more an action, than the continuation of the alteration of its figure by the ſame blow is an action. The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what paſſes in ourſelves, where we find by experience that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bo

were before at reſt. So that it ſeems to me, we have from the obſervation of the operation of bodies by our ſenſes but a very imperfect obſcure idea of active power, ſince they afford us not any idea in themſelves of the power to begin any action, either motion or thought. But if, from the impulſe bodies are obſerved to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear idea of power, it ſerves as well to my purpoſe, ſenſation being one of thoſe ways whereby the mind comes by its ideas: only I thought it worth while to conſider here by the way, whether the mind doth not receive its idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own operations, than it doth from any external ſenſation.

Will and underſtanding, two powers.

§. 5. This at leaſt I think evident, that we find in ourſelves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end ſeveral actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing ſuch or ſuch a particular action. This power which the mind has thus to order the conſideration of any idea, or the forbearing to conſider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its reſt, and vice verſa, in any particular inſtance: is that which we call the will. The actual exerciſe of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call volition or willing. The forbearance of that action, conſequent to ſuch order or command of the mind, is called voluntary. And whatſoever action is performed without ſuch a thought of the mind, is called involuntary. The power of perception is that which we call the underſtanding. Perception, which we make the act of the underſtanding, is of three ſorts: 1. The perception of ideas in our mind. 2. The perception of the ſignification of ſigns. 3. The perception of the connexion or repugnancy, agreement or diſagreement, that there is between any of our ideas. All theſe are attributed to the underſtanding, or perceptive power, though it be the two latter only that uſe allows us to ſay we underſtand.

§. 6.

Faculty. §. 6. Theſe powers of the mind, viz. of perceiving, and of preferring, are uſually called by another name: and the ordinary way of ſpeaking, is, that the underſtanding and will are two faculties of the mind; a word proper enough, if it be uſed as all words ſhould be, ſo as not to breed any confuſion in men's thoughts, by being ſuppoſed (as I ſuſpect it has been) to ſtand for ſome real beings in the ſoul that performed thoſe actions of underſtanding and volition. For when we ſay the will is the commanding and ſuperior faculty of the ſoul: that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior faculties; that it follows the dictates of the underſtanding, &c. though theſe, and the like expreſſions, by thoſe that carefully attend to their own ideas, and conduct their thoughts more by the evidence of things, than the ſound of words, may be underſtood in a clear and diſtinct ſenſe; yet I ſuſpect, I ſay, that this way of ſpeaking of faculties has miſled many into a confuſed notion of ſo many diſtinct agents in us, which had their ſeveral provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform ſeveral actions, as ſo many diſtinct beings; which has been no ſmall occaſion of wrangling, obſcurity, and uncertainty in queſtions relating to them.

Whence the idea of liberty and neceſſity. §. 7. Every one, I think, finds in himſelf a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to ſeveral actions in himſelf. From the conſideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himſelf, ariſe the ideas of liberty and neceſſity.

Liberty, what. §. 8. All the actions that we have any idea of, reducing themſelves, as has been ſaid, to theſe two, viz. thinking and motion; ſo far as a man has power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind; ſo far is a man free. Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power; wherever doing or not doing, will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it: there he is not free, though perhaps

haps the action may be voluntary. So that the idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty; that agent is under neceſſity. So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty. A little conſideration of an obvious inſtance or two may make this clear.

Suppoſes the underſtanding and will.

§. 9. A tennis ball, whether in motion by the ſtroke of a racket, or lying ſtill at reſt, is not by any one taken to be a free agent. If we inquire into the reaſon, we ſhall find it is becauſe we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and conſequently not to have any volition, or preference of motion to reſt, or vice verſa; and therefore has not liberty, is not a free agent; but all its both motion and reſt come under our idea of neceſſary, and are ſo called. Likewiſe a man falling into the water (a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent. For though he has volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the ſtop or ceſſation of that motion follows not upon his volition; and therefore therein he is not free. So a man ſtriking himſelf, or his friend, by a convulſive motion of his arm, which it is not in his power, by volition or the direction of his mind, to ſtop, or forbear; no-body thinks he has in this liberty; every one pities him, as acting by neceſſity and conſtraint.

Belongs not to volition.

§. 10. Again, ſuppoſe a man be carried, whilſt faſt aſleep, into a room, where is a perſon he longs to ſee and ſpeak with; and be there locked faſt in, beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himſelf in ſo deſirable company, which he ſtays willingly in, i. e. prefers his ſtay to going away; I aſk, Is not this ſtay voluntary? I think no-body will doubt it; and yet being

locked faſt in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to ſtay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition, or preferring; but to the perſon having the power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind ſhall chuſe or direct. Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power, and no farther. For wherever reſtraint comes to check that power, or compulſion takes away that indifferency of ability on either ſide to act, or to forbear acting; there liberty, and our notion of it, preſently ceaſes.

Voluntary oppoſed to involuntary, not to neceſſary.

§. 11. We have inſtances enough, and often more than enough, in our own bodies. A man's heart beats, and the blood circulates, which it is not in his power by any thought or volition to ſtop; and therefore in reſpect of theſe motions, where reſt depends not on his choice, nor would follow the determination of his mind, if it ſhould prefer it, he is not a free agent. Convulſive motions agitate his legs, ſo that though he wills it ever ſo much, he cannot by any power of his mind ſtop their motion (as in that odd diſeaſe called chorea ſancti Viti) but he is perpetually dancing: he is not at liberty in this action, but under as much neceſſity of moving, as a ſtone that falls, or a tennis-ball ſtruck with a racket. On the other ſide, a palſy or the ſtocks hinder his legs from obeying the determination of his mind, if it would thereby transfer his body to another place. In all theſe there is want of freedom; though the ſitting ſtill even of a paralytick, whilſt he prefers it to a removal, is truly voluntary. Voluntary then is not oppoſed to neceſſary, but to involuntary. For a man may prefer what he can do, to what he cannot do; the ſtate he is in, to its abſence or change, though neceſſity has made it in itſelf unalterable.

Liberty, what.

§. 12. As it is in the motions of the body; ſo it is in the thoughts of our minds: where any one is ſuch, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the mind, there we are at liberty. A waking man being under the neceſſity of having ſome ideas conſtantly in his

his mind, is not at liberty to think, or not to think; no more than he is at liberty, whether his body ſhall touch any other or no: but whether he will remove his contemplation from one idea to another, is many times in his choice; and then he is in reſpect of his ideas as much at liberty, as he is in reſpect of bodies he reſts on: he can at pleaſure remove himſelf from one to another. But yet ſome ideas to the mind, like ſome motions to the body, are ſuch as in certain circumſtances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their abſence by the utmoſt effort it can uſe. A man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain, and divert himſelf with other contemplations: and ſometimes a boiſterous paſſion hurries our thoughts as a hurricane does our bodies, without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather chooſe. But as ſoon as the mind regains the power to ſtop or continue, begin or forbear, any of theſe motions of the body without, or thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then conſider the man as a free agent again.

Neceſſity, what.

§. 13. Wherever thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear according to the direction of thought; there neceſſity takes place. This in an agent capable of volition, when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to that preference of his mind, is called compulſion; when the hindering or ſtopping any action is contrary to his volition, it is called reſtraint. Agents that have no thought, no volition, at all, are in every thing neceſſary agents.

Liberty belongs not to the will.

§. 14. If this be ſo (as I imagine it is) I leave it to be conſidered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and I think, unreaſonable, becauſe unintelligible queſtion, viz. Whether man's will be free, or no? For if I miſtake not, it follows from what I have ſaid, that the queſtion itſelf is altogether improper; and it is as inſignificant to aſk, whether man's will be free, as to aſk whether his ſleep be ſwift, or his virtue ſquare; liberty being as little applicable to the will, as

ſwiftneſs of motion is to ſleep, or ſquareneſs to virtue. Every one would laugh at the abſurdity of ſuch a queſtion, as either of theſe; becauſe it is obvious, that the modifications of motion belong not to ſleep, nor the difference of figure to virtue: and when any one well conſiders it, I think he will as plainly perceive, that liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will, which is alſo but a power.

Volition.

§. 15. Such is the difficulty of explaining and giving clear notions of internal actions by ſounds, that I muſt here warn my reader that ordering, directing, chooſing, preferring, &c. which I have made uſe of, will not diſtinctly enough expreſs volition, unleſs he will reflect on what he himſelf does when he wills. For example, preferring, which ſeems perhaps beſt to expreſs the act of volition, does it not preciſely. For though a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can ſay he ever wills it? Volition, it is plain, is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itſelf to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or with-holding it from, any particular action. And what is the will, but the faculty to do this? And is that faculty any thing more in effect than a power, the power of the mind to determine its thought, to the producing, continuing, or ſtopping any action, as far as it depends on us? For can it be denied, that whatever agent has a power to think on its own actions, and to prefer their doing or omiſſion either to other, has that faculty called will? Will then is nothing but ſuch a power. Liberty, on the other ſide, is the power a man has to do or forbear doing any particular action, according as its doing or forbearance has the actual preference in the mind; which is the ſame thing as to ſay, according as he himſelf wills it.

Powers belonging to agents.

§. 16. It is plain then, that the will is nothing but one power or ability, and freedom another power or ability: ſo that to aſk, whether the will has freedom, is to aſk whether one power has another power, one ability another

ther ability; a queſtion at firſt ſight too groſly abſurd to make a diſpute, or need an anſwer. For who is it that ſees not that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes only of ſubſtances, and not of powers themſelves? So that this way of putting the queſtion, viz. Whether the will be free? is in effect to aſk, Whether the will be a ſubſtance, an agent? or at leaſt to ſuppoſe it, ſince freedom can properly be attributed to nothing elſe. If freedom can with any propriety of ſpeech be applied to power, or may be attributed to the power that is in a man to produce or forbear producing motion in parts of his body, by choice or preference; which is that which denominates him free, and is freedom itſelf. But if any one ſhould aſk, whether freedom were free, he would be ſuſpected not to underſtand well what he ſaid; and he would be thought to deſerve Midas's ears, who, knowing that rich was a denomination for the poſſeſſion of riches, ſhould demand whether riches themſelves were rich.

§. 17. However the name faculty, which men have given to this power called the will, and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the will as acting, may, by an appropriation that diſguiſes its true ſenſe, ſerve a little to palliate the abſurdity; yet the will in truth ſignifies nothing but a power, or ability, to prefer or chooſe: and when the will, under the name of a faculty, is conſidered as it is, barely as an ability to do ſomething, the abſurdity in ſaying it is free, or not free, will eaſily diſcover itſelf. For if it be reaſonable to ſuppoſe and talk of faculties, as diſtinct beings that can act (as we do, when we ſay the will orders, and the will is free) it is fit that we ſhould make a ſpeaking faculty, and a walking faculty, and a dancing faculty, by which thoſe actions are produced, which are but ſeveral modes of motion; as well as we make the will and underſtanding to be faculties, by which the actions of chooſing and perceiving are produced, which are but ſeveral modes of thinking: and we may as properly ſay, that it is the ſinging faculty ſings, and the dancing faculty dances; as that the will chooſes, or that the underſtanding conceives; or, as is

uſual, that the will directs the underſtanding, or the underſtanding obeys, or obeys not the will: it being altogether as proper and intelligible to ſay, that the power of ſpeaking directs the power of ſinging, or the power of ſinging obeys or diſobeys the power of ſpeaking.

§. 18. This way of talking, nevertheleſs, has prevailed, and, as I gueſs, produced great confuſion. For theſe being all different powers in the mind, or in the man, to do ſeveral actions, he exerts them as he thinks fit: but the power to do one action, is not operated on by the power of doing another action. For the power of thinking operates not on the power of chooſing, nor the power of chooſing on the power of thinking; no more than the power of dancing operates on the power of ſinging, or the power of ſinging on the power of dancing; as any one, who reflects on it, will eaſily perceive: and yet this is it which we ſay, when we thus ſpeak, that the will operates on the underſtanding, or the underſtanding on the will.

§. 19. I grant, that this or that actual thought may be the occaſion of volition, or exerciſing the power a man has to chooſe; or the actual choice of the mind, the cauſe of actual thinking on this or that thing: as the actual ſinging of ſuch a tune, may be the cauſe of dancing ſuch a dance, and the actual dancing of ſueh a dance the occaſion of ſinging ſuch a tune. But in all theſe it is not one power that operates on another: but it is the mind that operates, and exerts theſe powers; it is the man that does the action, it is the agent that has power, or is able to do. For powers are relations, not agents: and that which has the power, or not the power to operate, is that alone which is or is not free, and not the power itſelf. For freedom, or not freedom, can belong to nothing, but what has or has not a power to act.

Liberty belongs not to the will.

§. 20. The attributing to faculties that which belonged not to them, has given occaſion to this way of talking: but the introducing into diſcourſes concerning the mind, with

with the name of faculties, a notion of their operating, has, I ſuppoſe, as little advanced our knowledge in that part of ourſelves, as the great uſe and mention of the like invention of faculties, in the operations of the body, has helped us in the knowledge of phyſick. Not that I deny there are faculties, both in the body and mind: they both of them have their powers of operating, elſe neither the one nor the other could operate. For nothing can operate that is not able to operate; and that is not able to operate, that has no power to operate. Nor do I deny, that thoſe words, and the like, are to have their place in the common uſe of languages, that have made them current. It looks like too much affectation wholly to lay them by: and philoſophy itſelf, though it likes not a gaudy dreſs, yet when it appears in public, muſt have ſo much complacency, as to be clothed in the ordinary faſhion and language of the country, ſo far as it can conſiſt with truth and perſpicuity. But the fault has been, that faculties have been ſpoken of and repreſented as ſo many diſtinct agents. For it being aſked, what it was that digeſted the meat in our ſtomachs? it was a ready and very ſatisfactory anſwer, to ſay, that it was the digeſtive faculty. What was it that made any thing come out of the body? the expulſive faculty. What moved? the motive faculty. And ſo in the mind, the intellectual faculty, or the underſtanding, underſtood; and the elective faculty, or the will, willed or commanded. This is in ſhort to ſay, that the ability to digeſt, digeſted; and the ability to move, moved; and the ability to underſtand, underſtood. For faculty, ability, and power, I think, are but different names of the ſame things; which ways of ſpeaking, when put into more intelligible words, will, I think, amount to thus much; that digeſtion is performed by ſomething that is able to digeſt, motion by ſomething able to move, and underſtanding by ſomething able to underſtand. And in truth it would be very ſtrange if it ſhould be otherwiſe; as ſtrange as it would be for a man to be free without being able to be free.

But to the agent or man.

§. 21. To return then to the inquiry about liberty, I think the queſtion is not proper, whether the will be free, but whether a man be free. Thus, I think,

1. That ſo far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring the exiſtence of any action to the non-exiſtence of that action, and vice verſa, make it to exiſt or not exiſt; ſo far he is free. For if I can, by a thought directing the motion of my finger, make it move when it was at reſt, or vice verſa; it is evident, that in reſpect of that I am free: and if I can, by a like thought of my mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words or ſilence, I am at liberty to ſpeak, or hold my peace; and as far as this power reaches, of acting, or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, ſo far is a man free. For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will? And ſo far as any one can, by preferring any action to its not being, or reſt to any action, produce that action or reſt, ſo far can he do what he will. For ſuch a preferring of action to its abſence, is the willing of it; and we can ſcarce tell how to imagine any being freer, than to be able to do what he wills. So that in reſpect of actions within the reach of ſuch a power in him, a man ſeems as free, as it is poſſible for freedom to make him.

In reſpect of willing, a man is not free.

§. 22. But the inquiſitive mind of man, willing to ſhift off from himſelf, as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, though it be by putting himſelf into a worſe ſtate than that of fatal neceſſity, is not content with this: freedom, unleſs it reaches farther than this, will not ſerve the turn: and it paſſes for a good plea, that a man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will, as he is to act what he wills. Concerning a man's liberty, there yet therefore is raiſed this farther queſtion, Whether a man be free to will? which I think is what is meant, when it is diſputed whether the will be free. And as to that I imagine,

§. 23. That willing, or volition, being an action, and freedom conſiſting in a power of acting or not acting,

acting, a man in reſpect of willing or the act of volition, when any action in his power is once propoſed to his thoughts, as preſently to be done, cannot be free. The reaſon whereof is very manifeſt: for it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will ſhould exiſt, or not exiſt: and its exiſtence, or not exiſtence, following perfectly the determination and preference of his will; he cannot avoid willing the exiſtence, or not exiſtence of that action; it is abſolutely neceſſary that he will the one, or the other; i. e. prefer the one to the other: ſince one of them muſt neceſſarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the choice and determination of his mind, that is, by his willing it: for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in reſpect of the act of willing, a man in ſuch a caſe is not free: liberty conſiſting in a power to act, or not to act; which, in regard of volition, a man, upon ſuch a propoſal, has not. For it is unavoidably neceſſary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in a man's power, which is once ſo propoſed to his thoughts; a man muſt neceſſarily will the one or the other of them, upon which preference or volition, the action or its forbearance certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. But the act of volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a man in reſpect of that act of willing is under a neceſſity, and ſo cannot be free; unleſs neceſſity and freedom can conſiſt together, and a man can be free and bound at once.

§. 24. This then is evident, that in all propoſals of preſent action, a man is not at liberty to will or not to will, becauſe he cannot forbear willing: liberty conſiſting in a power to act or to forbear acting, and in that only. For a man that ſits ſtill is ſaid yet to be at liberty, becauſe he can walk if he wills it. But if a man ſitting ſtill has not a power to remove himſelf, he is not at liberty; ſo likewiſe a man falling down a precipice, though in motion, is not at liberty, becauſe he cannot ſtop that motion if he would. This being ſo, it is plain that a man that is walking, to whom it is propoſed to give off walking, is not at liberty whether he will determine himſelf to walk, or give off walking,

or

or no: he must necessarily prefer one or the other of them, walking or not walking; and so it is in regard of all other actions in our power so proposed, which are the far greater number. For considering the vast number of voluntary actions that succeed one another every moment that we are awake in the course of our lives, there are but few of them that are thought on or proposed to the will, till the time they are to be done: and in all such actions, as I have shown, the mind in respect of willing has not a power to act, or not to act, wherein consists liberty. The mind in that case has not a power to forbear willing; it cannot avoid some determination concerning them, let the consideration be as short, the thought as quick as it will; it either leaves the man in the state he was before thinking, or changes it; continues the action, or puts an end to it. Whereby it is manifest, that it orders and directs one, in preference to or with neglect of the other, and thereby either the continuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary.

The will determined by something without it.

§. 25. Since then it is plain, that in most cases a man is not at liberty, whether he will, or no; the next thing demanded, is, whether a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, motion or rest? This question carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in itself, that one might thereby sufficiently be convinced that liberty concerns not the will. For to ask, whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or rest, speaking or silence, which he pleases; is to ask, whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleased with what he is pleased with? A question which, I think, needs no answer; and they who can make a question of it, must suppose one will to determine the acts of another, and another to determine that; and so on in infinitum.

§. 26. To avoid these and the like absurdities, nothing can be of greater use, than to establish in our minds determined ideas of the things under consideration. If the ideas of liberty and volition were well fixed in the understandings, and carried along with us in our minds, as they ought, through all the questions

that

that are raiſed about them, I ſuppoſe a great part of the difficulties that perplex men's thoughts, and entangle their underſtandings, would be much eaſier reſolved; and we ſhould perceive where the confuſed ſignification of terms, or where the nature of the thing cauſed the obſcurity.

Freedom.

§. 27. Firſt then, it is carefully to be remembered, that freedom conſiſts in the dependence of the exiſtence, or not exiſtence of any action, upon our volition of it; and not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary, on our preference. A man ſtanding on a cliff, is at liberty to leap twenty yards downwards into the ſea, not becauſe he has a power to do the contrary action, which is to leap twenty yards upwards, for that he cannot do: but he is therefore free becauſe he has a power to leap or not to leap. But if a greater force than his either holds him faſt, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free in that caſe; becauſe the doing or forbearance of that particular action is no longer in his power. He that is a cloſe priſoner in a room twenty feet ſquare, being at the north ſide of his chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty feet ſouthward, becauſe he can walk or not walk it; but is not, at the ſame time, at liberty to do the contrary, i. e. to walk twenty feet northward.

In this then conſiſts freedom, viz. in our being able to act or not to act, according as we ſhall chooſe or will.

Volition, what.

§. 28. Secondly, we muſt remember, that volition or willing is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word action, to comprehend the forbearance too of any action propoſed: ſitting ſtill, or holding one's peace, when walking or ſpeaking are propoſed, though mere forbearances, requiring as much the determination of the will, and being as often weighty in their conſequences as the contrary actions, may, on that conſideration, well enough paſs for actions too: but this I ſay, that I may not be miſtaken, if for brevity ſake I ſpeak thus.

§. 29

What determines the will.

§. 29. Thirdly, The will being nothing but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or reſt, as far as they depend on ſuch direction: to the queſtion, What is it determines the will? the true and proper anſwer is, The mind. For that which determines the general power of directing to this or that particular direction, is nothing but the agent itſelf exerciſing the power it has, that particular way. If this anſwer ſatisfies not, it is plain the meaning of the queſtion, What determines the will? is this, What moves the mind, in every particular inſtance, to determine its general power of directing to this or that particular motion or reſt? And to this I anſwer, the motive for continuing in the ſame ſtate or action, is only the preſent ſatisfaction in it; the motive to change, is always ſome uneaſineſs; nothing ſetting us upon the change of ſtate, or upon any new action, but ſome uneaſineſs. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action, which for ſhortneſs ſake we will call determining of the will; which I ſhall more at large explain.

Will and deſire muſt not be confounded.

§. 30. But, in the way to it, it will be neceſſary to premiſe, that though I have above endeavoured to expreſs the act of volition by chooſing, preferring, and the like terms, that ſignify deſire as well as volition, for want of other words to mark that act of the mind, whoſe proper name is willing or volition; yet it being a very ſimple act, whoſoever deſires to underſtand what it is, will better find it by reflecting on his own mind, and obſerving what it does when it wills, than by any variety of articulate ſounds whatſoever. This caution of being careful not to be miſled by expreſſions that do not enough keep up the difference between the will and ſeveral acts of the mind that are quite diſtinct from it, I think the more neceſſary; becauſe I find the will often confounded with ſeveral of the affections, eſpecially deſire, and one put for the other; and that by men, who would not willingly be thought not to have had very diſtinct notions of things, and not to have

writ very clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no ſmall occaſion of obſcurity and miſtake in this matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that ſhall turn his thoughts inwards upon what paſſes in his mind when he wills, ſhall ſee that the will or power of volition is converſant about nothing, but that particular determination of the mind, whereby barely by a thought the mind endeavours to give riſe, continuation, or ſtop, to any action which it takes to be in its power. This well conſidered, plainly ſhows that the will is perfectly diſtinguiſhed from deſire; which in the very ſame action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will ſets us upon. A man whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to uſe perſuaſions to another, which, at the ſame time I am ſpeaking, I may wiſh may not prevail on him. In this caſe, it is plain the will and deſire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilſt my deſire tends another, and that the direct contrary way. A man who by a violent fit of the gout in his limbs finds a dozineſs in his head, or a want of appetite in his ſtomach removed, deſires to be eaſed too of the pain of his feet or hands (for wherever there is pain, there is a deſire to be rid of it) though yet, whilſt he apprehends that the removal of the pain may tranſlate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one action that may ſerve to remove this pain. Whence it is evident that deſiring and willing are two diſtinct acts of the mind; and conſequently that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more diſtinct from deſire.

Uneaſineſs determines the will.

§. 31. To return then to the inquiry, What is it that determines the will in regard to our actions? And that, upon ſecond thoughts, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally ſuppoſed, the greater good in view; but ſome (and for the moſt part the moſt preſſing) uneaſineſs a man is at preſent under. This is that which ſucceſſively determines the will, and ſets us upon thoſe actions we perform. This uneaſineſs we may call, as it is, deſire; which is an uneaſineſs of the mind for want

of

of ſome abſent good. All pain of the body, of what ſort ſoever, and diſquiet of the mind, is uneaſineſs: and with this is always joined deſire, equal to the pain or uneaſineſs felt, and is ſcarce diſtinguiſhable from it. For deſire being nothing but an uneaſineſs in the want of an abſent good, in reference to any pain felt, eaſe is that abſent good; and till that eaſe be attained, we may call it deſire, no-body feeling pain that he wiſhes not to be eaſed of, with a deſire equal to that pain, and inſeparable from it. Beſides this deſire of eaſe from pain, there is another of abſent poſitive good; and here alſo the deſire and uneaſineſs are equal. As much as we deſire any abſent good, ſo much are we in pain for it. But here all abſent good does not, according to the greatneſs it has, or is acknowledged to have, cauſe pain equal to that greatneſs; as all pain cauſes deſire equal to it itſelf: becauſe the abſence of good is not always a pain, as the preſence of pain is. And therefore abſent good may be looked on, and conſidered without deſire. But ſo much as there is any where of deſire, ſo much there is of uneaſineſs.

Deſire is uneaſineſs.

§. 32. That deſire is a ſtate of uneaſineſs, every one who reflects on himſelf will quickly find. Who is there, that has not felt in deſire what the wiſe man ſays of hope, (which is not much different from it) "that it being deferred makes the heart ſick?" and that ſtill proportionable to the greatneſs of the deſire: which ſometimes raiſes the uneaſineſs to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, Give me children, give me the thing deſired, or I die? Life itſelf, and all its enjoyments, is a burden cannot be born under the laſting and unremoved preſſure of ſuch an uneaſineſs.

The uneaſineſs of deſire determines the will.

§. 33. Good and evil, preſent and abſent, it is true, work upon the mind: but that which immediately determines the will, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the uneaſineſs of deſire, fixed on ſome abſent good; either negative, as indolence to one in pain; or poſitive, as enjoyment of pleaſure. That it is this uneaſineſs that determines the will to the ſucceſſive

ſive voluntary actions, whereof the greateſt part of our lives is made up, and by which we are conducted through different courſes to different ends: I ſhall endeavour to ſhow, both from experience and the reaſon of the thing.

This is the ſpring of action.

§. 34. When a man is perfectly content with the ſtate he is in, which is, when he is perfectly without any uneaſineſs, what induſtry, what action, what will is there left, but to continue in it? of this every man's obſervation will ſatisfy him. And thus we ſee our All-wiſe Maker, ſuitably to our conſtitution and frame, and knowing what it is that determines the will, has put into man the uneaſineſs of hunger and thirſt, and other natural deſires, that return at their ſeaſons, to move and determine their wills, for the preſervation of themſelves, and the continuation of their ſpecies. For I think we may conclude, that if the bare contemplation of theſe good ends, to which we are carried by theſe ſeveral uneaſineſſes, had been ſufficient to determine the will, and ſet us on work, we ſhould have had none of theſe natural pains, and perhaps in this world little or no pain at all. "It is better to marry than to burn," ſays St. Paul; where we may ſee what it is that chiefly drives men into the enjoyments of a conjugal life. A little burning felt puſhes us more powerfully, than greater pleaſures in proſpect draw or allure.

The greateſt poſitive good determines not the will, but uneaſineſs.

§. 35. It ſeems ſo eſtabliſhed and ſettled a maxim by the general conſent of all mankind, that good, the greater good, determines the will, that I do not at all wonder, that when I firſt publiſhed my thoughts on this ſubject, I took it for granted; and I imagine that by a great many I ſhall be thought more excuſable, for having then done ſo, than that now I have ventured to recede from ſo received an opinion. But yet upon a ſtricter inquiry, I am forced to conclude, that good, the greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be ſo, does not determine the will, until our deſire, raiſed proportionably to it, makes us uneaſy in the want of it. Convince a man ever ſo much

that plenty has its advantages over poverty; make him ſee and own, that the handſome conveniencies of life are better than naſty penury; yet as long as he is content with the latter, and finds no uneaſineſs in it, he moves not; his will never is determined to any action that ſhall bring him out of it. Let a man be ever ſo well perſuaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as neceſſary to a man who has any great aims in this world, or hopes in the next, as food to life; yet, till he hungers or thirſts after righteouſneſs, till he feels an uneaſineſs in the want of it, his will will not be determined to any action in purſuit of this confeſſed greater good; but any other uneaſineſs he feels in himſelf ſhall take place, and carry his will to other actions. On the other ſide, let a drunkard ſee that his health decays, his eſtate waſtes; diſcredit and diſeaſes, and the want of all things, even of his beloved drink, attends him in the courſe he follows; yet the returns of uneaſineſs to miſs his companions, the habitual thirſt after his cups, at the uſual time, drives him to the tavern, though he has in his view the loſs of health and plenty, and perhaps of the joys of another life: the leaſt of which is no inconſiderable good, but ſuch as he confeſſes is far greater than the tickling of his palate with a glaſs of wine, or the idle chat of a ſoaking club. It is not want of viewing the greater good; for he ſees and acknowledges it, and, in the intervals of his drinking hours, will take reſolutions to purſue the greater good; but when the uneaſineſs to miſs his accuſtomed delight returns, the greater acknowledged good loſes its hold, and the preſent uneaſineſs determines the will to the accuſtomed action: which thereby gets ſtronger footing to prevail againſt the next occaſion, though he at the ſame time makes ſecret promiſes to himſelf, that he will do ſo no more; this is the laſt time he will act againſt the attainment of thoſe greater goods. And thus he is from time to time in the ſtate of that unhappy complainer, video meliora proboque, deteriora ſequor: which ſentence, allowed for true, and made good by conſtant experience, may this, and poſſibly no other way, be eaſily made intelligible.

§. 36.

§. 36. If we inquire into the reaſon of what experience makes ſo evident in fact, and examine why it is uneaſineſs alone operates on the will, and determines it in its choice; we ſhall find that we being capable but of one determination of the will, to one action at once, the preſent uneaſineſs that we are under does naturally determine the will, in order to that happineſs which we all aim at in all our actions; foraſmuch as whilſt we are under any uneaſineſs, we cannot apprehend ourſelves happy, or in the way to it. Pain and uneaſineſs being, by every one, concluded and felt to be inconſiſtent with happineſs, ſpoiling the reliſh even of thoſe good things which we have; a little pain ſerving to mar all the pleaſure we rejoiced in. And therefore that which of courſe determines the choice of our will to the next action, will always be the removing of pain, as long as we have any left, as the firſt and neceſſary ſtep towards happineſs.

Becauſe the removal of uneaſineſs is the firſt ſtep to happineſs.

§. 37. Another reaſon why it is uneaſineſs alone determines the will, may be this; becauſe that alone is preſent, and it is againſt the nature of things, that what is abſent ſhould operate where it is not. It may be ſaid, that abſent good may by contemplation be brought home to the mind, and made preſent. The idea of it indeed may be in the mind, and viewed as preſent there; but nothing will be in the mind as a preſent good, able to counter-balance the removal of any uneaſineſs which we are under, till it raiſes our deſire; and the uneaſineſs of that has the prevalency in determining the will. Till then, the idea in the mind of whatever good, is there only, like other ideas, the object of bare unactive ſpeculation, but operates not on the will, nor ſets us on work; the reaſon whereof I ſhall ſhow by and by. How many are to be found, that have had lively repreſentations ſet before their minds of the unſpeakable joys of heaven, which they acknowledge both poſſible and probable too, who yet would be content to take up with their happineſs here? And ſo the prevailing uneaſineſſes of their deſires, let

Becauſe uneaſineſs alone is preſent.

looſe after the enjoyments of this life, take their turns in the determining their wills; and all that while they take not one ſtep, are not one jot moved towards the good things of another life, conſidered as ever ſo great.

Becauſe all who allow the joys of heaven poſſible, purſue them not.

§. 38. Were the will determined by the views of good, as it appears in contemplation greater or leſs to the underſtanding, which is the ſtate of all abſent good, and that which in the received opinion the will is ſuppoſed to move to, and to be moved by, I do not ſee how it could ever get looſe from the infinite eternal joys of heaven, once propoſed and conſidered as poſſible. For all abſent good, by which alone, barely propoſed, and coming in view, the will is thought to be determined, and ſo to ſet us on action, being only poſſible, but not infallibly certain; it is unavoidable, that the infinitely greater poſſible good ſhould regularly and conſtantly determine the will in all the ſucceſſive actions it directs: and then we ſhould keep conſtantly and ſteadily in our courſe towards heaven, without ever ſtanding ſtill, or directing our actions to any other end. The eternal condition of a future ſtate infinitely outweighing the expectation of riches, or honour, or any other worldly pleaſure which we can propoſe to ourſelves, though we ſhould grant theſe the more probable to be obtained: for nothing future is yet in poſſeſſion, and ſo the expectation even of theſe may deceive us. If it were ſo, that the greater good in view determines the will, ſo great a good once propoſed could not but ſeize the will, and hold it faſt to the purſuit of this infinitely greateſt good, without ever letting it go again: for the will having a power over, and directing the thoughts as well as other actions, would, if it were ſo, hold the contemplation of the mind fixed to that good.

But any great uneaſineſs is never neglected.

This would be the ſtate of the mind, and regular tendency of the will in all its determinations, were it determined by that which is conſidered, and in view the greater good; but that it is not ſo, is viſible in experience: the

the infinitely greateſt confeſſed good being often neglected, to ſatisfy the ſucceſſive uneaſineſs of our deſires purſuing trifles. But though the greateſt allowed, even everlaſting unſpeakable good, which has ſometimes moved and affected the mind, does not ſtedfaſtly hold the will, yet we ſee any very great and prevailing uneaſineſs, having once laid hold on the will, lets it not go; by which we may be convinced, what it is that determines the will. Thus any vehement pain of the body, the ungovernable paſſion of a man violently in love, or the impatient deſire of revenge, keeps the will ſteady and intent; and the will, thus determined, never lets the underſtanding lay by the object, but all the thoughts of the mind and powers of the body are uninterruptedly employed that way, by the determination of the will, influenced by that topping uneaſineſs as long as it laſts; whereby it ſeems to me evident, that the will or power of ſetting us upon one action in preference to all other, is determined in us by uneaſineſs. And whether this be not ſo, I deſire every one to obſerve in himſelf.

Deſire accompanies all uneaſineſs.

§. 39. I have hitherto chiefly inſtanced in the uneaſineſs of deſire, as that which determines the will; becauſe that is the chief and moſt ſenſible, and the will ſeldom orders any action, nor is there any voluntary action performed, without ſome deſire accompanying it; which I think is the reaſon why the will and deſire are ſo often confounded. But yet we are not to look upon the uneaſineſs which makes up, or at leaſt accompanies moſt of the other paſſions, as wholly excluded in the caſe. Averſion, fear, anger, envy, ſhame, &c. have each their uneaſineſs too, and thereby influence the will. Theſe paſſions are ſcarce any of them in life and practice ſimple and alone, and wholly unmixed with others: though uſually in diſcourſe and contemplation, that carries the name which operates ſtrongeſt, and appears moſt in the preſent ſtate of the mind: nay there is, I think, ſcarce any of the paſſions to be found without deſire joined with it. I am ſure, wherever there is uneaſineſs, there is deſire: for we conſtantly

deſire happineſs: and whatever we feel of uneaſineſs, ſo much it is certain we want of happineſs, even in our own opinion, let our ſtate and condition otherwiſe be what it will. Beſides, the preſent moment not being our eternity, whatever our enjoyment be, we look beyond the preſent, and deſire goes with our foreſight, and that ſtill carries the will with it. So that even in joy itſelf, that which keeps up the action, whereon the enjoyment depends, is the deſire to continue it, and fear to loſe it: and whenever a greater uneaſineſs than that takes place in the mind, the will preſently is by that determined to ſome new action, and the preſent delight neglected.

The moſt preſſing uneaſineſs naturally determines the will.

§. 40. But we being in this world beſet with ſundry uneaſineſſes, diſtracted with different deſires, the next inquiry naturally will be, which of them has the precedency in determining the will to the next action? and to that the anſwer is, that ordinarily, which is the moſt preſſing of thoſe that are judged capable of being then removed. For the will being the power of directing our operative faculties to ſome action, for ſome end, cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable: that would be to ſuppoſe an intelligent being deſignedly to act for an end, only to loſe its labour, for ſo it is to act for what is judged not attainable; and therefore very great uneaſineſſes move not the will, when they are judged not capable of a cure: they, in that caſe, put us not upon endeavours. But theſe ſet apart, the moſt important and urgent uneaſineſs we at that time feel, is that which ordinarily determines the will ſucceſſively, in that train of voluntary actions which makes up our lives. The greateſt preſent uneaſineſs is the ſpur to action, that is conſtantly felt, and for the moſt part determines the will in its choice of the next action. For this we muſt carry along with us, that the proper and only object of the will is ſome action of ours, and nothing elſe: for we producing nothing by our willing it, but ſome action in our power, it is there the will terminates, and reaches no farther.

§. 41. If it be farther aſked, what it is moves deſire? I anſwer, Happineſs, and that alone. Happineſs and miſery are the names of two extremes, the utmoſt bounds whereof we know not; it is what "eye hath not ſeen, ear not "heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to "conceive." But of ſome degrees of both we have very lively impreſſions, made by ſeveral inſtances of delight and joy on the one ſide, and torment and ſorrow on the other; which for ſhortneſs ſake I ſhall comprehend under the names of pleaſure and pain, there being pleaſure and pain of the mind as well as the body: "with him is fulneſs of joy and pleaſure for "evermore." Or, to ſpeak truly, they are all of the mind; though ſome have their riſe in the mind from thought, others in the body from certain modifications of motion.

All deſire happineſs.

§. 42. Happineſs then in its full extent is the utmoſt pleaſure we are capable of, and miſery the utmoſt pain: and the loweſt degree of what can be called happineſs is ſo much eaſe from all pain, and ſo much preſent pleaſure, as without which any one cannot be content. Now becauſe pleaſure and pain are produced in us by the operation of certain objects, either on our minds or our bodies, and in different degrees; therefore what has an aptneſs to produce pleaſure in us is that we call good, and what is apt to produce pain in us we call evil, for no other reaſon, but for its aptneſs to produce pleaſure and pain in us, wherein conſiſts our happineſs and miſery. Farther, though what is apt to produce any degree of pleaſure, be in itſelf good; and what is apt to produce any degree of pain, be evil; yet it often happens, that we do not call it ſo, when it comes in competition with a greater of its ſort; becauſe when they come in competition, the degrees alſo of pleaſure and pain have juſtly a preference. So that if we will rightly eſtimate what we call good and evil, we ſhall find it lies much in compariſon: for the cauſe of every leſs degree of pain, as well as every greater

Happineſs, what.

degree of pleaſure, has the nature of good, and vice verſa.

What good is deſired, what not.

§. 43. Though this be that which is called good and evil: and all good be the proper object of deſire in general; yet all good, even ſeen, and confeſſed to be ſo, does not neceſſarily move every particular man's deſire, but only that part, or ſo much of it as is conſidered and taken to make a neceſſary part of his happineſs. All other good, however great in reality or appearance, excites not a man's deſires, who looks not on it to make a part of that happineſs, wherewith he, in his preſent thoughts, can ſatisfy himſelf. Happineſs, under this view, every one conſtantly purſues, and deſires what makes any part of it: other things, acknowledged to be good, he can look upon without deſire, paſs by, and be content without. There is no-body, I think, ſo ſenſeleſs as to deny, that there is pleaſure in knowledge: and for the pleaſures of ſenſe, they have too many followers to let it be queſtioned, whether men are taken with them or no. Now let one man place his ſatisfaction in ſenſual pleaſures, another in the delight of knowledge: though each of them cannot but confeſs, there is great pleaſure in what the other purſues; yet neither of them making the other's delight a part of his happineſs, their deſires are not moved, but each is ſatisfied without what the other enjoys, and ſo his will is not determined to the purſuit of it. But yet as ſoon as the ſtudious man's hunger and thirſt makes him uneaſy, he, whoſe will was never determined to any purſuit of good chear, poignant ſauces, delicious wine, by the pleaſant taſte he has found in them, is, by the uneaſineſs of hunger and thirſt, preſently determined to eating and drinking, though poſſibly with great indifferency, what wholeſome food comes in his way. And on the other ſide, the epicure buckles to ſtudy, when ſhame, or the deſire to recommend himſelf to his miſtreſs, ſhall make him uneaſy in the want of any ſort of knowledge. Thus, how much ſoever men are in earneſt, and conſtant in purſuit of happineſs, yet they may have a clear view of good, great and con-

feſſed

ſeſſed good, without being concerned for it, or moved by it, if they think they can make up their happineſs without it. Though as to pain, that they are always concerned for; they can feel no uneaſineſs without being moved. And therefore being uneaſy in the want of whatever is judged neceſſary to their happineſs, as ſoon as any good appears to make a part of their portion of happineſs, they begin to deſire it.

Why the greateſt good is not always deſired.

§. 44. This, I think, any one may obſerve in himſelf, and others, that the greater viſible good does not always raiſe men's deſires, in proportion to the greatneſs it appears, and is acknowledged to have: though every little trouble moves us, and ſets us on work to get rid of it. The reaſon whereof is evident from the nature of our happineſs and miſery itſelf. All preſent pain, whatever it be, makes a part of our preſent miſery: but all abſent good does not at any time make a neceſſary part of our preſent happineſs, nor the abſence of it make a part of our miſery. If it did, we ſhould be conſtantly and infinitely miſerable; there being infinite degrees of happineſs, which are not in our poſſeſſion. All uneaſineſs therefore being removed, a moderate portion of good ſerves at preſent to content men; and ſome few degrees of pleaſure in a ſucceſſion of ordinary enjoyments make up a happineſs, wherein they can be ſatisfied. If this were not ſo, there could be no room for thoſe indifferent and viſibly trifling actions, to which our wills are ſo often determined, and wherein we voluntarily waſte ſo much of our lives; which remiſſneſs could by no means conſiſt with a conſtant determination of will or deſire to the greateſt apparent good. That this is ſo, I think few people need go far from home to be convinced. And indeed in this life there are not many whoſe happineſs reaches ſo far as to afford them a conſtant train of moderate mean pleaſures, without any mixture of uneaſineſs; and yet they could be content to ſtay here for ever: though they cannot deny, but that it is poſſible there may be a ſtate of eternal durable joys after this life, far ſurpaſſing all the good that is to be found here.

Nay, they cannot but ſee, that it is more poſſible than the attainment and continuation of that pittance of honour, riches, or pleaſure, which they purſue, and for which they neglect that eternal ſtate; but yet in full view of this difference, ſatisfied of the poſſibility of a perfect, ſecure, and laſting happineſs in a future ſtate, and under a clear conviction, that it is not to be had here, whilſt they bound their happineſs within ſome little enjoyment, or aim of this life, and exclude the joys of heaven from making any neceſſary part of it; their deſires are not moved by this greater apparent good, nor their wills determined to any action, or endeavour for its attainment.

Why not being deſired, it moves not the will.

§. 45. The ordinary neceſſities of our lives fill a great part of them with the uneaſineſs of hunger, thirſt, heat, cold, wearineſs with labour, and ſleepineſs, in their conſtant returns, &c. To which, if, beſides accidental harms, we add the fantaſtical uneaſineſs (as itch after honour, power, or riches, &c.) which acquired habits by faſhion, example, and education, have ſettled in us, and a thouſand other irregular deſires, which cuſtom has made natural to us; we ſhall find, that a very little part of our life is ſo vacant from theſe uneaſineſſes, as to leave us free to the attraction of remoter abſent good. We are ſeldom at eaſe, and free enough from the ſolicitation of our natural or adopted deſires, but a conſtant ſucceſſion of uneaſineſſes out of that ſtock, which natural wants or acquired habits have heaped up, take the will in their turns: and no ſooner is one action diſpatched, which by ſuch a determination of the will we are ſet upon, but another uneaſineſs is ready to ſet us on work. For the removing of the pains we feel, and are at preſent preſſed with, being the getting out of miſery, and conſequently the firſt thing to be done in order to happineſs, abſent good, though thought on, confeſſed, and appearing to be good, not making any part of this unhappineſs in its abſence, is juſtled out to make way for the removal of thoſe uneaſineſſes we feel; till due and repeated contemplation has brought it nearer to our mind, given ſome reliſh of it, and raiſed

raiſed in us ſome deſire: which then beginning to make a part of our preſent uneaſineſs, ſtands upon fair terms with the reſt, to be ſatisfied; and ſo, according to its greatneſs and preſſure, comes in its turn, to determine the will.

Due conſideration raiſes deſire.

§. 46. And thus, by a due conſideration, and examining any good propoſed, it is in our power to raiſe our deſires in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby in its turn and place it may come to work upon the will, and be purſued. For good, though appearing, and allowed ever ſo great, yet till it has raiſed deſires in our minds, and thereby made us uneaſy in its want, it reaches not our wills; we are not within the ſphere of its activity; our wills being under the determination only of thoſe uneaſineſſes which are preſent to us, which (whilſt we have any) are always ſoliciting, and ready at hand to give the will its next determination: the balancing, when there is any in the mind, being only which deſire ſhall be next ſatisfied, which uneaſineſs firſt removed. Whereby comes to paſs, that as long as any uneaſineſs, any deſire remains in our mind, there is no room for good, barely as ſuch, to come at the will, or at all to determine it. Becauſe, as has been ſaid, the firſt ſtep in our endeavours after happineſs being to get wholly out of the confines of miſery, and to feel no part of it, the will can be at leiſure for nothing elſe, till every uneaſineſs we feel be perfectly removed; which, in the multitude of wants and deſires we are beſet with in this imperfect ſtate, we are not like to be ever freed from in this world.

The power to ſuſpend the proſecution of any deſire makes way for conſideration.

§. 47. There being in us a great many uneaſineſſes always ſoliciting, and ready to determine the will, it is natural, as I have ſaid, that the greateſt and moſt preſſing ſhould determine the will to the next action; and ſo it does for the moſt part, but not always. For the mind having in moſt caſes, as is evident in experience, a power to ſuſpend the execution and ſatisfaction of any of its deſires, and ſo all, one after another; is at liberty to conſider the objects

of

of them, examine them on all ſides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has; and from the not uſing of it right comes all that variety of miſtakes, errors, and faults which we run into in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happineſs; whilſt we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too ſoon before due examination. To prevent this, we have a power to ſuſpend the proſecution of this or that deſire, as every one daily may experiment in himſelf. This ſeems to me the ſource of all liberty; in this ſeems to conſiſt that which is (as I think improperly) called free-will. For during this ſuſpenſion of any deſire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due examination, we have judged, we have done our duty, all that we can or ought to do in purſuit of our happineſs; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature to deſire, will, and act according to the laſt reſult of a fair examination.

To be determined by our own judgment, is no reſtraint to liberty.

§. 48. This is ſo far from being a reſtraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it; it is not an abridgment, it is the end and uſe of our liberty; and the farther we are removed from ſuch a determination, the nearer we are to miſery and ſlavery. A perfect indifferency in the mind, not determinable by its laſt judgment of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be ſo far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act or not to act till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other ſide. A man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it reſt quiet; he is perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted that power, if he were deprived of that indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection if he had the ſame indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand,

hand, or its remaining in reſt, when it would ſave his head or eyes from a blow he ſees coming: it is as much a perfection, that deſire, or the power of preferring, ſhould be determined by good, as that the power of acting ſhould be determined by the will; and the certainer ſuch determination is, the greater is the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the laſt reſult of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free: the very end of our freedom being, that we may attain the good we chooſe. And therefore every man is put under a neceſſity by his conſtitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgement what is beſt for him to do: elſe he would be under the determination of ſome other than himſelf, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's will, in every determination, follows his own judgement, is to ſay, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his preſent thoughts before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unleſs he can have and not have it, will and not will it, at the ſame time; a contradiction too manifeſt to be admitted!

The freeſt agents are ſo determined.

§. 49. If we look upon thoſe ſuperior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happineſs, we ſhall have reaſon to judge that they are more ſteadily determined in their choice of good than we; and yet we have no reaſon to think they are leſs happy, or leſs free than we are. And if it were fit for ſuch poor finite creatures as we are to pronounce what infinite wiſdom and goodneſs could do, I think we might ſay, that God himſelf cannot chooſe what is not good; the freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is beſt.

A conſtant determination to a purſuit of happineſs no abridgment of liberty.

§. 50. But to give a right view of this miſtaken part of liberty, let me aſk, "Would any one be a changeling, be- "cauſe he is leſs determined by wiſe conſi- "derations than a wiſe man? Is it worth "the name of freedom to be at liberty to

" play the fool, and draw ſhame and miſery upon a " man's ſelf?" If to break looſe from the conduct of reaſon, and to want that reſtraint of examination and judgment, which keeps us from chooſing or doing the worſe, be liberty, true liberty, madmen and fools are the only freemen: but yet, I think, nobody would chooſe to be mad for the ſake of ſuch liberty, but he that is mad already. The conſtant deſire of happineſs, and the conſtraint it puts upon us to act for it, no-body, I think, accounts an abridgment of liberty, or at leaſt an abridgment of liberty to be complained of. God Almighty himſelf is under the neceſſity of being happy; and the more any intelligent being is ſo, the nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and happineſs. That in this ſtate of ignorance we ſhort-ſighted creatures might not miſtake true felicity, we are endowed with a power to ſuſpend any particular deſire, and keep it from determining the will, and engaging us in action. This is ſtanding ſtill, where we are not ſufficiently aſſured of the way: examination is conſulting a guide. The determination of the will upon inquiry is following the direction of that guide: and he that has a power to act or not to act, according as ſuch determination directs, is a free agent; ſuch determination abridges not that power wherein liberty conſiſts. He that has his chains knocked off, and the priſon-doors ſet open to him, is perfectly at liberty, becauſe he may either go or ſtay, as he beſt likes; though his preference be determined to ſtay, by the darkneſs of the night, or illneſs of the weather, or want of other lodging. He ceaſes not to be free, though the deſire of ſome convenience to be had there abſolutely determines his preference, and makes him ſtay in his priſon.

The neceſſity of purſuing true happineſs the foundation of liberty.

§. 51. As therefore the higheſt perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and conſtant purſuit of true and ſolid happineſs, ſo the care of ourſelves, that we miſtake not imaginary for real happineſs, is the neceſſary foundation of our liberty. The ſtronger ties we have to an unalterable purſuit of happineſs in general, which is our greateſt good, and which,

which, as ſuch, our deſires always follow, the more are we free from any neceſſary determination of our will to any particular action, and from a neceſſary compliance with our deſire, ſet upon any particular, and then appearing preferable good, till we have duly examined, whether it has a tendency to, or be inconſiſtent with our real happineſs: and therefore till we are as much informed upon this inquiry, as the weight of the matter, and the nature of the caſe demands; we are, by the neceſſity of preferring and purſuing true happineſs as our greateſt good, obliged to ſuſpend the ſatisfaction of our deſires in particular caſes.

The reaſon of it.

§. 52. This is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings, in their conſtant endeavours after and a ſteady proſecution of true felicity, that they can ſuſpend this proſecution in particular caſes, till they had looked before them, and informed themſelves whether that particular thing, which is then propoſed or deſired, lie in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which is their greateſt good: for the inclination and tendency of their nature to happineſs is an obligation and motive to them, to take care not to miſtake or miſs it; and ſo neceſſarily puts them upon caution, deliberation, and warineſs, in the direction of their particular actions, which are the means to obtain it. Whatever neceſſity determines to the purſuit of real bliſs, the ſame neceſſity with the ſame force eſtabliſhes ſuſpenſe, deliberation, and ſcrutiny of each ſucceſſive deſire, whether the ſatisfaction of it does not interfere with our true happineſs, and miſlead us from it. This, as ſeems to me, is the great privilege of finite intellectual beings; and I deſire it may be well conſidered, whether the great inlet and exerciſe of all the liberty men have, are capable of, or can be uſeful to them, and that whereon depends the turn of their actions, does not lie in this, that they can ſuſpend their deſires, and ſtop them from determining their wills to any action, till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the thing requires. This we are able to do; and when we have

have done it, we have done our duty, and all that is in our power, and indeed all that needs. For ſince the will ſuppoſes knowledge to guide its choice, and all that we can do is to hold our wills undetermined, till we have examined the good and evil of what we deſire. What follows after that, follows in a chain of conſequences linked one to another, all depending on the laſt determination of the judgment; which, whether it ſhall be upon a haſty and precipitate view, or upon a due and mature examination, is in our power: experience ſhowing us, that in moſt caſes we are able to ſuſpend the preſent ſatisfaction of any deſire.

Government of our paſſions the right improvement of liberty.

§. 53. But if any extreme diſturbance (as ſometimes it happens) poſſeſſes our whole mind, as when the pain of the rack, an impetuous uneaſineſs, as of love, anger, or any other violent paſſion, running away with us, allows us not the liberty of thought, and we are not maſters enough of our own minds to conſider thoroughly and examine fairly; God, who knows our frailty, pities our weakneſs, and requires of us no more than we are able to do, and ſees what was and what was not in our power, will judge as a kind and merciful father. But the forbearance of a too haſty compliance with our deſires, the moderation and reſtraint of our paſſions, ſo that our underſtandings may be free to examine, and reaſon unbiaſſed give its judgment, being that whereon a right direction of our conduct to true happineſs depends; it is in this we ſhould employ our chief care and endeavours. In this we ſhould take pains to ſuit the reliſh of our minds to the true intrinſick good or ill that is in things, and not permit an allowed or ſuppoſed poſſible great and weighty good to ſlip out of our thoughts, without leaving any reliſh, any deſire of itſelf there, till, by a due conſideration of its true worth, we have formed appetites in our minds ſuitable to it, and made ourſelves uneaſy in the want of it, or in the fear of loſing it. And how much this is in every one's power, by making reſolutions to himſelf, ſuch as he may keep, is eaſy for every one to try. Nor let any one ſay he cannot go-

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vern his paſſions, nor hinder them from breaking out, and carrying him into action; for what he can do before a prince, or a great man, he can do alone, or in the preſence of God, if he will.

How men come to purſue different courſes.

§. 54. From what has been ſaid, it is eaſy to give an account how it comes to paſs, that though all men deſire happineſs, yet their wills carry them ſo contrarily, and conſequently ſome of them to what is evil. And to this I ſay, that the various and contrary choices that men make in the world, do not argue that they do not all purſue good; but that the ſame thing is not good to every man alike. This variety of purſuits ſhows, that every one does not place his happineſs in the ſame thing, or chooſe the ſame way to it. Were all the concerns of man terminated in this life, why one followed ſtudy and knowledge, and another hawking and hunting: why one choſe luxury and debauchery, and another ſobriety and riches; would not be, becauſe every one of theſe did not aim at his own happineſs, but becauſe their happineſs was placed in different things. And therefore it was a right anſwer of the phyſician to his patient that had ſore eyes: If you have more pleaſure in the taſte of wine than in the uſe of your ſight, wine is good for you; but if the pleaſure of ſeeing be greater to you than that of drinking, wine is naught.

§. 55. The mind has a different reliſh, as well as the palate; and you will as fruitleſly endeavour to delight all men with riches or glory (which yet ſome men place their happineſs in) as you would to ſatisfy all men's hunger with cheeſe or lobſters; which, though very agreeable and delicious fare to ſome, are to others extremely nauſeous and offenſive: and many people would with reaſon prefer the griping of an hungry belly, to thoſe diſhes which are a feaſt to others. Hence it was, I think, that the philoſophers of old did in vain inquire, whether ſummum bonum conſiſted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation. And they might have as reaſonably diſputed, whether the beſt reliſh were to be found in apples, plums, or nuts; and have divided themſelves into ſects upon it.

For

For as pleaſant taſtes depend not on the things themſelves, but their agreeableneſs to this or that particular palate, wherein there is great variety; ſo the greateſt happineſs conſiſts in the having thoſe things which produce the greateſt pleaſure, and in the abſence of thoſe which cauſe any diſturbance, any pain. Now, theſe, to different men, are very different things. If therefore men in this life only have hope, if in this life they can only enjoy, it is not ſtrange nor unreaſonable, that they ſhould ſeek their happineſs by avoiding all things that diſeaſe them here, and by purſuing all that delight them; wherein it will be no wonder to find variety and difference. For if there be no proſpect beyond the grave, the inference is certainly right, "let "us eat and drink," let us enjoy what we delight in, "for to-morrow we ſhall die." This, I think, may ſerve to ſhow us the reaſon, why, though all men's deſires tend to happineſs, yet they are not moved by the ſame object. Men may chooſe different things, and yet all chooſe right; ſuppoſing them only like a company of poor inſects, whereof ſome are bees, delighted with flowers and their ſweetneſs; others beetles, delighted with other kinds of viands, which having enjoyed for a ſeaſon, they would ceaſe to be, and exiſt no more for ever.

How men come to chooſe ill.

§. 56. Theſe things duly weighed, will give us, as I think, a clear view into the ſtate of human liberty. Liberty it is plain, conſiſts in a power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing, as we will. This cannot be denied. But this ſeeming to comprehend only the actions of a man conſecutive to volition, it is farther inquired, "whe-"ther he be at liberty to will, or no." And to this it has been anſwered, that in moſt caſes a man is not at liberty to forbear the act of volition: he muſt exert an act of his will, whereby the action propoſed is made to exiſt, or not to exiſt. But yet there is a caſe wherein a man is at liberty in reſpect of willing, and that is the chooſing of a remote good as an end to be purſued. Here a man may ſuſpect the act of his choice from being determined for or againſt the thing propoſed

propoſed, till he has examined whether it be really of a nature in itſelf and conſequences to make him happy, or no. For when he has once choſen it, and thereby it is become a part of his happineſs, it raiſes deſire, and that proportionably gives him uneaſineſs, which determines his will, and ſets him at work in purſuit of his choice on all occaſions that offer. And here we may ſee how it comes to paſs, that a man may juſtly incur puniſhment, though it be certain that in all the particular actions that he wills, he does, and neceſſarily does will that which he then judges to be good. For, though his will be always determined by that which is judged good by his underſtanding, yet it excuſes him not: becauſe, by a too haſty choice of his own making, he has impoſed on himſelf wrong meaſures of good and evil; which, however falſe and fallacious, have the ſame influence on all his future conduct, as if they were true and right. He has vitiated his own palate, and muſt be anſwerable to himſelf for the ſickneſs and death that follows from it. The eternal law and nature of things muſt not be altered, to comply with his ill-ordered choice. If the neglect, or abuſe, of the liberty he had to examine what would really and truly make for his happineſs, miſleads him, the miſcarriages that follow on it muſt be imputed to his own election. He had a power to ſuſpend his determination: it was given him, that he might examine, and take care of his own happineſs, and look that he were not deceived. And he could never judge, that it was better to be deceived than not, in a matter of ſo great and near concernment.

What has been ſaid may alſo diſcover to us the reaſon why men in this world prefer different things, and purſue happineſs by contrary courſes. But yet, ſince men are always conſtant, and in earneſt, in matters of happineſs and miſery, the queſtion ſtill remains, How men come often to prefer the worſe to the better; and to chooſe that, which by their own confeſſion, has made them miſerable?

§. 57. To account for the various and contrary ways men take, though all aim at being happy, we muſt con-

ſider whence the various uneaſineſſes, that determine the will in the preference of each voluntary action, have their riſe.

Form bodily pains.

1. Some of them come from cauſes not in our power; ſuch as are often the pains of the body from want, diſeaſe, or outward injuries, as the rack, &c. which, when preſent and violent, operate for the moſt part forcibly on the will, and turn the courſes of men's lives from virtue, piety, and religion, and what before they judged to lead to happineſs; every one not endeavouring, or through diſuſe not being able, by the contemplation of remote and future good, to raiſe in himſelf deſires of them ſtrong enough to counterbalance the uneaſineſs he feels in thoſe bodily torments, and to keep his will ſteady in the choice of thoſe actions which lead to future happineſs. A neighbour country has been of late a tragical theatre, from which we might fetch inſtances, if there needed any, and the world did not in all countries and ages furniſh examples enough to confirm that received obſervation, "neceſſitas cogit adturpia;" and therefore there is great reaſon for us to pray, "lead us not into temptation."

From wrong deſires ariſing from wrong judgment.

2. Other uneaſineſſes ariſe from our deſires of abſent good; which deſires always bear proportion to, and depend on the judgment we make, and the reliſh we have of any abſent good: in both which we are apt to be variouſly miſled, and that by our own fault.

Our judgment of preſent good or evil always right.

§. 58. In the firſt place, I ſhall conſider the wrong judgments men make of future good and evil, whereby their deſires are miſled. For, as to preſent happineſs and miſery, when that alone comes into conſideration, and the conſequences are quite removed, a man never chooſes amiſs; he knows what beſt pleaſes him, and that he actually prefers. Things in their preſent enjoyment are what they ſeem; the apparent and real good are, in this caſe, always the ſame. For the pain or pleaſure being juſt ſo great, and no greater than it is felt, the preſent good or evil is really ſo much

as

as it appears. And therefore, were every action of ours concluded within itſelf, and drew no conſequences after it, we ſhould undoubtedly never err in our choice of good; we ſhould always infallibly prefer the beſt. Were the pains of honeſt induſtry, and of ſtarving with hunger and cold, ſet together before us, no-body would be in doubt which to chooſe: were the ſatisfaction of a luſt, and the joys of heaven offered at once to any one's preſent poſſeſſion, he would not balance, or err in the determination of his choice.

§. 59. But ſince our voluntary actions carry not all the happineſs and miſery that depend on them, along with them in their preſent performance, but are the precedent cauſes of good and evil, which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themſelves are paſſed and ceaſe to be; our deſires look beyond our preſent enjoyments, and carry the mind out to abſent good, according to the neceſſity which we think there is of it, to the making or increaſe of our happineſs. It is our opinion of ſuch a neceſſity, that gives it its attraction: without that, we are not moved by abſent good. For in this narrow ſcantling of capacity, which we are accuſtomed to, and ſenſible of here, wherein we enjoy but one pleaſure at once, which, when all uneaſineſs is away, is, whilſt it laſts, ſufficient to make us think ourſelves happy; it is not all remote, and even apparent good, that affects us. Becauſe the indolency and enjoyment we have, ſufficing for our preſent happineſs, we deſire not to venture the change; ſince we judge that we are happy already, being content, and that is enough. For who is content is happy. But as ſoon as any new uneaſineſs comes in, this happineſs is diſturbed, and we are ſet afreſh on work in the purſuit of happineſs.

From a wrong judgment of what makes a neceſſary part of their happineſs.

§. 60. Their aptneſs therefore to conclude that they can be happy without it, is one great occaſion that men often are not raiſed to the deſire of the greateſt abſent good. For whilſt ſuch thoughts poſſeſs them, the joys of a future ſtate move them not: they have little concern or uneaſineſs about them;

and the will, free from the determination of ſuch deſires, is left to the purſuit of nearer ſatisfactions, and to the removal of thoſe uneaſineſſes which it then feels, in its want of and longings after them. Change but a man's view of theſe things; let him ſee, that virtue and religion are neceſſary to his happineſs; let him look into the future ſtate of bliſs or miſery, and ſee there God, the righteous judge, ready to "render to "every man according to his deeds; to them who by "patient continuance in well-doing ſeek for glory, and "honour, and immortality, eternal life; but unto "every ſoul that doth evil, indignation and wrath, "tribulation and anguiſh:" to him, I ſay, who hath a proſpect of the different ſtate of perfect happineſs, or miſery, that attends all men after this life, depending on their behaviour here, the meaſures of good and evil, that govern his choice, are mightily changed. For ſince nothing of pleaſure and pain in this life can bear any proportion to the endleſs happineſs, or exquiſite miſery, of an immortal ſoul hereafter; actions in his power will have their preference, not according to the tranſient pleaſure or pain that accompanies or follows them here, but as they ſerve to ſecure that perfect durable happineſs hereafter.

A more particular account of wrong judgments.

§. 61. But to account more particularly for the miſery that men often bring on themſelves, notwithſtanding that they do all in earneſt purſue happineſs, we muſt conſider how things come to be repreſented to our deſires, under deceitful appearances: and that is by the judgment pronouncing wrongly concerning them. To ſee how far this reaches, and what are the cauſes of wrong judgment, we muſt remember that things are judged good or bad in a double ſenſe.

Firſt, That which is properly good or bad, is nothing but barely pleaſure or pain.

Secondly, But becauſe not only preſent pleaſure and pain, but that alſo which is apt by its efficacy or conſequences to bring it upon us at a diſtance, is a proper object of our deſires, and apt to move a creature that has foreſight; therefore things alſo that draw after them

them pleaſure and pain, are conſidered as good and evil.

§. 62. The wrong judgment that miſleads us, and makes the will often faſten on the worſe ſide, lies in miſreporting upon the various compariſons of theſe. The wrong judgment I am here ſpeaking of, is not what one man may think of the determination of another, but what every man himſelf muſt confeſs to be wrong. For ſince I lay it for a certain ground, that every intelligent being really ſeeks happineſs, which conſiſts in the enjoyment of pleaſure, without any conſiderable mixture of uneaſineſs; it is impoſſible any one ſhould willingly put into his own draught any bitter ingredient, or leave out any thing in his power, that would tend to his ſatisfaction, and the compleating of his happineſs, but only by wrong judgment. I ſhall not here ſpeak of that miſtake which is the conſequence of invincible error, which ſcarce deſerves the name of wrong judgment; but of that wrong judgment which every man himſelf muſt confeſs to be ſo.

In comparing preſent and future.

§. 63. If, therefore, as to preſent pleaſure and pain, the mind, as has been ſaid, never miſtakes that which is really good or evil; that which is the greater pleaſure, or the greater pain, is really juſt as it appears. But though preſent pleaſure and pain ſhow their difference and degrees ſo plainly, as not to leave room for miſtake; yet when we compare preſent pleaſure or pain with future, (which is uſually the caſe in the moſt important determinations of the will) we often make wrong judgments of them, taking our meaſures of them in different poſitions of diſtance. Objects, near our view, are apt to be thought greater than thoſe of a larger ſize, that are more remote: and ſo it is with pleaſures and pains; the preſent is apt to carry it, and thoſe at a diſtance have the diſadvantage in the compariſon. Thus moſt men, like ſpendthrift heirs, are apt to judge a little in hand better than a great deal to come; and ſo, for ſmall matters in poſſeſſion, part with greater ones in reverſion. But that this is a wrong judgment, every one muſt allow, let his pleaſure conſiſt in whatever it

will: ſince that which is future will certainly come to be preſent; and then having the ſame advantage of nearneſs, will ſhow itſelf in its full dimenſions, and diſcover his wilful miſtake, who judged of it by unequal meaſures. Were the pleaſure of drinking accompanied, the very moment a man takes off his glaſs, with that ſick ſtomach and aking head, which in ſome men, are ſure to follow not many hours after; I think no-body, whatever pleaſure he had in his cups, would, on theſe conditions, ever let wine touch his lips; which yet he daily ſwallows, and the evil ſide comes to be choſen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time. But if pleaſure or pain can be ſo leſſened only by a few hours removal, how much more will it be ſo by a farther diſtance, to a man that will not by a right judgment do what time will, i. e. bring it home upon himſelf, and conſider it as preſent, and there take its true dimenſions? This is the way we uſually impoſe on ourſelves, in reſpect of bare pleaſure and pain, or the true degrees of happineſs or miſery; the future loſes its juſt proportion, and what is preſent obtains the preference as the greater. I mention not here the wrong judgment, whereby the abſent are not only leſſened, but reduced to perfect nothing; when men enjoy what they can in preſent, and make ſure of that, concluding amiſs that no evil will thence follow. For that lies not in comparing the greatneſs of future good and evil, which is that we are here ſpeaking of; but in another ſort of wrong judgment, which is concerning good or evil, as it is conſidered to be the cauſe and procurement of pleaſure or pain, that will follow from it.

Cauſes of this.

§. 64. The cauſe of our judging amiſs, when we compare our preſent pleaſure or pain with future, ſeems to me to be the weak and narrow conſtitution of our minds. We cannot well enjoy two pleaſures at once, much leſs any pleaſure almoſt, whilſt pain poſſeſſes us. The preſent pleaſure, if it be not very languid, and almoſt none at all, fills our narrow ſouls, and ſo takes up the whole mind, that it ſcarce leaves any thought of things abſent:

ſent: or if, among our pleaſures, there are ſome which are not ſtrong enough to exclude the conſideration of things at a diſtance; yet we have ſo great an abhorrence of pain, that a little of it extinguiſhes all our pleaſures: a little bitter mingled in our cup, leaves no reliſh of the ſweet. Hence it comes, that at any rate we deſire to be rid of the preſent evil, which we are apt to think nothing abſent can equal; becauſe, under the preſent pain, we find not ourſelves capable of any the leaſt degree of happineſs. Men's daily complaints are a loud proof of this: the pain that any one actually feels is ſtill of all other the worſt; and it is with anguiſh they cry out, "Any rather than this: nothing "can be ſo intolerable as what I now ſuffer." And therefore our whole endeavours and thoughts are intent to get rid of the preſent evil, before all things, as the firſt neceſſary condition to our happineſs, let what will follow. Nothing, as we paſſionately think, can exceed, or almoſt equal, the uneaſineſs that ſits ſo heavy upon us. And becauſe the abſtinence from a preſent pleaſure that offers itſelf, is a pain, nay oftentimes a very great one, the deſire being inflamed by a near and tempting object; it is no wonder that that operates after the ſame manner pain does, and leſſens in our thoughts what is future; and ſo forces, as it were, blindfold into its embraces.

§. 65. Add to this, that abſent good, or, which is the ſame thing, future pleaſure, eſpecially if of a ſort we are unacquainted with, ſeldom is able to counterbalance any uneaſineſs, either of pain or deſire, which is preſent. For its greatneſs being no more than what ſhall be really taſted when enjoyed, men are apt enough to leſſen that, to make it give place to any preſent deſire; and conclude with themſelves, that when it comes to trial, it may poſſibly not anſwer the report, or opinion, that generally paſſes of it; they having often found, that not only what others have magnified, but even what they themſelves have enjoyed with great pleaſure and delight at one time, has proved inſipid or nauſeous at another; and therefore they ſee nothing in it for which they ſhould forego a preſent enjoyment.

But that this is a falſe way of judging, when applied to the happineſs of another life, they muſt confeſs; unleſs they will ſay, "God cannot make thoſe happy he de-"ſigns to be ſo." For that being intended for a ſtate of happineſs, it muſt certainly be agreeable to every one's wiſh and deſire: could we ſuppoſe their reliſhes as different there as they are here, yet the manna in heaven will ſuit every one's palate. Thus much of the wrong judgment we make of preſent and future pleaſure and pain, when they are compared together, and ſo the abſent conſidered as future.

In conſidering conſequences of actions.

§. 66. II. As to things good or bad in their conſequences, and by the aptneſs is in them to procure us good or evil in the future, we judge amiſs ſeveral ways.

1. When we judge that ſo much evil does not really depend on them, as in truth there does.

2. When we judge, that though the conſequence be of that moment, yet it is not of that certainty, but that it may otherwiſe fall out, or elſe by ſome means be avoided, as by induſtry, addreſs, change, repentance, &c. That theſe are wrong ways of judging, were eaſy to ſhow in every particular, if I would examine them at large ſingly: but I ſhall only mention this in general, viz. that it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater good for a leſs, upon uncertain gueſſes, and before a due examination be made proportionable to the weightineſs of the matter, and the concernment it is to us not to miſtake. This, I think, every one muſt confeſs, eſpecially if he conſiders the uſual cauſes of this wrong judgment, whereof theſe following are ſome.

Cauſes of this.

§. 67. I. Ignorance: he that judges without informing himſelf to the utmoſt that he is capable, cannot acquit himſelf of judging amiſs.

II. Inadvertency: when a man overlooks even that which he does know. This is an affected and preſent ignorance, which miſleads our judgments as much as the other. Judging is, as it were, balancing an account, and determining on which ſide the odds lie.

If

If therefore either ſide be huddled up in haſte, and ſeveral of the ſums, that ſhould have gone into the reckoning, be overlooked and left out, this precipitancy cauſes as wrong a judgment, as if it were a perfect ignorance. That which moſt commonly cauſes this, is the prevalency of ſome preſent pleaſure or pain, heightened by our feeble paſſionate nature, moſt ſtrongly wrought on by what is preſent. To check this precipitancy, our underſtanding and reaſon was given us, if we will make a right uſe of it, to ſearch and ſee, and then judge thereupon. Without liberty, the underſtanding would be to no purpoſe: and without underſtanding, liberty (if it could be) would ſignify nothing. If a man ſees what would do him good or harm, what would make him happy or miſerable, without being able to move himſelf one ſtep towards or from it, what is he the better for ſeeing? And he that is at liberty to ramble in perfect darkneſs, what is his liberty better, than if he were driven up and down as a bubble by the force of the wind? The being acted by a blind impulſe from without, or from within, is little odds. The firſt therefore, and great uſe of liberty, is to hinder blind precipitancy; the principal exerciſe of freedom is to ſtand ſtill, open the eyes, look about, and take a view of the conſequence of what we are going to do, as much as the weight of the matter requires. How much ſloth and negligence, heat and paſſion, the prevalency of faſhion, or acquired indiſpoſitions, do ſeverally contribute on occaſion to theſe wrong judgments, I ſhall not here farther inquire. I ſhall only add one other falſe judgment, which I think neceſſary to mention, becauſe perhaps it is little taken notice of, though of great influence.

Wrong judgment of what is neceſſary to our happineſs.

§. 68. All men deſire happineſs, that is paſt doubt; but, as has been already obſerved, when they are rid of pain, they are apt to take up with any pleaſure at hand, or that cuſtom has endeared to them, to reſt ſatisfied in that; and ſo being happy, till ſome new deſire, by making them uneaſy, diſturbs that happineſs, and ſhows them that they are not ſo, they look no farther;

ther; nor is the will determined to any action, in purſuit of any other known or apparent good. For ſince we find, that we cannot enjoy all ſorts of good, but one excludes another; we do not fix our deſires on every apparent greater good, unleſs it be judged to be neceſſary to our happineſs; if we think we can be happy without it, it moves us not. This is another occaſion to men of judging wrong, when they take not that to be neceſſary to their happineſs, which really is ſo. This miſtake miſleads us both in the choice of the good we aim at, and very often in the means to it, when it is a remote good. But which way ever it be, either by placing it where really it is not, or by neglecting the means as not neceſſary to it; when a man miſſes his great end, happineſs, he will acknowledge he judged not right. That which contributes to this miſtake, is the real or ſuppoſed unpleaſantneſs of the actions, which are the way to this end; it ſeeming ſo prepoſterous a thing to men, to make themſelves unhappy in order to happineſs, that they do not eaſily bring themſelves to it.

We can change the agreeableneſs or diſagreeableneſs in things.

§. 69. The laſt inquiry therefore concerning this matter is, "whether it be in "a man's power to change the pleaſantneſs and unpleaſantneſs that accompanies "any ſort of action?" And as to that, it is plain, in many caſes he can. Men may and ſhould correct their palates, and give reliſh to what either has, or they ſuppoſe has none. The reliſh of the mind is as various as that of the body, and like that too may be altered; and it is a miſtake to think, that men cannot change the diſpleaſingneſs or indifferency that is in actions into pleaſure and deſire, if they will do but what is in their power. A due conſideration will do it in ſome caſes; and practice, application, and cuſtom in moſt. Bread or tobacco may be neglected, where they are ſhown to be uſeful to health, becauſe of an indifferency or diſreliſh to them; reaſon and conſideration at firſt recommend, and begin their trial, and uſe finds, or cuſtom makes them pleaſant. That this is ſo in virtue too, is very certain. Actions

are

are pleaſing or diſpleaſing, either in themſelves, or conſidered as a means to a greater and more deſirable end. The eating of a well-ſeaſoned diſh, ſuited to a man's palate, may move the mind by the delight itſelf that accompanies the eating, without reference to any other end: to which the conſideration of the pleaſure there is in health and ſtrength (to which that meat is ſubſervient) may add a new guſto, able to make us ſwallow an ill-reliſhed potion. In the latter of theſe, any action is rendered more or leſs pleaſing, only by the contemplation of the end, and the being more or leſs perſuaded of its tendency to it, or neceſſary connexion with it: but the pleaſure of the action itſelf is beſt acquired or increaſed by uſe and practice. Trials often reconcile us to that, which at a diſtance we looked on with averſion; and by repetitions wear us into a liking of what poſſibly, in the firſt eſſay, diſpleaſed us. Habits have powerful charms, and put ſo ſtrong attractions of eaſineſs and pleaſure into what we accuſtom ourſelves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at leaſt be eaſy in the omiſſion of actions, which habitual practice has ſuited, and thereby recommends to us. Though this be very viſible, and every one's experience ſhows him he can do ſo; yet it is a part in the conduct of men towards their happineſs, neglected to a degree, that it will be poſſibly entertained as a paradox, if it be ſaid, that men can make things or actions more or leſs pleaſing to themſelves; and thereby remedy that, to which one may juſtly impute a great deal of their wandering. Faſhion and the common opinion having ſettled wrong notions, and education and cuſtom ill habits, the juſt values of things are miſplaced, and the palates of men corrupted. Pains ſhould be taken to rectify theſe; and contrary habits change our pleaſures, and give a reliſh to that which is neceſſary or conducive to our happineſs. This every one muſt confeſs he can do; and when happineſs is loſt, and miſery overtakes him, he will confeſs he did amiſs in neglecting it, and condemn himſelf for it: and I aſk every one, whether he has not often done ſo?

§. 70.

Preference of vice to virtue a manifeſt wrong judgment.

§. 70. I ſhall not now enlarge any farther on the wrong judgments and neglect of what is in their power, whereby men miſlead themſelves. This would make a volume, and is not my buſineſs. But whatever falſe notions, or ſhameful neglect of what is in their power, may put men out of their way to happineſs, and diſtract them, as we ſee, into ſo different courſes of life, this yet is certain, that morality, eſtabliſhed upon its true foundations, cannot but determine the choice in any one that will but conſider: and he that will not be ſo far a rational creature as to reflect ſeriouſly upon infinite happineſs and miſery, muſt needs condemn himſelf as not making that uſe of his underſtanding he ſhould. The rewards and puniſhments of another life, which the Almighty has eſtabliſhed as the enforcements of his law, are of weight enough to determine the choice, againſt whatever pleaſure or pain this life can ſhow, when the eternal ſtate is conſidered but in its bare poſſibility, which no-body can make any doubt of. He that will allow exquiſite and endleſs happineſs to be but the poſſible conſequence of a good life here, and the contrary ſtate the poſſible reward of a bad one; muſt own himſelf to judge very much amiſs if he does not conclude, that a virtuous life, with the certain expectation of everlaſting bliſs, which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the fear of that dreadful ſtate of miſery, which it is very poſſible may overtake the guilty; or at beſt the terrible uncertain hope of annihilation. This is evidently ſo, though the virtuous life here had nothing put pain, and the vicious continual pleaſure: which yet is, for the moſt part, quite otherwiſe, and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their preſent poſſeſſion; nay, all things rightly conſidered, have, I think, even the worſt part here. But when infinite happineſs is put into one ſcale againſt infinite miſery in the other; if the worſt that comes to the pious man, if he miſtakes, be the beſt that the wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, who can without madneſs run the venture? Who in his wits would chooſe to come within a poſ-

a poſſibility of infinite miſery, which if he miſs, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas on the other ſide, the ſober man ventures nothing againſt infinite happineſs to be got, if his expectation comes to paſs. If the good man be in the right, he is eternally happy; if he miſtakes, he is not miſerable, he feels nothing. On the other ſide, if the wicked be in the right, he is not happy; if he miſtakes, he is infinitely miſerable. Muſt it not be a moſt manifeſt wrong judgment that does not preſently ſee to which ſide, in this caſe, the preference is to be given? I have forborn to mention any thing of the certainty or probability of a future ſtate, deſigning here to ſhow the wrong judgment that any one muſt allow he makes upon his own principles, laid how he pleaſes, who prefers the ſhort pleaſures of a vicious life upon any conſideration, whilſt he knows, and cannot but be certain, that a future life is at leaſt poſſible.

Recapitulation.

§. 71. To conclude this inquiry into human liberty, which as it ſtood before, I myſelf from the beginning fearing, and a very judicious friend of mine, ſince the publication, ſuſpecting to have ſome miſtake in it, though he could not particularly ſhow it me, I was put upon a ſtricter review of this chapter. Wherein lighting upon a very eaſy and ſcarce obſervable ſlip I had made, in putting one ſeemingly indifferent word for another, that diſcovery opened to me this preſent view, which here, in this ſecond edition, I ſubmit to the learned world, and which in ſhort is this: "Liberty is a power to act "or not to act, according as the mind directs." A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or reſt in particular inſtances, is that which we call the will. That which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation, is ſome preſent uneaſineſs; which is, or at leaſt is always accompanied with, that of deſire. Deſire is always moved by evil, to fly it; becauſe a total freedom from pain always makes a neceſſary part of our happineſs: but every good, nay every greater good, does not conſtantly move deſire, becauſe it may not make, or may

not be taken to make any neceſſary part of our happineſs. For all that we deſire, is only to be happy. But though this general deſire of happineſs operates conſtantly and invariably, yet the ſatisfaction of any particular deſire can be ſuſpended from determining the will to any ſubſervient action, till we have maturely examined, whether the particular apparent good, which we then deſire, makes a part of our real happineſs, or be conſiſtent or inconſiſtent with it. The reſult of our judgment upon that examination is what ultimately determines the man, who could not be free if his will were determined by any thing but his own deſire guided by his own judgment. I know that liberty by ſome is placed in an indifferency of the man, antecedent to the determination of his will. I wiſh they, who lay ſo much ſtreſs on ſuch an antecedent indifferency, as they call it, had told us plainly, whether this ſuppoſed indifferency be antecedent to the thought and judgment of the underſtanding, as well as to the decree of the will. For it is pretty hard to ſtate it between them; i. e. immediately after the judgment of the underſtanding, and before the determination of the will, becauſe the determination of the will immediately follows the judgment of the underſtanding: and to place liberty in an indifferency, antecedent to the thought and judgment of the underſtanding, ſeems to me to place liberty in a ſtate of darkneſs, wherein we can neither ſee nor ſay any thing of it; at leaſt it places it in a ſubject incapable of it, no agent being allowed capable of liberty, but in conſequence of thought and judgment. I am not nice about phraſes, and therefore conſent to ſay with thoſe that love to ſpeak ſo, that liberty is placed in indifferency; but it is an indifferency which remains after the judgment of the underſtanding; yea, even after the determination of the will: and that is an indifferency not of the man, (for after he has once judged which is beſt, viz. to do, or forbear, he is no longer indifferent) but an indifferency of the operative powers of the man, which remaining equally able to operate, or to forbear operating after, as before the decree of the will, are in a ſtate, which,

if one pleaſes, may be called indifferency; and as far as this indifferency reaches, a man is free, and no farther: v. g. I have the ability to move my hand, or to let it reſt, that operative power is indifferent to move, or not to move my hand: I am then in that reſpect perfectly free. My will determines that operative power to reſt, I am yet free, becauſe the indifferency of that my operative power to act, or not to act, ſtill remains; the power of moving my hand is not at all impaired by the determination of my will, which at preſent orders reſt; the indifferency of that power to act, or not to act, is juſt as it was before, as will appear, if the will puts it to the trial, by ordering the contrary. But if during the reſt of my hand, it be ſeized by a ſudden palſy, the indifferency of that operative power is gone, and with it my liberty; I have no longer freedom in that reſpect, but am under a neceſſity of letting my hand reſt. On the other ſide, if my hand be put into motion by a convulſion, the indifferency of that operative faculty is taken away by that motion, and my liberty in that caſe is loſt: for I am under a neceſſity of having my hand move. I have added this, to ſhow in what ſort of indifferency liberty ſeems to me to conſiſt, and not in any other, real or imaginary.

§. 72. True notions concerning the nature and extent of liberty are of ſo great importance, that I hope I ſhall be pardoned this digreſſion, which my attempt to explain it has led me into. The idea of will, volition, liberty, and neceſſity, in this chapter of power, came naturally in my way. In a former edition of this treatiſe I gave an account of my thoughts concerning them, according to the light I then had: and now, as a lover of truth, and not a worſhipper of my own doctrines, I own ſome change of my opinion, which I think I have diſcovered ground for. In what I firſt writ, I with an unbiaſſed indifferency followed truth, whither I thought ſhe led me. But neither being ſo vain as to fancy infallibility, nor ſo diſingenuous as to diſſemble my miſtakes for fear of blemiſhing my reputation, I have, with the ſame ſincere deſign for truth only,

only, not been aſhamed to publiſh what a ſeverer inquiry has ſuggeſted. It is not impoſſible but that ſome may think my former notions right, and ſome (as I have already found) theſe latter, and ſome neither. I ſhall not at all wonder at this variety in men's opinions; impartial deductions of reaſon in controverted points being ſo rare, and exact ones in abſtract notions not ſo very eaſy, eſpecially if of any length. And therefore I ſhould think myſelf not a little beholden to any one, who would upon theſe, or any other grounds, fairly clear this ſubject of liberty from any difficulties that may yet remain.

Before I cloſe this chapter, it may perhaps be to our purpoſe, and help to give us clearer conceptions about power, if we make our thoughts take a little more exact ſurvey of action. I have ſaid above, that we have ideas but of two ſorts of action, viz. motion and thinking. Theſe, in truth, though called and counted actions, yet if nearly conſidered, will not be found to be always perfectly ſo. For, if I miſtake not, there are inſtances of both kinds, which, upon due conſideration, will be found rather paſſions than actions, and conſequently ſo far the effects barely of paſſive powers in thoſe ſubjects, which yet on their accounts are thought agents. For in theſe inſtances, the ſubſtance that hath motion or thought receives the impreſſion, where it is put into that action purely from without, and ſo acts merely by the capacity it has to receive ſuch an impreſſion from ſome external agent; and ſuch a power is not properly an active power, but a mere paſſive capacity in the ſubject. Sometimes the ſubſtance or agent puts itſelf into action by its own power, and this is properly active power. Whatſoever modification a ſubſtance has, whereby it produces any effect, that is called action; v. g. a ſolid ſubſtance by motion operates on, or alters the ſenſible ideas of another ſubſtance, and therefore this modification of motion we call action. But yet this motion in that ſolid ſubſtance is, when rightly conſidered, but a paſſion, if it received it only from ſome external agent. So that the active power of motion is in no ſubſtance

which

which cannot begin motion in itſelf, or in another ſubſtance, when at reſt. So likewiſe in thinking, a power to receive ideas or thoughts, from the operation of any external ſubſtance, is called a power of thinking: but this is but a paſſive power, or capacity. But to be able to bring into view ideas out of ſight at one's own choice, and to compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an active power. This reflection may be of ſome uſe to preſerve us from miſtakes about powers and actions, which grammar and the common frame of languages may be apt to lead us into; ſince what is ſignified by verbs that grammarians call active, does not always ſignify action: v. g. this propoſition, I ſee the moon, or a ſtar, or I feel the heat of the ſun, though expreſſed by a verb active, does not ſignify any action in me, whereby I operate on thoſe ſubſtances; but the reception of the ideas of light, roundneſs and heat, wherein I am not active, but barely paſſive, and cannot in that poſition of my eyes, or body, avoid receiving them. But when I turn my eyes another way, or remove my body out of the ſunbeams, I am properly active; becauſe of my own choice, by a power within myſelf, I put myſelf into that motion. Such an action is the product of active power.

§. 73. And thus I have, in a ſhort draught, given a view of our original ideas, from whence all the reſt are derived, and of which they are made up; which if I would conſider, as a philoſopher, and examine on what cauſes they depend, and of what they are made, I believe they all might be reduced to theſe very few primary and original ones, viz. Extenſion, Solidity, Mobility, or the power of being moved; which by our ſenſes we receive from body; Perceptivity, or the power of perception, or thinking; Motivity, or the power of moving; which by reflection we receive from our minds. I crave leave to make uſe of theſe two new words, to avoid the danger of being miſtaken in the uſe of thoſe which are equivocal. To which if we add Exiſtence, Duration, Number; which belong both to the one and the other; we have, perhaps, all the original ideas, on which the reſt depend. For by

theſe, I imagine, might be explained the nature of colours, ſounds, taſtes, ſmells, and all other ideas we have, if we had but faculties acute enough to perceive the ſeverally modified extenſions and motions of theſe minute bodies, which produce thoſe ſeveral ſenſations in us. But my preſent purpoſe being only to inquire into the knowledge the mind has of things, by thoſe ideas and appearances, which God has fitted it to receive from them, and how the mind comes by that knowledge, rather than into their cauſes, or manner of production; I ſhall not, contrary to the deſign of this eſſay, ſet myſelf to inquire philoſophically into the peculiar conſtitution of bodies, and the configuration of parts, whereby they have the power to produce in us the ideas of their ſenſible qualities: I ſhall not enter any farther into that diſquiſition, it ſufficing to my purpoſe to obſerve, that gold or ſaffron has a power to produce in us the idea of yellow, and ſnow or milk the idea of white, which we can only have by our ſight, without examining the texture of the parts of thoſe bodies, or the particular figures or motion of the particles which rebound from them, to cauſe in us that particular ſenſation: though when we go beyond the bare ideas in our minds, and would inquire into their cauſes, we cannot conceive any thing elſe to be in any ſenſible object, whereby it produces different ideas in us, but the different bulk, figure, number, texture, and motion of its inſenſible parts.

CHAP. XXII.

Of mixed Modes.

Mixed modes, what.

§. 1. HAVING treated of ſimple modes in the foregoing chapters, and given ſeveral inſtances of ſome of the moſt conſiderable of them, to ſhow what they are, and how we come by them; we are now in the next place to conſider thoſe we call mixed modes: ſuch

are

are the complex ideas we mark by the names Obligation, Drunkenneſs, a Lye, &c. which conſiſting of ſeveral combinations of ſimple ideas of different kinds, I have called mixed modes, to diſtinguiſh them from the more ſimple modes, which conſiſt only of ſimple ideas of the ſame kind. Theſe mixed modes being alſo ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas, as are not looked upon to be characteriſtical marks of any real beings that have a ſteady exiſtence, but ſcattered and independent ideas put together by the mind, are thereby diſtinguiſhed from the complex ideas of ſubſtances.

Made by the mind.

§. 2. That the mind, in reſpect of its ſimple ideas, is wholly paſſive, and receives them all from the exiſtence and operations of things, ſuch as ſenſation or reflection offers them, without being able to make any one idea, experience ſhows us: but if we attentively conſider theſe ideas I call mixed modes, we are now ſpeaking of, we ſhall find their original quite different. The mind often exerciſes an active power in making theſe ſeveral combinations: for it being once furniſhed with ſimple ideas, it can put them together in ſeveral compoſitions, and ſo make variety of complex ideas, without examining whether they exiſt ſo together in nature. And hence I think it is that theſe ideas are called notions, as if they had their original and conſtant exiſtence more in the thoughts of men, than in the reality of things; and to form ſuch ideas, it ſufficed, that the mind puts the parts of them together, and that they were conſiſtent in the underſtanding, without conſidering whether they had any real being: though I do not deny, but ſeveral of them might be taken from obſervation, and the exiſtence of ſeveral ſimple ideas ſo combined, as they are put together in the underſtanding. For the man who firſt framed the idea of hypocriſy, might have either taken it at firſt from the obſervation of one, who made ſhow of good qualities which he had not, or elſe have framed that idea in his mind, without having any ſuch pattern to faſhion it by: for it is evident, that in the beginning of languages and ſocieties of men, ſeveral of thoſe complex ideas, which were conſequent to the con-

ſtitutions eſtabliſhed amongſt them, muſt needs have been in the minds of men, before they exiſted any where elſe: and that many names that ſtood for ſuch complex ideas were in uſe, and ſo thoſe ideas framed, before the combinations they ſtood for ever exiſted.

Sometimes got by the explication of their names.

§. 3. Indeed now that languages are made, and abound with words ſtanding for ſuch combinations, an uſual way of getting theſe complex ideas is by the explication of thoſe terms that ſtand for them. For conſiſting of a company of ſimple ideas combined, they may by words, ſtanding for thoſe ſimple ideas, be repreſented to the mind of one who underſtands thoſe words, though that complex combination of ſimple ideas were never offered to his mind by the real exiſtence of things. Thus a man may come to have the idea of ſacrilege or murder, by enumerating to him the ſimple ideas which theſe words ſtand for, without ever ſeeing either of them committed.

The name ties the parts of mixed modes into one idea.

§. 4. Every mixed mode conſiſting of many diſtinct ſimple ideas, it ſeems reaſonable to inquire, "whence it has its unity, "and how ſuch a preciſe multitude comes "to make but one idea, ſince that combi-"nation does not always exiſt together in nature?" To which I anſwer, it is plain it has its unity from an act of the mind combining thoſe ſeveral ſimple ideas together, and conſidering them as one complex one, conſiſting of thoſe parts; and the mark of this union, or that which is looked on generally to complete it, is one name given to that combination. For it is by their names that men commonly regulate their account of their diſtinct ſpecies of mixed modes, ſeldom allowing or conſidering any number of ſimple ideas to make one complex one, but ſuch collections as there be names for. Thus, though the killing of an old man be as fit in nature to be united into one complex idea, as the killing a man's father; yet there being no name ſtanding preciſely for the one, as there is the name of parricide to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex

plex idea, nor a diſtinct ſpecies of actions from that of killing a young man, or any other man.

The cauſe of making mixed modes.

§. 5. If we ſhould inquire a little farther, to ſee what it is that occaſions men to make ſeveral combinations of ſimple ideas into diſtinct, and, as it were, ſettled modes, and neglect others which, in the nature of things themſelves, have as much an aptneſs to be combined and make diſtinct ideas, we ſhall find the reaſon of it to be the end of language; which being to mark, or communicate men's thoughts to one another with all the diſpatch that may be, they uſually make ſuch collections of ideas into complex modes, and affix names to them, as they have frequent uſe of in their way of living and converſation, leaving others, which they have but ſeldom an occaſion to mention, looſe and without names to tie them together; they rather chooſing to enumerate (when they have need) ſuch ideas as make them up, by the particular names that ſtand for them, than to trouble their memories by multiplying of complex ideas with names to them, which they ſeldom or never have any occaſion to make uſe of.

Why words in our language have none anſwering in another.

§. 6. This ſhows us how it comes to paſs, that there are in every language many particular words, which cannot be rendered by any one ſingle word of another. For the ſeveral faſhions, cuſtoms, and manners of one nation, making ſeveral combinations of ideas familiar and neceſſary in one, which another people have had never any occaſion to make, or perhaps ſo much as taken notice of; names come of courſe to be annexed to them, to avoid long periphraſes in things of daily converſation, and ſo they become ſo many diſtinct complex ideas in their minds. Thus ὑβρις amongſt the Greeks, and proſcriptio amongſt the Romans, were words which other languages had no names that exactly anſwered, becauſe they ſtood for complex ideas, which were not in the minds of the men of other nations. Where there was no ſuch cuſtom, there was no notion of any ſuch actions; no uſe of ſuch combinations of ideas as were united, and as it were

tied together by thoſe terms; and therefore in other countries there were no names for them.

And languages change.

§. 7. Hence alſo we may ſee the reaſon why languages conſtantly change, take up new, and lay by old terms; becauſe change of cuſtoms and opinions bringing with it new combinations of ideas, which it is neceſſary frequently to think on, and talk about, new names, to avoid long deſcriptions, are annexed to them, and ſo they become new ſpecies of complex modes. What a number of different ideas are by this means wrapt up in one ſhort ſound, and how much of our time and breath is thereby ſaved, any one will ſee, who will but take the pains to enumerate all the ideas that either reprieve or appeal ſtand for; and, inſtead of either of thoſe names, uſe a periphraſis, to make any one underſtand their meaning.

Mixed modes, where they exiſt.

§. 8. Though I ſhall have occaſion to conſider this more at large, when I come to treat of words and their uſe; yet I could not avoid to take thus much notice here of the names of mixed modes; which being fleeting and tranſient combinations of ſimple ideas, which have but a ſhort exiſtence any where but in the minds of men, and there too have no longer any exiſtence, than whilſt they are thought on, have not ſo much any where the appearance of a conſtant and laſting exiſtence, as in their names: which are therefore, in this ſort of ideas, very apt to be taken for the ideas themſelves. For if we ſhould inquire where the idea of a triumph or apotheoſis exiſts, it is evident they could neither of them exiſt altogether any where in the things themſelves, being actions that required time to their performance, and ſo could never all exiſt together: and as to the minds of men, where the ideas of theſe actions are ſuppoſed to be lodged, they have there too a very uncertain exiſtence; and therefore we are apt to annex them to the names that excite them in us.

How we get the ideas of mixed modes.

§. 9. There are therefore three ways whereby we get the complex ideas of mixed modes. 1. By experience and obſervation of things themſelves. Thus by ſeeing two men

men wreſtle or fence, we get the idea of wreſtling or fencing. 2. By invention, or voluntary putting together of ſeveral ſimple ideas in our own minds: ſo he that firſt invented printing, or etching, had an idea of it in his mind before it ever exiſted. 3. Which is the moſt uſual way, by explaining the names of actions we never ſaw, or notions we cannot ſee; and by enumerating, and thereby, as it were, ſetting before our imaginations all thoſe ideas which go to the making them up, and are the conſtituent parts of them. For having by ſenſation and reflection ſtored our minds with ſimple ideas, and by uſe got the names that ſtand for them, we can by thoſe means repreſent to another any complex idea we would have him conceive; ſo that it has in it no ſimple ideas, but what he knows, and has with us the ſame name for. For all our complex ideas are ultimately reſolvible into ſimple ideas, of which they are compounded and originally made up, though perhaps their immediate ingredients, as I may ſo ſay, are alſo complex ideas. Thus the mixed mode, which the word lye ſtands for, is made of theſe ſimple ideas: 1. Articulate ſounds. 2. Certain ideas in the mind of the ſpeaker. 3. Thoſe words the ſigns of thoſe ideas. 4. Thoſe ſigns put together by affirmation or negation, otherwiſe than the ideas they ſtand for are in the mind of the ſpeaker. I think I need not go any farther in the analyſis of that complex idea we call a lye; what I have ſaid is enough to ſhow, that it is made up of ſimple ideas: and it could not be but an offenſive tediouſneſs to my reader, to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular ſimple idea, that goes to this complex one; which, from what has been ſaid, he cannot but be able to make out to himſelf. The ſame may be done in all our complex ideas whatſoever; which, however compounded and decompounded, may at laſt be reſolved into ſimple ideas, which are all the materials of knowledge or thought we have, or can have. Nor ſhall we have reaſon to fear that the mind is hereby ſtinted to too ſcanty a number of ideas, if we conſider what an inexhauſtible ſtock of ſimple modes, number and figure alone afford

us. How far then mixed modes which admit of the various combinations of different ſimple ideas, and their infinite modes, are from being few and ſcanty, we may eaſily imagine. So that before we have done, we ſhall ſee that no-body need be afraid he ſhall not have ſcope and compaſs enough for his thoughts to range in, though they be, as I pretend, confined only to ſimple ideas received from ſenſation or reflection, and their ſeveral combinations.

Motion, thinking, and power have been moſt modified.

§. 10. It is worth our obſerving, which of all our ſimple ideas have been moſt modified, and had moſt mixed ideas made out of them, with names given to them; and thoſe have been theſe three; thinking and motion (which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action) and power, from whence theſe actions are conceived to flow. The ſimple ideas, I ſay, of thinking, motion, and power, have been thoſe which have been moſt modified, and out of whoſe modifications have been made moſt complex modes, with names to them. For action being the great buſineſs of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are converſant, it is no wonder that the ſeveral modes of thinking and motion ſhould be taken notice of, the ideas of them obſerved, and laid up in the memory, and have names aſſigned to them; without which, laws could be but ill made, or vice and diſorder repreſſed. Nor could any communication be well had amongſt men, without ſuch complex ideas, with names to them: and therefore men have ſettled names, and ſuppoſed ſettled ideas in their minds of modes of action diſtinguiſhed by their cauſes, means, objects, ends, inſtruments, time, place, and other circumſtances, and alſo of their powers fitted for thoſe actions: v. g. boldneſs is the power to ſpeak or do what we intend, before others, without fear or diſorder; and the Greeks call the confidence of ſpeaking by a peculiar name, παῤῥησία: which power or ability in man, of doing any thing, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the ſame thing, is that idea we name habit; when it is forward, and ready upon every occaſion

ſion to break into action, we call it diſpoſition. Thus teſtineſs is a diſpoſition or aptneſs to be angry.

To conclude: Let us examine any modes of action, v. g. conſideration and aſſent, which are actions of the mind; running and ſpeaking, which are actions of the body; revenge and murder, which are actions of both together: and we ſhall find them but ſo many collections of ſimple ideas, which together make up the complex ones ſignified by thoſe names.

Several words ſeeming to ſignify action, ſignify but the effect.

§. 11. Power being the ſource from whence all action proceeds, the ſubſtances wherein theſe powers are, when they exert this power into act, are called cauſes; and the ſubſtances which thereupon are produced, or the ſimple ideas which are introduced into any ſubject by the exerting of that power, are called effects. The efficacy whereby the new ſubſtance or idea is produced, is called, in the ſubject exerting that power, action; but in the ſubject wherein any ſimple idea is changed or produced, it is called paſſion: which efficacy however various, and the effects almoſt infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing elſe but modes of thinking and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing elſe but modifications of motion. I ſay, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but theſe two: for whatever ſort of action, beſides theſe, produces any effects, I confeſs myſelf to have no notion or idea of; and ſo it is quite remote from my thoughts, apprehenſions, and knowledge; and as much in the dark to me as five other ſenſes, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man: and therefore many words, which ſeem to expreſs ſome action, ſignify nothing of the action or modus operandi at all, but barely the effect, with ſome circumſtances of the ſubject wrought on, or cauſe operating; v. g. creation, annihilation, contain in them no idea of the action or manner whereby they are produced, but barely of the cauſe, and the thing done. And when a countryman ſays the cold freezes water, though the word freezing ſeems to import ſome action, yet truly it ſignifies nothing but the effect, viz. that water that was before

before fluid is become hard and conſiſtent, without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.

Mixed modes made alſo of other ideas.

§. 12. I think I ſhall not need to remark here, that though power and action make the greateſt part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men; yet other ſimple ideas, and their ſeveral combinations, are not excluded: much leſs, I think, will it be neceſſary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes, which have been ſettled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the greateſt part of the words made uſe of in divinity, ethicks, law, and politicks, and ſeveral other ſciences. All that is requiſite to my preſent deſign, is, to ſhow what ſort of ideas thoſe are which I call mixed modes, how the mind comes by them, and that they are compoſitions made up of ſimple ideas got from ſenſation and reflection: which, I ſuppoſe, I have done.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our complex Ideas of Subſtances.

Ideas of ſubſtances how made.

§. 1. THE mind being, as I have declared, furniſhed with a great number of the ſimple ideas, conveyed in by the ſenſes, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice alſo, that a certain number of theſe ſimple ideas go conſtantly together; which being preſumed to belong to one thing, and words being ſuited to common apprehenſions, and made uſe of for quick diſpatch, are called, ſo united in one ſubject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of, and conſider as one ſimple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together: becauſe, as I have ſaid, not imagining how theſe ſimple ideas can ſubſiſt by themſelves, we accuſtom ourſelves to ſuppoſe ſome ſub-

ſtratum wherein they do ſubſiſt, and from which they do reſult; which therefore we call ſubſtance (1).

§. 2. So that if any one will examine himſelf concerning his notion of pure ſubſtance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a ſuppoſition of he knows not what ſupport of ſuch qualities, which are capable of producing ſimple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one ſhould be aſked, what is the ſubject wherein colour or weight

Our idea of ſubſtance in general.

(1) This ſection, which was intended only to ſhow how the individuals of diſtinct ſpecies of ſubſtances came to be looked upon as ſimple ideas, and ſo to have ſimple names; viz. from the ſuppoſed ſubſtratum or ſubſtance, which was looked upon as the thing itſelf in which inhered, and from which reſulted that complication of ideas, by which it was repreſented to us, hath been miſtaken for an account of the idea of ſubſtance in general; and as ſuch, hath been repreſented in theſe words; But how comes the general idea of ſubſtance to be framed in our minds? Is this by abſtracting and enlarging ſimple ideas? No: 'But it is by a 'complication of many ſimple ideas together: becauſe, not imagining 'how theſe ſimple ideas can ſubſiſt by themſelves, we accuſtom ourſelves 'to ſuppoſe ſome ſubſtratum wherein they do ſubſiſt, and from whence 'they do reſult; which therefore we call ſubſtance.' And is this all, indeed, that is to be ſaid for the being of ſubſtance, That we accuſtom ourſelves to ſuppoſe a ſubſtratum? Is that cuſtom grounded upon true reaſon, or not? If not, then accidents or modes muſt ſubſiſt of themſelves; and theſe ſimple ideas need no tortoiſe to ſupport them: for figures and colours, &c. would do well enough of themſelves, but for ſome fancies men have accuſtomed themſelves to.

To which objection of the biſhop of Worceſter, our author * anſwers thus: Herein your lordſhip ſeems to charge me with two faults: one, That I make the general idea of ſubſtance to be framed, not by abſtracting and enlarging ſimple ideas, but by a complication of many ſimple ideas together: the other, as if I had ſaid, the being of ſubſtance had no other foundation but the fancies of men.

As to the firſt of theſe, I beg leave to remind your lordſhip, that I ſay in more places than one, and particularly Book 3. Chap. 3. §. 6. and Book 1. Chap. 11. §. 9. where, ex profeſſo, I treat of abſtraction and general ideas, that they are all made by abſtracting, and therefore could not be underſtood to mean, that that of ſubſtance was made any other way; however my pen might have ſlipt, or the negligence of expreſſion, where I might have ſomething elſe than the general idea of ſubſtance in view, might make me ſeem to ſay ſo.

That I was not ſpeaking of the general idea of ſubſtance in the paſſage your lordſhip quotes, is manifeſt from the title of that chapter, which

* In his firſt letter to the biſhop of Worceſter.

is

weight inheres, he would have nothing to ſay, but the ſolid extended parts: and if he were demanded, what is it that ſolidity and extenſion adhere in, he would not be in a much better caſe than the Indian before-mentioned, who, ſaying that the world was ſupported by a great elephant, was aſked what the elephant reſted on; to which his anſwer was, a great tortoiſe. But being again preſſed to know what gave ſupport to the broad-backed tortoiſe, replied, ſomething, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other caſes where we

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is, Of the complex ideas of ſubſtances: and the firſt ſection of it, which your lordſhip cites for thoſe words you have ſet down.

In which words I do not obſerve any that deny the general idea of ſubſtance to be made by abſtracting, nor any that ſay it is made by a complication of many ſimple ideas together. But ſpeaking in that place of the ideas of diſtinct ſubſtances, ſuch as man, horſe, gold, &c. I ſay they are made up of certain combinations of ſimple ideas, which combinations are looked upon, each of them, as one ſimple idea, though they are many; and we call it by one name of ſubſtance, though made up of modes, from the cuſtom of ſuppoſing a ſubſtratum, wherein that combination does ſubſiſt. So that in this paragraph I only give an account of the idea of diſtinct ſubſtances, ſuch as oak, elephant, iron, &c. how, though they are made up of diſtinct complications of modes, yet they are looked on as one idea, called by one name, as making diſtinct ſorts of ſubſtance.

But that my notion of ſubſtance in general, is quite different from theſe, and has no ſuch combination of ſimple ideas in it, is evident from the immediate following words, where I ſay, * 'The idea of pure ſubſtance 'in general, is only a ſuppoſion of we know not what ſupport of ſuch 'qualities as are capable of producing ſimple ideas in us.' And theſe two I plainly diſtinguiſh all along, particularly where I ſay, 'whatever 'therefore be the ſecret and abſtract nature of ſubſtance in general, all 'the ideas we have of particular diſtinct ſubſtances, are nothing but 'ſeveral combinations of ſimple ideas, co-exiſting in ſuch, though un-'known cauſe of their union, as makes the whole ſubſiſt of itſelf.'

The other thing laid to my charge, is, as if I took the being of ſubſtance to be doubtful, or rendered it ſo by the imperfect and ill-grounded idea I have given of it. To which I beg leave to ſay, that I ground not the being, but the idea of ſubſtance, on our accuſtoming ourſelves to ſuppoſe ſome ſubſtratum; for it is of the idea alone I ſpeak there, and not of the being of ſubſtance. And having every where affirmed and built upon it, that a man is a ſubſtance, I cannot be ſuppoſed to queſtion or doubt of the being of ſubſtance, till I can queſtion or doubt of my own being. Farther, I ſay, † 'Senſation convinces us, that there are

* B. 2. C. 23. §. 2. † Ib. §. 29.

'ſolid,

we uſe words without having clear and diſtinct ideas, we talk like children; who being queſtioned what ſuch a thing is, which they know not, readily give this ſatisfactory anſwer, that it is ſomething: which in truth ſignifies no more, when ſo uſed either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no diſtinct idea of at all, and ſo are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have, to which we give the general name ſubſtance, being nothing but the ſuppoſed, but unknown ſupport of thoſe qualities we find exiſting, which we imagine cannot ſubſiſt, "ſine re ſubſtante," without ſomething to ſupport

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'ſolid, extended ſubſtances; and reflection, that there are thinking 'ones.' So that, I think, the being of ſubſtance is not ſhaken by what I have ſaid: and if the idea of it ſhould be, yet (the being of things depending not on our ideas) the being of ſubſtance would not be at all ſhaken by my ſaying, we had but an obſcure imperfect idea of it, and that that idea came from our accuſtoming ourſelves to ſuppoſe ſome ſubſtratum; or indeed, if I ſhould ſay, we had no idea of ſubſtance at all. For a great many things may be, and are granted to have a being, and be in nature, of which we have no ideas. For example: it cannot be doubted but there are diſtinct ſpecies of ſeparate ſpirits, of which yet we have no diſtinct ideas at all: it cannot be queſtioned but ſpirits have ways of communicating their thoughts, and yet we have no idea of it at all.

The being then of ſubſtance being ſafe and ſecure, notwithſtanding any thing I have ſaid, let us ſee whether the idea of it be not ſo too. Your lordſhip aſks, with concern, And is this all, indeed, that is to be ſaid for the being (if your lordſhip pleaſe, let it be the idea) of ſubſtance, that we accuſtom ourſelves to ſuppoſe a ſubſtratum? Is that cuſtom grounded upon true reaſon or no? I have ſaid that it is grounded upon this, * 'That we cannot conceive how ſimple ideas of ſenſible qualities 'ſhould ſubſiſt alone; and therefore we ſuppoſe them to exiſt in, and to 'be ſupported by ſome common ſubject; which ſupport we denote by the 'name ſubſtance.' Which, I think, is a true reaſon, becauſe it is the ſame your lordſhip grounds the ſuppoſition of a ſubſtratum on, in this very page; even on the repugnancy to our conceptions, that modes and accidents ſhould ſubſiſt by themſelves. So that I have the good luck to agree here with your lordſhip: and conſequently conclude, I have your approbation in this, that the ſubſtratum to modes or accidents, which is our idea of ſubſtance in general, is founded in this, 'that we cannot 'conceive how modes or accidents can ſubſiſt by themſelves.'

* B. 2. C. 23. §. 4.

them,

them, we call that ſupport ſubſtantia; which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain Engliſh, ſtanding under or upholding (1).

Of the ſorts of ſubſtance.

§. 3. An obſcure and relative idea of ſubſtance in general being thus made, we come to have the ideas of particular ſorts of ſubſtances, by collecting ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas, as are by experience and obſervation of men's ſenſes taken notice of to exiſt together, and are therefore ſuppoſed to flow from the particular internal conſtitution, or

(1) From this paragraph, there hath been raiſed an objection by the biſhop of Worceſter, as if our author's doctrine here concerning ideas, had almoſt diſcarded ſubſtance out of the world: his words in this paragraph, being brought to prove, that he is one of the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning, that have almoſt diſcarded ſubſtance out of the reaſonable part of the world. To which our author replies: * 'This, my lord, is an accuſation, which your lordſhip will pardon me, if I do not readily know what to plead to, becauſe I do not underſtand what it is almoſt to diſcard ſubſtance out of the reaſonable part of the world. If your lordſhip means by it, that I deny, or doubt, that there is in the world any ſuch thing as ſubſtance, that your lordſhip will acquit me of, when your lordſhip looks again into this 23d chapter of the ſecond book, which you have cited more than once; where you will find theſe words, §. 4. 'When we talk or think of any particular ſort of corporeal ſubſtances, as horſe, ſtone, &c. though the idea we have of either of them, be but the complication or collection of thoſe ſeveral ſimple ideas of ſenſible qualities, which we uſe to find united in the thing called horſe or ſtone; yet, becauſe we cannot conceive how they ſhould ſubſiſt alone, nor one in another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting in, and ſupported by ſome common ſubject, which ſupport we denote by the name ſubſtance; though it is certain, we have no clear or diſtinct idea of that thing we ſuppoſe a ſupport.' And again, §. 5. 'The ſame happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reaſoning, fearing, &c. which we conſidering not to ſubſiſt of themſelves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think theſe the actions of ſome other ſubſtance, which we call ſpirit; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea or notion of matter, but ſomething wherein thoſe many ſenſible qualities, which affect our ſenſes, do ſubſiſt, by ſuppoſing a ſubſtance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do ſubſiſt, we have as clear a notion of the nature or ſubſtance of ſpirit, as we have of body; the one being ſuppoſed to be (without knowing what it is) the ſubſtratum to thoſe ſimple ideas we have from

* In his firſt letter to that biſhop.

'with-

or unknown eſſence of that ſubſtance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horſe, gold, water, &c. of which ſubſtances, whether any one has any other clear idea, farther than of certain ſimple ideas co-exiſtent together, I appeal to every one's own experience. It is the ordinary qualities obſervable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of thoſe ſubſtances, which a ſmith or a jeweller commonly knows better than a philoſopher; who, whatever ſub-

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'without: and the other ſuppoſed (with a like ignorance of what it is) 'to be the ſubſtratum to thoſe operations, which we experiment in our-'ſelves within.' And again, §. 6. 'Whatever therefore be the ſecret 'nature of ſubſtance in general, all the ideas we have of particular diſ-'tinct ſubſtances, are nothing but ſeveral combinations of ſimple ideas, 'co-exiſting in ſuch, though unknown cauſe of their union, as makes 'the whole ſubſiſt of itſelf.' And I farther ſay in the ſame ſection, 'that 'we ſuppoſe theſe combinations to reſt in, and to be adherent to that 'unknown common ſubject, which inheres not in any thing elſe.' And §. 3. 'That our complex ideas of ſubſtances, beſides all thoſe ſimple 'ideas they are made up of, have always the confuſed idea of ſomething 'to which they belong, and in which they ſubſiſt; and therefore, when 'we ſpeak of any ſort of ſubſtance, we ſay it is a thing having ſuch and 'ſuch qualities; as body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable 'of motion; ſpirit, a thing capable of thinking.

'Theſe, and the like faſhions of ſpeaking, intimate, that the ſub-'ſtance is ſuppoſed always ſomething beſides the extenſion, figure, ſoli-'dity, motion, thinking, or other obſervable idea, though we know not 'what it is.'

'Our idea of body, I ſay, * is an extended, ſolid ſubſtance; and our 'idea of ſoul, is of a ſubſtance that thinks.' So that as long as there is any ſuch thing as body or ſpirit in the world, I have done nothing towards the diſcarding ſubſtance out of the reaſonable part of the world. Nay, as long as there is any ſimple idea or ſenſible quality left, according to my way of arguing, ſubſtance cannot be diſcarded; becauſe all ſimple ideas, all ſenſible qualities, carry with them a ſuppoſition of a ſubſtratum to exiſt in, and of a ſubſtance wherein they inhere: and of this that whole chapter is ſo full, that I challenge any one who reads it, to think I have almoſt, or one jot, diſcarded ſubſtance out of the reaſonable part of the world. And of this, man, horſe, ſun, water, iron, diamond, &c. which I have mentioned of diſtinct ſorts of ſubſtances, will be my witneſſes, as long as any ſuch things remain in being; of which I ſay, † 'That the ideas of ſubſtances are ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas as 'are taken to repreſent diſtinct particular things ſubſiſting by themſelves,

* B. 2. C. 23. §. 22. † B. 2. C. 12. §. 6.

'in

ſubſtantial forms he may talk of, has no other idea of thoſe ſubſtances, than what is framed by a collection of thoſe ſimple ideas which are to be found in them; only we muſt take notice, that our complex ideas of ſubſtances, beſides all thoſe ſimple ideas they are made up of, have always the confuſed idea of ſomething to which they belong, and in which they ſubſiſt. And therefore when we ſpeak of any ſort of ſubſtance, we ſay it is a thing having ſuch or ſuch qualities; as body

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• is which the ſuppoſed or confuſed idea of ſubſtance is always the firſt and • chief.'

If, by almoſt diſcarding ſubſtance out of the reaſonable part of the world, your lordſhip means, that I have deſtroyed, and almoſt diſcarded the true idea we have of it, by calling it a ſubſtratum, * a ſuppoſition of we know not what ſupport of ſuch qualities as are capable of producing ſimple ideas in us, an obſcure and relative idea: † That without knowing what it is, it is that which ſupports accidents; ſo that of ſubſtance we have no idea of what it is, but only a confuſed, obſcure one of what it does: I muſt confeſs, this and the like I have ſaid of our idea of ſubſtance: and ſhould be very glad to be convinced by your lordſhip, or any body elſe, that I have ſpoken too meanly of it. He that would ſhow me a more clear and diſtinct idea of ſubſtance, would do me a kindneſs I ſhould thank him for. But this is the beſt I can hitherto find, either in my own thoughts, or in the books of logicians: for the account or idea of it is, that it is ens, or res per ſe ſubſiſtens, & ſubſtat accidentibus; which in effect is no more, but that ſubſtance is a being or thing; or, in ſhort, ſomething, they know not what, or of which they have no clearer idea, than that it is ſomething which ſupports accidents, or other ſimple ideas or modes, and is not ſupported itſelf, as a mode, or an accident. So that I do not ſee but Burgerſdicius, Sanderſon, and the whole tribe of logicians, muſt be reckoned with the gentlemen of this new way of reaſoning, who have almoſt diſcarded ſubſtance out of the reaſonable part of the world.

But ſuppoſing, my lord, that I, or theſe gentlemen, logicians of note in the ſchool, ſhould own that we have a very imperfect, obſcure, inadequate idea of ſubſtance, would it not be a little too hard to charge us with diſcarding ſubſtance out of the world? For what almoſt diſcarding of, and reaſonable part of the world, ſignifies, I muſt confeſs I do not clearly comprehend: but let almoſt and reaſonable part ſignify here what they will, for I dare ſay your lordſhip meant ſomething by them; would not your lordſhip think you were a little hardly dealt with, if, for acknowledging yourſelf to have a very imperfect and inadequate idea of God, or of ſeveral other things which in this very treatiſe you confeſs our under-

* B. 2. C. 23. §. 1. §. 2. §. 3. † B. 2. C. 13. §. 19.

ſtandings

body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; ſpirit, a thing capable of thinking; and ſo hardneſs, friability, and power to draw iron, we ſay, are qualities to be found in a loadſtone. Theſe, and the like faſhions of ſpeaking, intimate, that the ſubſtance is ſuppoſed always ſomething beſides the extenſion, figure, ſolidity, motion, thinking, or other obſervable ideas, though we know not what it is.

§. 4. Hence, when we talk or think of any particular ſort of corporeal ſubſtances, as horſe, ſtone, &c. though the idea we have

No clear idea of ſubſtance in general.

ſtandings come ſhort in, and cannot comprehend, you ſhould be accuſed to be one of theſe gentlemen that have almoſt diſcarded God, or thoſe other myſterious things, whereof you contend we have very imperfect and inadequate ideas, out of the reaſonable world? For I ſuppoſe your lordſhip means by almoſt diſcarding out of the reaſonable world, ſomething that is blameable, for it ſeems not to be inſerted for a commendation; and yet I think he deſerves no blame, who owns the having imperfect, inadequate, obſcure ideas, where he has no better; however, if it be inferred from thence, that either he almoſt excludes thoſe things out of being, or out of rational diſcourſe, if that be meant by the reaſonable world; for the firſt of theſe will not hold, becauſe the being of things in the world depends not on our ideas: the latter indeed is true in ſome degree, but it is no fault: for it is certain, that where we have imperfect, inadequate, confuſed, obſcure ideas, we cannot diſcourſe and reaſon about thoſe things ſo well, fully, and clearly, as if we had perfect, adequate, clear, and diſtinct ideas.

Other objections are made againſt the following parts of this paragraph by that reverend prelate, viz. The repetition of the ſtory of the Indian philoſopher, and the talking like children about ſubſtance: to which our author replies:

Your lordſhip, I muſt own, with great reaſon, takes notice, that I paralleled more than once our idea of ſubſtance with the Indian philoſopher's he-knew-not-what, which ſupported the tortoiſe, &c.

This repetition is, I confeſs, a fault in exact writing: but I have acknowledged and excuſed it in theſe words in my preface: 'I am 'not ignorant how little I herein conſult my own reputation, when I 'knowingly let my eſſay go with a fault ſo apt to diſguſt the moſt judi'cious, who are always the niceſt readers.' And there farther add, 'That I did not publiſh my eſſay for ſuch great maſters of knowledge as 'your lordſhip; but fitted it to men of my own ſize, to whom repetitions 'might be ſometimes uſeful.' It would not therefore have been beſide your lordſhip's generoſity (who were not intended to be provoked by this repetition) to have paſſed by ſuch a fault as this, in one who pretends not beyond the lower rank of writers. But I ſee your lordſhip would have

have of either of them be but the complication or collection of thoſe ſeveral ſimple ideas of ſenſible qualities, which we uſed to find united in the thing called horſe or ſtone; yet becauſe we cannot conceive how they ſhould ſubſiſt alone, nor one in another, we ſuppoſe them exiſting in and ſupported by ſome common ſubject; which ſupport we denote by the name ſubſtance, though it be certain we have no clear or diſtinct idea of that thing we ſuppoſe a ſupport.

As clear an idea of ſpirit as body.

§. 5. The ſame thing happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reaſoning, fearing, &c. which we concluding

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me exact, and without any faults; and I wiſh I could be ſo, the better to deſerve your lordſhip's approbation.

My ſaying, 'That when we talk of ſubſtance, we talk like children; 'who being aſked a queſtion about ſomething which they know not, 'readily give this ſatisfactory anſwer, That it is ſomething;' your lordſhip ſeems mightily to lay to heart in theſe words that follow; If this be the truth of the caſe, we muſt ſtill talk like children, and I know not how it can be remedied. For if we cannot come at a rational idea of ſubſtance, we can have no principle of certainty to go upon in this debate.

If your lordſhip has any better and diſtincter idea of ſubſtance than mine is, which I have given an account of, your lordſhip is not at all concerned in what I have there ſaid. But thoſe whoſe idea of ſubſtance, whether a rational or not rational idea, is like mine, ſomething, they know not what, muſt in that, with me, talk like children, when they ſpeak of ſomething, they know not what. For a philoſopher that ſays, That which ſupports accidents, is ſomething, he knows not what; and a countryman that ſays, the foundation of the great church at Harlem, is ſupported by ſomething, he knows not what; and a child that ſtands in the dark upon his mother's muff, and ſays he ſtands upon ſomething, he knows not what, in this reſpect talk all three alike. But if the countryman knows, that the foundation of the church of Harlem is ſupported by a rock, as the houſes about Briſtol are; or by gravel, as the houſes about London are; or by wooden piles, as the houſes in Amſterdam are; it is plain, that then having a clear and diſtinct idea of the thing that ſupports the church, he does not talk of this matter as a child; nor will he of the ſupport of accidents, when he has a clearer and more diſtinct idea of it, than that it is barely ſomething. But as long as we think like children, in caſes where our ideas are no clearer nor diſtincter than theirs, I agree with your lordſhip, that I know not how it can be remedied, but that we muſt talk like them.

Farther, the biſhop aſks, Whether there be no difference between the bare being of a thing, and its ſubſiſtence by itſelf? To which our author

cluding not to ſubſiſt of themſelves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think theſe the actions of ſome other ſubſtance, which we call ſpirit; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea or notion of matter, but ſomething wherein thoſe many ſenſible qualities which affect our ſenſes do ſubſiſt; by ſuppoſing a ſubſtance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do ſubſiſt, we have as clear a notion of the ſubſtance of ſpirit, as we have of body: the one being ſuppoſed to be (without knowing what it is) the ſubſtratum to thoſe ſimple ideas we have from without;

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thor anſwers, Yes.* But what will that do to prove, that upon my principles, we can come to no certainty of reaſon, that there is any ſuch thing as ſubſtance? You ſeem by this queſtion to conclude, That the idea of a thing that ſubſiſts by itſelf, is a clear and diſtinct idea of ſubſtance; but I beg leave to aſk, Is the idea of the manner of ſubſiſtence of a thing, the idea of the thing itſelf? If it be not, we may have a clear and diſtinct idea of the manner, and yet have none but a very obſcure and confuſed one of the thing. For example; I tell your lordſhip, that I know a thing that cannot ſubſiſt without a ſupport, and I know another thing that does ſubſiſt without a ſupport, and ſay no more of them: can you, by having the clear and diſtinct ideas of having a ſupport, and not having a ſupport, ſay, that you have a clear and diſtinct idea of the thing that I know which has, and of the thing that I know which has not a ſupport? If your lordſhip can, I beſeech you to give me the clear and diſtinct ideas of theſe, which I only call by the general name, things, that have or have not ſupports: for ſuch there are, and ſuch I ſhall give your lordſhip clear and diſtinct ideas of, when you ſhall pleaſe to call upon me for them; though I think your lordſhip will ſcarce find them by the general and confuſed idea of things, nor in the clearer and more diſtinct idea of having or not having a ſupport,

To ſhow a blind man, that he has no clear and diſtinct idea of ſcarlet, I tell him, that his notion of it, that it is a thing or being, does not prove he has any clear or diſtinct idea of it; but barely that he takes it to be ſomething, he knows not what. He replies, That he knows more than that, v. g. he knows that it ſubſiſts, or inheres in another thing: and is there no difference, ſays he, in your lordſhip's words, between the bare being of a thing, and its ſubſiſtence in another? Yes, ſay I to him, a great deal, they are very different ideas. But for all that, you have no clear and diſtinct idea of ſcarlet, nor ſuch a one as I have, who ſee and know it, and have another kind of idea of it, beſides that of inherence.

* Mr. Locke's 3d letter.

without; and the other ſuppoſed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the ſubſtratum to thoſe operations we experiment in ourſelves within. It is plain then, that the idea of corporeal ſubſtance in matter is as remote from our conceptions and apprehenſions, as that of ſpiritual ſubſtance or ſpirit: and therefore from our not having any notion of the ſubſtance of ſpirit, we can no more conclude its non-exiſtence, than we can for the ſame reaſon deny the exiſtence of body; it being as rational to affirm there is no body, becauſe we have no clear and diſtinct idea of the ſubſtance of matter, as to ſay there is no ſpirit, becauſe we have no clear and diſtinct idea of the ſubſtance of a ſpirit.

Of the ſorts of ſubſtances.

§. 6. Whatever therefore be the ſecret, abſtract nature of ſubſtance in general, all the ideas we have of particular diſtinct ſorts of ſubſtances, are nothing but ſeveral combinations of ſimple ideas, co-exiſting in ſuch, though unknown, cauſe of their union, as make the whole ſubſiſt of itſelf. It is by ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas, and nothing elſe, that we repreſent particular ſorts of ſubſtances to ourſelves; ſuch are the ideas we have of their ſeveral ſpecies in our minds; and ſuch only do we, by their ſpecifick names, ſignify to others, v. g. man, horſe, ſun, water, iron: upon hearing which words, every one who underſtands the language, frames in his mind a combination of thoſe ſeveral ſimple ideas, which he has uſually obſerved, or fancied to exiſt to-

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Your lordſhip has the idea of ſubſiſting by itſelf, and therefore you conclude, you have a clear and diſtinct idea of the thing that ſubſiſts by itſelf: which, methinks, is all one, as if your countryman ſhould ſay, he hath an idea of a cedar of Lebanon, that it is a tree of a nature to need no prop to lean on for its ſupport; therefore he hath a clear and diſtinct idea of a cedar of Lebanon: which clear and diſtinct idea, when he comes to examine, is nothing but a general one of a tree, with which his indetermined idea of a cedar is confounded. Juſt ſo is the idea of ſubſtance; which, however called clear and diſtinct, is confounded with the general indetermined idea of ſomething. But ſuppoſe that the manner of ſubſiſting by itſelf gives us a clear and diſtinct idea of ſubſtance, how does that prove, That upon my principles we can come to no certainty of reaſon, that there is any ſuch thing as ſubſtance in the world? Which is the propoſition to be proved.

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gether under that denomination; all which he ſuppoſes to reſt in, and be as it were adherent to that unknown common ſubject, which inheres not in any thing elſe. Though in the mean time it be manifeſt, and every one upon inquiry into his own thoughts will find, that he has no other idea of any ſubſtance, v. g. let it be gold, horſe, iron, man, vitriol, bread, but what he has barely of thoſe ſenſible qualities, which he ſuppoſes to inhere, with a ſuppoſition of ſuch a ſubſtratum, as gives, as it were, a ſupport to thoſe qualities or ſimple ideas, which he has obſerved to exiſt united together. Thus the idea of the ſun, what is it but an aggregate of thoſe ſeveral ſimple ideas, bright, hot, roundiſh, having a conſtant regular motion, at a certain diſtance from us, and perhaps ſome other? As he who thinks and diſcourſes of the ſun, has been more or leſs accurate in obſerving thoſe ſenſible qualities, ideas, or properties, which are in that thing which he calls the ſun.

Power a great part of our complex ideas of ſubſtances.

§. 7. For he has the perfecteſt idea of any of the particular ſorts of ſubſtances, who has gathered and put together moſt of thoſe ſimple ideas which do exiſt in it, among which are to be reckoned its active powers, and paſſive capacities; which though not ſimple ideas, yet in this reſpect, for brevity ſake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongſt them. Thus the power of drawing iron, is one of the ideas of the complex one of that ſubſtance we call a load-ſtone; and a power to be ſo drawn is a part of the complex one we call iron: which powers paſs for inherent qualities in thoſe ſubjects. Becauſe every ſubſtance, being as apt, by the powers we obſerve in it, to change ſome ſenſible qualities in other ſubjects, as it is to produce in us thoſe ſimple ideas which we receive immediately from it, does, by thoſe new ſenſible qualities introduced into other ſubjects, diſcover to us thoſe powers, which do thereby mediately affect our ſenſes, as regularly as its ſenſible qualities do it immediately: v. g. we immediately by our ſenſes perceive in fire its heat and colour; which are, if rightly conſidered, no-

thing but powers in it to produce thoſe ideas in us: we alſo by our ſenſes perceive the colour and brittleneſs of charcoal, whereby we come by the knowledge of another power in fire, which it has to change the colour and conſiſtency of wood. By the former, fire immediately, by the latter it mediately diſcovers to us theſe ſeveral qualities, which therefore we look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire, and ſo make them a part of the complex idea of it. For all thoſe powers that we take cognizance of, terminating only in the alteration of ſome ſenſible qualities in thoſe ſubjects on which they operate, and ſo making them exhibit to us new ſenſible ideas; therefore it is that I have reckoned theſe powers amongſt the ſimple ideas, which make the complex ones of the ſorts of ſubſtances; though theſe powers, conſidered in themſelves, are truly complex ideas. And in this looſer ſenſe I crave leave to be underſtood, when I name any of theſe potentialities among the ſimple ideas, which we recollect in our minds, when we think of particular ſubſtances. For the powers that are ſeverally in them are neceſſary to be conſidered, if we will have true diſtinct notions of the ſeveral ſorts of ſubſtances.

And why.

§. 8. Nor are we to wonder, that powers make a great part of our complex ideas of ſubſtances; ſince their ſecondary qualities are thoſe, which in moſt of them ſerve principally to diſtinguiſh ſubſtances one from another, and commonly make a conſiderable part of the complex idea of the ſeveral ſorts of them. For our ſenſes failing us in the diſcovery of the bulk, texture, and figure of the minute parts of bodies, on which their real conſtitutions and differences depend, we are fain to make uſe of their ſecondary qualities, as the characteriſtical notes and marks, whereby to frame ideas of them in our minds, and diſtinguiſh them one from another. All which ſecondary qualities, as has been ſhown, are nothing but bare powers. For the colour and taſte of opium are, as well as its ſoporifick or anodyne virtues, mere powers depending on its primary qualities, whereby it is fitted

fitted to produce different operations on different parts of our bodies.

Three ſorts of ideas make our complex ones of ſubſtances.

§. 9. The ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal ſubſtances, are of theſe three ſorts. Firſt, the ideas of the primary qualities of things which are diſcovered by our ſenſes, and are in them even when we perceive them not; ſuch are the bulk, figure, number, ſituation, and motion of the parts of bodies, which are really in them, whether we take notice of them or no. Secondly, the ſenſible ſecondary qualities, which depending on theſe, are nothing but the powers thoſe ſubſtances have to produce ſeveral ideas in us by our ſenſes; which ideas are not in the things themſelves, otherwiſe than as any thing is in its cauſe. Thirdly, the aptneſs we conſider in any ſubſtance to give or receive ſuch alterations of primary qualities, as that the ſubſtance ſo altered ſhould produce in us different ideas from what it did before; theſe are called active and paſſive powers: all which powers, as far as we have any notice or notion of them, terminate only in ſenſible ſimple ideas. For whatever alteration a loadſtone has the power to make, in the minute particles of iron, we ſhould have no notion of any power it had at all to operate on iron, did not its ſenſible motion diſcover it; and I doubt not, but there are a thouſand changes, that bodies we daily handle have a power to cauſe in one another, which we never ſuſpect, becauſe they never appear in ſenſible effects.

Powers make a great part of our complex ideas of ſubſtances.

§. 10. Powers therefore juſtly make a great part of our complex ideas of ſubſtances. He that will examine his complex idea of gold, will find ſeveral of its ideas that make it up to be only powers: as the power of being melted, but of not ſpending itſelf in the fire; of being diſſolved in aqua regia; are ideas as neceſſary to make up our complex idea of gold, as its colour and weight: which, if duly conſidered, are alſo nothing but different powers. For to ſpeak truly, yellowneſs is not actually in gold; but is a power in gold to produce that idea in us by our eyes, when placed in

a due light: and the heat, which we cannot leave out of our ideas of the ſun, is no more really in the ſun, than the white colour it introduces into wax. Theſe are both equally powers in the ſun, operating, by the motion and figure of its ſenſible parts, ſo on a man, as to make him have the idea of heat; and ſo on wax, as to make it capable to produce in a man the idea of white.

The new ſecondary qualities of bodies would diſappear, if we could diſcover the primary ones of their minute parts.

§. 11. Had we ſenſes acute enough to diſcern the minute particles of bodies, and the real conſtitution on which their ſenſible qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different ideas in us; and that which is now the yellow colour of gold, would then diſappear, and inſtead of it we ſhould ſee an admirable texture of parts of a certain ſize and figure. This microſcopes plainly diſcover to us; for what to our naked eyes produces a certain colour, is, by thus augmenting the acuteneſs of our ſenſes, diſcovered to be quite a different thing; and the thus altering, as it were, the proportion of the bulk of the minute parts of a coloured object to our uſual ſight, produces different ideas from what it did before. Thus ſand or pounded glaſs, which is opake, and white to the naked eye, is pelluicd in a microſcope; and a hair ſeen this way, loſes its former colour, and is in a great meaſure pellucid, with a mixture of ſome bright ſparkling colours, ſuch as appear from the refraction of diamonds, and other pellucid bodies. Blood to the naked eye appears all red; but by a good microſcope, wherein its leſſer parts appear, ſhows only ſome few globules of red, ſwimming in a pellucid liquor: and how theſe red globules would appear, if glaſſes could be found that could yet magnify them a thouſand or ten thouſand times more, is uncertain.

Our faculties of diſcovery ſuited to our ſtate.

§. 12. The infinitely wiſe contriver of us, and all things about us, hath fitted our ſenſes, faculties, and organs, to the conveniencies of life, and the buſineſs we have to do here. We are able, by our ſenſes, to know and diſtinguiſh things; and to examine them ſo far, as to

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apply them to our uſes, and ſeveral ways to accommodate the exigencies of this life. We have inſight enough into their admirable contrivances and wonderful effects, to admire and magnify the wiſdom, power, and goodneſs of their author. Such a knowledge as this, which is ſuited to our preſent condition, we want not faculties to attain. But it appears not, that God intended we ſhould have a perfect, clear, and adequate knowledge of them: that perhaps is not in the comprehenſion of any finite being. We are furniſhed with faculties (dull and weak as they are) to diſcover enough in the creatures, to lead us to the knowledge of the Creator, and the knowledge of our duty; and we are fitted well enough with abilities to provide for the conveniencies of living: theſe are our buſineſs in this world. But were our ſenſes altered, and made much quicker and acuter, the appearance and outward ſcheme of things would have quite another face to us; and, I am apt to think, would be inconſiſtent with our being, or at leaſt well-being, in this part of the univerſe which we inhabit. He that conſiders how little our conſtitution is able to bear a remove into parts of this air, not much higher than that we commonly breathe in, will have reaſon to be ſatisfied, that in this globe of earth allotted for our manſion, the all-wiſe Architect has ſuited our organs, and the bodies that are to affect them, one to another. If our ſenſe of hearing were but one thouſand times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual noiſe diſtract us? And we ſhould in the quieteſt retirement be leſs able to ſleep or meditate, than in the middle of a ſea-fight. Nay, if that moſt inſtructive of our ſenſes, ſeeing, were in any man a thouſand or a hundred thouſand times more acute than it is by the beſt microſcope, things ſeveral millions of times leſs than the ſmalleſt object of his ſight now, would then be viſible to his naked eyes, and ſo he would come nearer to the diſcovery of the texture and motion of the minute parts of corporeal things; and in many of them, probably get ideas of their internal conſtitutions. But then he would be in a quite different world from other people: nothing would appear

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the ſame to him, and others; the viſible ideas of every thing would be different. So that I doubt, whether he and the reſt of men could diſcourſe concerning the objects of ſight, or have any communication about colours, their appearances being ſo wholly different. And perhaps ſuch a quickneſs and tenderneſs of ſight could not endure bright ſun-ſhine, or ſo much as open day-light; nor take in but a very ſmall part of any object at once, and that too only at a very near diſtance. And if by the help of ſuch microſcopical eyes (if I may ſo call them) a man could penetrate farther than ordinary into the ſecret compoſition and radical texture of bodies, he would not make any great advantage by the change, if ſuch an acute ſight would not ſerve to conduct him to the market and exchange; if he could not ſee things he was to avoid, at a convenient diſtance; nor diſtinguiſh things he had to do with, by thoſe ſenſible qualities others do. He that was ſharp-ſighted enough to ſee the configuration of the minute particles of the ſpring of a clock, and obſerve upon what peculiar ſtructure and impulſe its elaſtic motion depends, would no doubt diſcover ſomething very admirable: but if eyes ſo framed could not view at once the hand, and the characters of the hour-plate, and thereby at a diſtance ſee what o'clock it was, their owner could not be much benefitted by that acuteneſs; which, whilſt it diſcovered the ſecret contrivance of the parts of the machine, made him loſe its uſe.

Conjecture about ſpirits.

§. 13. And here give me leave to propoſe an extravagant conjecture of mine, viz. that ſince we have ſome reaſon (if there be any credit to be given to the report of things, that our philoſophy cannot account for) to imagine, that ſpirits can aſſume to themſelves bodies of different bulk, figure, and conformation of parts; whether one great advantage ſome of them have over us, may not lie in this, that they can ſo frame and ſhape to themſelves organs of ſenſation or perception, as to ſuit them to their preſent deſign, and the circumſtances of the object they would conſider. For how much would that man exceed all others in knowledge, who had but the faculty

faculty ſo to alter the ſtructure of his eyes, that one ſenſe, as to make it capable of all the ſeveral degrees of viſion, which the aſſiſtance of glaſſes (caſually at firſt lighted on) has taught us to conceive? What wonders would he diſcover, who could ſo fit his eyes to all ſorts of objects, as to ſee, when he pleaſed, the figure and motion of the minute particles in the blood, and other juices of animals, as diſtinctly as he does, at other times, the ſhape and motion of the animals themſelves? But to us, in our preſent ſtate, unalterable organs ſo contrived, as to diſcover the figure and motion of the minute parts of bodies, whereon depend thoſe ſenſible qualities we now obſerve in them, would perhaps be of no advantage. God has, no doubt, made them ſo, as is beſt for us in our preſent condition. He hath fitted us for the neighbourhood of the bodies that ſurround us, and we have to do with: and though we cannot, by the faculties we have, attain to a perfect knowledge of things, yet they will ſerve us well enough for thoſe ends above-mentioned, which are our great concernment. I beg my reader's pardon for laying before him ſo wild a fancy, concerning the ways of perception in beings above us; but how extravagant ſoever it be, I doubt whether we can imagine any thing about the knowledge of angels, but after this manner, ſome way or other in proportion to what we find and obſerve in ourſelves. And though we cannot but allow that the infinite power and wiſdom of God may frame creatures with a thouſand other faculties and ways of perceiving things without them, than what we have: yet our thoughts can go no farther than our own: ſo impoſſible it is for us to enlarge our very gueſſes beyond the ideas received from our own ſenſation and reflection. The ſuppoſition at leaſt, that angels do ſometimes aſſume bodies, needs not ſtartle us; ſince ſome of the moſt antient and moſt learned fathers of the church ſeemed to believe, that they had bodies: and this is certain, that their ſtate and way of exiſtence is unknown to us.

Complex ideas of ſubſtances.

§. 14. But to return to the matter in hand, the ideas we have of ſubſtances, and the ways we come by them; I ſay, our ſpe-

cifick ideas of ſubſtances are nothing elſe but a collection of a certain number of ſimple ideas, conſidered as united in one thing. Theſe ideas of ſubſtances, though they are commonly ſimple apprehenſions, and the names of them ſimple terms; yet in effect are complex, and compounded. Thus the idea which an Engliſhman ſignifies by the name Swan, is white colour, long neck, red beak, black legs, and whole feet, and all theſe of a certain ſize, with a power of ſwimming in the water, and making a certain kind of noiſe: and perhaps, to a man who has long obſerved this kind of birds, ſome other properties which all terminate in ſenſible ſimple ideas, all united in one common ſubject.

Idea of ſpiritual ſubſtances as clear as of bodily ſubſtances.

§. 15. Beſides the complex ideas we have of material ſenſible ſubſtances, of which I have laſt ſpoken, by the ſimple ideas we have taken from thoſe operations of our own minds, which we experiment daily in ourſelves, as thinking, underſtanding, willing, knowing, and power of beginning motion, &c. co-exiſting in ſome ſubſtance: we are able to frame the complex idea of an immaterial ſpirit. And thus, by putting together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty, and power of moving themſelves and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial ſubſtances, as we have of material. For putting together the ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion, joined to ſubſtance, of which we have no diſtinct idea, we have the idea of an immaterial ſpirit; and by putting together the ideas of coherent ſolid parts, and a power of being moved, joined with ſubſtance, of which likewiſe we have no poſitive idea, we have the idea of matter. The one is as clear and diſtinct an idea as the other: the idea of thinking, and moving a body, being as clear and diſtinct ideas, as the ideas of extenſion, ſolidity, and being moved. For our idea of ſubſtance is equally obſcure, or none at all in both: it is but a ſuppoſed I know not what, to ſupport thoſe ideas we call accidents. It is for want of reflection that we are apt to think, that our ſenſes ſhow us nothing but material

material things. Every act of ſenſation, when duly conſidered, gives us an equal view of both parts of nature, the corporeal and ſpiritual. For whilſt I know, by ſeeing or hearing, &c. that there is ſome corporeal being without me, the object of that ſenſation; I do more certainly know, that there is ſome ſpiritual being within me that ſees and hears. This, I muſt be convinced, cannot be the action of bare inſenſible matter; nor ever could be, without an immaterial thinking being.

No idea of abſtract ſubſtance.

§. 16. By the complex idea of extended, figured, coloured, and all other ſenſible qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the idea of the ſubſtance of body, as if we knew nothing at all: nor after all the acquaintance and familiarity, which we imagine we have with matter, and the many qualities men aſſure themſelves they perceive and know in bodies, will it perhaps upon examination be found, that they have any more, or clearer, primary ideas belonging to body, than they have belonging to immaterial ſpirit.

The coheſion of ſolid parts and impulſe the primary ideas of body.

§. 17. The primary ideas we have peculiar to body, as contradiſtinguiſhed to ſpirit, are the coheſion of ſolid, and conſequently ſeparable, parts, and a power of communicating motion by impulſe. Theſe, I think, are the original ideas proper and peculiar to body; for figure is but the conſequence of finite extenſion.

Thinking and motivity the primary ideas of ſpirit.

§. 18. The ideas we have belonging, and peculiar to ſpirit, are thinking and will, or a power of putting body into motion by thought, and which is conſequent to it, liberty. For as body cannot but communicate its motion by impulſe to another body, which it meets with at reſt; ſo the mind can put bodies into motion, or forbear to do ſo, as it pleaſes. The ideas of exiſtence, duration, and mobility, are common to them both.

Spirits capable of motion.

§. 19. There is no reaſon why it ſhould be thought ſtrange, that I make mobility belong to ſpirit: for having no other

idea of motion, but change of diſtance with other beings that are conſidered as at reſt; and finding, that ſpirits, as well as bodies, cannot operate but where they are, and that ſpirits do operate at ſeveral times in ſeveral places; I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite ſpirits; (for of the infinite ſpirit I ſpeak not here.) For my ſoul being a real being, as well as my body, is certainly as capable of changing diſtance with any other body, or being, as body itſelf; and ſo is capable of motion. And if a mathematician can conſider a certain diſtance, or a change of that diſtance between two points, one may certainly conceive a diſtance, and a change of diſtance between two ſpirits: and ſo conceive their motion, their approach or removal, one from another.

§. 20. Every one finds in himſelf, that his ſoul can think, will, and operate on his body in the place where that is; but cannot operate on a body, or in a place an hundred miles diſtant from it. No-body can imagine, that his ſoul can think, or move a body at Oxford, whilſt he is at London; and cannot but know, that, being united to his body, it conſtantly changes place all the whole journey between Oxford and London, as the coach or horſe does that carries him, and I think may be ſaid to be truly all that while in motion; or if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear idea enough of its motion, its being ſeparated from the body in death, I think, will; for to conſider it as going out of the body, or leaving it, and yet to have no idea of its motion, ſeems to me impoſſible.

§. 21. If it be ſaid by any one, that it cannot change place, becauſe it hath none, for the ſpirits are not in loco, but ubi; I ſuppoſe that way of talking will not now be of much weight to many, in an age that is not much diſpoſed to admire, or ſuffer themſelves to be deceived by ſuch unintelligible ways of ſpeaking. But if any one thinks there is any ſenſe in that diſtinction, and that it is applicable to our preſent purpoſe, I deſire him to put it into intelligible Engliſh; and then from thence draw a reaſon to ſhow, that immaterial ſpirits are not capable of motion. Indeed motion cannot be attributed

attributed to God; not becauſe he is an immaterial, but becauſe he is an infinite ſpirit.

Idea of ſoul and body compared.

§. 22. Let us compare then our complex idea of an immaterial ſpirit with our complex idea of body, and ſee whether there be any more obſcurity in one than in the other, and in which moſt. Our idea of body, as I think, is an extended ſolid ſubſtance, capable of communicating motion by impulſe: And our idea of ſoul, as an immaterial ſpirit, is of a ſubſtance that thinks, and has a power of exciting motion in body, by willing or thought. Theſe, I think, are our complex ideas of ſoul and body, as contra diſtinguiſhed; and now let us examine which has moſt obſcurity in it, and difficulty to be apprehended. I know, that people, whoſe thoughts are immerſed in matter, and have ſo ſubjected their minds to their ſenſes, that they ſeldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to ſay, they cannot comprehend a thinking thing, which perhaps is true: but I affirm, when they conſider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing.

Coheſion of ſolid parts in body as hard to be conceived as thinking in a ſoul.

§. 23. If any one ſay, he knows not what it is thinks in him; he means, he knows not what the ſubſtance is of that thinking thing: no more, ſay I, knows he what the ſubſtance is of that ſolid thing. Farther, if he ſays he knows not how he thinks: I anſwer, neither knows he how he is extended; how the ſolid parts of body are united, or cohere together to make extenſion. For though the preſſure of the particles of air may account for the coheſion of ſeveral parts of matter, that are groſſer than the particles of air, and have pores leſs than the corpuſcles of air; yet the weight, or preſſure of the air, will not explain, nor can be a cauſe of the coherence of the particles of air themſelves. And if the preſſure of the æther, or any ſubtiler matter than the air, may unite, and hold faſt together the parts of a particle of air, as well as other bodies; yet it cannot make bonds for itſelf, and hold together the parts that make up every the leaſt corpuſcle of that materia ſubtilis.

ſubtilis. So that that hypotheſis, how ingeniouſly ſoever explained, by ſhowing, that the parts of ſenſible bodies are held together by the preſſure of other external inſenſible bodies, reaches not the parts of the æther itſelf: and by how much the more evident it proves, that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external preſſure of the æther, and can have no other conceivable cauſe of their coheſion and union, by ſo much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the coheſion of the parts of the corpuſcles of the æther itſelf; which we can neither conceive without parts, they being bodies, and diviſible; nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that cauſe of coheſion, which is given of the coheſion of the parts of all other bodies.

§. 24. But, in truth, the preſſure of any ambient fluid, how great ſoever, can be no intelligible cauſe of the coheſion of the ſolid parts of matter. For though ſuch a preſſure may hinder the avulſion of two poliſhed ſuperficies, one from another, in a line perpendicular to them, as in the experiment of two poliſhed marbles; yet it can never, in the leaſt, hinder the ſeparation by a motion, in a line parallel to thoſe ſurfaces. Becauſe the ambient fluid, having a full liberty to ſucceed in each point of ſpace, deſerted by a lateral motion, reſiſts ſuch a motion of bodies ſo joined, no more than it would reſiſt the motion of that body, were it on all ſides environed by that fluid, and touched no other body: and therefore, if there were no other cauſe of coheſion, all parts of bodies muſt be eaſily ſeparable by ſuch a lateral ſliding motion. For if the preſſure of the æther be the adequate cauſe of coheſion, wherever that cauſe operates not, there can be no coheſion. And ſince it cannot operate againſt ſuch a lateral ſeparation, (as has been ſhown) therefore in every imaginary plane, interſecting any maſs of matter, there could be no more coheſion, than of two poliſhed ſurfaces, which will always, notwithſtanding any imaginable preſſure of a fluid, eaſily ſlide one from another. So that, perhaps, how clear an idea ſoever we think we have of the extenſion of body, which is nothing but the coheſion of ſolid

ſolid parts, he that ſhall well conſider it in his mind, may have reaſon to conclude, that it is as eaſy for him to have a clear idea, how the ſoul thinks, as how body is extended. For ſince body is no farther, nor otherwiſe extended, than by the union and coheſion of its ſolid parts, we ſhall very ill comprehend the extenſion of body, without underſtanding wherein conſiſts the union and coheſion of its parts; which ſeems to me as incomprehenſible, as the manner of thinking, and how it is performed.

§. 25. I allow it is uſual for moſt people to wonder how any one ſhould find a difficulty in what they think they every day obſerve. Do we not ſee, will they be ready to ſay, the parts of bodies ſtick firmly together? Is there any thing more common? And what doubt can there be made of it? And the like, I ſay, concerning thinking and voluntary motion: Do we not every moment experiment it in ourſelves: and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear, I confeſs; but when we would a little nearer look into it, and conſider how it is done, there I think we are at a loſs, both in the one, and the other; and can as little underſtand how the parts of body cohere, as how we ourſelves perceive, or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the parts of gold, or braſs, (that but now in fuſion were as looſe from one another, as the particles of water, or the ſands of an hour-glaſs) come in a few moments to be ſo united, and adhere ſo ſtrongly one to another, that the utmoſt force of men's arms cannot ſeparate them: a conſidering man will, I ſuppoſe, be here at a loſs, to ſatisfy his own, or another man's underſtanding.

§. 26. The little bodies that compoſe that fluid we call water, are ſo extremely ſmall, that I have never heard of any one, who by a microſcope (and yet I have heard of ſome that have magnified to ten thouſand; nay, to much above a hundred thouſand times) pretended to perceive their diſtinct bulk, figure, or motion: and the particles of water are alſo ſo perfectly looſe one from another, that the leaſt force ſenſibly ſeparates them. Nay, if we conſider their perpetual

motion, we muſt allow them to have no coheſion one with another: and yet let but a ſharp cold come, they unite, they conſolidate, theſe little atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, ſeparable. He that could find the bonds that tie theſe heaps of looſe little bodies together ſo firmly; he that could make known the cement that makes them ſtick ſo faſt one to another: would diſcover a great, and yet unknown ſecret: and yet when that was done, would he be far enough from making the extenſion of body (which is the coheſion of its ſolid parts) intelligible, till he could ſhow wherein conſiſted the union, or conſolidation of the parts of thoſe bonds, or of that cement, or of the leaſt particle of matter that exiſts. Whereby it appears, that this primary and ſuppoſed obvious quality of body will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehenſible as any thing belonging to our minds, and a ſolid extended ſubſtance as hard to be conceived as a thinking immaterial one, whatever difficulties ſome would raiſe againſt it.

§. 27. For to extend our thoughts a little farther, that preſſure, which is brought to explain the coheſion of bodies, is as unintelligible as the coheſion itſelf. For if matter be conſidered, as no doubt it is, finite, let any one ſend his contemplation to the extremities of the univerſe, and there ſee what conceivable hoops, what bond he can imagine to hold this maſs of matter in ſo cloſe a preſſure together; from whence ſteel has its firmneſs, and the parts of a diamond their hardneſs and indiſſolubility. If matter be finite, it muſt have its extremes; and there muſt be ſomething to hinder it from ſcattering aſunder. If, to avoid this difficulty, any one will throw himſelf into the ſuppoſition and abyſs of infinite matter, let him conſider what light he thereby brings to the coheſion of body, and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by reſolving it into a ſuppoſion, the moſt abſurd and moſt incomprehenſible of all other: So far is our extenſion of body (which is nothing but the coheſion of ſolid parts) from being clearer, or more diſtinct, when we

would inquire into the nature, cauſe, or manner of it, than the idea of thinking.

Communication of motion by impulſe, or by thought, equally intelligible.

§. 28. Another idea we have of body is the power of communication of motion by impulſe: and of our ſouls, the power of exciting motion by thought. Theſe ideas, the one of body, the other of our minds, every day's experience clearly furniſhes us with: but if here again we inquire how this is done, we are equally in the dark. For to the communication of motion by impulſe, wherein as much motion is loſt to one body, as is got to the other, which is the ordinarieſt caſe, we can have no other conception, but of the paſſing of motion out of one body into another: which, I think, is as obſcure and unconceivable, as how our minds move or ſtop our bodies by thought; which we every moment find they do. The increaſe of motion by impulſe, which is obſerved or believed ſometimes to happen, is yet harder to be underſtood. We have by daily experience clear evidence of motion produced both by impulſe and by thought; but the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehenſion: we are equally at a loſs in both. So that however we conſider motion, and its communication, either from body or ſpirit, the idea which belongs to ſpirit is at leaſt as clear as that which belongs to body. And if we conſider the active power of moving, or, as I may call it, motivity, it is much clearer in ſpirit than body; ſince two bodies, placed by one another at reſt, will never afford us the idea of a power in the one to move the other, but by a borrowed motion: whereas the mind, every day, affords us ideas of an active power of moving of bodies; and therefore it is worth our conſideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of ſpirits, and paſſive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created ſpirits are not totally ſeparate from matter, becauſe they are both active and paſſive. Pure ſpirit, viz. God, is only active; pure matter is only paſſive; thoſe beings that are both active and paſſive, we may judge to partake of both. But be that as it will, I

think, we have as many, and as clear ideas belonging to ſpirit, as we have belonging to body, the ſubſtance of each being equally unknown to us; and the idea of thinking in ſpirit as clear as of extenſion in body; and the communication of motion by thought, which we attribute to ſpirit, is as evident as that by impulſe, which we aſcribe to body. Conſtant experience makes us ſenſible of both theſe, though our narrow underſtandings can comprehend neither. For when the mind would look beyond thoſe original ideas we have from ſenſation or reflection, and penetrate into their cauſes, and manner of production, we find ſtill it diſcovers nothing but its own ſhort-ſightedneſs.

§. 29. To conclude; ſenſation convinces us, that there are ſolid extended ſubſtances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones: experience aſſures us of the exiſtence of ſuch beings; and that the one hath a power to move body by impulſe, the other by thought; this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I ſay, every moment furniſhes us with the clear ideas, both of the one and the other. But beyond theſe ideas, as received from their proper ſources, our faculties will not reach. If we would inquire farther into their nature, cauſes, and manner, we perceive not the nature of extenſion clearer than we do of thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as eaſy as the other; and there is no more difficulty to conceive how a ſubſtance we know not ſhould by thought ſet body into motion, than how a ſubſtance we know not ſhould by impulſe ſet body into motion. So that we are no more able to diſcover wherein the ideas belonging to body conſiſt, than thoſe belonging to ſpirit. From whence it ſeems probable to me, that the ſimple ideas we receive from ſenſation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any diſcoveries, when it would pry into the nature and hidden cauſes of thoſe ideas.

Idea of body and ſpirit compared.

§. 30. So that, in ſhort, the idea we have of ſpirit, compared with the idea we have of body, ſtands thus: the ſubſtance of ſpirit

rit is unknown to us; and ſo is the ſubſtance of body equally unknown to us. Two primary qualities or properties of body, viz. ſolid coherent parts and impulſe, we have diſtinct clear ideas of: ſo likewiſe we know, and have diſtinct clear ideas of two primary qualities or properties of ſpirit, viz. thinking, and a power of action; i. e. a power of beginning or ſtopping ſeveral thoughts or motions. We have alſo the ideas of ſeveral qualities inherent in bodies, and have the clear diſtinct ideas of them; which qualities are but the various modifications of the extenſion of cohering ſolid parts, and their motion. We have likewiſe the ideas of the ſeveral modes of thinking, viz. believing, doubting, intending, fearing, hoping; all which are but the ſeveral modes of thinking. We have alſo the ideas of willing, and moving the body conſequent to it, and with the body itſelf too; for, as has been ſhown, ſpirit is capable of motion.

The notion of ſpirit involves no more difficulty in it than that of body.

§. 31. Laſtly, if this notion of immaterial ſpirit may have perhaps ſome difficulties in it not eaſy to be explained, we have therefore no more reaſon to deny or doubt the exiſtence of ſuch ſpirits, than we have to deny or doubt the exiſtence of body; becauſe the notion of body is cumbered with ſome difficulties very hard, and perhaps impoſſible to be explained or underſtood by us. For I would fain have inſtanced any thing in our notion of ſpirit more perplexed, or nearer a contradiction, than the very notion of body includes in it: the diviſibility in infinitum of any finite extenſion involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in conſequences impoſſible to be explicated or made in our apprehenſions conſiſtent; conſequences that carry greater difficulty, and more apparent abſurdity, than any thing can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing ſubſtance.

We know nothing beyond our ſimple ideas.

§. 32. Which we are not at all to wonder at, ſince we having but ſome few ſuperficial ideas of things, diſcovered to us only by the ſenſes from without, or by the mind, reflecting on what it experiments in itſelf with-

in, have no knowledge beyond that, much leſs of the internal conſtitution, and true nature of things, being deſtitute of faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and diſcovering in ourſelves knowledge, and the power of voluntary motion, as certainly as we experiment, or diſcover in things without us, the cohesion and ſeparation of ſolid parts, which is the extenſion and motion of bodies; we have as much reaſon to be ſatisfied with our notion of immaterial ſpirit, as with our notion of body, and the exiſtence of the one as well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction that thinking ſhould exiſt, ſeparate and independent from ſolidity, than it is a contradiction that ſolidity ſhould exiſt, ſeparate and independent from thinking, they being both but ſimple ideas, independent one from another; and having as clear and diſtinct ideas in us of thinking, as of ſolidity: I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without ſolidity, i. e. immaterial, to exiſt, as a ſolid thing without thinking, i. e. matter, to exiſt; eſpecially ſince it is not harder to conceive how thinking ſhould exiſt without matter, than how matter ſhould think. For whenſoever we would proceed beyond theſe ſimple ideas we have from ſenſation and reflection, and dive farther into the nature of things, we fall preſently into darkneſs and obſcurity, perplexedneſs and difficulties; and can diſcover nothing farther but our own blindneſs and ignorance. But whichever of theſe complex ideas be cleareſt, that of body, or immaterial ſpirit, this is evident, that the ſimple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received from ſenſation or reflection: and ſo is it of all our other ideas of ſubſtances, even of God himſelf.

Idea of God. §. 33. For if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehenſible ſupreme being, we ſhall find, that we come by it the ſame way; and that the complex ideas we have both of God and ſeparate ſpirits are made up of the ſimple ideas we receive from reflection: v. g. having, from what we experiment in ourſelves, got the ideas of exiſtence and duration; of knowledge and power; of pleaſure and happineſs; and of ſeveral other qualities and powers,

which

which it is better to have than to be without: when we would frame an idea the moſt ſuitable we can to the ſupreme being, we enlarge every one of theſe with our idea of infinity; and ſo putting them together, make our complex idea of God. For that the mind has ſuch a power of enlarging ſome of its ideas, received from ſenſation and reflection, has been already ſhown.

§. 34. If I find that I know ſome few things, and ſome of them, or all, perhaps imperfectly, I can frame an idea of knowing twice as many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to number; and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge, by extending its comprehenſion to all things exiſting, or poſſible. The ſame alſo I can do of knowing them more perfectly; i. e. all their qualities, powers, cauſes, conſequences, and relations, &c. till all be perfectly known that is in them, or can any way relate to them; and thus frame the idea of infinite or boundleſs knowledge. The ſame may alſo be done of power, till we come to that we call infinite; and alſo of the duration of exiſtence, without beginning or end; and ſo frame the idea of an eternal being. The degrees or extent wherein we aſcribe exiſtence, power, wiſdom, and all other perfections (which we can have any ideas of) to that ſovereign being which we call God, being all boundleſs and infinite, we frame the beſt idea of him our minds are capable of: all which is done, I ſay, by enlarging thoſe ſimple ideas we have taken from the operations of our own minds, by reflection; or by our ſenſes, from exterior things; to that vaſtneſs to which infinity can extend them.

Idea of God.

§. 35. For it is infinity, which joined to our ideas of exiſtence, power, knowledge, &c. makes that complex idea, whereby we repreſent to ourſelves, the beſt we can, the ſupreme being. For though in his own eſſence (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real eſſence of a pebble, or a fly, or of our own ſelves) God be ſimple and uncompounded; yet, I think, I may ſay we have no other idea of him, but a complex one of exiſtence, knowledge, power, happineſs, &c. infinite and eternal: which are

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all diſtinct ideas, and ſome of them, being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been ſhown, originally got from ſenſation and reflection, go to make up the idea or notion we have of God.

No idea in our complex one of ſpirits, but thoſe got from ſenſation or reflection.

§. 36. This farther is to be obſerved, that there is no idea we attribute to God, bating infinity, which is not alſo a part of our complex idea of other ſpirits. Becauſe, being capable of no other ſimple ideas, belonging to any thing but body, but thoſe which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to ſpirits no other but what we receive from thence: and all the difference we can put between them in our contemplation of ſpirits, is only in the ſeveral extents and degrees of their knowledge, power, duration, happineſs, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of ſpirits, as of other things, we are reſtrained to thoſe we receive from ſenſation and reflection, is evident from hence, that in our ideas of ſpirits, how much ſoever advanced in perfection beyond thoſe of bodies, even to that of infinite, we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they diſcover their thoughts one to another: though we muſt neceſſarily conclude, that ſeparate ſpirits, which are beings that have perfecter knowledge and greater happineſs than we, muſt needs have alſo a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are fain to make uſe of corporeal ſigns and particular ſounds; which are therefore of moſt general uſe, as being the beſt and quickeſt we are capable of. But of immediate communication, having no experiment in ourſelves, and conſequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how ſpirits, which uſe not words, can with quickneſs, or much leſs how ſpirits, that have no bodies, can be maſters of their own thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleaſure, though we cannot but neceſſarily ſuppoſe they have ſuch a power.

Recapitulation.

§. 37. And thus we have ſeen, what kind of ideas we have of ſubſtances of all kinds, wherein

wherein they conſiſt, and how we came by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,

Firſt, That all our ideas of the ſeveral ſorts of ſubſtances are nothing but collections of ſimple ideas, with a ſuppoſition of ſomething to which they belong, and in which they ſubſiſt; though of this ſuppoſed ſomething we have no clear diſtinct idea at all.

Secondly, That all the ſimple ideas, that thus united in one common ſubſtratum make up our complex ideas of ſeveral ſorts of ſubſtances, are no other but ſuch as we have received from ſenſation or reflection. So that even in thoſe which we think we are moſt intimately acquainted with, and that come neareſt the comprehenſion of our moſt enlarged conceptions, we cannot go beyond thoſe ſimple ideas. And even in thoſe which ſeem moſt remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely ſurpaſs any thing we can perceive in ourſelves by reflection, or diſcover by ſenſation in other things, we can attain to nothing but thoſe ſimple ideas, which we originally received from ſenſation or reflection; as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels, and particularly of God himſelf.

Thirdly, That moſt of the ſimple ideas, that make up our complex ideas of ſubſtances, when truly conſidered, are only powers, however we are apt to take them for poſitive qualities; v. g. the greateſt part of the ideas that make our complex idea of gold are yellowneſs, great weight, ductility, fuſibility and ſolubility in aqua regia, &c. all united together in an unknown ſubſtratum: all which ideas are nothing elſe but ſo many relations to other ſubſtances, and are not really in the gold, conſidered barely in itſelf, though they depend on thoſe real and primary qualities of its internal conſtitution, whereby it has a fitneſs differently to operate, and be operated on by ſeveral other ſubſtances.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of collective Ideas of Subſtances.

One idea.

§. 1. BESIDES theſe complex ideas of ſeveral ſingle ſubſtances, as of man, horſe, gold, violet, apple, &c. the mind hath alſo complex collective ideas of ſubſtances; which I ſo call, becauſe ſuch ideas are made up of many particular ſubſtances conſidered together, as united into one idea, and which ſo joined are looked on as one; v. g. the idea of ſuch a collection of men as make an army, though conſiſting of a great number of diſtinct ſubſtances, is as much one idea, as the idea of a man: and the great collective idea of all bodies whatſoever, ſignified by the name world, is as much one idea, as the idea of any the leaſt particle of matter in it; it ſufficing to the unity of any idea, that it be conſidered as one repreſentation or picture, though made up of ever ſo many particulars.

Made by the power of compoſing in the mind.

§. 2. Theſe collective ideas of ſubſtances the mind makes by its power of compoſition, and uniting ſeverally either ſimple or complex ideas into one, as it does by the ſame faculty make the complex ideas of particular ſubſtances, conſiſting of an aggregate of divers ſimple ideas, united in one ſubſtance: and as the mind, by putting together the repeated ideas of unity, makes the collective mode, or complex idea of any number, as a ſcore, or a groſs, &c. ſo by putting together ſeveral particular ſubſtances, it makes collective ideas of ſubſtances, as a troop, an army, a ſwarm, a city, a fleet; each of which, every one finds, that he repreſents to his own mind by one idea, in one view; and ſo under that notion conſiders thoſe ſeveral things as perfectly one, as one ſhip, or one atom. Nor is it harder to conceive, how an army of ten thouſand men ſhould make one idea, than how a man ſhould make one idea: it being as eaſy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great number

number of men, and conſider it as one, as it is to unite into one particular all the diſtinct ideas that make up the compoſition of a man, and conſider them all together as one.

All artificial things are collective ideas.

§. 3. Amongſt ſuch kind of collective ideas, are to be counted moſt part of artificial things, at leaſt ſuch of them as are made up of diſtinct ſubſtances: and, in truth, if we conſider all theſe collective ideas aright, as army, conſtellation, univerſe, as they are united into ſo many ſingle ideas, they are but the artificial draughts of the mind; bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one view, the better to contemplate and diſcourſe of them, united into one conception, and ſignified by one name. For there are no things ſo remote, nor ſo contrary, which the mind cannot, by this art of compoſition, bring into one idea; as is viſible in that ſignified by the univerſe.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Relation.

Relation what.

§. 1. BESIDES the ideas, whether ſimple or complex, that the mind has of things, as they are in themſelves, there are others it gets from their compariſon one with another. The underſtanding, in the conſideration of any thing, is not confined to that preciſe object: it can carry any idea as it were beyond itſelf, or at leaſt look beyond it, to ſee how it ſtands in conformity to any other. When the mind ſo conſiders one thing, that it does as it were bring it to and ſet it by another, and carry its view from one to the other: this is, as the words import, relation and reſpect; and the denominations given to poſitive things, intimating that reſpect, and ſerving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the ſubject itſelf denominated to ſomething diſtinct from it, are what we call relatives: and the things, ſo brought together,

together, related. Thus, when the mind conſiders Caius as ſuch a poſitive being, it takes nothing into that idea, but what really exiſts in Caius; v. g. when I conſider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the ſpecies, man. So likewiſe, when I ſay Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare conſideration of a man who hath that white colour. But when I gave Caius the name huſband, I intimate ſome other perſon; and when I give him the name whiter, I intimate ſome other thing: in both caſes my thought is led to ſomething beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into conſideration. And ſince any idea, whether ſimple or complex, may be the occaſion why the mind thus brings two things together, and as it were takes a view of them at once, though ſtill conſidered as diſtinct; therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation. As in the above-mentioned inſtance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia is the occaſion of the denomination or relation of huſband; and the colour white the occaſion why he is ſaid to be whiter than free-ſtone.

Relations without correlative terms not eaſily perceived.

§. 2. Theſe, and the like relations, expreſſed by relative terms, that have others anſwering them, with a reciprocal intimation, as father and ſon, bigger and leſs, cauſe and effect, are very obvious to every one, and every body at firſt ſight perceives the relation. For father and ſon, huſband and wife, and ſuch other correlative terms, ſeem ſo nearly to belong one to another, and through cuſtom do ſo readily chime and anſwer one another in people's memories, that, upon the naming of either of them, the thoughts are preſently carried beyond the thing ſo named; and no-body overlooks or doubts of a relation, where it is ſo plainly intimated. But where languages have failed to give correlative names, there the relation is not always ſo eaſily taken notice of. Concubine is, no doubt, a relative name, as well as wife: but in languages where this, and the like words, have not a correlative term, there people are not ſo apt to take them

to

to be ſo, as wanting that evident mark of relation which is between correlatives, which ſeem to explain one another, and not to be able to exiſt, but together. Hence it is, that many of thoſe names which, duly conſidered, do include evident relations, have been called external denominations. But all names, that are more than empty ſounds, muſt ſignify ſome idea, which is either in the thing to which the name is applied; and then it is poſitive, and is looked on as united to, and exiſting in the thing to which the denomination is given: or elſe it ariſes from the reſpect the mind finds in it to ſomething diſtinct from it, with which it conſiders it; and then it concludes a relation.

Some ſeemingly abſolute terms contain relations.

§. 3. Another ſort of relative terms there is, which are not looked on to be either relative, or ſo much as external denominations; which yet, under the form and appearance of ſignifying ſomething abſolute in the ſubject, do conceal a tacit, though leſs obſervable relation. Such are the ſeemingly poſitive terms of old, great, imperfect, &c. whereof I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more at large in the following chapters.

Relation different from the things related.

§. 4. This farther may be obſerved, that the ideas of relation may be the ſame in men, who have far different ideas of the things that are related, or that are thus compared; v. g. thoſe who have far different ideas of a man, may yet agree in the notion of a father: which is a notion ſuperinduced to the ſubſtance, or man, and refers only to an act of that thing called man, whereby he contributed to the generation of one of his own kind, let man be what it will.

Change of relation may be without any change in the ſubject.

§. 5. The nature therefore of relation conſiſts in the referring or comparing two things one to another; from which compariſon, one or both comes to be denominated. And if either of thoſe things be removed or ceaſe to be, the relation ceaſes, and the denomination conſequent to it, though the other receive in itſelf no alteration at all: v. g. Caius, whom I conſider to-day as a father, ceaſes to be ſo to-morrow, only

by

by the death of his ſon, without any alteration made in himſelf. Nay, barely by the mind's changing the object to which it compares any thing, the ſame thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the ſame time: v. g. Caius, compared to ſeveral perſons, may truly be ſaid to be older and younger, ſtronger, and weaker, &c.

Relation only betwixt two things

§. 6. Whatſoever doth or can exiſt, or be conſidered as one thing, is poſitive; and ſo not only ſimple ideas and ſubſtances, but modes alſo, are poſitive beings: though the parts of which they conſiſt, are very often relative one to another; but the whole together conſidered as one thing, and producing in us the complex idea of one thing, which idea is in our minds, as one picture, though an aggregate of divers parts, and under one name, it is a poſitive or abſolute thing, or idea. Thus a triangle, though the parts thereof compared one to another be relative, yet the idea of the whole is a poſitive abſolute idea. The ſame may be ſaid of a family, a tune, &c. for there can be no relation, but betwixt two things conſidered as two things. There muſt always be in relation two ideas, or things, either in themſelves really ſeparate, or conſidered as diſtinct, and then a ground or occaſion for their compariſon.

All things capable of relation.

§. 7. Concerning relation in general, theſe things may be conſidered.

Firſt, that there is no one thing, whether ſimple idea, ſubſtance, mode, or relation, or name of either of them, which is not capable of almoſt an infinite number of conſiderations, in reference to other things; and therefore this makes no ſmall part of men's thoughts and words: v. g. one ſingle man may at once be concerned in, and ſuſtain all theſe following relations, and many more, viz. father, brother, ſon, grandfather, grandſon, father-in-law, ſon-in-law, huſband, friend, enemy, ſubject, general, judge, patron, client, profeſſor, European, Engliſhman, iſlander, ſervant, maſter, poſſeſſor, captain, ſuperior, inferior, bigger, leſs, older, younger, contemporary, like, unlike, &c. to an almoſt infinite number: he being capable

pable of as many relations, as there can be occaſions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of agreement, diſagrèement, or reſpect whatſoever. For, as I ſaid, relation is a way of comparing or conſidering two things together, and giving one or both of them ſome appellation from that compariſon; and ſometimes giving even the relation itſelf a name.

The ideas of relations clearer often than of the ſubjects related.

§. 8. Secondly, This farther may be conſidered concerning relation, that though it be not contained in the real exiſtence of things, but ſomething extraneous and ſuperinduced; yet the ideas which relative words ſtand for, are often clearer and more diſtinct, than of thoſe ſubſtances to which they do belong. The notion we have of a father, or brother, is a great deal clearer and more diſtinct, than that we have of a man; or, if you will, paternity is a thing whereof it is eaſier to have a clear idea, than of humanity: and I can much eaſier conceive what a friend is, than what God. Becauſe the knowledge of one action, or one ſimple idea, is oftentimes ſufficient to give me the notion of a relation: but to the knowing of any ſubſtantial being, an accurate collection of ſundry ideas is neceſſary. A man, if he compares two things together, can hardly be ſuppoſed not to know what it is, wherein he compares them: ſo that when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a very clear idea of that relation. The ideas then of relations are capable at leaſt of being more perfect and diſtinct in our minds, than thoſe of ſubſtances. Becauſe it is commonly hard to know all the ſimple ideas which are really in any ſubſtance, but for the moſt part eaſy enough to know the ſimple ideas that make up any relation I think on, or have a name for: v. g. comparing two men, in reference to one common parent, it is very eaſy to frame the ideas of brothers, without having yet the perfect idea of a man. For ſignificant relative words, as well as others, ſtanding only for ideas; and thoſe being all either ſimple, or made up of ſimple ones, it ſuffices, for the knowing the preciſe idea the relative term ſtands for, to have a clear conception of

that

that which is the foundation of the relation; which may be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to. Thus having the notion, that one laid the egg out of which the other was hatched, I have a clear idea of the relation of dam and chick, between the two caſſiowaries in St. James's park; though perhaps I have but a very obſcure and imperfect idea of thoſe birds themſelves.

Relations all terminate in ſimple ideas.

§. 9. Thirdly, Though there be a great number of conſiderations, wherein things may be compared one with another, and ſo a multitude of relations; yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about, thoſe ſimple ideas, either of ſenſation or reflection: which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge. To clear this, I ſhall ſhow it in the moſt conſiderable relations that we have any notion of, and in ſome that ſeem to be the moſt remote from ſenſe or reflection; which yet will appear to have their ideas from thence, and leave it paſt doubt, that the notions we have of them are but certain ſimple ideas, and ſo originally derived from ſenſe or reflection.

Terms leading the mind beyond the ſubject denominated, are relative.

§. 10. Fourthly, That relation being the conſidering of one thing with another, which is extrinſecal to it, it is evident, that all words that neceſſarily lead the mind to any other ideas than are ſuppoſed really to exiſt in that thing, to which the words are applied, are relative words: v. g. a man black, merry, thoughtful, thirſty, angry, extended; theſe, and the like, are all abſolute, becauſe they neither ſignify nor intimate any thing, but what does or is ſuppoſed really to exiſt in the man thus denominated: but father, brother, king, huſband, blacker, merrier, &c. are words which, together with the thing they denominate, imply alſo ſomething elſe ſeparate and exterior to the exiſtence of that thing.

Concluſion.

§. 11. Having laid down theſe premiſes concerning relation in general, I ſhall now proceed to ſhow, in ſome inſtances, how all the ideas we have of relation are made up, as the others are, only

of

of ſimple ideas; and that they all, how refined or remote from ſenſe ſoever they ſeem, terminate at laſt in ſimple ideas. I ſhall begin with the moſt comprehenſive relation, wherein all things that do or can exiſt are concerned; and that is the relation of cauſe and effect. The idea whereof, how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge, ſenſation, and reflection, I ſhall in the next place conſider.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Cauſe and Effect, and other Relations.

§. 1. Whence their ideas got.

IN the notice that our ſenſes take of the conſtant viciſſitude of things, we cannot but obſerve, that ſeveral particular, both qualities and ſubſtances, begin to exiſt; and that they receive this their exiſtence from the due application and operation of ſome other being. From this obſervation, we get our ideas of cauſe and effect. That which produces any ſimple or complex idea we denote by the general name cauſe; and that which is produced, effect. Thus finding that in that ſubſtance which we call wax fluidity, which is a ſimple idea that was not in it before, is conſtantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat; we call the ſimple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cauſe of it, and fluidity the effect. So alſo finding that the ſubſtance of wood, which is a certain collection of ſimple ideas, ſo called, by the application of fire is turned into another ſubſtance, called aſhes, i. e. another complex idea, conſiſting of a collection of ſimple ideas, quite different from that complex idea which we call wood; we conſider fire, in relation to aſhes, as cauſe, and the aſhes as effect. So that whatever is conſidered by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular ſimple idea, or collection of ſimple ideas, whether ſubſtance or mode, which did not before exiſt, hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cauſe, and ſo is denominated by us.

Creation, generation, making alteration.

§. 2. Having thus, from what our ſenſes are able to diſcover, in the operations of bodies on one another, got the notion of cauſe and effect, viz. that a cauſe is that which makes any other thing, either ſimple idea, ſubſtance or mode, begin to be: and an effect is that which had its beginning from ſome other thing: the mind finds no great difficulty to diſtinguiſh the ſeveral originals of things into two ſorts.

Firſt, when the thing is wholly made new, ſo that no part thereof did ever exiſt before; as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exiſt, in rerum natura, which had before no being, and this we call creation.

Secondly, when a thing is made up of particles, which did all of them before exiſt, but that very thing ſo conſtituted of pre-exiſting particles, which, conſidered all together, make up ſuch a collection of ſimple ideas as had not any exiſtence before; as this man, this egg, roſe, or cherry, &c. And this, when referred to a ſubſtance, produced in the ordinary courſe of nature by internal principle, but ſet on work, and received from ſome external agent or cauſe, and working by inſenſible ways, which we perceive not, we call generation; when the cauſe is extrinſecal, and the effect produced by a ſenſible ſeparation, or juxta-poſition of diſcernible parts, we call it making; and ſuch are all artificial things. When any ſimple idea is produced, which was not in that ſubject before, we call it alteration. Thus a man is generated, a picture made, and either of them altered, when any new ſenſible quality or ſimple idea is produced in either of them, which was not there before; and the things thus made to exiſt, which were not there before, are effects; and thoſe things, which operated to the exiſtence, cauſes. In which, and all other cauſes, we may obſerve, that the notion of cauſe and effect has its riſe from ideas, received by ſenſation, or reflection; and that this relation, how comprehenſible ſoever, terminates at laſt in them. For to have the idea of cauſe and effect, it ſuffices to conſider any ſimple idea, or ſubſtance, as beginning to exiſt by the operation of ſome other, without knowing the manner of that operation.

§. 3.

§. 3. Time and place are alſo the foundations of very large relations, and all finite beings at leaſt are concerned in them. But having already ſhown, in another place, how we get theſe ideas, it may ſuffice here to intimate, that moſt of the denominations of things, received from time, are only relations. Thus when any one ſays, that queen Elizabeth lived ſixty-nine, and reigned forty-five years, theſe words import only the relation of that duration to ſome other, and mean no more than this, that the duration of her exiſtence was equal to ſixty-nine, and the duration of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the ſun; and ſo are all words, anſwering, how long. Again, William the Conqueror invaded England about the year 1066, which means this, that taking the duration from our Saviour's time till now, for one entire great length of time, it ſhows at what diſtance this invaſion was from the two extremes: and ſo do all words of time, anſwering to the queſtion, when, which ſhow only the diſtance of any point of time, from the period of a longer duration, from which we meaſure, and to which we thereby conſider it as related. Relations of time.

§. 4. There are yet, beſides thoſe, other words of time, that ordinarily are thought to ſtand for poſitive ideas, which yet will, when conſidered, be found to be relative, ſuch as are young, old, &c. which include and intimate the relation any thing has to a certain length of duration, whereof we have the idea in our minds. Thus having ſettled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be ſeventy years, when we ſay a man is young, we mean that his age is yet but a ſmall part of that which uſually men attain to: and when we denominate him old, we mean that his duration is run out almoſt to the end of that which men do not uſually exceed. And ſo it is but comparing the particular age, or duration of this or that man, to the idea of that duration which we have in our minds, as ordinarily belonging to that ſort of animals: which is plain, in the application of theſe names to other things: for a man is called young at twenty years, and very young at ſeven years old; but yet a

horſe we call old at twenty, and a dog at ſeven years; becauſe in each of theſe, we compare their age to different ideas of duration, which are ſettled in our minds, as belonging to theſe ſeveral ſorts of animals, in the ordinary courſe of nature. But the ſun and ſtars, though they have out-laſted ſeveral generations of men, we call not old, becauſe we do not know what period God hath ſet to that ſort of beings. This term belonging properly to thoſe things, which we can obſerve in the ordinary courſe of things, by a natural decay, to come to an end in a certain period of time; and ſo have in our minds, as it were, a ſtandard to which we can compare the ſeveral parts of their duration; and, by the relation they bear thereunto, call them young or old: which we cannot therefore do to a ruby or diamond, things whoſe uſual periods we know not.

Relations of place and extenſion.

§. 5. The relation alſo that things have to one another in their places and diſtances, is very obvious to obſerve; as above, below, a mile diſtant from Charing-croſs, in England, and in London. But as in duration, ſo in extenſion and bulk, there are ſome ideas that are relative, which we ſignify by names that are thought poſitive; as great and little are truly relations. For here alſo having, by obſervation, ſettled in our minds the ideas of the bigneſs of ſeveral ſpecies of things from thoſe we have been moſt accuſtomed to, we make them as it were the ſtandards whereby to denominate the bulk of others. Thus we call a great apple, ſuch a one as is bigger than the ordinary ſort of thoſe we have been uſed to; and a little horſe, ſuch a one as comes not up to the ſize of that idea, which we have in our minds, to belong ordinarily to horſes: and that will be a great horſe to a Welſhman, which is but a little one to a Fleming; they two having, from the different breed of their countries, taken ſeveral-ſized ideas to which they compare, and in relation to which they denominate their great and their little.

Abſolute terms often ſtand for relations.

§. 6. So likewiſe weak and ſtrong are but relative denominations of power, compared to ſome ideas we have at that time of — or leſs power. Thus when we

ſay

ſay a weak man, we mean one that has not ſo much ſtrength or power to move, as uſually men have, or uſually thoſe of his ſize have: which is a comparing his ſtrength to the idea we have of the uſual ſtrength of men, or men of ſuch a ſize. The like, when we ſay the creatures are all weak things; weak, there, is but a relative term, ſignifying the diſproportion there is in the power of God and the creatures. And ſo abundance of words, in ordinary ſpeech, ſtand only for relations (and perhaps the greateſt part) which at firſt ſight ſeem to have no ſuch ſignification: v. g. the ſhip has neceſſary ſtores. Neceſſary and ſtores are both relative words; one having a relation to the accompliſhing the voyage intended, and the other to future uſe. All which relations, how they are confined to and terminate in ideas derived from ſenſation or reflection, is too obvious to need any explication.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diverſity.

Wherein identity conſiſts.

§. 1. ANOTHER occaſion the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of things; when conſidering any thing as exiſting at any determined time and place, we compare it with itſelf exiſting at another time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and diverſity. When we ſee any thing to be in any place in any inſtant of time, we are ſure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that ſame time exiſts in another place, how like and undiſtinguiſhable ſoever it may be in all other reſpects: and in this conſiſts identity, when the idea it is attributed to, vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we conſider their former exiſtence, and to which we compare the preſent. For we never finding, nor conceiving it poſſible, that two things of the ſame kind ſhould exiſt in the ſame place at the ſame time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exiſts any where at any time, excludes all of the ſame kind, and is there itſelf alone. When therefore we demand, whether any thing

be the ſame or no; it refers always to ſomething that exiſted ſuch a time in ſuch a place, which it was certain at that inſtant was the ſame with itſelf, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of exiſtence, nor two things one beginning; it being impoſſible for two things of the ſame kind to be or exiſt in the ſame inſtant, in the very ſame place, or one and the ſame thing in different places. That therefore that had one beginning, is the ſame thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the ſame, but diverſe. That which has made the difficulty about this relation, has been the little care and attention uſed in having preciſe notions of the things to which it is attributed.

Identity of ſubſtances.

§. 2. We have the ideas but of three ſorts of ſubſtances; 1. God. 2. Finite intelligences. 3. Bodies. Firſt, God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and everywhere; and therefore concerning his identity, there can be no doubt. Secondly, finite ſpirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exiſt, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity, as long as it exiſts. Thirdly, the ſame will hold of every particle of matter, to which no addition or ſubtraction of matter being made, it is the ſame. For though theſe three ſorts of ſubſtances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the ſame place; yet we cannot conceive but that they muſt neceſſarily each of them exclude any of the ſame kind out of the ſame place: or elſe the notions and names of identity and diverſity would be in vain, and there could be no ſuch diſtinction of ſubſtances, or any thing elſe one from another. For example: could two bodies be in the ſame place at the ſame time, then thoſe two parcels of matter muſt be one and the ſame, take them great or little; nay, all bodies muſt be one and the ſame. For by the ſame reaſon that two particles of matter may be in one place, all bodies may be in one place: which, when it can be ſuppoſed, takes away the diſtinction of identity and diver[illegible]e and more, and renders it ridiculous.

ridiculous. But it being a contradiction, that two or more ſhould be one, identity and diverſity are relations and ways of comparing well-founded, and of uſe to the underſtanding. All other things being but modes or relations ultimately terminated in ſubſtances, the identity and diverſity of each particular exiſtence of them too will be by the ſame way determined: only as to things whoſe exiſtence is in ſucceſſion, ſuch as are the actions of finite beings, v. g. motion and thought, both which conſiſt in a continued train of ſucceſſion: concerning their diverſity, there can be no queſtion: becauſe each periſhing the moment it begins, they cannot exiſt in different times, or in different places, as permanent beings can at different times exiſt in diſtant places; and therefore no motion or thought, conſidered as at different times, can be the ſame, each part thereof having a different beginning of exiſtence.

Identity of modes.

§. 3. From what has been ſaid, it is eaſy to diſcover what is ſo much inquired after, the principium individuationis; and that, it is plain, is exiſtence itſelf, which determines a being of any ſort to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the ſame kind. This, though it ſeems eaſier to conceive in ſimple ſubſtances or modes, yet when reflected on is not more difficult in compound ones, if care be taken to what it is applied: v. g. let us ſuppoſe an atom, i. e. a continued body under one immutable ſuperficies, exiſting in a determined time and place; it is evident that, conſidered in any inſtant of its exiſtence, it is in that inſtant the ſame with itſelf. For being at that inſtant what it is, and nothing elſe, it is the ſame, and ſo muſt continue as long as its exiſtence is continued; for ſo long it will be the ſame, and no other. In like manner, if two or more atoms be joined together into the ſame maſs, every one of thoſe atoms will be the ſame, by the foregoing rule: and whilſt they exiſt united together, the maſs, conſiſting of the ſame atoms, muſt be the ſame maſs, or the ſame body, let the parts be ever ſo differently jumbled. But if one of theſe atoms be

Principium individuationis.

taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the ſame maſs, or the ſame body. In the ſtate of living creatures, their identity depends not on a maſs of the ſame particles, but on ſomething elſe. For in them the variation of great parcels of matters alter not the identity: an oak growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lopped, is ſtill the ſame oak; and a colt grown up to a horſe, ſometimes fat, ſometimes lean, is all the while the ſame horſe: though in both theſe caſes, there may be a manifeſt change of the parts; ſo that truly they are not either of them the ſame maſſes of matter, though they be truly one of them the ſame oak, and the other the ſame horſe. The reaſon whereof is, that in theſe two caſes, a maſs of matter, and a living body, identity is not applied to the ſame thing.

Identity of vegetables.

§. 4. We muſt therefore conſider wherein an oak differs from a maſs of matter, and that ſeems to me to be in this, that the one is only the coheſion of particles of matter any how united, the other ſuch a diſpoſition of them as conſtitutes the parts of an oak; and ſuch an organization of thoſe parts as is fit to receive and diſtribute nouriſhment, ſo as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c. of an oak, in which conſiſts the vegetable life. That being then one plant which has ſuch an organization of parts in one coherent body partaking of one common life, it continues to be the ſame plant as long as it partakes of the ſame life, though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued organization conformable to that ſort of plants. For this organization being at any one inſtant in any one collection of matter, is in that particular concrete diſtinguiſhed from all other, and is that individual life which exiſting conſtantly from that moment both forwards and backwards, in the ſame continuity of inſenſibly ſucceeding parts united to the living body of the plant, it has that identity, which makes the ſame plant, and all the parts of it parts of the ſame plant, during all the time that they exiſt united in that continued organization.

nization, which is fit to convey that common life to all the parts ſo united.

Identity of animals.

§. 5. The caſe is not ſo much different in brutes, but that any one may hence ſee what makes an animal, and continues it the ſame. Something we have like this in machines, and may ſerve to illuſtrate it. For example, what is a watch? It is plain it is nothing but a fit organization, or conſtruction of parts, to a certain end, which when a ſufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would ſuppoſe this machine one continued body, all whoſe organized parts were repaired, increaſed or diminiſhed by a conſtant addition or ſeparation of inſenſible parts, with one common life, we ſhould have ſomething very much like the body of an animal; with this difference, that in an animal the fitneſs of the organization, and the motion wherein life conſiſts, begin together, the motion coming from within; but in machines, the force coming ſenſibly from without, is often away when the organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.

Identity of man.

§. 6. This alſo ſhows wherein the identity of the ſame man conſiſts; viz. in nothing but a participation of the ſame continued life, by conſtantly fleeting particles of matter, in ſucceſſion vitally united to the ſame organized body. He that ſhall place the identity of man in any thing elſe, but like that of other animals in one fitly organized body, taken in any one inſtant, and from thence continued under one organization of life in ſeveral ſucceſſively fleeting particles of matter united to it, will find it hard to make an embryo, one of years, mad and ſober, the ſame man, by any ſuppoſition, that will not make it poſſible for Seth, Iſmael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Auſtin, and Cæſar Borgia, to be the ſame man. For if the identity of ſoul alone makes the ſame man, and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the ſame individual ſpirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be poſſible that thoſe men living in diſtant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the ſame man: which way of ſpeaking muſt be, from a very ſtrange

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uſe of the word man, applied to an idea, out of which body and ſhape are excluded. And that way of ſpeaking would agree yet worſe with the notions of thoſe philoſophers who allow of tranſmigration, and are of opinion that the ſouls of men may, for their miſcarriages, be detruded into the bodies of beaſts, as fit habitations, with organs ſuited to the ſatisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet I think, no-body could be be ſure that the ſoul of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, would yet ſay that hog were a man or Heliogabalus.

Identity ſuited to the idea.

§. 7. It is not therefore unity of ſubſtance that comprehends all ſorts of identity, or will determine it in every caſe: but to conceive and judge of it aright, we muſt conſider what idea the word it is applied to ſtands for; it being one thing to be the ſame ſubſtance, another the ſame man, and a third the ſame perſon, if perſon, man, and ſubſtance are three names ſtanding for three different ideas; for ſuch as is the idea belonging to that name, ſuch muſt be the identity: which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would poſſibly have prevented a great deal of that confuſion, which often occurs about this matter, with no ſmall ſeeming difficulties, eſpecially concerning perſonal identity, which therefore we ſhall in the next place a little conſider.

Same man.

§. 8. An animal is a living organized body; and conſequently the ſame animal, as we have obſerved, is the ſame continued life communicated to different particles of matter, as they happen ſucceſſively to be united to that organized living body. And whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenuous obſervation puts it paſt doubt, that the idea in our minds, of which the ſound man in our mouths is the ſign, is nothing elſe but of an animal of ſuch a certain form: ſince I think I may be confident, that whoever ſhould ſee a creature of his own ſhape and make, though it had no more reaſon all its life than a cat or a parrot, would call him ſtill a man; or whoever ſhould hear a cat or a parrot diſcourſe, reaſon and philo-

philoſophize, would call or think it nothing but a cat or a parrot; and ſay, the one was a dull irrational man, and the other a very intelligent rational parrot. A relation we have in an author of great note is ſufficient to countenance the ſuppoſition of a rational parrot. His words are *:

"I had a mind to know from prince Maurice's own "mouth the account of a common, but much credited "ſtory, that I heard ſo often from many others, of "an old parrot he had in Brazil during his govern- "ment there, that ſpoke, and aſked, and anſwered "common queſtions like a reaſonable creature: ſo that "thoſe of his train there generally concluded it to be "witchery or poſſeſſion; and one of his chaplains, who "lived long afterwards in Holland, would never from "that time endure a parrot, but ſaid, they all had a "devil in them. I had heard many particulars of this "ſtory, and aſſevered by people hard to be diſcredited, "which made me aſk prince Maurice what there was "of it. He ſaid, with his uſual plainneſs and dryneſs "in talk, there was ſomething true, but a great deal "falſe of what had been reported. I deſired to know "of him what there was of the firſt? He told me ſhort "and coldly, that he had heard of ſuch an old parrot "when he had been at Brazil; and though he believed "nothing of it, and it was a good way off, yet he had "ſo much curioſity as to ſend for it: that it was a very "great and a very old one, and when it came firſt "into the room where the prince was, with a great "many Dutchmen about him, it ſaid preſently, What "a company of white men are here! They aſked it "what it thought that man was, pointing to the prince? "It anſwered, ſome general or other; when they "brought it cloſe to him, he aſked it, † D'ou venez

* Memoirs of what paſſed in Chriſtendom from 1672 to 1679, p. 317.

† Whence come ye? It anſwered, From Marinnan. The Prince, To whom do you belong? The parrot, To a Portugueſe. Prince, What do you there? Parrot, I look after the chickens. The Prince laughed, and ſaid, You look after the chickens? The parrot anſwered, Yes, I, and I know well enough how to do it.

"vous?

" vous? It anſwered, De Marinnan. The prince, A " qui eſtes vous? The parrot, A un Portugais. Prince, " Que fais tu la? Parrot, Je garde les poulles. The " prince laughed, and ſaid, Vous gardez les poulles? " The parrot anſwered, Oui moi, & je ſcai bien faire; " and made the chuck four or five times that people " uſe to make to chickens when they call them. I ſet " down the words of this worthy dialogue in French, " juſt as prince Maurice ſaid them to me. I aſked " him in what language the parrot ſpoke, and he ſaid, " in Braſilian; I aſked whether he underſtood Braſi- " lian; he ſaid, no, but he had taken care to have two " interpreters by him, the one a Dutchman that ſpoke " Braſilian, and the other a Braſilian that ſpoke " Dutch; that he aſked them ſeparately and privately, " and both of them agreed in telling him juſt the ſame " thing that the parrot had ſaid. I could not but tell " this odd ſtory, becauſe it is ſo much out of the way, " and from the firſt hand, and what may paſs for a good " one; for I dare ſay this prince at leaſt believed him- " ſelf in all he told me, having ever paſſed for a very " honeſt and pious man: I leave it to naturaliſts to " reaſon, and to other men to believe, as they pleaſe " upon it; however, it is not, perhaps, amiſs to re- " lieve or enliven a buſy ſcene ſometimes with ſuch " digreſſions, whether to the purpoſe or no."

Same man. I have taken care that the reader ſhould have the ſtory at large in the author's own words, becauſe he ſeems to me not to have thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagined that ſo able a man as he, who had ſufficiency enough to warrant all the teſtimonies he gives of himſelf, ſhould take ſo much pains, in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin ſo cloſe not only on a man whom he mentions as his friend, but on a prince in whom he acknowledges very great honeſty and piety, a ſtory, which if he himſelf thought incredible, he could not but alſo think ridiculous. The prince, it is plain, who vouches this ſtory, and our author, who relates it from him, both of them call this talker a parrot: and I aſk any one elſe, who thinks ſuch a ſtory fit to be told, whether if this

this parrot, and all of its kind, had always talked, as we have a prince's word for it this one did, whether, I ſay, they would not have paſſed for a race of rational animals: but yet whether for all that they would have been allowed to be men, and not parrots? For I preſume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the idea of a man in moſt people's ſenſe, but of a body, ſo and ſo ſhaped, joined to it: and if that be the idea of a man, the ſame ſucceſſive body not ſhifted all at once, muſt, as well as the ſame immaterial ſpirit, go to the making of the ſame man.

Perſonal identity.

§. 9. This being premiſed, to find wherein perſonal identity conſiſts, we muſt conſider what perſon ſtands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reaſon and reflection, and can conſider itſelf as itſelf, the ſame thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that conſciouſneſs which is inſeparable from thinking, and as it ſeems to me eſſential to it: it being impoſſible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we ſee, hear, ſmell, taſte, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do ſo. Thus it is always as to our preſent ſenſations and perceptions: and by this every one is to himſelf that which he calls ſelf; it not being conſidered in this caſe whether the ſame ſelf be continued in the ſame or divers ſubſtances. For ſince conſciouſneſs always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls ſelf, and thereby diſtinguiſhes himſelf from all other thinking things; in this alone conſiſts perſonal identity, i. e. the ſameneſs of a rational being: and as far as this conſciouſneſs can be extended backwards to any paſt action or thought, ſo far reaches the identity of that perſon; it is the ſame ſelf now it was then; and it is by the ſame ſelf with this preſent one that now reflects on it, that that action was done.

Conſciouſneſs makes perſonal identity.

§. 10. But it is farther inquired, whether it be the ſame identical ſubſtance? This few would think they had reaſon to doubt of, if theſe perceptions, with their

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conſciouſneſs, always remained preſent in the mind, whereby the ſame thinking thing would be always conſciouſly preſent, and, as would be thought, evidently the ſame to itſelf. But that which ſeems to make the difficulty is this, that this conſciouſneſs being interrupted always by forgetfulneſs, there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our paſt actions before our eyes in one view, but even the beſt memories loſing the ſight of one part whilſt they are viewing another; and we ſometimes, and that the greateſt part of our lives, not reflecting on our paſt ſelves, being intent on our preſent thoughts, and in ſound ſleep having no thoughts at all, or at leaſt none with that conſciouſneſs which remarks our waking thoughts: I ſay, in all theſe caſes, our conſciouſneſs being interrupted, and we loſing the ſight of our paſt ſelves, doubts are raiſed whether we are the ſame thinking thing, i. e. the ſame ſubſtance or no. Which, however reaſonable or unreaſonable, concerns not perſonal identity at all: the queſtion, being, what makes the ſame perſon, and not whether it be the ſame identical ſubſtance, which always thinks in the ſame perſon; which in this caſe matters not at all: different ſubſtances, by the ſame conſciouſneſs, (where they do partake in it) being united into one perſon, as well as different bodies by the ſame life are united into one animal, whoſe identity is preſerved, in that change of ſubſtances, by the unity of one continued life. For it being the ſame conſciouſneſs that makes a man be himſelf to himſelf, perſonal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed ſolely to one individual ſubſtance, or can be continued in a ſucceſſion of ſeveral ſubſtances. For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any paſt action with the ſame conſciouſneſs it had of it at firſt, and with the ſame conſciouſneſs it has of any preſent action; ſo far it is the ſame perſonal ſelf. For it is by the conſciouſneſs it has of its preſent thoughts and actions, that it is ſelf to itſelf now, and ſo will be the ſame ſelf, as far as the ſame conſciouſneſs can extend to actions paſt or to come; and would be by diſtance of time, or change of ſubſtance, no more two perſons,

perſons, than a man be two men by wearing other cloaths to-day than he did yeſterday, with a long or a ſhort ſleep between: the ſame conſciouſneſs uniting thoſe diſtant actions into the ſame perſon, whatever ſubſtances contributed to their production.

Perſonal identity in change of ſubſtances.

§. 11. That this is ſo, we have ſome kind of evidence in our very bodies, all whoſe particles, whilſt vitally united to this ſame thinking conſcious ſelf, ſo that we feel when they are touched, and are affected by, and conſcious of good or harm that happens to them, are a part of ourſelves; i. e. of our thinking conſcious ſelf. Thus the limbs of his body are to every one a part of himſelf; he ſympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby ſeparate it from that conſciouſneſs he had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is himſelf, any more than the remoteſt part of matter. Thus we ſee the ſubſtance, whereof perſonal ſelf conſiſted at one time, may be varied at another, without the change of perſonal identity; there being no queſtion about the ſame perſon, though the limbs which but now were a part of it, be cut off.

§. 12. But the queſtion is, "whether if the ſame "ſubſtance which thinks, be changed, it can be the "ſame perſon; or, remaining the ſame, it can be dif-"ferent perſons?"

Whether in the change of thinking ſubſtances.

And to this I anſwer, firſt, This can be no queſtion at all to thoſe who place thought in a purely material animal conſtitution, void of an immaterial ſubſtance. For whether their ſuppoſition be true or no, it is plain they conceive perſonal identity preſerved in ſomething elſe than identity of ſubſtance; as animal identity is preſerved in identity of life, and not of ſubſtance. And therefore thoſe who place thinking in an immaterial ſubſtance only, before they can come to deal with theſe men, muſt ſhow why perſonal identity cannot be preſerved in the change of immaterial ſubſtances, or variety of particular immaterial ſubſtances, as well as animal identity is preſerved in the change of materia

ſubſtances!

ſubſtances, or variety of particular bodies: unleſs they will ſay, it is one immaterial ſpirit that makes the ſame life in brutes, as it is one immaterial ſpirit that makes the ſame perſon in men; which the Carteſians at leaſt will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too.

§. 13. But next, as to the firſt part of the queſtion, "whether if the ſame thinking ſubſtance (ſuppoſing "immaterial ſubſtances only to think) be changed, it "can be the ſame perſon?" I anſwer, that cannot be reſolved, but by thoſe who know what kind of ſubſtances they are that do think, and whether the conſciouſneſs of paſt actions can be transferred from one thinking ſubſtance to another. I grant, were the ſame conſciouſneſs the ſame individual action, it could not: but it being a preſent repreſentation of a paſt action, why it may not be poſſible, that that may be repreſented to the mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be ſhown. And therefore how far the conſciouſneſs of paſt actions is annexed to any individual agent, ſo that another cannot poſſibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of action it is that cannot be done without a reflex act of perception accompanying it, and how performed by thinking ſubſtances, who cannot think without being conſcious of it. But that which we call the ſame conſciouſneſs, not being the ſame individual act, why one intellectual ſubſtance may not have repreſented to it, as done by itſelf, what it never did, and was perhaps done by ſome other agent; why, I ſay, ſuch a repreſentation may not poſſibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well as ſeveral repreſentations in dreams are, which yet whilſt dreaming we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it never is ſo, will by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking ſubſtances, be beſt reſolved into the goodneſs of God, who, as far as the happineſs or miſery of any of his ſenſible creatures is concerned in it, will not by a fatal error of theirs transfer from one to another that conſciouſneſs which draws reward or puniſhment with it. How far this may be an argument againſt

againſt thoſe who would place thinking in a ſyſtem of fleeting animal ſpirits, I leave to be conſidered. But yet to return to the queſtion before us, it muſt be allowed, that if the ſame conſciouſneſs (which, as has been ſhown, is quite a different thing from the ſame numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking ſubſtance to another, it will be poſſible that two thinking ſubſtances may make but one perſon. For the ſame conſciouſneſs being preſerved, whether in the ſame or different ſubſtances, the perſonal identity is preſerved.

§. 14. As to the ſecond part of the queſtion, "whether the ſame immaterial ſubſtance remaining, there "may be two diſtinct perſons?" which queſtion ſeems to me to be built on this, whether the ſame immaterial being, being conſcious of the action of its paſt duration, may be wholly ſtripped of all the conſciouſneſs of its paſt exiſtence, and loſe it beyond the power of ever retrieving again; and ſo as it were beginning a new account from a new period, have a conſciouſneſs that cannot reach beyond this new ſtate. All thoſe who hold pre-exiſtence are evidently of this mind, ſince they allow the ſoul to have no remaining conſciouſneſs of what it did in that pre-exiſtent ſtate, either wholly ſeparate from body, or informing any other body; and if they ſhould not, it is plain, experience would be againſt them. So that perſonal identity reaching no farther than conſciouſneſs reaches, a pre-exiſtent ſpirit not having continued ſo many ages in a ſtate of ſilence, muſt needs make different perſons. Suppoſe a Chriſtian Platoniſt or Pythagorean ſhould, upon God's having ended all his works of creation the ſeventh day, think his ſoul hath exiſted ever ſince; and would imagine it has revolved in ſeveral human bodies, as I once met with one, who was perſuaded his had been the ſoul of Socrates; (how reaſonably I will not diſpute; this I know, that in the poſt he filled, which was no inconſiderable one, he paſſed for a very rational man, and the preſs has ſhown that he wanted not parts or learning) would any one ſay, that he being not conſcious of any of Socrates's actions or thoughts,

could be the ſame perſon with Socrates? Let any one reflect upon himſelf, and conclude that he has in himſelf an immaterial ſpirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in the conſtant change of his body keeps him the ſame: and is that which he calls himſelf: let him alſo ſuppoſe it to be the ſame ſoul that was in Neſtor or Therſites, at the ſiege of Troy (for ſouls being, as far as we know any thing of them in their nature, indifferent to any parcel of matter, the ſuppoſition has no apparent abſurdity in it) which it may have been, as well as it is now the ſoul of any other man: but he now having no conſciouſneſs of any of the actions either of Neſtor or Therſites, does or can he conceive himſelf the ſame perſon with either of them? can he be concerned in either of their actions? attribute them to himſelf, or think them his own more than the actions of any other men that ever exiſted? So that this conſciouſneſs not reaching to any of the actions of either of thoſe men, he is no more one ſelf with either of them, than if the ſoul or immaterial ſpirit that now informs him, had been created, and began to exiſt, when it began to inform his preſent body; though it were ever ſo true, that the ſame ſpirit that informed Neſtor's or Therſites's body, were numerically the ſame that now informs his. For this would no more make him the ſame perſon with Neſtor, than if ſome of the particles of matter that were once a part of Neſtor, were now a part of this man; the ſame immaterial ſubſtance, without the ſame conſciouſneſs, no more making the ſame perſon by being united to any body, than the ſame particle of matter, without conſciouſneſs united to any body, makes the ſame perſon. But let him once find himſelf conſcious of any of the actions of Neſtor, he then finds himſelf the ſame perſon with Neſtor.

§. 15. And thus we may be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the ſame perſon at the reſurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the ſame which he had here, the ſame conſciouſneſs going along with the ſoul that inhabits it. But yet the ſoul alone, in the change of bodies, would ſcarce to any one, but to him that makes the ſoul the man, be enough to make

make the ſame man. For ſhould the ſoul of a prince, carrying with it the conſciouſneſs of the prince's paſt life, enter and inform the body of a cobler, as ſoon as deſerted by his own ſoul, every one ſees he would be the ſame perſon with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions: but who would ſay it was the ſame man? The body too goes to the making the man, and would, I gueſs, to every body determine the man in this caſe; wherein the ſoul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man: but he would be the ſame cobler to every one beſides himſelf. I know that, in the ordinary way of ſpeaking, the ſame perſon, and the ſame man, ſtand for one and the ſame thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to ſpeak as he pleaſes, and to apply what articulate ſounds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleaſes. But yet when we will inquire what makes the ſame ſpirit, man, or perſon, we muſt fix the ideas of ſpirit, man, or perſon in our minds; and having reſolved with ourſelves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or the like, when it is the ſame, and when not.

Conſciouſneſs makes the ſame perſon.

§. 16. But though the ſame immaterial ſubſtance or ſoul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatſoever ſtate, make the ſame man; yet it is plain conſciouſneſs, as far as ever it can be extended, ſhould it be to ages paſt, unites exiſtences and actions, very remote in time, into the ſame perſon, as well as it does the exiſtences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: ſo that whatever has the conſciouſneſs of preſent and paſt actions, is the ſame perſon to whom they both belong. Had I the ſame conſciouſneſs that I ſaw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I ſaw an overflowing of the Thames laſt winter, or as that I write now; I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that ſaw the Thames overflowed laſt winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the ſame ſelf, place that ſelf in what ſubſtance you pleaſe, than that I who write this am the ſame myſelf now whilſt I write (whether I conſiſt of all the ſame ſubſtance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was yeſterday. For as to this

point of being the ſame ſelf, it matters not whether this preſent ſelf be made up of the ſame or other ſubſtances; I being as much concerned, and as juſtly accountable for any action that was done a thouſand years ſince, appropriated to me now by this ſelf-conſciouſneſs, as I am for what I did the laſt moment.

Self depends on conſciouſneſs.

§. 17. Self is that conſcious thinking thing whatever ſubſtance made up of, (whether ſpiritual or material, ſimple or compounded, it matters not) which is ſenſible, or conſcious of pleaſure and pain, capable of happineſs or miſery, and ſo is concerned for itſelf, as far as that conſciouſneſs extends. Thus every one finds, that whilſt comprehended under that conſciouſneſs, the little finger is as much a part of himſelf, as what is moſt ſo. Upon ſeparation of this little finger, ſhould this conſciouſneſs go along with the little finger, and leave the reſt of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the perſon, the ſame perſon; and ſelf then would have nothing to do with the reſt of the body. As in this caſe it is the conſciouſneſs that goes along with the ſubſtance, when one part is ſeparate from another, which makes the ſame perſon, and conſtitutes this inſeparable ſelf; ſo it is in reference to ſubſtances remote in time. That with which the conſciouſneſs of this preſent thinking thing can join itſelf, makes the ſame perſon, and is one ſelf with it, and with nothing elſe; and ſo attributes to itſelf, and owns all the actions of that thing as its own, as far as that conſciouſneſs reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive.

Objects of reward and puniſhment.

§. 18. In this perſonal identity, is founded all the right and juſtice of reward and puniſhment; happineſs and miſery being that for which every one is concerned for himſelf, and not mattering what becomes of any ſubſtance not joined to, or affected with that conſciouſneſs. For as it is evident in the inſtance I gave but now, if the conſciouſneſs went along with the little finger when it was cut off, that would be the ſame ſelf which was concerned for the whole body yeſterday, as making part of itſelf, whoſe actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Though if the ſame body ſhould ſtill live, and immediately,

immediately, from the ſeparation of the little finger, have its own peculiar conſciouſneſs, whereof the little finger knew nothing; it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of itſelf, or could own any of its actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

§. 19. This may ſhow us wherein perſonal identity conſiſts; not in the identity of ſubſtance, but, as I have ſaid, in the identity of conſciouſneſs; wherein, if Socrates and the preſent mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the ſame perſon: if the ſame Socrates waking and ſleeping do not partake of the ſame conſciouſneſs, Socrates waking and ſleeping is not the ſame perſon. And to puniſh Socrates waking for what ſleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conſcious of; would be no more of right, than to puniſh one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, becauſe their outſides were ſo like, that they could not be diſtinguiſhed; for ſuch twins have been ſeen.

§. 20. But yet poſſibly it will ſtill be objected, ſuppoſe I wholly loſe the memory of ſome parts of my life beyond a poſſibility of retrieving them, ſo that perhaps I ſhall never be conſcious of them again; yet am I not the ſame perſon that did thoſe actions, had thoſe thoughts that I once was conſcious of, though I have now forgot them? To which I anſwer, that we muſt here take notice what the word I is applied to; which, in this caſe, is the man only. And the ſame man being preſumed to be the ſame perſon, I is eaſily here ſuppoſed to ſtand alſo for the ſame perſon. But if it be poſſible for the ſame man to have diſtinct incommunicable conſciouſneſs at different times, it is paſt doubt the ſame man would at different times make different perſons; which, we ſee, is the ſenſe of mankind in the ſolemneſt declaration of their opinions; human laws not puniſhing the mad man for the ſober man's actions, nor the ſober man for what the mad man did, thereby making them two perſons: which is ſomewhat explained by our way of ſpeaking in Engliſh, when we ſay ſuch an one is not himſelf, or is beſide himſelf; in which phraſes it is inſinuated, as if thoſe who now, or at leaſt firſt uſed them, thought that ſelf was changed, the ſelf-ſame perſon was no longer in that man.

Difference between identity of man and perſon.

§. 21. But yet it is hard to conceive that Socrates, the ſame individual man, ſhould be two perſons. To help us a little in this, we muſt conſider what is meant by Socrates, or the ſame individual man.

Firſt, it muſt be either the ſame individual, immaterial, thinking ſubſtance; in ſhort, the ſame numerical ſoul, and nothing elſe.

Secondly, or the ſame animal, without any regard to an immaterial ſoul.

Thirdly, or the ſame immaterial ſpirit united to the ſame animal.

Now take which of theſe ſuppoſitions you pleaſe, it is impoſſible to make perſonal identity to conſiſt in any thing but conſciouſneſs, or reach any farther than that does.

For by the firſt of them, it muſt be allowed poſſible that a man born of different women, and in diſtant times, may be the ſame man. A way of ſpeaking, which whoever admits, muſt allow it poſſible for the ſame man to be two diſtinct perſons, as any two that have lived in different ages, without the knowledge of one another's thoughts.

By the ſecond and third, Socrates in this life, and after it, cannot be the ſame man any way, but by the ſame conſciouſneſs; and ſo making human identity to conſiſt in the ſame thing wherein we place perſonal identity, there will be no difficulty to allow the ſame man to be the ſame perſon. But then they who place human identity in conſciouſneſs only, and not in ſomething elſe, muſt conſider how they will make the infant Socrates the ſame man with Socrates after the reſurrection. But whatſoever to ſome men makes a man, and conſequently the ſame individual man, wherein perhaps few are agreed, perſonal identity can by us be placed in nothing but conſciouſneſs (which is that alone which makes what we call ſelf) without involving us in great abſurdities.

§. 22. But is not a man drunk and ſober the ſame perſon, why elſe is he puniſhed for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conſcious

of

of it? Juſt as much the ſame perſon, as a man that walks, and does other things in his ſleep, is the ſame perſon, and is anſwerable for any miſchief he ſhall do in it. Human laws puniſh both, with a juſtice ſuitable to their way of knowledge; becauſe in theſe caſes, they cannot diſtinguiſh certainly what is real, what counterfeit: and ſo the ignorance in drunkenneſs or ſleep is not admitted as a plea. For though puniſhment be annexed to perſonality, and perſonality to conſciouſneſs, and the drunkard perhaps be not conſcious of what he did; yet human judicatures juſtly puniſh him, becauſe the fact is proved againſt him, but want of conſciouſneſs cannot be proved for him. But in the great day, wherein the ſecrets of all hearts ſhall be laid open, it may be reaſonable to think, no one ſhall be made to anſwer for what he knows nothing of; but ſhall receive his doom, his conſcience accuſing or excuſing him.

Conſciouſneſs alone, makes ſelf.

§. 23. Nothing but conſciouſneſs can unite remote exiſtences into the ſame perſon, the identity of ſubſtance will not do it. For whatever ſubſtance there is, however framed, without conſciouſneſs there is no perſon: and a carcaſe may be a perſon, as well as any ſort of ſubſtance be ſo without conſciouſneſs.

Could we ſuppoſe two diſtinct incommunicable conſciouſneſſes acting the ſame body, the one conſtantly by day, the other by night; and, on the other ſide, the ſame conſciouſneſs acting by intervals two diſtinct bodies: I aſk in the firſt caſe, whether the day and the night man would not be two as diſtinct perſons, as Socrates and Plato? And whether, in the ſecond caſe, there would not be one perſon in two diſtinct cloathings? Nor is it at all material to ſay, that this ſame, and this diſtinct conſciouſneſs, in the caſes above mentioned, is owing to the ſame and diſtinct immaterial ſubſtances, bringing it with them to thoſe bodies; which, whether true or no, alters not the caſe: ſince it is evident the perſonal identity would equally be determined by the conſciouſneſs, whether that conſciouſneſs were

were annexed to ſome individual immaterial ſubſtance or no. For granting, that the thinking ſubſtance in man muſt be neceſſarily ſuppoſed immaterial, it is evident that immaterial thinking thing may ſometimes part with its paſt conſciouſneſs, and be reſtored to it again, as appears in the forgetfulneſs men often have of their paſt actions: and the mind many times recovers the memory of a paſt conſciouſneſs, which it had loſt for twenty years together. Make theſe intervals of memory and forgetfulneſs to take their turns regularly by day and night, and you have two perſons with the ſame immaterial ſpirit, as much as in the former inſtance two perſons with the ſame body. So that ſelf is not determined by identity or diverſity of ſubſtance, which it cannot be ſure of, but only by identity of conſciouſneſs.

§. 24. Indeed it may conceive the ſubſtance, whereof it is now made up, to have exiſted formerly, united in the ſame conſcious being: but conſciouſneſs removed, that ſubſtance is no more itſelf, or makes no more a part of it, than any other ſubſtance; as is evident in the inſtance we have already given of a limb cut off, of whoſe heat, or cold, or other affections, having no longer any conſciouſneſs, it is no more of a man's ſelf, than any other matter of the univerſe. In like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial ſubſtance, which is void of that conſciouſneſs whereby I am myſelf to myſelf: if there be any part of its exiſtence, which I cannot upon recollection join with that preſent conſciouſneſs, whereby I am now myſelf, it is in that part of its exiſtence no more myſelf, than any other immaterial being. For whatſoever any ſubſtance has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my conſciouſneſs make my own thought and action, it will no more belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial being any where exiſting.

§. 25. I agree, the more probable opinion is, that this conſciouſneſs is annexed to, and the affection of one individual immaterial ſubſtance,

But

But let men, according to their diverſe hypotheſes, reſolve of that as they pleaſe, this very intelligent being, ſenſible of happineſs or miſery, muſt grant, that there is ſomething that is himſelf that he is concerned for, and would have happy; that this ſelf has exiſted in a continued duration more than one inſtant, and therefore it is poſſible may exiſt, as it has done, months and years to come, without any certain bounds to be ſet to its duration; and may be the ſame ſelf, by the ſame conſciouſneſs continued on for the future. And thus, by this conſciouſneſs, he finds himſelf to be the ſame ſelf which did ſuch or ſuch an action ſome years ſince, by which he comes to be happy or miſerable now. In all which account of ſelf, the ſame numerical ſubſtance is not conſidered as making the ſame ſelf; but the ſame continued conſciouſneſs, in which ſeveral ſubſtances may have been united, and again ſeparated from it; which, whilſt they continued in a vital union with that, wherein this conſciouſneſs then reſided, made a part of that ſame ſelf. Thus any part of our bodies vitally united to that which is conſcious in us, makes a part of ourſelves: but upon ſeparation from the vital union, by which that conſciouſneſs is communicated, that which a moment ſince was part of ourſelves, is now no more ſo, than a part of another man's ſelf is a part of me: and it is not impoſſible, but in a little time may become a real part of another perſon. And ſo we have the ſame numerical ſubſtance become a part of two different perſons; and the ſame perſon preſerved under the change of various ſubſtances. Could we ſuppoſe any ſpirit wholly ſtripped of all its memory or conſciouſneſs of paſt actions, as we find our minds always are of a great part of ours, and ſometimes of them all; the union or ſeparation of ſuch a ſpiritual ſubſtance would make no variation of perſonal identity, any more than that of any particle of matter does. Any ſubſtance vitally united to the preſent thinking being, is a part of that very ſame ſelf which now is: any thing united to it by a conſciouſneſs of former actions, makes alſo a part of the ſame ſelf, which is the ſame both then and now.

Perſon a forenſick term.

§. 26. Perſon, as I take it, is the name for this ſelf. Wherever a man finds what he calls himſelf, there I think another may ſay is the ſame perſon. It is a forenſick term appropriating actions and their merit; and ſo belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happineſs and miſery. This perſonality extends itſelf beyond preſent exiſtence to what is paſt, only by conſciouſneſs, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to itſelf paſt actions, juſt upon the ſame ground, and for the ſame reaſon that it does the preſent. All which is founded in a concern for happineſs, the unavoidable concomitant of conſciouſneſs; that which is conſcious of pleaſure and pain, deſiring that that ſelf that is conſcious ſhould be happy. And therefore whatever paſt actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that preſent ſelf by conſciouſneſs, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been done: and to receive pleaſure or pain, i. e. reward or puniſhment, on the account of any ſuch action, is all one as to be made happy or miſerable in its firſt being, without any demerit at all. For ſuppoſing a man puniſhed now for what he had done in another life, whereof he could be made to have no conſciouſneſs at all, what difference is there between that puniſhment, and being created miſerable? And therefore conformable to this the apoſtle tells us, that at the great day, when every one ſhall "receive according to his "doings, the ſecrets of all hearts ſhall be laid open." The ſentence ſhall be juſtified by the conſciouſneſs all perſons ſhall have, that they themſelves, in what bodies ſoever they appear, or what ſubſtances ſoever that conſciouſneſs adheres to, are the ſame that committed thoſe actions, and deſerve that puniſhment for them.

§. 27. I am apt enough to think I have, in treating of this ſubject, made ſome ſuppoſitions that will look ſtrange to ſome readers, and poſſibly they are ſo in themſelves. But yet, I think, they are ſuch as are pardonable in this ignorance we are in of the nature of that thinking thing that is in us, and which we look on as ourſelves. Did we know what it was, or how

how it was tied to a certain ſyſtem of fleeting animal ſpirits; or whether it could or could not perform its operations of thinking and memory out of a body organized as ours is: and whether it has pleaſed God, that no one ſuch ſpirit ſhall ever be united to any one but ſuch body, upon the right conſtitution of whoſe organs its memory ſhould depend: we might ſee the abſurdity of ſome of thoſe ſuppoſitions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do, (in the dark concerning theſe matters) the ſoul of a man, for an immaterial ſubſtance, independent from matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the nature of things be no abſurdity at all to ſuppoſe, that the ſame ſoul may, at different times, be united to different bodies, and with them make up, for that time, one man: as well as we ſuppoſe a part of a ſheep's body yeſterday ſhould be a part of a man's body to-morrow, and in that union make a vital part of Melibœus himſelf, as well as it did of his ram.

The difficulty from ill uſe of names.

§. 28. To conclude: Whatever ſubſtance begins to exiſt, it muſt, during its exiſtence, neceſſarily be the ſame: whatever compoſitions of ſubſtances begin to exiſt, during the union of thoſe ſubſtances the concrete muſt be the ſame: whatſoever mode begins to exiſt, during its exiſtence it is the ſame: and ſo if the compoſition be of diſtinct ſubſtances and different modes, the ſame rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the difficulty or obſcurity that has been about this matter, rather riſes from the names ill uſed, than from any obſcurity in things themſelves. For whatever makes the ſpecifick idea to which the name is applied, if that idea be ſteadily kept to, the diſtinction of any thing into the ſame and divers will eaſily be conceived, and there can ariſe no doubt about it.

Continued exiſtence makes identity.

§. 29. For ſuppoſing a rational ſpirit be the idea of a man, it is eaſy to know what is the ſame man; viz. the ſame ſpirit, whether ſeparate or in a body, will be the ſame man. Suppoſing a rational ſpirit vitally united to a body of a certain conformation of parts to make a man, whilſt that

that rational ſpirit, with that vital conformation of parts, though continued in a fleeting ſucceſſive body, remains, it will be the ſame. But if to any one the idea of a man be but the vital union of parts in a certain ſhape; as long as that vital union and ſhape remain, in a concrete no otherwiſe the ſame, but by a continued ſucceſſion of fleeting particles, it will be the ſame. For whatever be the compoſition, whereof the complex idea is made, whenever exiſtence makes it one particular thing under any denomination, the ſame exiſtence, continued, preſerves it the ſame individual under the ſame denomination. (1)

CHAP.

(1) The doctrine of identity and diverſity contained in this chapter, the biſhop of Worceſter pretends to be inconſiſtent with the doctrines of the Chriſtian faith, concerning the reſurrection of the dead. His way of arguing from it, is this; He ſays, The reaſon of believing the reſurrection of the ſame body, upon Mr. Locke's grounds, is from the idea of identity. To which our author * anſwers: Give me leave, my lord, to ſay, that the reaſon of believing any article of the Chriſtian faith (ſuch as your lordſhip is here ſpeaking of) to me, and upon my grounds, is its being a part of divine revelation: upon this ground I believed it, before I either writ that chapter of identity and diverſity, and before I ever thought of thoſe propoſitions which your lordſhip quotes out of that chapter; and upon the ſame ground I believe it ſtill; and not from my idea of identity. This ſaying of your lordſhip's, therefore, being a propoſition neither ſelf-evident, nor allowed by me to be true, remains to be proved. So that your foundation failing, all your large ſuperſtructure built thereon, comes to nothing.

But, my lord, before we go any farther, I crave leave humbly to repreſent to your lordſhip, that I thought you undertook to make out that my notion of ideas was inconſiſtent with the articles of the Chriſtian faith. But that which your lordſhip inſtances in here, is not, that I yet know, an article of the Chriſtian faith. The reſurrection of the dead I acknowledge to be an article of the Chriſtian faith: but that the reſurrection of the ſame body, in your lordſhip's ſenſe of the ſame body, is an article of the Chriſtian faith, is what, I confeſs, I do not yet know.

In the New Teſtament (wherein, I think, are contained all the articles of the Chriſtian faith) I find our Saviour and the apoſtles to preach the reſurrection of the dead, and the reſurrection from the dead, in many places: but I do not remember any place where the reſurrection of the ſame body is ſo much as mentioned. Nay, which is very remarkable in the caſe, I do not remember in any place of the New Teſtament (where

* In his 3d letter to the biſhop of Worceſter.

the

the general reſurrection at the laſt day is ſpoken of) any ſuch expreſſion as the reſurrection of the body, much leſs of the ſame body.

I ſay the general reſurrection at the laſt day: becauſe, where the reſurrection of ſome particular perſons, preſently upon our Saviour's reſurrection, is mentioned, the words are *, The graves were opened, and many bodies of ſaints, which ſlept, aroſe, and came out of the graves after his reſurrection, and went into the Holy City, and appeared to many: of which peculiar way of ſpeaking of this reſurrection, the paſſage itſelf gives a reaſon in theſe words, appeared to many, i. e. thoſe who ſlept appeared, ſo as to be known to be riſen. But this could not be known, unleſs they brought with them the evidence, that they were thoſe who had been dead; whereof there were theſe two proofs, their graves were opened, and their bodies not only gone out of them, but appeared to be the ſame to thoſe who had known them formerly alive, and knew them to be dead and buried. For if they had been thoſe who had been dead ſo long, that all who knew them once alive, were now gone, thoſe to whom they appeared might have known them to be men; but could not have known they were riſen from the dead, becauſe they never knew they had been dead. All that by their appearing they could have known, was, that they were ſo many living ſtrangers, of whoſe reſurrection they knew nothing. It was neceſſary therefore, that they ſhould come in ſuch bodies, as might in make and ſize, &c. appear to be the ſame they had before, that they might be known to thoſe of their acquaintance, whom they appeared to. And it is probable they were ſuch as were newly dead, whoſe bodies were not yet diſſolved and diſſipated; and therefore, it is particularly ſaid here (differently from what is ſaid of the general reſurrection) that their bodies aroſe; becauſe they were the ſame that were then lying in their graves, the moment before they roſe.

But your lordſhip endeavours to prove it muſt be the ſame body: and let us grant that your lordſhip, nay, and others too, think you have proved it muſt be the ſame body; Will you therefore ſay, that he holds what is inconſiſtent with an article of faith, who having never ſeen this your lordſhip's interpretation of the ſcripture, nor your reaſons for the ſame body, in your ſenſe of ſame body; or, if he has ſeen them, yet not underſtanding them, or not perceiving the force of them, believes what the ſcripture propoſes to him, viz. That at the laſt day the dead ſhall be raiſed, without determining whether it ſhall be with the very ſame bodies or no?

I know your lordſhip pretends not to erect your particular interpretations of ſcripture into articles of faith. And if you do not, he that believes the dead ſhall be raiſed, believes that article of faith which the ſcripture propoſes; and cannot be accuſed of holding any thing inconſiſtent with it, if it ſhould happen, that what he holds, is inconſiſtent with another propoſition, viz. That the dead ſhall be raiſed with the ſame bodies, in your lordſhip's ſenſe, which I do not find propoſed in Holy Writ as an article of faith.

But your lordſhip argues, It muſt be the ſame body; which, as you explain ſame body †, is not the ſame individual particles of matter, which were united at the point of death; nor the ſame particles of matter, that the ſinner had at the time of the commiſſion of his ſins;

* Matt. xxvii. 52, 53. † 2d Anſ.

but

but that it muſt be the ſame material ſubſtance which was vitally united to the ſoul here; i. e. as I underſtand it, the ſame individual particles of matter, which were, ſome time or other during his life here, vitally united to his ſoul.

Your firſt argument to prove, that it muſt be the ſame body in this ſenſe of the ſame body, is taken from theſe words of our Saviour, * All that are in the graves ſhall hear his voice, and ſhall come forth. † From whence your lordſhip argues, That theſe words, all that are in their graves, relate to no other ſubſtance than what was united to the ſoul in life; becauſe a different ſubſtance cannot be ſaid to be in the graves, and to come out of them. Which words of your lordſhip's, if they prove any thing, prove that the ſoul too is lodged in the grave, and raiſed out of it at the laſt day. For your lordſhip ſays, Can a different ſubſtance be ſaid to be in the graves, and come out of them? So that, according to this interpretation of theſe words of our Saviour, No other ſubſtance being raiſed, but what hears his voice; and no other ſubſtance hearing his voice, but what being called, comes out of the grave; and no other ſubſtance coming out of the grave, but what was in the grave; any one muſt conclude, that the ſoul, unleſs it be in the grave, will make no part of the perſon that is raiſed; unleſs, as your lordſhip argues againſt me ‡, You can make it out, that a ſubſtance which never was in the grave may come out of it, or that the ſoul is no ſubſtance.

But ſetting aſide the ſubſtance of the ſoul, another thing that will make any one doubt, whether this your interpretation of our Saviour's words be neceſſarily to be received as their true ſenſe, is, That it will not be very eaſily reconciled to your ſaying ‖, you do not mean by the ſame body, The ſame individual particles which were united at the point of death. And yet, by this interpretation of our Saviour's words, you can mean no other particles but ſuch as were united at the point of death; becauſe you mean no other ſubſtance but what comes out of the grave; and no ſubſtance, no particles come out, you ſay, but what were in the grave; and I think, your lordſhip will not ſay, that the particles that were ſeparate from the body by perſpiration before the point of death, were laid up in the grave.

But your lordſhip, I find, has an anſwer to this, viz. § That by comparing this with other places, you find that the words [of our Saviour above quoted] are to be underſtood of the ſubſtance of the body, to which the ſoul was united, and not to (I ſuppoſe your lordſhip writ, of) theſe individual particles, i. e. thoſe individual particles that are in the grave at the reſurrection. For ſo they muſt be read, to make your lordſhip's ſenſe entire, and to the purpoſe of your anſwer here: and then, methinks, this laſt ſenſe of our Saviour's words given by your lordſhip, wholly overturns the ſenſe which we have given of them above, where from theſe words you preſs the belief of the reſurrection of the ſame body, by this ſtrong argument, that a ſubſtance could not, upon hearing the voice of Chriſt, come out of the grave, which was never in the grave. There (as far as I can underſtand your words) your lordſhip argues, that our Saviour's words are to be underſtood of the particles in the grave, unleſs, as your lordſhip ſays, one can make it out, that a ſubſtance which never was in the grave, may come out of it. And here your

* John v. 28, 29. † 2d Anſ. ‡ ib. ‖ ib. § ib.

lordſhip

lordſhip expreſly ſays, That our Saviour's words are to be underſtood of the ſubſtance of that body, to which the ſoul was [at any time] united, and not to thoſe individual particles that are in the grave. Which put together, ſeems to me to ſay, That our Saviour's words are to be underſtood of thoſe particles only that are in the grave, and not of thoſe particles only which are in the grave, but of others alſo, which have at any time been vitally united to the ſoul, but never were in the grave.

The next text your lordſhip brings to make the reſurrection of the ſame body, in your ſenſe, an article of faith, are theſe words of St. Paul; * For we muſt all appear before the judgment ſeat of Chriſt, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad. To which your lordſhip ſubjoins † this queſtion: Can theſe words be underſtood of any other material ſubſtance, but that body in which theſe things were done? Anſwer. A man may ſuſpend his determining the meaning of the apoſtle to be, that a ſinner ſhall ſuffer for his ſins in the very ſame body wherein he committed them; becauſe St. Paul does not ſay he ſhall have the very ſame body when he ſuffers, that he had when he ſinned. The apoſtle ſays indeed, done in his body. The body he had, and did things in, at five or fifteen, was, no doubt, his body, as much as that, which he did things in at fifty, was his body, though his body were not the very ſame body at thoſe different ages: and ſo will the body, which he ſhall have after the reſurrection, be his body, though it be not the very ſame with that, which he had at five, or fifteen, or fifty. He that at threeſcore is broke on the wheel, for a murder he committed at twenty, is puniſhed for what he did in his body, though the body he has, i. e. his body at threeſcore, be not the ſame, i. e. made up of the ſame individual particles of matter, that that body was, which he had forty years before. When your lordſhip has reſolved with yourſelf, what that ſame immutable he is, which at the laſt judgment ſhall receive the things done in his body, your lordſhip will eaſily ſee, that the body he had when an embryo in the womb, when a child playing in coats, when a man marrying a wife, and when bed-rid dying of a conſumption, and at laſt, which he ſhall have after his reſurrection, are each of them his body, though neither of them be the ſame body, the one with the other.

But farther, to your lordſhip's queſtion, Can theſe words be underſtood of any other material ſubſtance, but that body in which theſe things were done? I anſwer, Theſe words of St. Paul may be underſtood of another material ſubſtance, than that body in which theſe things were done, becauſe your lordſhip teaches me, and gives me a ſtrong reaſon ſo to underſtand them. Your lordſhip ſays, ‡ That you do not ſay the ſame particles of matter, which the ſinner had at the very time of the commiſſion of his ſins, ſhall be raiſed at the laſt day. And your lordſhip gives this reaſon for it; ‖ For then a long ſinner muſt have a vaſt body, conſidering the continued ſpending of particles by perſpiration. Now, my lord, if the apoſtle's words, as your lordſhip would argue, cannot be underſtood of any other material ſubſtance, but that body in which theſe things were done; and no body, upon the removal or change of ſome of the particles that at any time make it up, is the ſame material ſub-

* 2 Cor. v. 10. † 2d Anſ. ‡ ib. ‖ ib.

ſtance, or the ſame body; it will, I think, thence follow, that either the ſinner muſt have all the ſame individual particles vitally united to his ſoul when he is raiſed, that he had vitally united to his ſoul when he ſinned; or elſe St. Paul's words here cannot be underſtood to mean the ſame body in which the things were done. For if there were other particles of matter in the body, wherein the things were done, than in that which is raiſed, that which is raiſed cannot be the ſame body in which they were done: unleſs that alone, which has juſt all the ſame individual particles when any action is done, being the ſame body wherein it was done, that alſo, which has not the ſame individual particles wherein that action was done, can be the ſame body wherein it was done; which is in effect to make the ſame body ſometimes to be the ſame, and ſometimes not the ſame.

Your lordſhip thinks it ſuffices to make the ſame body, to have not all, but no other particles of matter, but ſuch as were ſometime or other vitally united to the ſoul before; but ſuch a body, made up of part of the particles ſome time or other vitally united to the ſoul, is no more the ſame body wherein the actions were done in the diſtant parts of the long ſinner's life, than that is the ſame body in which a quarter, or half, or three quarters of the ſame particles, that made it up, are wanting. For example, A ſinner has acted here in his body an hundred years; he is raiſed at the laſt day, but with what body? The ſame, ſays your lordſhip, that he acted in; becauſe St. Paul ſays, he muſt receive the things done in his body. What therefore muſt his body at the reſurrection conſiſt of? Muſt it conſiſt of all the particles of matter that have ever been vitally united to his ſoul? For they, in ſucceſſion, have all of them made up his body wherein he did theſe things: No, ſays your lordſhip, * that would make his body too vaſt; it ſuffices to make the ſame body in which the things were done, that it conſiſts of ſome of the particles, and no other, but ſuch as were, ſome time during his life, vitally united to his ſoul. But according to this account, his body at the reſurrection being, as your lordſhip ſeems to limit it, near the ſame ſize it was in ſome part of his life, it will be no more the ſame body in which the things were done in the diſtant parts of his life, than that is the ſame body, in which half, or three quarters, or more of the individual matter that then made it up, is now wanting. For example, Let his body at fifty years old conſiſt of a million of parts: five hundred thouſand at leaſt of thoſe parts will be different from thoſe which made up his body at ten years, and at an hundred. So that to take the numerical particles, that made up his body at fifty, or any other ſeaſon of his life, or to gather them promiſcuouſly out of thoſe which at different times have ſucceſſively been vitally united to his ſoul, they will no more make the ſame body, which was his, wherein ſome of his actions were done, than that is the ſame body, which has but half the ſame particles: and yet all your lordſhip's argument here for the ſame body, is, becauſe St. Paul ſays it muſt be his body, in which theſe things were done; which it could not be, if any other ſubſtance were joined to it, i. e. if any other particles of matter made up the body, which were not vitally united to the ſoul when the action was done.

* 2d Anſ.

Again

Again, your lordſhip ſays, * 'That you do not ſay the ſame individual particles [ſhall make up the body at the reſurrection] which were united at the point of death, for there muſt be a great alteration in them in a lingering diſeaſe, as if a fat man falls into a conſumption.' Becauſe, it is likely, your lordſhip thinks theſe particles of a decrepit, waſted, withered body, would be too few, or unfit to make ſuch a plump, ſtrong, vigorous, well-ſized body, as it has pleaſed your lordſhip to proportion out in your thoughts to men at the reſurrection; and therefore ſome ſmall portion of the particles formerly united vitally to that man's ſoul, ſhall be reaſſumed to make up his body to the bulk your lordſhip judges convenient; but the greateſt part of them ſhall be left out, to avoid the making his body more vaſt than your lordſhip thinks will be fit, as appears by theſe your lordſhip's words immediately following, viz. † 'That you do not ſay the ſame particles the ſinner had at the very time of commiſſion of his ſins; for then a long ſinner muſt have a vaſt body.'

But then, pray, my lord, what muſt an embryo do, who dying within a few hours after his body was vitally united to his ſoul, has no particles of matter, which were formerly vitally united to it, to make up his body of that ſize and proportion which your lordſhip ſeems to require in bodies at the reſurrection? Or muſt we believe he ſhall remain content with that ſmall pittance of matter, and that yet imperfect body to eternity, becauſe it is an article of faith to believe the reſurrection of the very ſame body, i. e. made up of only ſuch particles as have been vitally united to the ſoul? For it muſt be ſo, as your lordſhip ſays, ‡ 'That life is the reſult of the union of ſoul and body,' it will follow, that the body of an embryo dying in the womb may be very little, not the thouſandth part of any ordinary man. For ſince from the firſt conception and beginning of formation it has life, and 'life is the reſult of the union of the ſoul with the body;' an embryo, that ſhall die either by the untimely death of the mother, or by any other accident, preſently after it has life, muſt, according to your lordſhip's doctrine, remain a man not an inch long to eternity; becauſe there are not particles of matter, formerly united to his ſoul, to make him bigger, and no other can be made uſe of to that purpoſe: though what greater congruity the ſoul hath with any particles of matter which were once vitally united to it, but are now ſo no longer, than it hath with particles of matter which it was never united to, would be hard to determine, if that ſhould be demanded.

By theſe and not a few other the like conſequences, one may ſee what ſervice they do to religion, and the Chriſtian doctrine, who raiſe queſtions, and make articles of faith about the reſurrection of the ſame body, where the ſcripture ſays nothing of the ſame body; or if it does, it is with no ſmall reprimand ‖ to thoſe who make ſuch an inquiry. 'But ſome men will ſay, How are the dead raiſed up? and with what body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou ſoweſt, is not quickened, except it die. And that which thou ſoweſt, thou ſoweſt not that body that ſhall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of ſome other grain. But God giveth it a body, as it hath pleaſed him.' Words, I ſhould think, ſufficient to deter us from determining any thing for or againſt the ſame body's being raiſed at the laſt day. It ſuffices, that all

* 2d Anſw. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. ‖ 1 Cor. xv. 35, &c.

the dead ſhall be raiſed, and every one appear and anſwer for the things done in his life, and receive according to the things he has done in his body, whether good or bad. He that believes this, and has ſaid nothing inconſiſtent herewith, I preſume may and muſt be acquitted from being guilty of any thing inconſiſtent with the article of the reſurrection of the dead.

But your lordſhip, to prove the reſurrection of the ſame body to be an article of faith, farther aſks, * 'How could it be ſaid, if any other ſubſtance be joined to the ſoul at the reſurrection, as its body, that they were the things done in or by the body?' Anſw. Juſt as it may be ſaid of a man at an hundred years old, that hath then another ſubſtance joined to his ſoul, than he had at twenty; that the murder or drunkenneſs he was guilty of at twenty, were things done in the body: how 'by the body' comes in here, I do not ſee.

Your lordſhip adds, 'and St. Paul's diſpute about the manner of raiſing the body, might ſoon have ended, if there were no neceſſity of the ſame body.' Anſw. When I underſtand what argument there is in theſe words to prove the reſurrection of the ſame body, without the mixture of one new atom of matter, I ſhall know what to ſay to it. In the mean time this I underſtand, that St. Paul would have put as ſhort an end to all diſputes about this matter, if he had ſaid, that there was a neceſſity of of the ſame body, or that it ſhould be the ſame body.

The next text of ſcripture you bring for the ſame body is, † 'If there be no reſurrection of the dead, then is not Chriſt raiſed.' From which your lordſhip argues, ‡ 'It ſeems then other bodies are to be raiſed as his was.' I grant other dead, as certainly raiſed as Chriſt was; for elſe his reſurrection would be of no uſe to mankind. But I do not ſee how it follows, that they ſhall be raiſed with the ſame body, as Chriſt was raiſed with the ſame body, as your lordſhip infers in theſe words annexed; 'And can there be any doubt, whether his body was the ſame material ſubſtance which was united to his ſoul before?' I anſwer, None at all; nor that it had juſt the ſame diſtinguiſhing lineaments and marks, yea, and the ſame wounds that it had at the time of his death. If therefore your lordſhip will argue from other bodies being raiſed as his was, That they muſt keep proportion with his in ſameneſs; then we muſt believe, that every man ſhall be raiſed with the ſame lineaments and other notes of diſtinction he had at the time of his death, even with his wounds yet open, if he had any, becauſe our Saviour was ſo raiſed; which ſeems to me ſcarce reconcileable with what your lordſhip ſays, ‖ of a fat man falling into a conſumption, and dying.

But whether it will conſiſt or no with your lordſhip's meaning in that place, this to me ſeems a conſequence that will need to be better proved, viz. That our bodies muſt be raiſed the ſame, juſt as our Saviour's was: becauſe St. Paul ſays, 'if there be no reſurrection of the dead, then is not Chriſt riſen.' For it may be a good conſequence, Chriſt is riſen, and therefore there ſhall be a reſurrection of the dead; and yet this may not be a good conſequence, Chriſt was raiſed with the ſame body he had at his death, therefore all men ſhall be raiſed with the ſame body they had at their death, contrary to what your lordſhip ſays concerning a fat man

* 2d Anſw. † 2 Cor. xv. 16. ‡ 2d Anſw. ‖ Ibid.

dying

dying of a conſumption. But the caſe I think far different betwixt our Saviour, and thoſe to be raiſed at the laſt day.

1. His body ſaw not corruption, and therefore to give him another body new moulded, mixed with other particles, which were not contained in it as it lay in the grave, whole and intire as it was laid there, had been to deſtroy his body to frame him a new one without any need. But why with the remaining particles of a man's body long ſince diſſolved and mouldered into duſt and atoms (whereof poſſibly a great part may have undergone variety of changes, and entered into other concretions; even in the bodies of other men) other new particles of matter mixed with them, may not ſerve to make his body again, as well as the mixture of new and different particles of matter with the old, did in the compaſs of his life make his body, I think no reaſon can be given.

This may ſerve to ſhow, why, though the materials of our Saviour's body were not changed at his reſurrection; yet it does not follow, but that the body of a man dead and rotten in his grave, or burnt, may at the laſt day have ſeveral new particles in it, and that without any inconvenience: ſince whatever matter is vitally united to his ſoul is his body, as much as is that which was united to it when he was born, or in any other part of his life.

2. In the next place, the ſize, ſhape, figure, and lineaments of our Saviour's body, even to his wounds, into which doubting Thomas put his fingers and his hand, were to be kept in the raiſed body of our Saviour, the ſame they were at his death, to be a conviction to his diſciples, to whom he ſhewed himſelf, and who were to be witneſſes of his reſurrection, that their maſter, the very ſame man, was crucified, dead, and buried, and raiſed again; and therefore he was handled by them, and eat before them after he was riſen, to give them in all points full ſatisfaction that it was really he, the ſame, and not another, nor a ſpectre or apparition of him: though I do not think your lordſhip will thence argue, that becauſe others are to be raiſed as he was, therefore it is neceſſary to believe, that becauſe he eat after his reſurrection, others at the laſt day ſhall eat and drink after they are raiſed from the dead; which ſeems to me as good an argument, as becauſe his undiſſolved body was raiſed out of the grave, juſt as it there lay intire, without the mixture of any new particles; therefore the corrupted and conſumed bodies of the dead, at the reſurrection, ſhall be new framed only out of thoſe ſcattered particles which were once vitally united to their ſouls, without the leaſt mixture of any one ſingle atom of new matter. But at the laſt day, when all men are raiſed, there will be no need to be aſſured of any one particular man's reſurrection. It is enough that every one ſhall appear before the judgment-ſeat of Chriſt, to receive according to what he had done in his former life; but in what ſort of body he ſhall appear, or of what particles made up, the ſcripture having ſaid nothing, but that it ſhall be a ſpiritual body raiſed in incorruption, it is not for me to determine.

Your lordſhip aſks, * "Were they [who ſaw our Saviour after his reſurrection] witneſſes only of ſome material ſubſtance then united to his ſoul?" In anſwer, I beg your lordſhip to conſider, whether you ſuppoſe our Saviour was to be known to be the ſame man (to the witneſſes that

* 2d Anſw.

were to ſee him, and teſtify his reſurrection) by his ſoul, that could neither be ſeen or known to be the ſame; or by his body, that could be ſeen, and by the diſcernible ſtructure and marks of it, be known to be the ſame? When your lordſhip has reſolved that, all that you ſay in that page will anſwer itſelf. But becauſe one man cannot know another to be the ſame, but by the outward viſible lineaments, and ſenſible marks he has been wont to be known and diſtinguiſhed by, will your lordſhip therefore argue, That the Great Judge, at the laſt day, who gives to each man, whom he raiſes, his new body, ſhall not be able to know who is who, unleſs he give to every one of them a body, juſt of the ſame figure, ſize, and features, and made up of the very ſame individual particles he had in his former life? Whether ſuch a way of arguing for the reſurrection of the ſame body, to be an article of faith, contributes much to the ſtrengthening the credibility of the article of the reſurrection of the dead, I ſhall leave to the judgment of others.

Farther, for the proving the reſurrection of the ſame body, to be an article of faith, your lordſhip ſays, * 'But the apoſtle inſiſts upon the reſurrection of Chriſt, not merely as an argument of the poſſibility of ours, but of the certainty of it; † becauſe he roſe, as the firſt-fruits; Chriſt the firſt-fruits, afterwards they that are Chriſt's at his coming. Anſw. No doubt, the reſurrection of Chriſt is a proof of the certainty of our reſurrection. But is it therefore a proof of the reſurrection of the ſame body, conſiſting of the ſame individual particles which concurred to the making up of our body here, without the mixture of any one other particle of matter? I confeſs I ſee no ſuch conſequence.

But your lordſhip goes on: ‡ 'St. Paul was aware of the objections in men's minds about the reſurrection of the ſame body; and it is of great conſequence as to this article, to ſhow upon what grounds he proceeds. 'But ſome men will ſay, how are the dead raiſed up, and with what body do they come?' Firſt, he ſhows, that the ſeminal parts of plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary Providence of God, in the manner of their vegetation.' Anſwer. I do not perfectly underſtand, what it is 'for the ſeminal parts of plants to be wonderfully improved by the ordinary Providence of God, in the manner of their vegetation: or elſe, perhaps, I ſhould better ſee how this here tends to the proof of the reſurrection of the ſame body, in your lordſhip's ſenſe.

It continues, ‖ 'They ſow bare grain of wheat, or of ſome other grain, but God giveth it a body, as it hath pleaſed him, and to every ſeed his own body. Here, ſays your lordſhip, is an identity of the material ſubſtance ſuppoſed.' It may be ſo. But to me a diverſity of the material ſubſtance, i. e. of the component particles, is here ſuppoſed, or in direct words ſaid. For the words of St. Paul taken all together, run thus, § 'That which thou ſoweſt, thou ſoweſt not that body which ſhall be, but bare grain;' and ſo on, as your lordſhip has ſet down in the remainder of them. From which words of St. Paul, the natural argument ſeems to me to ſtand thus: If the body that is put in the earth in ſowing, is not that body which ſhall be, then the body that is put in the grave, is not that, i. e. the ſame body that ſhall be.

* 2d Anſw. † 1 Cor. xv. 20, 23. ‡ 2d Anſw. ‖ Ibid. § V. 37.

But

But your lordſhip proves it to be the ſame body by theſe three Greek words of the text, τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα, which your lordſhip interprets thus, * 'That proper body which belongs to it.' Anſwer. Indeed by thoſe Greek words τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα, whether our tranſlators have rightly rendered them 'his own body,' or your lordſhip more rightly 'that proper body which belongs to it,' I formerly underſtood no more but this, that in the production of wheat, and other grain from ſeed, God continued every ſpecies diſtinct; ſo that from grains of wheat ſown, root, ſtalk, blade, ear, grains of wheat were produced, and not thoſe of barley; and ſo of the reſt, which I took to be the meaning of 'to every ſeed his own body.' No, ſays your lordſhip, theſe words prove, That to every plant of wheat, and to every grain of wheat produced in it, is given the proper body that belongs to it, which is the ſame body with the grain that was ſown. Anſwer. This, I confeſs, I do not underſtand; becauſe I do not underſtand how one individual grain can be the ſame with twenty, fifty, or an hundred individual grains; for ſuch ſometimes is the increaſe.

But your lordſhip proves it. For, ſays your lordſhip, † 'Every ſeed having that body in little, which is afterwards ſo much enlarged; and in grain the ſeed is corrupted before its germination; but it hath its proper organical parts, which make it the ſame body with that which it grows up to. For although grain be not divided into lobes, as other ſeeds are, yet it hath been found, by the moſt accurate obſervations, that upon ſeparating the membranes, theſe ſeminal parts are diſcerned in them; which afterwards grow up to that body which we call corn. In which words I crave leave to obſerve, that your lordſhip ſuppoſes that a body may be enlarged by the addition of an hundred or a thouſand times as much in bulk as its own matter, and yet continue the ſame body; which, I confeſs, I cannot underſtand.

But in the next place, if that could be ſo; and that the plant, in its full growth at harveſt, increaſed by a thouſand or a million of times as much new matter added to it, as it had when it lay in little concealed in the grain that was ſown, was the very ſame body; yet I do not think that your lordſhip will ſay, that every minute, inſenſible, and inconceivably ſmall grain of the hundred grains, contained in that little organized ſeminal plant, is every one of them the very ſame with that grain which contains that whole ſeminal plant, and all thoſe inviſible grains in it. For then it will follow, that one grain is the ſame with an hundred, and an hundred diſtinct grains the ſame with one: which I ſhall be able to aſſent to, when I can conceive, that all the wheat in the world is but one grain.

For I beſeech you, my lord, conſider what it is St. Paul here ſpeaks of: it is plain he ſpeaks of that which is ſown and dies, i. e. the grain that the huſbandman takes out of his barn to ſow in his field. And of this grain St. Paul ſays, 'that it is not that body that ſhall be.' Theſe two, viz. 'that which is ſown, and that body that ſhall be,' are all the bodies that St. Paul here ſpeaks of, to repreſent the agreement or difference of men's bodies after the reſurrection, with thoſe they had before they died. Now, I crave leave to aſk your lordſhip, which of theſe two is that little inviſible ſeminal plant, which your lordſhip here ſpeaks of?

* 2d Anſw. † Ibid.

Does your lordſhip mean by it the grain that is ſown? But that is not what St. Paul ſpeaks of; he could not mean this embryonated little plant, for he could not denote it by theſe words, 'that which thou ſoweſt,' for that he ſays muſt die: but this little embryonated plant, contained in the ſeed that is ſown, dies not: or does your lordſhip mean by it, 'the body that ſhall be?' But neither by theſe words, 'the body that ſhall be,' can St. Paul be ſuppoſed to denote this inſenſible little embryonated plant; for that is already in being, contained in the ſeed that is ſown, and therefore could not be ſpoken of under the name of the body that ſhall be. And therefore, I confeſs, I cannot ſee of what uſe it is to your lordſhip to introduce here this third body, which St. Paul mentions not, and to make that the ſame, or not the ſame with any other, when thoſe which St. Paul ſpeaks of, are, as I humbly conceive, theſe two viſible ſenſible bodies, the grain ſown, and the corn grown up to ear; with neither of which this inſenſible embryonated plant can be the ſame body, unleſs an inſenſible body can be the ſame body with a ſenſible body, and a little body can be the ſame body with one ten thouſand, or an hundred thouſand times as big as itſelf. So that yet, I confeſs, I ſee not the reſurrection of the ſame body proved, from theſe words of St. Paul, to be an article of faith.

Your lordſhip goes on: * 'St. Paul indeed ſaith, That we ſow not that body that ſhall be; but he ſpeaks not of the identity, but the perfection of it.' Here my underſtanding fails me again: for I cannot underſtand St. Paul to ſay, That the ſame identical ſenſible grain of wheat, which was ſown at ſeed-time, is the very ſame with every grain of wheat in the ear at harveſt, that ſprang from it: yet ſo I muſt underſtand it, to make it prove, that the ſame ſenſible body, that is laid in the grave, ſhall be the very ſame with that which ſhall be raiſed at the reſurrection. For I do not know of any ſeminal body in little, contained in the dead carcaſe of any man or woman, which, as your lordſhip ſays, in ſeeds, having its proper organical parts, ſhall afterwards be enlarged, and at the reſurrection grow up into the ſame man. For I never thought of any ſeed or ſeminal parts, either of plant or animal, 'ſo wonderfully improved by the Providence of God,' whereby the ſame plant or animal ſhould beget itſelf; nor ever heard, that it was by Divine Providence deſigned to produce the ſame individual, but for the producing of future and diſtinct individuals, for the continuation of the ſame ſpecies.

Your lordſhip's next words are, † 'And although there be ſuch a difference from the grain itſelf, when it comes up to be perfect corn, with root, ſtalk, blade, and ear, that it may be ſaid to outward appearance not to be the ſame body; yet with regard to the ſeminal and organical parts it is as much the ſame, as a man grown up, is the ſame with the embryo in the womb.' Anſwer. It does not appear by any thing I can find in the text, that St. Paul here compared the body produced, with the ſeminal and organical parts contained in the grain it ſprang from, but with the whole ſenſible grain that was grown. Microſcopes had not then diſcovered the little embryo plant in the ſeed: and ſuppoſing it ſhould have been revealed to St. Paul (though in the ſcripture we find little revelation of natural philoſophy) yet an argument taken from a thing perfectly unknown to the Corinthians, whom he writ to, could be of no

* 2d Anſw. † Ibid.

manner

manner of uſe to them; nor ſerve at all either to inſtruct or convince them. But granting that thoſe St. Paul writ to, knew it as well as Mr. Lewenhoek; yet your lordſhip thereby proves not the raiſing of the ſame body; your lordſhip ſays, it is as much the ſame [I crave leave to add body] 'as a man grown up is the ſame' (ſame what, I beſeech your lordſhip?) 'with the embryo in the womb.' For that the body of the embryo in the womb, and body of the man grown up, is the ſame body, I think no one will ſay; unleſs he can perſuade himſelf, that a body that is not the hundredth part of another, is the ſame with that other; which I think no one will do, till having renounced this dangerous way by ideas of thinking and reaſoning, he has learnt to ſay, that a part and the whole are the ſame.

Your lordſhip goes on, * 'And although many arguments may be uſed to prove, that a man is not the ſame, becauſe life, which depends upon the courſe of the blood, and the manner of reſpiration, and nutrition, is ſo different in both ſtates; yet that man would be thought ridiculous, that ſhould ſeriouſly affirm, That it was not the ſame man. And your lordſhip ſays, I grant that the variation of great parcels of matter in plants, alters not the identity: and that the organization of the parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, makes the identity of a plant.' Anſwer. My lord, I think the queſtion is not about the ſame man, but the ſame body. For though I do ſay, † (ſomewhat differently from what your lordſhip ſets down as my words here) 'That that which has 'ſuch an organization, as is fit to receive and diſtribute nouriſhment, ſo 'as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c. of a plant, 'in which conſiſts the vegetable life, continues to be the ſame plant, as 'long as it partakes of the ſame life, though that life be communicated 'to new particles of matter, vitally united to the living plant:' yet I do not remember, that I any where ſay, That a plant, which was once no bigger than an oaten ſtraw, and afterwards grows to be above a fathom about, is the ſame body, though it be ſtill the ſame plant.

The well-known tree in Epping Foreſt, called the King's Oak, which from not weighing an ounce at firſt, grew to have many tons of timber in it, was all along the ſame oak, the very ſame plant; but nobody, I think, will ſay that it was the ſame body when it weighed a ton, as it was when it weighed but an ounce, unleſs he has a mind to ſignalize himſelf by ſaying, That that is the ſame body, which has a thouſand particles of different matter in it, for one particle that is the ſame; which is no better than to ſay, That a thouſand different particles are but one and the ſame particle, and one and the ſame particle is a thouſand different particles; a thouſand times a greater abſurdity, than to ſay half is whole, or the whole is the ſame with the half; which will be improved ten thouſand times yet farther, if a man ſhall ſay (as your lordſhip ſeems to me to argue here) That that great oak is the very ſame body with the acorn it ſprang from, becauſe there was in that acorn an oak in little, which was afterwards (as your lordſhip expreſſes it) ſo much enlarged, as to make that mighty tree. For this embryo, if I may ſo call it, or oak in little, being not the hundredth, or perhaps the thouſandth part of the acorn, and the acorn being not the thouſandth part of the grown oak, it will be very extraordinary to prove the acorn and the grown oak to be the ſame body, by a way wherein it cannot be

* 3d Anſw. † Eſſay, b. 2. c. 27. §. 4.

pretended, that above one particle of an hundred thouſand, or a million, is the ſame in the one body, that it was in the other. From which way of reaſoning, it will follow, that a nurſe and her ſucking child have the ſame body, and be paſt doubt, that a mother and her infant have the ſame body. But this is a way of certainty found out to eſtabliſh the articles of faith, and to overturn the new method of certainty that your lordſhip ſays 'I have ſtarted, which is apt to leave men's minds more doubtful than before.'

And now I deſire your lordſhip to conſider of what uſe it is to you in the preſent caſe, to quote out of my Eſſay theſe words, 'That partaking of one common life, makes the identity of a plant;' ſince the queſtion is not about the identity of a plant, but about the identity of a body: it being a very different thing to be the ſame plant, and to be the ſame body. For that which makes the ſame plant, does not make the ſame body; the one being the partaking in the ſame continued vegetable life, the other the conſiſting of the ſame numerical particles of matter. And therefore your lordſhip's inference from my words above quoted, in theſe which you ſubjoin *, ſeems to me a very ſtrange one, viz. 'So that in things capable of any ſort of life, the identity is conſiſtent with a continued ſucceſſion of parts; and ſo the wheat grown up, is the ſame body with the grain that was ſown.' For I believe, if my words, from which you infer, 'And ſo the wheat grown up is the ſame body with the grain that was ſown,' were put into a ſyllogiſm, this would hardly be brought to be the concluſion.

But your lordſhip goes on with conſequence upon conſequence, though I have not eyes acute enough every where to ſee the connexion, till you bring it to the reſurrection of the ſame body. The connexion of your lordſhip's words † is as followeth; 'And thus the alteration of the parts of the body at the reſurrection, is conſiſtent with its identity, if its organization and life be the ſame; and this is a real identity of the body, which depends not upon conſciouſneſs. From whence it follows, that to make the ſame body, no more is required, but reſtoring life to the organized parts of it.' If the queſtion were about raiſing the ſame plant, I do not ſay but there might be ſome appearance for making ſuch an inference from my words as this, 'Whence it follows, that to make the ſame plant, no more is required, but to reſtore life to the organized parts of it.' But this deduction, wherein, from thoſe words of mine that ſpeak only of the identity of a plant, your lordſhip infers, there is no more required to make the ſame body, than to make the ſame plant, being too ſubtle for me, I leave to my reader to find out.

Your lordſhip goes on and ſays, ‡ That I grant likewiſe, 'That the 'identity of the ſame man conſiſts in a participation of the ſame con'tinued life, by conſtantly fleeting particles of matter in ſucceſſion, 'vitally united to the ſame organized body.' Anſwer. I ſpeak in theſe words of the identity of the ſame man, and your lordſhip thence roundly concludes; 'ſo that there is no difficulty of the ſameneſs of the body.' But your lordſhip knows, that I do not take theſe two ſounds, man and body, to ſtand for the ſame thing, nor the identity of the man to be the ſame with the identity of the body.

But let us read out your lordſhip's words. ‖ 'So that there is no difficulty as to the ſameneſs of the body, if life were continued; and if, by

* 2d Anſ. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. ‖ Ibid.

divine

divine power, life be reſtored to that material ſubſtance which was before united, by a reunion of the ſoul to it, there is no reaſon to deny the identity of the body, not from the conſciouſneſs of the ſoul, but from that life which is the reſult of the union of the ſoul and body.'

If I underſtand your lordſhip right, you in theſe words, from the paſſages above quoted out of my book, argue, that from thoſe words of mine it will follow, That it is or may be the ſame body, that is raiſed at the reſurrection. If ſo, my lord, your lordſhip has then proved, That my book is not inconſiſtent with, but conformable to this article of the reſurrection of the ſame body, which your lordſhip contends for, and will have to be an article of faith: for though I do by no means deny that the ſame bodies ſhall be raiſed at the laſt day, yet I ſee nothing your lordſhip has ſaid to prove it to be an article of faith.

But your lordſhip goes on with your proofs and ſays, * 'But St. Paul ſtill ſuppoſes, that it muſt be that material ſubſtance to which the ſoul was before united. For, ſaith he, "it is ſown in corruption, it is raiſed in incorruption: it is ſown in diſhonour, it is raiſed in glory: it is ſown in weakneſs, it is raiſed in power: it is ſown a natural body, it is raiſed a ſpiritual body." Can ſuch a material ſubſtance, which was never united to the body, be ſaid to be ſown in corruption, and weakneſs, and diſhonour? Either, therefore, he muſt ſpeak of the ſame body, or his meaning cannot be comprehended.' I anſwer, 'Can ſuch a material ſubſtance, which was never laid in the grave, be ſaid to be ſown,' &c.? For your lordſhip ſays, † 'You do not ſay the ſame individual particles, which were united at the point of death, ſhall be raiſed at the laſt day;' and no other particles are laid in the grave, but ſuch as are united at the point of death; either therefore your lordſhip muſt ſpeak of another body, different from that which was ſown, which ſhall be raiſed, or elſe your meaning, I think, cannot be comprehended.

But whatever be your meaning, your lordſhip proves it to be St. Paul's meaning, That the ſame body ſhall be raiſed, which was ſown, in theſe following words, ‡ 'For what does all this relate to a conſcious principle?' Anſw. The ſcripture being expreſs, that the ſame perſon ſhould be raiſed and appear before the judgment-ſeat of Chriſt, that every one may receive according to what he had done in his body; it was very well ſuited to common apprehenſions (which refined not about 'particles that had been vitally united to the ſoul') to ſpeak of the body which each one was to have after the reſurrection, as he would be apt to ſpeak of it himſelf. For it being his body both before and after the reſurrection, every one ordinarily ſpeaks of his body as the ſame, though in a ſtrict and philoſophical ſenſe, as your lordſhip ſpeaks, it be not the very ſame. Thus it is no impropriety of ſpeech to ſay, 'this body of mine, which was formerly ſtrong and plump, is now weak and waſted,' though in ſuch a ſenſe as you are ſpeaking here, it be not the ſame body. Revelation declares nothing any where concerning the ſame body, in your lordſhip's ſenſe of the ſame body, which appears not to have been thought of. The apoſtle directly propoſes nothing for or againſt the ſame body, as neceſſary to be believed: that which he is plain and direct in, is his oppoſing and condemning ſuch curious queſtions about the body, which could ſerve only to perplex, not to confirm what was material and neceſſary for them to believe, viz. a day of judgment and retribution to men in a future ſtate; and therefore it is

* 2d Anſ. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

no wonder, that mentioning their bodies, he ſhould uſe a way of ſpeaking ſuited to vulgar notions, from which it would be hard poſitively to conclude any thing for the determining of this queſtion (eſpecially againſt expreſſions in the ſame diſcourſe that plainly incline to the other ſide) in a matter which, as it appears, the apoſtle thought not neceſſary to determine, and the ſpirit of God thought not fit to gratify any one's curioſity in.

But your lordſhip ſays, * 'The apoſtle ſpeaks plainly of that body which was once quickened, and afterwards falls to corruption, and is to be reſtored with more noble qualities.' I wiſh your lordſhip had quoted the words of St. Paul, wherein he ſpeaks plainly of that numerical body that was once quickened; they would preſently decide this queſtion. But your lordſhip proves it by theſe following words of St. Paul: 'For this corruption muſt put on incorruption, and this mortal muſt put on immortality;' to which your lordſhip adds, 'that you do not ſee how he could more expreſsly affirm the identity of this corruptible body, with that after the reſurrection.' How expreſly it is affirmed by the apoſtle, ſhall be conſidered by and by. In the mean time, it is paſt doubt, that your lordſhip beſt knows what you do or do not ſee. But this I would be bold to ſay, that if St. Paul had any where in this chapter (where there are ſo many occaſions for it, if it had been neceſſary to have been believed) but ſaid in expreſs words that the ſame bodies ſhould be raiſed, every one elſe, who thinks of it, will ſee he had more expreſly affirmed the identity of the bodies which men now have, with thoſe they ſhall have after the reſurrection.

The remainder of your lordſhip's period † is; 'And that without any reſpect to the principle of ſelf-conſciouſneſs.' Anſ. Theſe words, I doubt not, have ſome meaning, but I muſt own I know not what; either towards the proof of the reſurrection of the ſame body, or to ſhow, that any thing I have ſaid concerning ſelf-conſciouſneſs, is inconſiſtent: for I do not remember that I have any where ſaid, that the identity of body conſiſted in ſelf-conſciouſneſs.

From your preceding words, your lordſhip concludes thus: ‡ 'And ſo if the ſcripture be the ſole foundation of our faith, this is an article of it.' My lord, to make the concluſion unqueſtionable, I humbly conceive the words muſt run thus: 'And ſo if the ſcripture, and your lordſhip's interpretation of it be the ſole foundation of our faith, the reſurrection of the ſame body is an article of it.' For, with ſubmiſſion, your lordſhip has neither produced expreſs words of ſcripture for it, nor ſo proved that to be the meaning of any of thoſe words of ſcripture which you have produced for it, that a man who reads and ſincerely endeavours to underſtand the ſcripture, cannot but find himſelf obliged to believe, as expreſly, 'that the ſame bodies of the dead,' in your lordſhip's ſenſe, ſhall be raiſed, as 'that the dead ſhall be raiſed.' And I crave leave to give your lordſhip this one reaſon for it. He who reads with attention this diſcourſe of St. Paul § where he diſcourſes of the reſurrection, will ſee, that he plainly diſtinguiſhes between the dead that ſhall be raiſed, and the bodies of the dead. For it is νεκροὶ, πάντες, οἱ are the nominative caſes to ‖ ἐγερθήσονται. ζωοποιηθήσονται. ἐγερθήσεται, all along, and not σώματα, bodies; which one may with reaſon think would ſomewhere or other have been

* 2d Anſ. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. § 1 Cor. xv.
‖ V. 15, 22, 23, 29, 32, 35, 52.

expreſſed,

expreſſed, if all this had been ſaid to propoſe it as an article of faith, that the very ſame bodies ſhould be raiſed. The ſame manner of ſpeaking the ſpirit of God obſerves all through the New Teſtament, where it is ſaid, * 'raiſe the dead, quicken or make alive the dead, the reſurrection of the dead.' Nay, theſe very words of our Saviour, † urged by your lordſhip for the reſurrection of the ſame body, run thus, Πανλες οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις ἀκούσονλαι τῆς φωνῆς ἀνλῦ· καὶ ἐκπορεύσονλαι, οἱ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ποιήσανλες εἰς ἀνάςασιν ζωῆς, οἱ δὲ τὰ φαῦλα πράξανλες εἰς ἀνάςασιν κρίσεως. Would not a well-meaning ſearcher of the ſcriptures be apt to think, that if the thing here intended by our Saviour were to teach, and propoſe it as an article of faith, neceſſary to be believed by every one, that the very ſame bodies of the dead ſhould be raiſed; would not, I ſay, any one be apt to think, that if our Saviour meant ſo, the words ſhould rather have been, πάνλα τὰ σώματα ἃ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις, i. e. 'all the bodies that are in the graves,' rather than 'all who are in the graves;' which muſt denote perſons, and not preciſely bodies?

Another evidence, that St. Paul makes a diſtinction between the dead and the bodies of the dead, ſo that the dead cannot be taken in this, 1 Cor. xv. to ſtand preciſely for the bodies of the dead, are theſe words of the apoſtle, ‡ 'But ſome man will ſay, how are the dead raiſed? And with what bodies do they come?' Which words, 'dead' and 'they,' if ſuppoſed to ſtand preciſely for the bodies of the dead, the queſtion will run thus: 'How are the dead bodies raiſed? And with what bodies do the dead bodies come?' Which ſeems to have no very agreeable ſenſe.

This therefore being ſo, that the Spirit of God keeps ſo expreſly to this phraſe, or form of ſpeaking in the New Teſtament, 'of raiſing, quickening, riſing, reſurrection, &c. of the dead,' where the reſurrection of the laſt day is ſpoken of; and that the body is not mentioned, but in anſwer to this queſtion, 'With what bodies ſhall thoſe dead, who are raiſed, come?' ſo that by the dead cannot preciſely be meant the dead bodies: I do not ſee but a good chriſtian, who reads the ſcripture with an intention to believe all that is there revealed to him concerning the reſurrection, may acquit himſelf of his duty therein, without entering into the inquiry, whether the dead ſhall have the very ſame bodies or no? Which ſort of inquiry the apoſtle, by the appellation he beſtows here on him that makes it, ſeems not much to encourage. Nor, if he ſhall think himſelf bound to determine concerning the identity of the bodies of the dead raiſed at the laſt day, will he, by the remainder of St. Paul's anſwer, find the determination of the Apoſtle to be much in favour of the very ſame body; unleſs the being told, that the body ſown, is not that body that ſhall be; that the body raiſed is as different from that which was laid down, as the fleſh of man is from the fleſh of beaſts, fiſhes, and birds; or as the ſun, moon, and ſtars are different one from another; or as different as a corruptible, weak, natural, mortal body, is from an incorruptible, powerful, ſpiritual, immortal body; and laſtly, as different as a body that is fleſh and blood, is from a body that is not fleſh and blood; 'for fleſh and blood cannot, ſays St. Paul, in this very place, ‖ inherit the kingdom of God:' unleſs, I ſay, all this, which is contained in St. Paul's words, can be ſuppoſed to be the way to deliver this as an article of

* Matt. xxii. 31. Mark xii. 26. John v. 21. Acts xvi. 7. Rom. iv. 17. 2 Cor. i. 9. 1 Theſſ. iv. 14, 16.

† John v. 28, 29. ‡ Ver. 35. ‖ V. 50.

faith,

faith, which is required to be believed by every one, viz. 'That the dead ſhould be raiſed with the very ſame bodies that they had before in this life;' which article propoſed in theſe or the like plain and expreſs words, could have left no room for doubt in the meaneſt capacities, nor for conteſt in the moſt perverſe minds.

Your lordſhip adds in the next words, * 'And ſo it hath been always underſtood by the chriſtian-church, viz. That the reſurrection of the ſame body, in your lordſhip's ſenſe of the ſame body, is an article of faith.' Anſwer, What the chriſtian church has always underſtood, is beyond my knowledge. But for thoſe who coming ſhort of your lordſhip's great learning, cannot gather their articles of faith from the underſtanding of all the whole chriſtian church, ever ſince the preaching of the goſpel, (who make the far greater part of chriſtians, I think I may ſay nine hundred ninety and nine of a thouſand) but are forced to have recourſe to the ſcripture to find them there, I do not ſee, that they will eaſily find there this propoſed as an article of faith, that there ſhall be a reſurrection of the ſame body; but that there ſhall be a reſurrection of the dead, without explicitly determining, That they ſhall be raiſed with bodies made up wholly of the ſame particles which were once vitally united to their ſouls in their former life, without the mixture of any one other particle of matter; which is that which your lordſhip means by the ſame body.

But ſuppoſing your lordſhip to have demonſtrated this to be an article of faith, though I crave leave to own, that I do not ſee, that all that your lordſhip has ſaid here, makes it ſo much as probable; What is all this to me? Yes, ſays your lordſhip in the following words, † 'My idea of perſonal identity is inconſiſtent with it, for it makes the ſame body which was here united to the ſoul, not to be neceſſary to the doctrine of the reſurrection. But any material ſubſtance united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame body.'

This is an argument of your lordſhip's which I am obliged to anſwer to. But is it not fit I ſhould firſt underſtand it, before I anſwer it? Now here I do not well know, what it is 'to make a thing not to be neceſſary to the doctrine of the reſurrection.' But to help myſelf out the beſt I can, with a gueſs, I will conjecture (which, in diſputing with learned men, is not very ſafe) your lordſhip's meaning is, that 'my idea of perſonal identity makes it not neceſſary,' that for the raiſing the ſame perſon, the body ſhould be the ſame.

Your lordſhip's next word is 'but;' to which I am ready to reply, But what? What does my idea of perſonal identity do? For ſomething of that kind the adverſative particle 'but' ſhould, in the ordinary conſtruction of our language, introduce, to make the propoſition clear and intelligible: but here is no ſuch thing. 'But,' is one of your lordſhip's privileged particles, which I muſt not meddle with, for fear your lordſhip complain of me again, 'as ſo ſevere a critic, that for the leaſt ambiguity in any particle fill up pages in my anſwer, to make my book look conſiderable for the bulk of it.' But ſince this propoſition here, 'my idea of perſonal identity makes the ſame body which was here united to the ſoul, not neceſſary to the doctrine of the reſurrection: But any material ſubſtance being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame body,' is brought to prove my idea of perſonal identity inconſiſtent

* 2d Anſ. † Ibid.

with

with the article of the reſurrection; I muſt make it out in ſome direct ſenſe or other, that I may ſee whether it be both true and concluſive. I therefore venture to read it thus: 'My idea of perſonal identity makes the ſame body which was here united to the ſoul, not to be neceſſary at the reſurrection; but allows, that any material ſubſtance being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame body. Ergo, my idea of perſonal identity is inconſiſtent with the article of the reſurrection of the ſame body.'

If this be your lordſhip's ſenſe in this paſſage, as I here have gueſſed it to be, or elſe I know not what it is, I anſwer,

1. That my idea of perſonal identity does not allow, that any material ſubſtance, being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame body, I ſay no ſuch thing in my book, nor any thing from whence it may be inferred; and your lordſhip would have done me a favour to have ſet down the words where I ſay ſo, or thoſe from which you infer ſo, and ſhowed how it follows from any thing I have ſaid.

2. Granting, that it were a conſequence from my idea of perſonal identity, that 'any material ſubſtance, being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame body;' this would not prove that my idea of perſonal identity was inconſiſtent with this propoſition, 'that the ſame body ſhall be raiſed;' but, on the contrary, affirms it: ſince, if I affirm, as I do, that the ſame perſons ſhall be raiſed, and it be a conſequence of my idea of perſonal identity, that 'any material ſubſtance, being united to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs, makes the ſame body;' it follows, that if the ſame perſon be raiſed, the ſame body muſt be raiſed; and ſo I have herein not only ſaid nothing inconſiſtent with the reſurrection of the ſame body, but have ſaid more for it than your lordſhip. For there can be nothing plainer, than that in the ſcripture it is revealed, that the ſame perſons ſhall be raiſed, and appear before the judgment-ſeat of Chriſt, to anſwer for what they have done in their bodies. If therefore whatever matter be joined to the ſame principle of conſciouſneſs makes the ſame body, it is demonſtration, that if the ſame perſons are raiſed, they have the ſame bodies.

How then your lordſhip makes this an inconſiſtency with the reſurrection, is beyond my conception. 'Yes,' ſays your lordſhip, * 'it is inconſiſtent with it, for it makes the ſame body which was here united to the ſoul, not to be neceſſary.'

3. I anſwer, therefore, Thirdly, That this is the firſt time I ever learnt, that 'not neceſſary' was the ſame with 'inconſiſtent.' I ſay, that a body made up of the ſame numerical parts of matter, is not neceſſary to the making of the ſame perſon; from whence it will indeed follow, that to the reſurrection of the ſame perſon, the ſame numerical particles of matter are not required. What does your lordſhip infer from hence? To wit, this: Therefore he who thinks, that the ſame particles of matter are not neceſſary to the making of the ſame perſon, cannot believe, that the ſame perſon ſhall be raiſed with bodies made of the very ſame particles of matter, if God ſhould reveal, that it ſhall be ſo, viz. That the ſame perſons ſhall be raiſed with the ſame bodies they had before. Which is all one as to ſay, that he who thought the blowing of rams-horns was not neceſſary in itſelf to the falling down of the walls of

* 2d Anſ.

Jericho,

Jericho, could not believe, that they ſhould fall upon the blowing of rams horns, when God had declared it ſhould be ſo.

Your lordſhip ſays, 'my idea of perſonal identity is inconſiſtent with the article of the reſurrection:' the reaſon you ground it on, is this, becauſe it makes not the ſame body neceſſary to the making the ſame perſon. Let us grant your lordſhip's conſequence to be good, what will follow from it? No leſs than this, that your lordſhip's notion (for I dare not ſay your lordſhip has any ſo dangerous things as ideas) of perſonal identity, is inconſiſtent with the article of the reſurrection. The demonſtration of it is thus; your lordſhip ſays, * 'It is not neceſſary that the body, to be raiſed at the laſt day, ſhould conſiſt of the ſame particles of matter which were united at the point of death; for there muſt be a great alteration in them in a lingering diſeaſe, as if a fat man falls into a conſumption: you do not ſay the ſame particles which the ſinner had at the very time of commiſſion of his ſins; for then a long ſinner muſt have a vaſt body, conſidering the continual ſpending of particles by perſpiration.' And again, here your lordſhip ſays, † 'You allow the notion of perſonal identity to belong to the ſame man under ſeveral changes of matter.' From which words it is evident, that your lordſhip ſuppoſes a perſon in this world may be continued and preſerved the ſame in a body not conſiſting of the ſame individual particles of matter; and hence it demonſtratively follows, That let your lordſhip's notion of perſonal identity be what it will, it makes 'the ſame body not to be neceſſary to the ſame perſon;' and therefore it is by your lordſhip's rule inconſiſtent with the article of the reſurrection. When your lordſhip ſhall think fit to clear your own notion of perſonal identity from this inconſiſtency with the article of the reſurrection, I do not doubt but my idea of perſonal identity will be thereby cleared too. Till then, all inconſiſtency with that article, which your lordſhip has here charged on mine, will unavoidably fall upon your lordſhip's too.

But for the clearing of both, give me leave to ſay, my lord, that whatſoever is not neceſſary, does not thereby become inconſiſtent. It is not neceſſary to the ſame perſon, that his body ſhould always conſiſt of the ſame numerical particles; this is demonſtration, becauſe the particles of the bodies of the ſame perſons in this life change every moment, and your lordſhip cannot deny it: and yet this makes it not inconſiſtent with God's preſerving, if he thinks fit, to the ſame perſons, bodies conſiſting of the ſame numerical particles always from the reſurrection to eternity. And ſo likewiſe though I ſay any thing that ſuppoſes it not neceſſary, that the ſame numerical particles, which were vitally united to the ſoul in this life, ſhould be reunited to it at the reſurrection, and conſtitute the body it ſhall then have; yet it is not inconſiſtent with this, that God may, if he pleaſes, give to every one a body conſiſting only of ſuch particles as were before vitally united to his ſoul. And thus, I think, I have cleared my book from all that inconſiſtency which your lordſhip charges on it, and would perſuade the world it has with the article of the reſurrection of the dead.

Only before I leave it, I will ſet down the remainder of what your lordſhip ſays upon this head, that though I ſee not the coherence nor tendency of it, nor the force of any argument in it againſt me; yet that nothing may be omitted that your lordſhip has thought fit to entertain

* 2d Anſ. † Ibid.

your

your reader with on this new point, nor any one have reaſon to ſuſpect, that I have paſſed by any word of your lordſhip's, (on this now firſt introduced ſubject) wherein he might find your lordſhip had proved what you had promiſed in your title-page. Your remaining words are theſe; * 'The diſpute is not how far perſonal identity in itſelf may conſiſt in the very ſame material ſubſtance; for we allow the notion of perſonal identity to belong to the ſame man under ſeveral changes of matter; but whether it doth not depend upon a vital union between the ſoul and body, and the life, which is conſequent upon it; and therefore in the reſurrection, the ſame material ſubſtance muſt be re-united, or elſe it cannot be called a reſurrection, but a renovation, i. e. it may be a new life, but not a raiſing the body from the dead.' I confeſs, I do not ſee how what is here uſhered in by the words 'and therefore,' is a conſequence from the preceding words: but as to the propriety of the name, I think it will not be much queſtioned, that if the ſame man riſe who was dead, it may very properly be called the reſurrection of the dead; which is the language of the ſcripture.

I muſt not part with this article of the reſurrection, without returning my thanks to your lordſhip for making me † take notice of a fault in my Eſſay. When I wrote that book, I took it for granted, as I doubt not but many others have done, that the ſcripture had mentioned, in expreſs terms, 'the reſurrection of the body.' But upon the occaſion your lordſhip has given me in your laſt letter, to look a little more narrowly into what revelation has declared concerning the reſurrection, and finding no ſuch expreſs words in the ſcripture, as that 'the body ſhall riſe or be raiſed, or the reſurrection of the body;' I ſhall in the next edition of it, change theſe words of my book, ‡ 'The dead bodies of men ſhall riſe,' into theſe of the ſcripure, 'the dead ſhall riſe.' Not that I queſtion, that the dead ſhall be raiſed with bodies; but in matters of revelation, I think it not only ſafeſt, but our duty, as far as any one delivers it for revelation, to keep cloſe to the words of the ſcripture, unleſs he will aſſume to himſelf the authority of one inſpired, or make himſelf wiſer than the Holy Spirit himſelf. If I had ſpoke of the reſurrection in preciſely ſcripture terms, I had avoided giving your lordſhip the occaſion of making ‖ here ſuch a verbal reflection on my words; 'What! not if there be an idea of identity as to the body?'

* 2d Anſ. † Ibid. ‡ Eſſay, B. 4. C. 18. §. 7.
‖ 2d Anſ.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of other Relations.

Proportional.

§. 1. BESIDES the before-mentioned occaſions of time, place, and cauſality, of comparing, or referring things one to another,

ther, there are, as I have ſaid, infinite others, ſome whereof I ſhall mention.

Firſt, The firſt I ſhall name is ſome one ſimple idea; which being capable of parts or degrees, affords an occaſion of comparing the ſubjects wherein it is to one another, in reſpect of that ſimple idea, v. g. whiter, ſweeter, equal, more, &c. Theſe relations depending on the equality and exceſs of the ſame ſimple idea, in ſeveral ſubjects, may be called, if one will, proportional; and that theſe are only converſant about thoſe ſimple ideas received from ſenſation or reflection, is ſo evident, that nothing need be ſaid to evince it.

Natural. §. 2. Secondly, Another occaſion of comparing things together, or conſidering one thing, ſo as to include in that conſideration ſome other thing, is the circumſtances of their origin or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the relations depending thereon as laſting as the ſubjects to which they belong; v. g. father and ſon, brothers, couſin-germans, &c. which have their relations by one community of blood, wherein they partake in ſeveral degrees: countrymen, i. e. thoſe who were born in the ſame country, or tract of ground; and theſe I call natural relations: wherein we may obſerve, that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the uſe of common life, and not to the truth and extent of things. For it is certain, that in reality the relation is the ſame betwixt the begetter and the begotten, in the ſeveral races of other animals as well as men: but yet it is ſeldom ſaid, this bull is the grandfather of ſuch a calf; or that two pigeons are couſin-germans. It is very convenient, that by diſtinct names theſe relations ſhould be obſerved, and marked out in mankind; there being occaſion, both in laws, and other communications one with another, to mention and take notice of men under theſe relations: from whence alſo ariſe the obligations of ſeveral duties amongſt men. Whereas in brutes, men having very little or no cauſe to mind theſe relations, they have not thought fit to give them diſtinct and peculiar names. This, by the way, may give us ſome light into the different ſtate and growth

of languages; which, being ſuited only to the convenience of communication, are proportioned to the notions men have, and the commerce of thoughts familiar amongſt them; and not to the reality or extent of things, nor to the various reſpects might be found among them, nor the different abſtract conſiderations might be framed about them. Where they had no philoſophical notions, there they had no terms to expreſs them: and it is no wonder men ſhould have framed no names for thoſe things they found no occaſion to diſcourſe of. From whence it is eaſy to imagine, why, as in ſome countries, they may have not ſo much as the name for a horſe; and in others, where they are more careful of the pedigrees of their horſes, than of their own, that there they may have not only names for particular horſes, but alſo of their ſeveral relations of kindred one to another.

Inſtituted.

§. 3. Thirdly, Sometimes the foundation of conſidering things, with reference to one another, is ſome act whereby any one comes by a moral right, power, or obligation to do ſomething. Thus a general is one that hath power to command an army; and an army under a general is a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man. A citizen, or a burgher, is one who has a right to certain privileges in this or that place. All this ſort depending upon men's wills, or agreement in ſociety, I call inſtituted, or voluntary: and may be diſtinguiſhed from the natural, in that they are moſt, if not all of them, ſome way or other alterable, and ſeparable from the perſons to whom they have ſometimes belonged, though neither of the ſubſtances, ſo related, be deſtroyed. Now, though theſe are all reciprocal, as well as the reſt, and contain in them a reference of two things one to the other; yet, becauſe one of the two things often wants a relative name, importing that reference, men uſually take no notice of it, and the relation is commonly overlooked: v. g. a patron and client are eaſily allowed to be relations, but a conſtable or dictator are not ſo readily, at firſt hearing, conſidered as ſuch; becauſe there is no peculiar name for thoſe who are under the com-

command of a dictator, or conſtable, expreſſing a relation to either of them; though it be certain, that either of them hath a certain power over ſome others; and ſo is ſo far related to them, as well as a patron is to his client, or general to his army.

Moral. §. 4. Fourthly, There is another ſort of relation, which is the conformity, or diſagreement, men's voluntary actions have to a rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of; which, I think, may be called moral-relation, as being that which denominates our moral actions, and deſerves well to be examined; there being no part of knowledge wherein we ſhould be more careful to get determined ideas, and avoid, as much as may be, obſcurity and confuſion. Human actions, when with their various ends, objects, manners, and circumſtances, they are framed into diſtinct complex ideas, are, as has been ſhown, ſo many mixed modes, a great part whereof have names annexed to them. Thus, ſuppoſing gratitude to be a readineſs to acknowledge and return kindneſs received, polygamy to be the having more wives than one at once; when we frame theſe notions thus in our minds, we have there ſo many determined ideas of mixed modes. But this is not all that concerns our actions; it is not enough to have determined ideas of them, and to know what names belong to ſuch and ſuch combinations of ideas. We have a farther and greater concernment, and that is, to know whether ſuch actions ſo made up are morally good or bad.

Moral good and evil. §. 5. Good and evil, as hath been ſhown, b. ii. chap. 20. §. 2. and chap. 21. §. 42. are nothing but pleaſure or pain, or that which occaſions or procures pleaſure or pain to us. Moral good and evil then is only the conformity or diſagreement of our voluntary actions to ſome law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the law-maker; which good and evil, pleaſure or pain, attending our obſervance, or breach of the law, by the decree of the law-maker, is that we call reward and puniſhment.

§. 6.

§. 6. Of theſe moral rules, or laws, to which men generally refer, and by which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions, there ſeem to me to be three ſorts, with their three different enforcements, or rewards and puniſhments. For ſince it would be utterly in vain to ſuppoſe a rule ſet to the free actions of men, without annexing to it ſome enforcement of good and evil to determine his will, we muſt, wherever we ſuppoſe a law, ſuppoſe alſo ſome reward or puniſhment annexed to that law. It would be in vain for one intelligent being to ſet a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with, and puniſh deviation from his rule, by ſome good and evil, that is not the natural product and conſequence of the action itſelf. For that being a natural convenience, or inconvenience, would operate of itſelf without a law. This, if I miſtake not, is the true nature of all law, properly ſo called. Moral rules.

§. 7. The laws that men generally refer their actions to, to judge of their rectitude or obliquity, ſeem to me to be theſe three. 1. The divine law. 2. The civil law. 3. The law of opinion or reputation, if I may ſo call it. By the relation they bear to the firſt of theſe, men judge whether their actions are ſins or duties; by the ſecond, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices. Laws.

§. 8. Firſt, the divine law, whereby I mean that law which God has ſet to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light of nature, or the voice of revelation. That God has given a rule whereby men ſhould govern themſelves, I think there is no-body ſo brutiſh as to deny. He has a right to do it, we are his creatures: he has goodneſs and wiſdom to direct our actions to that which is beſt; and he has power to enforce it by rewards and puniſhments, of infinite weight and duration, in another life; for no-body can take us out of his hands. This is the only true touch-one of moral rectitude; and by comparing them to Divine law, the meaſure of ſin and duty.

this law it is, that men judge of the moſt conſiderable moral good or evil of their actions: that is, whether as duties or ſins, they are like to procure them happineſs or miſery from the hands of the Almighty.

Civil law, the meaſure of crimes and innocence.

§. 9. Secondly, the civil law, the rule ſet by the commonwealth to the actions of thoſe who belong to it, is another rule to which men refer their actions, to judge whether they be criminal or no. This law no-body overlooks, the rewards and puniſhments that enforce it being ready at hand, and ſuitable to the power that makes it; which is the force of the commonwealth, engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and poſſeſſions of thoſe who live according to its law; and has power to take away life, liberty, or goods from him who diſobeys: which is the puniſhment of offences committed againſt this law.

Philoſophical law the meaſure of virtue and vice.

§. 10. Thirdly, the law of opinion or reputation. Virtue and vice are names pretended and ſuppoſed every-where to ſtand for actions in their own nature right and wrong; and as far as they really are ſo applied, they ſo far are co-incident with the divine law above-mentioned. But yet whatever is pretended, this is viſible, that theſe names virtue and vice, in the particular inſtances of their application, through the ſeveral nations and ſocieties of men in the world, are conſtantly attributed only to ſuch actions as in each country and ſociety are in reputation or diſcredit. Nor is it to be thought ſtrange, that men every-where ſhould give the name of virtue to thoſe actions, which amongſt them are judged praiſe-worthy; and call that vice, which they account blameable: ſince otherwiſe they would condemn themſelves, if they ſhould think any thing right, to which they allowed not commendation: any thing wrong, which they let paſs without blame. Thus the meaſure of what is every-where called and eſteemed virtue and vice, is the approbation or diſlike, praiſe or blame, which by a ſecret and tacit conſent eſtabliſhes itſelf in the ſeveral ſocieties, tribes, and clubs of men in the world; whereby ſeveral actions come to find

credit or diſgrace amongſt them, according to the judgment, maxims, or faſhion of that place. For though men uniting into politic ſocieties have reſigned up to the public the diſpoſing of all their force, ſo that they cannot employ it againſt any fellow-citizens any farther than the law of the country directs; yet they retain ſtill the power of thinking well or ill, approving or diſapproving of the actions of thoſe whom they live amongſt, and converſe with: and by this approbation and diſlike they eſtabliſh amongſt themſelves what they will call virtue and vice.

§. 11. That this is the common meaſure of virtue and vice, will appear to any one who conſiders, that though that paſſes for vice in one country, which is counted a virtue, or at leaſt not vice in another; yet, every-where, virtue and praiſe, vice and blame go together. Virtue is every-where that which is thought praiſe-worthy; and nothing elſe but that which has the allowance of public eſteem is called virtue *. Virtue

* Our author, in his preface to the fourth edition, taking notice how apt men have been to miſtake him, added what here follows: Of this the ingenious author of the diſcourſe concerning the nature of man has given me a late inſtance, to mention no other. For the civility of his expreſſions, and the candour that belongs to his order, forbid me to think, that he would have cloſed his preface with an inſinuation, as if in what I had ſaid, book ii. chap. 28, concerning the third rule which men refer their actions to, I went about to make virtue vice, and vice virtue, unleſs he had miſtaken my meaning; which he could not have done, if he had but given himſelf the trouble to conſider what the argument was I was then upon, and what was the chief deſign of that chapter, plainly enough ſet down in the fourth ſection, and thoſe following. For I was there not laying down moral rules, but ſhowing the original and nature of moral ideas, and enumerating the rules men make uſe of in moral relations, whether thoſe rules were true or falſe: and, purſuant thereunto, I tell what has every where that denomination, which in the language of that place anſwers to virtue, and vice in ours; which alters not the nature of things, though men do generally judge of, and denominate their actions according to the eſteem and faſhion of the place, or ſect they are of.

If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had ſaid, b. i. c. 3. §. 18. and in this preſent chapter, §. 13, 14, 15, and 20. he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong, and what I call virtue and vice: and if he had obſerved, that, in the place he quotes, I only report as matter of fact what others call

tue and praiſe are ſo united, that they are called often by the ſame name. "Sunt ſua præmia laudi," ſays Virgil; and ſo Cicero, "nihil habet natura præſtantius, quam "honeſtatem, quam laudem, quam dignitatem, quam "decus;" which, he tells you, are all names for the ſame thing, Tuſc. lib. ii. This is the language of the heathen philoſophers, who well underſtood wherein their notions of virtue and vice conſiſted, and though perhaps by the different temper, education, faſhion, maxims,

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virtue and vice, he would not have found it liable to any great exception. For, I think, I am not much out in ſaying, that one of the rules made uſe of in the world for a ground or meaſure of a moral relation, is that eſteem and reputation which ſeveral ſorts of actions find variouſly in the ſeveral ſocieties of men, according to which they are there called virtues or vices: and whatever authority the learned Mr. Lowde places in his old Engliſh dictionary, I dare ſay it no-where tells him (if I ſhould appeal to it) that the ſame action is not in credit, called and counted a virtue in one place, which being in diſrepute, paſſes for and under the name of vice in another. The taking notice that men beſtow the names of virtue and vice according to this rule of reputation, is all I have done, or can be laid to my charge to have done, towards the making vice virtue, and virtue vice. But the good man does well, and as becomes his calling, to be watchful in ſuch points, and to take the alarm, even at expreſſions, which ſtanding alone by themſelves might ſound ill, and be ſuſpected.

It is to this zeal, allowable in his function, that I forgive his citing, as he does, theſe words of mine, in §. 11. of this chapter: 'The exhortations of inſpired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute: "Whatſoever things are lovely, whatſoever things are of good report, "if there be any virtue, if there be any praiſe," &c. Phil. iv. 8.' without taking notice of thoſe immediately preceding, which introduce them, and run thus: 'whereby in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preſerved; ſo that even the exhortations of inſpired teachers, &c.' by which words, and the reſt of that ſection, it is plain that I brought that paſſage of St. Paul, not to prove that the general meaſure of what men call virtue and vice, throughout the world, was the reputation and faſhion of each particular ſociety within itſelf; but to ſhow, that though it were ſo, yet, for reaſons I there give, men, in that way of denominating their actions, did not for the moſt part much vary from the law of nature: which is that ſtanding and unalterable rule, by which they ought to judge of the moral rectitude and pravity of their actions, and accordingly denominate them virtues or vices. Had Mr. Lowde conſidered this, he would have found it little to his purpoſe to have quoted that paſſage in a ſenſe I uſed it not; and would, I imagine, have ſpared the explication he ſubjoins to it, as not very neceſſary. But I hope this ſecond edition will give him ſatisfaction in the point, and that

ims, or intereſts of different ſorts of men, it fell out that what was thought praiſe-worthy in one place, eſcaped not cenſure in another; and ſo in different ſocieties, virtues and vices were changed; yet, as to the main, they for the moſt part kept the ſame every-where. For ſince nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with eſteem and reputation that wherein every one

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that this matter is now ſo expreſſed, as to ſhow him there was no cauſe of ſcruple.

Though I am forced to differ from him in thoſe apprehenſions he has expreſſed in the latter end of his preface, concerning what I had ſaid about virtue and vice; yet we are better agreed than he thinks, in what he ſays in his third chapter, p. 78. concerning natural inſcription and innate notions. I ſhall not deny him the privilege he claims, p. 52. to ſtate the queſtion as he pleaſes, eſpecially when he ſtates it ſo, as to leave nothing in it contrary to what I have ſaid: for, according to him, innate notions being conditional things, depending upon the concurrence of ſeveral other circumſtances, in order to the ſoul's exerting them; all that he ſays for innate, imprinted, impreſſed notions (for of innate ideas he ſays nothing at all) amounts at laſt only to this: that there are certain propoſitions, which though the ſoul from the beginning, or when a man is born, does not know, yet by aſſiſtance from the outward ſenſes, and the help of ſome previous cultivation, it may afterwards come certainly to know the truth of; which is no more than what I have affirmed in my firſt book. For I ſuppoſe by the ſoul's exerting them, he means its beginning to know them, or elſe the ſoul's exerting of notions will be to me a very unintelligible expreſſion; and I think at beſt is a very unfit one in this caſe, it miſleading men's thoughts by an inſinuation, as if theſe notions were in the mind before the ſoul exerts them, i. e. before they are known: whereas truly before they are known, there is nothing of them in the mind, but a capacity to know them, when the concurrence of thoſe circumſtances, which this ingenious author thinks neceſſary in order to the ſoul's exerting them, brings them into our knowledge.

P. 52. I find him expreſs it thus; 'theſe natural notions are not ſo imprinted upon the ſoul, as that they naturally and neceſſarily exert themſelves (even in children and idiots) without any aſſiſtance from the outward ſenſes, or without the help of ſome previous cultivation.' Here he ſays they exert themſelves, as p. 78. that the ſoul exerts them. When he has explained to himſelf or others what he means by the ſoul's exerting innate notions, or their exerting themſelves, and what that previous cultivation and circumſtances, in order to their being exerted, are; he will, I ſuppoſe, find there is ſo little of controverſy between him and me in the point, bating that he calls that exerting of notions, which I in a more vulgar ſtyle call knowing, that I have reaſon to think he brought in my name upon this occaſion only out of the pleaſure he has to ſpeak civilly of me; which I muſt gratefully acknowledge he has done wherever he mentions me, not without conferring on me, as ſome others have done, a title I have no right to.

finds his advantage, and to blame and diſcountenance the contrary; it is no wonder that eſteem and diſcredit, virtue and vice, ſhould in a great meaſure every-where correſpond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong, which the law of God hath eſtabliſhed: there being nothing that ſo directly and viſibly ſecures and advances the general good of mankind in this world, as obedience to the laws he has ſet them; and nothing that breeds ſuch miſchiefs and confuſion, as the neglect of them. And therefore men, without renouncing all ſenſe and reaſon, and their own intereſt, which they are ſo conſtantly true to, could not generally miſtake in placing their commendation and blame on that ſide that really deſerved it not. Nay, even thoſe men whoſe practice was otherwiſe, failed not to give their approbation right; few being depraved to that degree, as not to condemn, at leaſt in others, the faults they themſelves were guilty of: whereby, even in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preferred. So that even the exhortations of inſpired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute: "Whatſoever is lovely, whatſoever is of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praiſe," &c. Phil. iv. 8.

Its enforcements commendation and diſcredit.

§. 12. If any one ſhall imagine that I have forgot my own notion of a law, when I make the law, whereby men judge of virtue and vice, to be nothing elſe but the conſent of private men, who have not authority enough to make a law: eſpecially wanting that, which is ſo neceſſary and eſſential to a law, a power to enforce it: I think I may ſay, that he who imagines commendation and diſgrace not to be ſtrong motives to men, to accommodate themſelves to the opinions and rules of thoſe with whom they converſe, ſeems little ſkilled in the nature or hiſtory of mankind: the greateſt part whereof he ſhall find to govern themſelves chiefly, if not ſolely, by this law of faſhion; and ſo they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company, little regard the laws of God, or the magiſtrate. The

penalties

penalties that attend the breach of God's laws, ſome, nay, perhaps moſt men, ſeldom ſeriouſly reflect on; and amongſt thoſe that do, many, whilſt they break the law, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation, and making their peace for ſuch breaches. And as to the puniſhments due from the laws of the commonwealth, they frequently flatter themſelves with the hopes of impunity. But no man eſcapes the puniſhment of their cenſure and diſlike, who offends againſt the faſhion and opinion of the company he keeps, and would recommend himſelf to. Nor is there one of ten thouſand, who is ſtiff and inſenſible enough to bear up under the conſtant diſlike and condemnation of his own club. He muſt be of a ſtrange and unuſual conſtitution, who can content himſelf to live in conſtant diſgrace and diſrepute with his own particular ſociety. Solitude many men have ſought, and been reconciled to: but no-body, that has the leaſt thought or ſenſe of a man about him, can live in ſociety under the conſtant diſlike and ill opinion of his familiars, and thoſe he converſes with. This is a burden too heavy for human ſufferance: and he muſt be made up of irreconcileable contradictions, who can take pleaſure in company, and yet be inſenſible of contempt and diſgrace from his companions.

Theſe three laws the rules of moral good and evil.

§. 13. Theſe three then, firſt, the law of God; ſecondly, the law of politic ſocieties; thirdly, the law of faſhion, or private cenſure; are thoſe to which men variouſly compare their actions: and it is by their conformity to one of theſe laws that they take their meaſures, when they would judge of their moral rectitude, and denominate their actions good or bad.

Morality is the relation of actions to theſe rules.

§. 14. Whether the rule, to which, as to a touchſtone, we bring our voluntary actions, to examine them by, and try their goodneſs, and accordingly to name them: which is, as it were, the mark of the value we ſet upon them: whether, I ſay, we take that rule from the faſhion of the country, or the will of a lawmaker, the mind is eaſily able to obſerve the relation

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any action hath to it, and to judge whether the action agrees or diſagrees with the rule; and ſo hath a notion of moral goodneſs or evil, which is either conformity or not conformity of any action to that rule: and therefore is often called moral rectitude. This rule being nothing but a collection of ſeveral ſimple ideas, the conformity thereto is but ſo ordering the action, that the ſimple ideas belonging to it may correſpond to thoſe which the law requires. And thus we ſee how moral beings and notions are founded on, and terminated in theſe ſimple ideas we have received from ſenſation or reflection. For example, et us conſider the complex idea we ſignify by the word murder; and when we have taken it aſunder, and examined all the particulars, we ſhall find them to amount to a collection of ſimple ideas derived from reflection or ſenſation, viz. firſt, from reflection on the operations of our own minds, we have the ideas of willing, conſidering, purpoſing before-hand, malice, or wiſhing ill to another; and alſo of life, or perception, and ſelf-motion. Secondly, from ſenſation we have the collection of thoſe ſimple ſenſible ideas which are to be found in a man, and of ſome action, whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man; all which ſimple ideas are comprehended in the word murder. This collection of ſimple ideas being found by me to agree or diſagree with the eſteem of the country I have been bred in, and to be held by moſt men there worthy praiſe or blame, I call the action virtuous or vicious: if I have the will of a ſupreme inviſible law-giver for my rule; then, as I ſuppoſed the action commanded or forbidden by God, I call it good or evil, ſin or duty: and if I compare it to the civil law, the rule made by the legiſlative power of the country, I call it lawful or unlawful, a crime or no crime. So that whenceſoever we take the rule of moral actions, or by what ſtandard ſoever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues or vices, they conſiſt only and are made up of collections of ſimple ideas, which we originally received from ſenſe or reflection, and their rectitude or obliquity conſiſts in

in the agreement or diſagreement with thoſe patterns preſcribed by ſome law.

§. 15. To conceive rightly of moral actions, we muſt take notice of them under this two-fold conſideration. Firſt, as they are in themſelves each made up of ſuch a collection of ſimple ideas. Thus drunkenneſs, or lying, ſignify ſuch or ſuch a collection of ſimple ideas, which I call mixed modes: and in this ſenſe they are as much poſitive abſolute ideas, as the drinking of a horſe, or ſpeaking of a parrot. Secondly, our actions are conſidered as good, bad, or indifferent; and in this reſpect they are relative, it being their conformity to, or diſagreement with ſome rule that makes them to be regular or irregular, good or bad: and ſo, as far as they are compared with a rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under relation. Thus the challenging and fighting with a man, as it is a certain poſitive mode, or particular ſort of action, by particular ideas, diſtinguiſhed from all others, is called duelling: which, when conſidered in relation to the law of God, will deſerve the name ſin; to the law of faſhion, in ſome countries, valour and virtue; and to the municipal laws of ſome governments, a capital crime. In this caſe, when the poſitive mode has one name, and another name as it ſtands in relation to the law, the diſtinction may as eaſily be obſerved, as it is in ſubſtances, where one name, v. g. man, is uſed to ſignify the thing; another, v. g. father, to ſignify the relation.

The denominations of actions often miſlead us.

§. 16. But becauſe very frequently the poſitive idea of the action, and its moral relation, are comprehended together under one name, and the ſame word made uſe of to expreſs both the mode or action, and its moral rectitude or obliquity; therefore the relation itſelf is leſs taken notice of, and there is often no diſtinction made between the poſitive idea of the action, and the reference it has to a rule. By which confuſion of theſe two diſtinct conſiderations under one term, thoſe who yield too eaſily to the impreſſions of ſounds, and are forward to take names for things, are often miſled in their judgment of actions. Thus the taking from another

ther what is his, without his knowledge or allowance, is properly called ſtealing; but that name being commonly underſtood to ſignify alſo the moral pravity of the action, and to denote its contrariety to the law, men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called ſtealing as an ill action, diſagreeing with the rule of right. And yet the private taking away his ſword from a madman, to prevent his doing miſchief, though it be properly denominated ſtealing, as the name of ſuch a mixed mode; yet when compared to the law of God, and conſidered in its relation to that ſupreme rule, it is no ſin or tranſgreſſion, though the name ſtealing ordinarily carries ſuch an intimation with it.

Relations innumerable.

§. 17. And thus much for the relation of human actions to a law, which therefore I call moral relation.

It would make a volume to go over all ſorts of relations; it is not therefore to be expected, that I ſhould here mention them all. It ſuffices to our preſent purpoſe to ſhow by theſe, what the ideas are we have of this comprehenſive conſideration, called relation: which is ſo various, and the occaſions of it ſo many (as many as there can be of comparing things one to another) that it is not very eaſy to reduce it to rules, or under juſt heads. Thoſe I have mentioned, I think, are ſome of the moſt conſiderable, and ſuch as may ſerve to let us ſee from whence we get our ideas of relations, and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this argument, from what has been ſaid, give me leave to obſerve;

All relations terminate in ſimple ideas.

§. 18. Firſt, That it is evident, that all relation terminates in, and is ultimately founded on thoſe ſimple ideas we have got from ſenſation or reflection: ſo that all that we have in our thoughts ourſelves (if we think of any thing, or have any meaning) or would ſignify to others, when we uſe words ſtanding for relations, is nothing but ſome ſimple ideas, or collections of ſimple ideas, compared one with another. This is ſo manifeſt in that ſort called proportional, that nothing can be more: for when a man ſays, honey is ſweeter than wax, it is pla[illegible]

thoughts in this relation terminate in this ſimple idea, ſweetneſs, which is equally true of all the reſt; though where they are compounded or decompounded, the ſimple ideas they are made up of are, perhaps, ſeldom taken notice of. V. g. when the word father is mentioned; firſt, there is meant that particular ſpecies, or collective idea, ſignified by the word man. Secondly, thoſe ſenſible ſimple ideas, ſignified by the word generation: and, thirdly, the effects of it, and all the ſimple ideas ſignified by the word child. So the word friend being taken for a man, who loves, and is ready to do good to another, has all theſe following ideas to the making of it up: firſt, all the ſimple ideas, comprehended in the word man, or intelligent being. Secondly, the idea of love. Thirdly, the idea of readineſs or diſpoſition. Fourthly, the idea of action, which is any kind of thought or motion. Fifthly, the idea of good, which ſignifies any thing that may advance his happineſs, and terminates at laſt, if examined, in particular ſimple ideas; of which the word good in general ſignifies any one, but, if removed from all ſimple ideas quite, it ſignifies nothing at all. And thus alſo all moral words terminate at laſt, though perhaps more remotely, in a collection of ſimple ideas: the immediate ſignification of relative words, being very often other ſuppoſed known relations; which, if traced one to another, ſtill end in ſimple ideas.

We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) a notion of the relation, as of its foundation.

§. 19. Secondly, That in relations we have for the moſt part, if not always, as clear a notion of the relation, as we have of thoſe ſimple ideas, wherein it is founded. Agreement or diſagreement, whereon relation depends, being things whereof we have commonly as clear ideas, as of any other whatſoever; it being but the diſtinguiſhing ſimple ideas, or their degrees one from another, without which we could have no diſtinct knowledge at all. For if I have a clear idea of ſweetneſs, light or extenſion, I have too, of equal, or more or leſs of each of theſe: if I know what it is for one man to be born of a woman, viz. Sempronia, I know what it is for another man

man to be born of the ſame woman Sempronia; and ſo have as clear a notion of brothers, as of births, and perhaps clearer. For if I believed that Sempronia dug Titus out of the parſley-bed (as they uſed to tell children) and thereby became his mother; and that afterwards, in the ſame manner, ſhe dug Caius out of the parſley-bed; I had as clear a notion of the relation of brothers between them, as if I had all the ſkill of a midwife: the notion that the ſame woman contributed, as mother, equally to their births, (though I were ignorant or miſtaken in the manner of it,) being that on which I grounded the relation, and that they agreed in that circumſtance of birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their deſcent from the ſame perſon, without knowing the particular circumſtances of that deſcent, is enough to found my notion of their having or not having the relation of brothers. But though the ideas of particular relations are capable of being as clear and diſtinct in the minds of thoſe, who will duly conſider them, as thoſe of mixed modes, and more determinate than thoſe of ſubſtances; yet the names belonging to relation are often of as doubtful and uncertain ſignification, as thoſe of ſubſtances or mixed modes, and much more than thoſe of ſimple ideas: becauſe relative words being the marks of this compariſon, which is made only by men's thoughts, and is an idea only in men's minds, men frequently apply them to different compariſons of things, according to their own imaginations, which do not always correſpond with thoſe of others uſing the ſame name.

The notion of the relation is the ſame, whether the rule any action is compared to be true or falſe.

§. 20. Thirdly, That in theſe I call moral relations, I have a true notion of relation, by comparing the action with the rule, whether the rule be true or falſe. For if I meaſure any thing by a yard, I know whether the thing I meaſure be longer or ſhorter than that ſuppoſed yard, though perhaps the yard I meaſure by be not exactly the ſtandard; which indeed is another inquiry. For though the rule be erroneous, and I miſtaken in it; yet the agreement or diſagreement obſervable in that which I compare

compare with, makes me perceive the relation. Though meaſuring by a wrong rule, I ſhall thereby be brought to judge amiſs of its moral rectitude, becauſe I have tried it by that which is not the true rule; yet I am not miſtaken in the relation which that action bears to that rule I compare it to, which is agreement or diſagreement.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Clear and Obſcure, Diſtinct and Confuſed Ideas.

Ideas ſome clear and diſtinct, others obſcure and confuſed.

§. 1. HAVING ſhown the original of our ideas, and taken a view of their ſeveral ſorts; conſidered the difference between the ſimple and the complex, and obſerved how the complex ones are divided into thoſe of modes, ſubſtances, and relations; all which, I think, is neceſſary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himſelf thoroughly with the progreſs of the mind in its apprehenſion and knowledge of things: it will, perhaps, be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the examination of ideas. I muſt, nevertheleſs, crave leave to offer ſome few other conſiderations concerning them. The firſt is that ſome are clear, and others obſcure; ſome diſtinct, and others confuſed.

Clear and obſcure explained by ſight.

§. 2. The perception of the mind being moſt aptly explained by words relating to the ſight, we ſhall beſt underſtand what is meant by clear and obſcure in our ideas, by reflecting on what we call clear and obſcure in the objects of ſight. Light being that which diſcovers to us viſible objects, we give the name of obſcure to that which is not placed in a light ſufficient to diſcover minutely to us the figure and colours, which are obſervable in it, and which, in a better light, would be diſcernible. In like manner our ſimple ideas are clear, when they are ſuch as the objects themſelves, from

from whence they were taken, did or might, in a well-ordered ſenſation or perception, preſent them. Whilſt the memory retains them thus, and can produce them to the mind, whenever it has occaſion to conſider them, they are clear ideas. So far as they either want any thing of the original exactneſs, or have loſt any of their firſt freſhneſs, and are, as it were, faded or tarniſhed by time; ſo far are they obſcure. Complex ideas, as they are made up of ſimple ones, ſo they are clear when the ideas that go to their compoſition are clear: and the number and order of thoſe ſimple ideas, that are the ingredients of any complex one, is determinate and certain.

Cauſes of obſcurity.

§. 3. The cauſes of obſcurity in ſimple ideas ſeem to be either dull organs, or very ſlight and tranſient impreſſions made by the objects, or elſe a weakneſs in the memory not able to retain them as received. For to return again to viſible objects, to help us to apprehend this matter: if the organs or faculties of perception, like wax over-hardened with cold, will not receive the impreſſion of the ſeal, from the uſual impulſe wont to imprint it; or, like wax of a temper too ſoft, will not hold it well when well imprinted; or elſe ſuppoſing the wax of a temper fit, but the ſeal not applied with a ſufficient force to make a clear impreſſion: in any of theſe caſes, the print left by the ſeal will be obſcure. This, I ſuppoſe, needs no application to make it plainer.

Diſtinct and confuſed, what.

§. 4. As a clear idea is that whereof the mind has ſuch a full and evident perception, as it does receive from an outward object operating duly on a well-diſpoſed organ; ſo a diſtinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other; and a confuſed idea is ſuch an one, as is not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from another, from which it ought to be different.

Objection.

§. 5. If no idea be confuſed, but ſuch as is not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from another, from which it ſhould be different; it will be hard, may any one ſay, to find any where a confuſed idea.

. For let any idea be as it will, it can be no other ſuch as the mind perceives it to be; and that very eption ſufficiently diſtinguiſhes it from all other s, which cannot be other, i. e. different, without g perceived to be ſo. No idea therefore can be unnguiſhable from another, from which it ought to lifferent, unleſs you would have it different from f: for from all other it is evidently different.

Confuſion of ideas is in reference to their names.

6. To remove this difficulty, and to us to conceive aright what it is that es the confuſion ideas are at any time geable with, we muſt conſider, that gs ranked under diſtinct names are ſuppoſed dift enough to be diſtinguiſhed, and ſo each ſort by peculiar name may be marked, and diſcourſed of rt upon any occaſion: and there is nothing more ent, than that the greateſt part of different names uppoſed to ſtand for different things. Now every a man has being viſibly what it is, and diſtinct all other ideas but itſelf; the which makes it uſed, is, when it is ſuch, that it may as well be d by another name, as that which it is expreſſed the difference which keeps the things (to be ranked r thoſe two different names) diſtinct, and makes of them belong rather to the one, and ſome of to the other of thoſe names, being left out; and e diſtinction, which was intended to be kept up by different names, is quite loſt.

Defaults which make confuſion.

7. The defaults which uſually occaſion this confuſion, I think, are chiefly following:

Firſt, complex ideas made up of too few ſimple ones.

firſt, when any complex idea (for it is plex ideas that are moſt liable to con-n) is made up of too ſmall a number mple ideas, and ſuch only as are com- to other things, whereby the differences make it deſerve a different name, are left out. Thus at has an idea made up of barely the ſimple ones beaſt with ſpots, has but a confuſed idea of a ard; it not being thereby ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed a lynx, and ſeveral other ſorts of beaſts that are

spotted. So that such an idea, though it hath the peculiar name leopard, is not distinguishable from those designed by the names lynx or panther, and may as well come under the name lynx as leopard. How much the custom of defining of words by general terms contributes to make the ideas we would express by them confused and undetermined, I leave others to consider. This is evident, that confused ideas are such as render the use of words uncertain, and take away the benefit of distinct names. When the ideas, for which we use different terms, have not a difference answerable to their distinct names, and so cannot be distinguished by them, there it is that they are truly confused.

Secondly, or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together.

§. 8. Secondly, Another fault which makes our ideas confused, is, when though the particulars that make up any idea are in number enough; yet they are so jumbled together, that it is not easily discernible, whether it more belongs to the name that is given it, than to any other. There is nothing properer to make us conceive this confusion, than a sort of pictures usually shown as surprizing pieces of art, wherein the colours, as they are laid by the pencil on the table itself, mark out very odd and unusual figures, and have no discernible order in their position. This draught, thus made up of parts wherein no symmetry nor order appears, is in itself no more a confused thing, than the picture of a cloudy sky; wherein though there be as little order of colours or figures to be found, yet nobody thinks it a confused picture. What is it then that makes it be thought confused, since the want of symmetry does not? as it is plain it does not; for another draught made, barely in imitation of this, could not be called confused. I answer, that which makes it be thought confused, is, the applying it to some name, to which it does no more discernibly belong, than to some other: v. g. When it is said to be the picture of a man, or Cæsar, then any one with reason counts it confused: because it is not discernible, in that state, to belong more to the name man, or Cæsar, than to the name baboon, or Pompey; which are supposed to stand for different

different ideas from thoſe ſignified by man, or Cæſar. But when a cylindrical mirrour, placed right, hath reduced thoſe irregular lines on the table into their due order and proportion, then the confuſion ceaſes, and the eye preſently ſees that it is a man, or Cæſar, i. e. that it belongs to thoſe names; and that it is ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from a baboon, or Pompey, i. e. from the ideas ſignified by thoſe names. Juſt thus it is with our ideas, which are as it were the pictures of things. No one of theſe mental draughts, however the parts are put together, can be called confuſed (for they are plainly diſcernible as they are) till it be ranked under ſome ordinary name, to which it cannot be diſcerned to belong, any more than it does to ſome other name of an allowed different ſignification.

Thirdly, or are mutable and undetermined.

§. 9. Thirdly, A third defect that frequently gives the name of confuſed to our ideas, is, when any one of them is uncertain and undetermined. Thus we may obſerve men, who not forbearing to uſe the ordinary words of their language, till they have learned their preciſe ſignification, change the idea they make this or that term ſtand for, almoſt as often as they uſe it. He that does this, out of uncertainty of what he ſhould leave out, or put into his idea of church or idolatry, every time he thinks of either, and holds not ſteady to any one preciſe combination of ideas that makes it up, is ſaid to have a confuſed idea of idolatry or the church: though this be ſtill for the ſame reaſon as the former, viz. becauſe a mutable idea (if we will allow it to be one idea) cannot belong to one name rather than another; and ſo loſes the diſtinction that diſtinct names are deſigned for.

Confuſion, without reference to names, hardly conceivable.

§. 10. By what has been ſaid, we may obſerve how much names, as ſuppoſed ſteady ſigns of things, and by their difference to ſtand for and keep things diſtinct that in themſelves are different, are the occaſion of denominating ideas diſtinct or confuſed, by a ſecret and unobſerved reference the mind makes of its ideas to ſuch names. This perhaps

will be fuller underſtood, after what I ſay of words, in the third book, has been read and conſidered. But without taking notice of ſuch a reference of ideas to diſtinct names, as the ſigns of diſtinct things, it will be hard to ſay what a confuſed idea is. And therefore when a man deſigns, by any name, a ſort of things, or any one particular thing, diſtinct from all others; the complex idea he annexes to that name is the more diſtinct, the more particular the ideas are, and the greater and more determinate the number and order of them is, whereof it is made up. For the more it has of theſe, the more it has ſtill of the perceivable differences, whereby it is kept ſeparate and diſtinct from all ideas belonging to other names, even thoſe that approach neareſt to it; and thereby all confuſion with them is avoided.

Confuſion concerns always two ideas.

§. 11. Confuſion, making it a difficulty to ſeparate two things that ſhould be ſeparated, concerns always two ideas; and thoſe moſt, which moſt approach one another. Whenever therefore we ſuſpect any idea to be confuſed, we muſt examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot eaſily be ſeparated from; and that will always be found an idea belonging to another name, and ſo ſhould be a different thing, from which yet it is not ſufficiently diſtinct; being either the ſame with it, or making a part of it, or at leaſt as properly called by that name, as the other it is ranked under; and ſo keeps not that difference from that other idea, which the different names import.

Cauſes of confuſion.

§. 12. This, I think, is the confuſion proper to ideas, which ſtill carries with it a ſecret reference to names. At leaſt, if there be any other confuſion of ideas, this is that which moſt of all diſorders men's thoughts and diſcourſes: ideas, as ranked under names, being thoſe that for the moſt part men reaſon of within themſelves, and always thoſe which they commune about with others. And therefore where there are ſuppoſed two different ideas marked by two different names, which are not as diſtinguiſhable as the ſounds that ſtand for them, there never fails to

to be confuſion: and where any ideas are diſtinct as the ideas of thoſe two ſounds they are marked by, there can be between them no confuſion. The way to prevent it is to collect and unite into one complex idea, as preciſely as is poſſible, all thoſe ingredients whereby it is differenced from others; and to them, ſo united in a determinate number and order, apply ſteadily the ſame name. But this neither accomodating men's eaſe or vanity, or ſerving any deſign but that of naked truth, which is not always the thing aimed at, ſuch exactneſs is rather to be wiſhed than hoped for. And ſince the looſe application of names to undetermined, variable, and almoſt no ideas, ſerves both to cover our own ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for learning and ſuperiority in knowledge, it is no wonder that moſt men ſhould uſe it themſelves, whilſt they complain of it in others. Though, I think, no ſmall part of the confuſion to be found in the notions of men might by care and ingenuity be avoided, yet I am far from concluding it every-where wilful. Some ideas are ſo complex, and made up of ſo many parts, that the memory does not eaſily retain the very ſame preciſe combination of ſimple ideas under one name; much leſs are we able conſtantly to divine for what preciſe complex idea ſuch a name ſtands in another man's uſe of it. From the firſt of theſe, follows confuſion in a man's own reaſonings and opinions within himſelf; from the latter, frequent confuſion in diſcourſing and arguing with others. But having more at large treated of words, their defects and abuſes, in the following book, I ſhall here ſay no more of it.

Complex ideas may be diſtinct in one part, and confuſed in another.

§. 13. Our complex ideas being made up of collections, and ſo variety of ſimple ones, may accordingly be very clear and diſtinct in one part, and very obſcure and confuſed in another. In a man who ſpeaks of a chiliaedron, or a body of a thouſand ſides, the ideas of the figure may be very confuſed, though that of the number be very diſtinct; ſo that he being able to diſcourſe and demonſtrate concerning that part

of his complex idea, which depends upon the number of a thouſand, he is apt to think he has a diſtinct idea of a chiliaedron; though it be plain he has no preciſe idea of its figure, ſo as to diſtinguiſh it by that, from one that has but 999 ſides; the not obſerving whereof cauſes no ſmall errour in men's thoughts, and confuſion in their diſcourſes.

This, if not heeded, cauſes confuſion in our arguings.

§. 14. He that thinks he has a diſtinct idea of the figure of a chiliaedron, let him for trial-ſake take another parcel of the ſame uniform matter, viz. gold, or wax, of an equal bulk, and make it into a figure of 999 ſides; he will, I doubt not, be able to diſtinguiſh theſe two ideas one from another, by the number of ſides; and reaſon and argue diſtinctly about them, whilſt he keeps his thoughts and reaſoning to that part only of theſe ideas, which is contained in their numbers; as that the ſides of the one could be divided into two equal numbers, and of the others not, &c. But when he goes about to diſtinguiſh them by their figure, he will there be preſently at a loſs, and not be able, I think, to frame in his mind two ideas, one of them diſtinct from the other, by the bare figure of theſe two pieces of gold; as he could, if the ſame parcels of gold were made one into a cube, the other a figure of five ſides. In which incompleat ideas, we are very apt to impoſe on ourſelves, and wrangle with others, eſpecially where they have particular and familiar names. For being ſatisfied in that part of the idea, which we have clear; and the name which is familiar to us, being applied to the whole, containing that part alſo which is imperfect and obſcure: we are apt to uſe it for that confuſed part, and draw deductions from it, in the obſcure part of its ſignification, as confidently as we do from the other.

Inſtance in eternity.

§. 15. Having frequently in our mouths the name eternity, we are apt to think we have a poſitive comprehenſive idea of it, which is as much as to ſay, that there is no part of that duration, which is not clearly contained in our idea. It is true, that he that thinks ſo may have a clear idea of

duration;

duration; he may alſo have a very clear idea of a very great length of duration; he may alſo have a clear idea of the compariſon of that great one with ſtill a greater: but it not being poſſible for him to include in his idea of any duration, let it be as great as it will, the whole extent together of a duration, where he ſuppoſes no end, that part of his idea, which is ſtill beyond the bounds of that large duration, he repreſents to his own thoughts, is very obſcure and undetermined. And hence it is that in diſputes and reaſonings concerning eternity, or any other infinite, we are apt to blunder, and involve ourſelves in manifeſt abſurdities.

Diviſibility of matter.

§. 16. In matter we have no clear ideas of the ſmallneſs of parts much beyond the ſmalleſt that occur to any of our ſenſes: and therefore when we talk of the diviſibility of matter in infinitum, though we have clear ideas of diviſion and diviſibility, and have alſo clear ideas of parts made out of a whole by diviſion; yet we have but very obſcure and confuſed ideas of corpuſcles, or minute bodies ſo to be divided, when by former diviſions they are reduced to a ſmallneſs much exceeding the perception of any of our ſenſes; and ſo all that we have clear and diſtinct ideas of, is of what diviſion in general or abſtractedly is, and the relation of totum and parts: but of the bulk of the body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain progreſſions, I think, we have no clear nor diſtinct idea at all. For I aſk any one, whether taking the ſmalleſt atom of duſt he ever ſaw, he has any diſtinct idea (bating ſtill the number, which concerns not extenſion) betwixt the 100,000th, and the 1,000,000th part of it. Or if he thinks he can refine his ideas to that degree, without loſing ſight of them, let him add ten cyphers to each of thoſe numbers. Such a degree of ſmallneſs is not unreaſonable to be ſuppoſed, ſince a diviſion carried on ſo far brings it no nearer the end of infinite diviſion, than the firſt diviſion into two halves does. I muſt confeſs, for my part, I have no clear diſtinct ideas of the different bulk or extenſion of thoſe bodies, having but a very obſcure one of either of them. So that, I think, when we talk of diviſion of bodies in infinitum, our idea of their

diſtinct bulks, which is the ſubject and foundation of diviſion, comes, after a little progreſſion, to be confounded, and almoſt loſt in obſcurity. For that idea, which is to repreſent only bigneſs, muſt be very obſcure and confuſed, which we cannot diſtinguiſh from one ten times as big, but only by number; ſo that we have clear diſtinct ideas, we may ſay, of ten and one, but no diſtinct ideas of two ſuch extenſions. It is plain from hence, that when we talk of infinite diviſibility of body, or extenſion, our diſtinct and clear ideas are only of numbers; but the clear diſtinct ideas of extenſion, after ſome progreſs of diviſion, are quite loſt: and of ſuch minute parts we have no diſtinct ideas at all: but it returns, as all our ideas of infinite do, at laſt to that of number always to be added; but thereby never amounts to any diſtinct idea of actual infinite parts. We have, it is true, a clear idea of diviſion, as often as we think of it; but thereby we have no more a clear idea of infinite parts in matter, than we have a clear idea of an infinite number, by being able ſtill to add new numbers to any aſſigned numbers we have: endleſs diviſibility giving us no more a clear and diſtinct idea of actually infinite parts, than endleſs addibility (if I may ſo ſpeak) gives us a clear and diſtinct idea of an actually infinite number; they both being only in a power ſtill of increaſing the number, be it already as great as it will. So that of what remains to be added (wherein conſiſts the infinity) we have but an obſcure, imperfect, and confuſed idea; from or about which we can argue or reaſon with no certainty or clearneſs, no more than we can in arithmetick, about a number of which we have no ſuch diſtinct idea as we have of 4 or 100; but only this relative obſcure one, that compared to any other, it is ſtill bigger: and we have no more a clear poſitive idea of it when we ſay or conceive it is bigger, or more than 400,000,000, than if we ſhould ſay it is bigger than 40, or 4; 400,000,000 having no nearer a proportion to the end of addition, or number, than 4. For he that adds only 4 to 4, and ſo proceeds, ſhall as ſoon come to the end of all addition, as he that adds 400,000,000

to

to 400,000,000. And ſo likewiſe in eternity, he that has an idea of but four years, has as much a poſitive compleat idea of eternity, as he that has one of 400,000,000 of years: for what remains of eternity beyond either of theſe two numbers of years is as clear to the one as the other; i. e. neither of them has any clear poſitive idea of it at all. For he that adds only four years to 4, and ſo on, ſhall as ſoon reach eternity, as he that adds 400,000,000 of years, and ſo on; or, if he pleaſe, doubles the increaſe as often as he will: the remaining abyſs being ſtill as far beyond the end of all theſe progreſſions, as it is from the length of a day or an hour. For nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite; and therefore our ideas, which are all finite, cannot bear any. Thus it is alſo in our idea of extenſion, when we increaſe it by addition, as well as when we diminiſh it by diviſion, and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite ſpace. After a few doublings of thoſe ideas of extenſion, which are the largeſt we are accuſtomed to have, we loſe the clear diſtinct idea of that ſpace: it becomes a confuſedly great one, with a ſurplus of ſtill greater; about which, when we would argue or reaſon, we ſhall always find ourſelves at a loſs; confuſed ideas in our arguings and deductions from that part of them which is confuſed always leading us into confuſion.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Real and Fantaſtical Ideas.

§. 1. BESIDES what we have already mentioned concerning ideas, other conſiderations belong to them, in reference to things from whence they are taken, or which they may be ſuppoſed to repreſent: and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold diſtinction; and are,

Real ideas are conformable to their archetypes.

Firſt, either real or fantaſtical.

Secondly,

Secondly, adequate or inadequate.

Thirdly, true or falſe.

Firſt, by real ideas, I mean ſuch as have a foundation in nature; ſuch as have a conformity with the real being and exiſtence of things, or with their archetypes. Fantaſtical or chimerical I call ſuch as have no foundation in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes. If we examine the ſeveral ſorts of ideas before-mentioned, we ſhall find, that,

Simple ideas all real.

§. 2. Firſt, our ſimple ideas are all real, all agree to the reality of things, not that they are all of them the images or repreſentations of what does exiſt; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been already ſhown. But though whiteneſs and coldneſs are no more in ſnow than pain is; yet thoſe ideas of whiteneſs and coldneſs, pain, &c. being in us the effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker to produce in us ſuch ſenſations; they are real ideas in us, whereby we diſtinguiſh the qualities that are really in things themſelves. For theſe ſeveral appearances being deſigned to be the mark, whereby we are to know and diſtinguiſh things which we have to do with, our ideas do as well ſerve us to that purpoſe, and are as real diſtinguiſhing characters, whether they be only conſtant effects, or elſe exact reſemblances of ſomething in the things themſelves; the reality lying in that ſteady correſpondence they have with the diſtinct conſtitutions of real beings. But whether they anſwer to thoſe conſtitutions, as to cauſes or patterns, it matters not; it ſuffices that they are conſtantly produced by them. And thus our ſimple ideas are all real and true, becauſe they anſwer and agree to thoſe powers of things which produce them in our minds; that being all that is requiſite to make them real, and not fictions at pleaſure. For in ſimple ideas (as has been ſhown) the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itſelf no ſimple idea, more than what it has received.

§. 3.

§. 3. Though the mind be wholly paſſive in reſpect of its ſimple ideas; yet I think, we may ſay, it is not ſo in reſpect of its complex ideas: for thoſe being combinations of ſimple ideas put together, and united under one general name; it is plain that the mind of man uſes ſome kind of liberty, in forming thoſe complex ideas: how elſe comes it to paſs that one man's idea of gold, or juſtice, is different from another's? but becauſe he has put in, or left out of his, ſome ſimple idea, which the other has not. The queſtion then is, which of theſe are real, and which barely imaginary combinations? What collections agree to the reality of things, and what not? And to this I ſay, That,

Complex ideas are voluntary combinations.

§. 4. Secondly, mixed modes and relations having no other reality but what they have in the minds of men, there is nothing more required to this kind of ideas to make them real, but that they be ſo framed, that there be a poſſibility of exiſting conformable to them. Theſe ideas themſelves, being archetypes, cannot differ from their archetypes, and ſo cannot be chimerical, unleſs any one will jumble together in them inconſiſtent ideas. Indeed, as any of them have the names of a known language aſſigned to them, by which he that has them in his mind would ſignify them to others, ſo bare poſſibility of exiſting is not enough; they muſt have a conformity to the ordinary ſignification of the name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantaſtical: as if a man would give the name of juſtice to that idea, which common uſe calls liberality. But this fantaſticalneſs relates more to propriety of ſpeech, than reality of ideas: for a man to be undiſturbed in danger, ſedately to conſider what is fitteſt to be done, and to execute it ſteadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex idea of an action which may exiſt. But to be undiſturbed in danger, without uſing one's reaſon or induſtry, is what is alſo poſſible to be; and ſo is as real an idea as the other. Though the firſt of theſe,

Mixed modes made of conſiſtent ideas, are real.

theſe, having the name courage given to it, may, in reſpect of that name, be a right or wrong idea: but the other, whilſt it has not a common received name of any known language aſſigned to it, is not capable of any deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but itſelf.

Ideas of ſubſtances are real, when they agree with the exiſtence of things.

§. 5. Thirdly, our complex ideas of ſubſtances being made all of them in reference to things exiſting without us, and intended to be repreſentations of ſubſtances, as they really are; are no farther real, than as they are ſuch combinations of ſimple ideas, as are really united, and co-exiſt in things without us. On the contrary, thoſe are fantaſtical which are made up of ſuch collections of ſimple ideas as were really never united, never were found together in any ſubſtance; v. g. a rational creature, conſiſting of a horſe's head, joined to a body of human ſhape, or ſuch as the centaurs are deſcribed: or, a body yellow, very malleable, fuſible, and fixed; but lighter than common water: or an uniform, unorganized body, conſiſting, as to ſenſe, all of ſimilar parts, with perception and voluntary motion joined to it. Whether ſuch ſubſtances as theſe can poſſibly exiſt or no, it is probable we do not know: but be that as it will, theſe ideas of ſubſtances being made conformable to no pattern exiſting that we know, and conſiſting of ſuch collections of ideas, as no ſubſtance ever ſhowed us united together, they ought to paſs with us for barely imaginary; but much more are thoſe complex ideas ſo, which contain in them any inconſiſtency or contradiction of their parts.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

§. 1. OF our real ideas, ſome are adequate, and ſome are inadequate. Thoſe I call adequate, which perfectly repreſent thoſe archetypes which the mind ſuppoſes them taken from; which it intends them to ſtand for, and to which it refers them. Inadequate ideas are ſuch, which are but a partial or incomplete repreſentation of thoſe archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain,

Adequate ideas are ſuch as perfectly repreſent their archetypes.

§. 2. Firſt, that all our ſimple ideas are adequate. Becauſe being nothing but the effects of certain powers in things, fitted and ordained by God to produce ſuch ſenſations in us, they cannot but be correſpondent and adequate to thoſe powers: and we are ſure they agree to the reality of things. For if ſugar produce in us the ideas which we call whiteneſs and ſweetneſs, we are ſure there is a power in ſugar to produce thoſe ideas in our minds, or elſe they could not have been produced by it. And ſo each ſenſation anſwering the power that operates on any of our ſenſes, the idea ſo produced is a real idea, (and not a fiction of the mind, which has no power to produce any ſimple idea;) and cannot but be adequate, ſince it ought only to anſwer that power: and ſo all ſimple ideas are adequate. It is true, the things producing in us theſe ſimple ideas are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the cauſes of them; but as if thoſe ideas were real beings in them. For though fire be called painful to the touch, whereby is ſignified the power of producing in us the idea of pain, yet it is denominated alſo light and hot; as if light and heat were really ſomething in the fire more than a power to excite theſe ideas in us; and therefore are called qualities in, or of the fire. But theſe being nothing,

Simple ideas all adequate.

nothing, in truth, but powers to excite ſuch ideas in us, I muſt in that ſenſe be underſtood, when I ſpeak of ſecondary qualities, as being in things; or of their ideas, as being the objects that excite them in us. Such ways of ſpeaking, though accommodated to the vulgar notions, without which one cannot be well underſtood, yet truly ſignify nothing but thoſe powers which are in things to excite certain ſenſations or ideas in us: ſince were there no fit organs to receive the impreſſions fire makes on the ſight and touch, nor a mind joined to thoſe organs to receive the ideas of light and heat by thoſe impreſſions from the fire or ſun, there would yet be no more light or heat in the world, than there would be pain, if there were no ſenſible creature to feel it, though the ſun ſhould continue juſt as it is now, and mount Ætna flame higher than ever it did. Solidity and extenſion, and the termination of it, figure, with motion and reſt, whereof we have the ideas, would be really in the world as they are, whether there were any ſenſible being to perceive them or no; and therefore we have reaſon to look on thoſe as the real modifications of matter, and ſuch are the exciting cauſes of all our various ſenſations from bodies. But this being an inquiry not belonging to this place, I ſhall enter no farther into it, but proceed to ſhow what complex ideas are adequate, and what not.

Modes are all adequate.

§. 3. Secondly, our complex ideas of modes, being voluntary collections of ſimple ideas which the mind puts together without reference to any real archetypes or ſtanding patterns exiſting any-where, are and cannot but be adequate ideas. Becauſe they not being intended for copies of things really exiſting, but for archetypes made by the mind to rank and denominate things by, cannot want any thing: they having each of them that combination of ideas, and thereby that perfection which the mind intended they ſhould: ſo that the mind acquieſces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the idea of a figure, with three ſides meeting at three angles, I have a compleat idea, wherein I require nothing elſe to make it perfect. That the mind

mind is ſatisfied with the perfection of this its idea, is plain in that it does not conceive, that any underſtanding hath, or can have a more compleat or perfect idea of that thing it ſignifies by the word triangle, ſuppoſing it to exiſt, than itſelf has in that complex idea of three ſides and three angles; in which is contained all that is, or can be eſſential to it, or neceſſary to compleat it, wherever or however it exiſts. But in our ideas of ſubſtances it is otherwiſe. For there deſiring to copy things as they really do exiſt, and to repreſent to ourſelves that conſtitution on which all their properties depend, we perceive our ideas attain not that perfection we intend: we find they ſtill want ſomething we ſhould be glad were in them; and ſo are all inadequate. But mixed modes and relations, being archetypes without patterns, and ſo having nothing to repreſent but themſelves, cannot but be adequate, every thing being ſo to itſelf. He that at firſt put together the idea of danger perceived, abſence of diſorder from fear, ſedate conſideration of what was juſtly to be done, and executing that without diſturbance, or being deterred by the danger of it, had certainly in his mind that complex idea made up of that combination; and intending it to be nothing elſe, but what is, nor to have in it any other ſimple ideas, but what it hath, it could not alſo but be an adequate idea: and laying this up in his memory, with the name courage annexed to it, to ſignify to others, and denominate from thence any action he ſhould obſerve to agree with it, had thereby a ſtandard to meaſure and denominate actions by, as they agreed to it. This idea thus made, and laid up for a pattern, muſt neceſſarily be adequate, being referred to nothing elſe but itſelf, nor made by any other original, but the good-liking and will of him that firſt made this combination.

Modes, in reference to ſettled names, may be inadequate.

§. 4. Indeed another coming after, and in converſation learning from him the word courage, may make an idea, to which he gives the name courage, different from what the firſt author applied it to, and has in his mind, when he uſes it. And in this

this caſe, if he deſigns that his idea in thinking ſhould be conformable to the other's idea, as the name he uſes in ſpeaking is conformable in ſound to his, from whom he learned it, his idea may be very wrong and inadequate: becauſe in this caſe, making the other man's idea the pattern of his idea in thinking, as the other man's word or ſound is the pattern of his in ſpeaking, his idea is ſo far defective and inadequate, as it is diſtant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to, and intends to expreſs and ſignify by the name he uſes for it; which name he would have to be a ſign of the other man's idea (to which, in its proper uſe, it is primarily annexed) and of his own, as agreeing to it: to which, if his own does not exactly correſpond, it is faulty and inadequate.

§. 5. Therefore theſe complex ideas of modes, when they are referred by the mind, and intended to correſpond to the ideas in the mind of ſome other intelligent being, expreſſed by the names we apply to them, they may be very deficient, wrong, and inadequate; becauſe they agree not to that, which the mind deſigns to be their archetype and pattern: in which reſpect only, any idea of modes can be wrong, imperfect, or inadequate. And on this account our ideas of mixed modes are the moſt liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper ſpeaking, than knowing right.

Ideas of ſubſtances, as referred to real eſſences, not adequate.

§. 6. Thirdly, what ideas we have of ſubſtances, I have above ſhowed. Now thoſe ideas have in the mind a double reference: 1. Sometimes they are referred to a ſuppoſed real eſſence of each ſpecies of things. 2. Sometimes they are only deſigned to be pictures and repreſentations in the mind of things that do exiſt by ideas of thoſe qualities that are diſcoverable in them. In both which ways, theſe copies of thoſe originals and archetypes are imperfect and inadequate.

Firſt, it is uſual for men to make the names of ſubſtances ſtand for things, as ſuppoſed to have certain real eſſences, whereby they are of this or that

ſpecies: and names ſtanding for nothing but the ideas that are in men's minds, they muſt conſtantly refer their ideas to ſuch real eſſences, as to their archetypes. That men (eſpecially ſuch as have been bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world) do ſuppoſe certain ſpecific eſſences of ſubſtances, which each individual, in its ſeveral kinds, is made conformable to, and partakes of; is ſo far from needing proof, that it will be thought ſtrange if any one ſhould do otherwiſe. And thus they ordinarily apply the ſpecific names they rank particular ſubſtances under to things, as diſtinguiſhed by ſuch ſpecific real eſſences. Who is there almoſt, who would not take it amiſs, if it ſhould be doubted, whether he called himſelf a man, with any other meaning, than as having the real eſſence of a man? And yet if you demand what thoſe real eſſences are, it is plain men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows, that the ideas they have in their minds, being referred to real eſſences, as to archetypes which are unknown, muſt be ſo far from being adequate, that they cannot be ſuppoſed to be any repreſentation of them at all. The complex ideas we have of ſubſtances are, as it has been ſhown, certain collections of ſimple ideas that have been obſerved or ſuppoſed conſtantly to exiſt together. But ſuch a complex idea cannot be the real eſſence of any ſubſtance; for then the properties we diſcover in that body would depend on that complex idea, and be deducible from it, and their neceſſary connection with it be known; as all properties of a triangle depend on, and, as far as they are diſcoverable, are deducible from the complex idea of three lines, including a ſpace. But it is plain, that in our complex ideas of ſubſtances are not contained ſuch ideas, on which all the other qualities, that are to be found in them, do depend. The common idea men have of iron, is a body of a certain colour, weight and hardneſs; and a property that they look on as belonging to it, is malleableneſs. But yet this property has no neceſſary connexion with that complex idea, or any part of it; and there is no more reaſon to think that malleableneſs depends on that colour, weight,

and hardneſs, than that colour, or that weight depends on its malleableneſs. And yet, though we know nothing of theſe real eſſences, there is nothing more ordinary, than that men ſhould attribute the ſorts of things to ſuch eſſences. The particular parcel of matter, which makes the ring I have on my finger, is forwardly, by moſt men, ſuppoſed to have a real eſſence, whereby it is gold; and from whence thoſe qualities flow, which I find in it, viz. its peculiar colour, weight, hardneſs, fuſibility, fixedneſs, and change of colour upon a ſlight touch of mercury, &c. This eſſence, from which all theſe properties flow, when I inquire into it, and ſearch after it, I plainly perceive I cannot diſcover: the fartheſt I can go is only to preſume, that it being nothing but body, its real eſſence, or internal conſtitution, on which theſe qualities depend, can be nothing but the figure, ſize, and connexion of its ſolid parts; of neither of which having any diſtinct perception at all, can I have any idea of its eſſence, which is the cauſe that it has that particular ſhining yellowneſs, a greater weight than any thing I know of the ſame bulk, and a fitneſs to have its colour changed by the touch of quickſilver. If any one will ſay, that the real eſſence and internal conſtitution, on which theſe properties depend, is not the figure, ſize, and arrangement or connexion of its ſolid parts, but ſomething elſe, called its particular form; I am farther from having any idea of its real eſſence, than I was before: for I have an idea of figure, ſize, and ſituation of ſolid parts in general, though I have none of the particular figure, ſize, or putting together of parts, whereby the qualities above-mentioned are produced; which qualities I find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger, and not in another parcel of matter, with which I cut the pen I write with. But when I am told, that ſomething beſides the figure, ſize, and poſture of the ſolid parts of that body, is its eſſence, ſomething called ſubſtantial form; of that, I confeſs, I have no idea at all, but only of the ſound form, which is far enough from an idea of its real eſſence, or conſtitution. The like ignorance as I have of the real eſſence of

this

this particular ſubſtance, I have alſo of the real eſſence of all other natural ones: of which eſſences, I confeſs, I have no diſtinct ideas at all; and I am apt to ſuppoſe others, when they examine their own knowledge, will find in themſelves, in this one point, the ſame ſort of ignorance.

§. 7. Now then, when men apply to this particular parcel of matter on my finger, a general name already in uſe, and denominate it gold, do they not ordinarily, or are they not underſtood to give it that name as belonging to a particular ſpecies of bodies, having a real internal eſſence; by having of which eſſence, this particular ſubſtance comes to be of that ſpecies, and to be called by that name? If it be ſo, as it is plain it is, the name, by which things are marked, as having that eſſence, muſt be referred primarily to that eſſence; and conſequently the idea to which that name is given, muſt be referred alſo to that eſſence, and be intended to repreſent it. Which eſſence, ſince they, who ſo uſe the names, know not, their ideas of ſubſtances muſt be all inadequate in that reſpect, as not containing in them that real eſſence which the mind intends they ſhould.

Ideas of ſubſtances, as collections of their qualities, are all inadequate.

§. 8. Secondly, thoſe who neglecting that uſeleſs ſuppoſition of unknown real eſſences, whereby they are diſtinguiſhed, endeavour to copy the ſubſtances that exiſt in the world, by putting together the ideas of thoſe ſenſible qualities which are found coexiſting in them, though they come much nearer a likeneſs of them, than thoſe who imagine they know not what real ſpecific eſſences; yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate ideas of thoſe ſubſtances they would thus copy into their minds; nor do thoſe copies exactly and fully contain all that is to be found in their archetypes. Becauſe thoſe qualities, and powers of ſubſtances, whereof we make their complex ideas, are ſo many and various, that no man's complex idea contains them all. That our abſtract ideas of ſubſtances do not contain in them all the ſimple ideas that are united in the things themſelves, it is evident, in that.

men do rarely put into their complex idea of any ſubſtance, all the ſimple ideas they do know to exiſt in it. Becauſe endeavouring to make the ſignification of their names as clear, and as little cumberſome as they can, they make their ſpecific ideas of the ſorts of ſubſtance, for the moſt part, of a few of thoſe ſimple ideas which are to be found in them: but theſe having no original precedency, or right to be put in, and make the ſpecific idea, more than others that are left out, it is plain that both theſe ways our ideas of ſubſtances are deficient and inadequate. The ſimple ideas, whereof we make our complex ones of ſubſtances, are all of them (bating only the figure and bulk of ſome ſorts) powers, which being relations to other ſubſtances, we can never be ſure that we know all the powers that are in any one body, till we have tried what changes it is fitted to give to, or receive from other ſubſtances, in their ſeveral ways of application: which being impoſſible to be tried upon any one body, much leſs upon all, it is impoſſible we ſhould have adequate ideas of any ſubſtance, made up of a collection of all its properties.

§. 9. Whoſoever firſt lighted on a parcel of that ſort of ſubſtance we denote by the word gold, could not rationally take the bulk and figure he obſerved in that lump to depend on its real eſſence or internal conſtitution. Therefore thoſe never went into his idea of that ſpecies of body; but its peculiar colour, perhaps, and weight, were the firſt he abſtracted from it, to make the complex idea of that ſpecies. Which both are but powers; the one to affect our eyes after ſuch a manner, and to produce in us that idea we call yellow; and the other to force upwards any other body of equal bulk; they being put into a pair of equal ſcales, one againſt another. Another perhaps added to theſe the ideas of fuſibility and fixedneſs, two other paſſive powers, in relation to the operation of fire upon it; another, its ductility and ſolubility in aq. regia, two other powers relating to the operation of other bodies, in changing its outward figure, or ſeparation of it into inſenſible parts. Theſe, or part of theſe, put together,

ther, uſually make the complex idea in men's minds of that ſort of body we call gold.

§. 10. But no one, who hath conſidered the properties of bodies in general, or this ſort in particular, can doubt that this called gold has infinite other properties not contained in that complex idea. Some who have examined this ſpecies more accurately, could I believe, enumerate ten times as many properties in gold, all of them as inſeparable from its internal conſtitution, as its colour or weight: and it is probable, if any one knew all the properties that are by divers men known of this metal, there would be an hundred times as many ideas go to the complex idea of gold, as any one man yet has in his; and yet perhaps that not be the thouſandth part of what is to be diſcovered in it. The changes which that one body is apt to receive, and make in other bodies, upon a due application, exceeding far not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear ſo much a paradox to any one, who will but conſider how far men are yet from knowing all the properties of that one, no very compound figure, a triangle; though it be no ſmall number that are already by mathematicians diſcovered of it.

Ideas of ſubſtances, as collections of their qualities, are all inadequate.

§. 11. So that all our complex ideas of ſubſtances are imperfect and inadequate. Which would be ſo alſo in mathematical figures, if we were to have our complex ideas of them, only by collecting their properties in reference to other figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our ideas be of an ellipſis, if we had no other idea of it, but ſome few of its properties? Whereas having in our plain idea the whole eſſence of that figure, we from thence diſcover thoſe properties, and demonſtratively ſee how they flow, and are inſeparable from it.

Simple ideas, ἰκανὰ, and adequate.

§. 12. Thus the mind has three ſorts of abſtract ideas or nominal eſſences:

Firſt, ſimple ideas, which are ἰκανὰ, or copies; but yet certainly adequate. Becauſe being intended to expreſs nothing but the power in things to

produce in the mind ſuch a ſenſation, that ſenſation, when it is produced, cannot but be the effect of that power. So the paper I write on, having the power, in the light (I ſpeak according to the common notion of light) to produce in men the ſenſation which I call white, it cannot but be the effect of ſuch a power, in ſomething without the mind; ſince the mind has not the power to produce any ſuch idea in itſelf, and being meant for nothing elſe but the effect of ſuch a power, that ſimple idea is real and adequate; the ſenſation of white, in my mind, being the effect of that power, which is in the paper to produce it, is perfectly adequate to that power; or elſe, that power would produce a different idea.

Ideas of ſubſtances are ἄδωτα, inadequate.

§. 13. Secondly, the complex ideas of ſubſtances are ectypes, copies too; but not perfect ones, not adequate: which is very evident to the mind, in that it plainly perceives that whatever collection of ſimple ideas it makes of any ſubſtance that exiſts, it cannot be ſure that it exactly anſwers all that are in that ſubſtance: ſince not having tried all the operations of all other ſubſtances upon it, and found all the alterations it would receive from, or cauſe in, other ſubſtances, it cannot have an exact adequate collection of all its active and paſſive capacities; and ſo not have an adequate complex idea of the powers of any ſubſtance exiſting, and its relations, which is that ſort of complex idea of ſubſtances we have. And after all, if we would have, and actually had, in our complex idea, an exact collection of all the ſecondary qualities or powers of any ſubſtance, we ſhould not yet thereby have an idea of the eſſence of that thing. For ſince the powers or qualities that are obſervable by us, are not the real eſſence of that ſubſtance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any collection whatſoever of theſe qualities cannot be the real eſſence of that thing. Whereby it is plain, that our ideas of ſubſtances are not adequate; are not what the mind intends them to be. Beſides, a man has no idea of ſubſtance in general, nor knows what ſubſtance is in itſelf.

§. 14.

§. 14. Thirdly, complex ideas of modes and relations are originals, and archetypes; are not copies, nor made after the pattern of any real exiſtence, to which the mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to anſwer. Theſe being ſuch collections of ſimple ideas, that the mind itſelf puts together, and ſuch collections, that each of them contains in it preciſely all that the mind intends that it ſhould, they are archetypes and eſſences of modes that may exiſt; and ſo are deſigned only for, and belong only to, ſuch modes as, when they do exiſt, have an exact conformity with thoſe complex ideas. The ideas therefore of modes and relations cannot but be adequate.

Ideas of modes and relations are archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of True and Falſe Ideas.

§. 1. THOUGH truth and falſhood belong, in propriety of ſpeech, only to propoſitions; yet ideas are oftentimes termed true or falſe (as what words are there, that are not uſed with great latitude, and with ſome deviation from their ſtrict and proper ſignifications?) Though, I think, that, when ideas themſelves are termed true or falſe, there is ſtill ſome ſecret or tacit propoſition, which is the foundation of that denomination: as we ſhall ſee, if we examine the particular occaſions wherein they come to be called true or falſe. In all which, we ſhall find ſome kind of affirmation or negation, which is the reaſon of that denomination. For our ideas, being nothing but bare appearances or perceptions in our minds, cannot properly and ſimply in themſelves be ſaid to be true or falſe, no more than a ſingle name of any thing can be ſaid to be true or falſe.

Truth and falſhood properly belong to propoſitions.

Metaphyſical truth contains a tacit propoſition.

§. 2. Indeed both ideas and words may be ſaid to be true in a metaphyſical ſenſe of the word truth, as all other things, that any way exiſt, are ſaid to be true; i. e. really to be ſuch as they exiſt. Though in things called true, even in that ſenſe, there is perhaps a ſecret reference to our ideas, looked upon as the ſtandards of that truth, which amounts to a mental propoſition, though it be uſually not taken notice of.

No idea, as an appearance in the mind, true or falſe.

§. 3. But it is not in that metaphyſical ſenſe of truth which we inquire here, when we examine whether our ideas are capable of being true or falſe; but in the more ordinary acceptation of thoſe words: and ſo I ſay, that the ideas in our minds being only ſo many perceptions, or appearances there, none of them are falſe: the idea of a centaur having no more falſhood in it, when it appears in our minds, than the name centaur has falſhood in it, when it is pronounced by our mouths or written on paper. For truth or falſhood lying always in ſome affirmation, or negation, mental or verbal, our ideas are not capable, any of them, of being falſe, till the mind paſſes ſome judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies ſomething of them.

Ideas referred to any thing may be true or falſe.

§. 4. Whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to any thing extraneous to them, they are then capable to be called true or falſe. Becauſe the mind in ſuch a reference makes a tacit ſuppoſition of their conformity to that thing: which ſuppoſition, as it happens to be true or falſe, ſo the ideas themſelves come to be denominated. The moſt uſual caſes wherein this happens, are theſe following:

Other men's ideas, real exiſtence, and ſuppoſed real eſſences, are what men uſually refer their ideas to.

§. 5. Firſt, when the mind ſuppoſes any idea it has conformable to that in other men's minds, called by the ſame common name; v. g. when the mind intends or judges its ideas of juſtice, temperance, religion, to be the ſame with what other men give thoſe names to.

Secondly,

Secondly, when the mind ſuppoſes any idea it has in itſelf to be conformable to ſome real exiſtence. Thus the two ideas, of a man and a centaur, ſuppoſed to be the ideas of real ſubſtances, are the one true, and the other falſe; the one having a conformity to what has really exiſted, the other not.

Thirdly, when the mind refers any of its ideas to that real conſtitution and eſſence of any thing, whereon all its properties depend: and thus the greateſt part, if not all our ideas of ſubſtances, are falſe.

The cauſe of ſuch references.

§. 6. Theſe ſuppoſitions the mind is very apt tacitly to make concerning its own ideas. But yet, if we will examine it, we ſhall find it is chiefly, if not only, concerning its abſtract complex ideas. For the natural tendency of the mind being towards knowledge; and finding that, if it ſhould proceed by and dwell upon only particular things, its progreſs would be very ſlow, and its work endleſs; therefore to ſhorten its way to knowledge, and make each perception more comprehenſive; the firſt thing it does, as the foundation of the eaſier enlarging its knowledge, either by contemplation of the things themſelves that it would know, or conference with others about them, is to bind them into bundles, and rank them ſo into ſorts, that what knowledge it gets of any of them it may thereby with aſſurance extend to all of that ſort; and ſo advance by larger ſteps in that, which is its great buſineſs, knowledge. This, as I have elſewhere ſhown, is the reaſon why we collect things under comprehenſive ideas, with names annexed to them, into genera and ſpecies, i. e. into kinds and ſorts.

§. 7. If therefore we will warily attend to the motions of the mind, and obſerve what courſe it uſually takes in its way to knowledge; we ſhall, I think, find that the mind having got an idea, which it thinks it may have uſe of, either in contemplation or diſcourſe, the firſt thing it does is to abſtract it, and then get a name to it; and ſo lay it up in its ſtore-houſe, the memory, as containing the eſſence of a ſort of things, of which that name is always to be the mark. Hence

it

it is, that we may often obſerve, that when any one ſees a new thing of a kind that he knows not, he preſently aſks what it is, meaning by that inquiry nothing but the name. As if the name carried with it the knowledge of the ſpecies, or the eſſence of it; whereof it is indeed uſed as the mark, and is generally ſuppoſed annexed to it.

Cauſe of ſuch references.

§. 8. But this abſtract idea being ſomething in the mind between the thing that exiſts, and the name that is given to it; it is in our ideas, that both the rightneſs of our knowledge, or the propriety or intelligibleneſs of our ſpeaking, conſiſts. And hence it is, that men are ſo forward to ſuppoſe, that the abſtract ideas they have in their minds are ſuch as agree to the things exiſting without them, to which they are referred; and are the ſame alſo, to which the names they give them do by the uſe and propriety of that language belong. For without this double conformity of their ideas, they find they ſhould both think amiſs of things in themſelves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

Simple ideas, may be falſe in reference to others of the ſame name, but are leaſt liable to be ſo.

§. 9. Firſt then, I ſay, that when the truth of our ideas is judged of, by the conformity they have to the ideas which other men have, and commonly ſignify by the ſame name, they may be any of them falſe. But yet ſimple ideas are leaſt of all liable to be ſo miſtaken; becauſe a man by his ſenſes, and every day's obſervation, may eaſily ſatisfy himſelf what the ſimple ideas are, which their ſeveral names that are in common uſe ſtand for: they being but few in number, and ſuch as if he doubts or miſtakes in, he may eaſily rectify by the objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is ſeldom, that any one miſtakes in his names of ſimple ideas; or applies the name red to the idea green; or the name ſweet to the idea bitter: much leſs are men apt to confound the names of ideas belonging to different ſenſes; and call a colour by the name of a taſte, &c. whereby it is evident, that the ſimple ideas they call by any name, are commonly the

the ſame that others have and mean when they uſe the ſame names.

Ideas of mixed modes moſt liable to be falſe in this ſenſe.

§. 10. Complex ideas are much more liable to be falſe in this reſpect: and the complex ideas of mixed modes, much more than thoſe of ſubſtances: becauſe in ſubſtances (eſpecially thoſe which the common and unborrowed names of any language are applied to) ſome remarkable ſenſible qualities, ſerving ordinarily to diſtinguiſh one ſort from another, eaſily preſerve thoſe, who take any care in the uſe of their words, from applying them to ſorts of ſubſtances, to which they do not at all belong. But in mixed modes we are much more uncertain; it being not ſo eaſy to determine of ſeveral actions, whether they are to be called juſtice or cruelty, liberality or prodigality. And ſo in referring our ideas to thoſe of other men, called by the ſame names, ours may be falſe; and the idea in our minds, which we expreſs by the word juſtice, may perhaps be that which ought to have another name.

Or at leaſt to be thought falſe.

§. 11. But whether or no our ideas of mixed modes are more liable than any ſort to be different from thoſe of other men, which are marked by the ſame names; this at leaſt is certain, that this ſort of falſhood is much more familiarly attributed to our ideas of mixed modes, than to any other. When a man is thought to have a falſe idea of juſtice, or gratitude, or glory, it is for no other reaſon, but that his agrees not with the ideas which each of thoſe names are the ſigns of in other men.

And why.

§. 12. The reaſon whereof ſeems to me to be this, that the abſtract ideas of mixed modes, being men's voluntary combinations of ſuch a preciſe collection of ſimple ideas; and ſo the eſſence of each ſpecies being made by men alone, whereof we have no other ſenſible ſtandard exiſting any where, but the name itſelf, or the definition of that name: we having nothing elſe to refer theſe our ideas of mixed modes to, as a ſtandard to which we would conform them, but the ideas of thoſe who are thought to uſe thoſe names in their moſt proper ſignifications; and ſo as our ideas conform or differ from them, they paſs for

true

true or falſe. And thus much concerning the truth and falſhood of our ideas, in reference to their names.

As referred to real exiſtences, none of our ideas can be falſe, but thoſe of ſubſtances.

§. 13. Secondly, as to the truth and falſhood of our ideas, in reference to the real exiſtence of things; when that is made the ſtandard of their truth, none of them can be termed falſe, but only our complex ideas of ſubſtances.

Firſt, ſimple ideas in this ſenſe not falſe, and why.

§. 14. Firſt, our ſimple ideas being barely ſuch perceptions as God has fitted us to receive, and given power to external objects to produce in us by eſtabliſhed laws and ways, ſuitable to his wiſdom and goodneſs, though incomprehenſible to us, their truth conſiſts in nothing elſe but in ſuch appearances as are produced in us, and muſt be ſuitable to thoſe powers he has placed in external objects, or elſe they could not be produced in us: and thus anſwering thoſe powers, they are what they ſhould be, true ideas. Nor do they become liable to any imputation of falſhood, if the mind (as in moſt men I believe it does) judges theſe ideas to be in the things themſelves. For God, in his wiſdom, having ſet them as marks of diſtinction in things, whereby we may be able to diſcern one thing from another, and ſo chooſe any of them for our uſes, as we have occaſion; it alters not the nature of our ſimple idea, whether we think that the idea of blue be in the violet itſelf, or in our mind only; and only the power of producing it by the texture of its parts, reflecting the particles of light after a certain manner, to be in the violet itſelf. For that texture in the object, by a regular and conſtant operation, producing the ſame idea of blue in us, it ſerves us to diſtinguiſh, by our eyes, that from any other thing, whether that diſtinguiſhing mark, as it is really in the violet, be only a peculiar texture of parts, or elſe that very colour, the idea whereof (which is in us) is the exact reſemblance. And it is equally from that appearance to be denominated blue, whether it be that real colour, or only a peculiar texture in it, that cauſes in us that idea: ſince the name blue notes properly nothing but that mark of diſtinction that is in a violet, diſcernible only by our eyes, whatever it conſiſts in:

that

that being beyond our capacities diſtinctly to know, and perhaps would be of leſs uſe to us, if we had faculties to diſcern.

Though one man's idea of blue ſhould be different from another's.

§. 15. Neither would it carry any imputation of falſhood to our ſimple ideas, if by the different ſtructure of our organs it were ſo ordered, that the ſame object ſhould produce in ſeveral men's minds different ideas at the ſame time; v. g. if the idea that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eyes were the ſame that a marygold produced in another man's, and vice verſa. For ſince this could never be known, becauſe one man's mind could not paſs into another man's body, to perceive what appearances were produced by thoſe organs; neither the ideas hereby, nor the names would be at all confounded, or any falſhood be in either. For all things that had the texture of a violet, producing conſtantly the idea that he called blue; and thoſe which had the texture of a marygold, producing conſtantly the idea which he as conſtantly called yellow; whatever thoſe appearances were in his mind, he would be able as regularly to diſtinguiſh things for his uſe by thoſe appearances, and underſtand and ſignify thoſe diſtinctions marked by the names blue and yellow, as if the appearances, or ideas in his mind, received from thoſe two flowers, were exactly the ſame with the ideas in other men's minds. I am nevertheleſs very apt to think, that the ſenſible ideas produced by any object in different men's minds, are moſt commonly very near and undiſcernibly alike. For which opinion, I think, there might be many reaſons offered: but that being beſides my preſent buſineſs, I ſhall not trouble my reader with them: but only mind him, that the contrary ſuppoſition, if it could be proved, is of little uſe, either for the improvement of our knowledge, or conveniency of life; and ſo we need not trouble ourſelves to examine it.

Firſt, ſimple ideas in this ſenſe not falſe, and why.

§. 16. From what has been ſaid concerning our ſimple ideas, I think it evident, that our ſimple ideas can none of them be falſe in reſpect of things exiſting without

out us. For the truth of theſe appearances, or perceptions in our minds, conſiſting, as has been ſaid, only in their being anſwerable to the powers in external objects to produce by our ſenſes ſuch appearances in us; and each of them being in the mind, ſuch as it is, ſuitable to the power that produced it, and which alone it repreſents; it cannot upon that account, or as referred to ſuch a pattern, be falſe. Blue and yellow, bitter or ſweet, can never be falſe ideas: theſe perceptions in the mind are juſt ſuch as they are there, anſwering the powers appointed by God to produce them; and ſo are truly what they are, and are intended to be. Indeed the names may be miſapplied; but that in this reſpect makes no falſhood in the ideas; as if a man ignorant in the Engliſh tongue ſhould call purple ſcarlet.

Secondly, modes not falſe.

§. 17. Secondly, neither can our complex ideas of modes, in reference to the eſſence of any thing really exiſting, be falſe. Becauſe whatever complex idea I have of any mode, it hath no reference to any pattern exiſting, and made by nature: it is not ſuppoſed to contain in it any other ideas than what it hath; nor to repreſent any thing but ſuch a complication of ideas as it does. Thus when I have the idea of ſuch an action of a man, who forbears to afford himſelf ſuch meat, drink, and clothing, and other conveniencies of life, as his riches and eſtate will be ſufficient to ſupply, and his ſtation requires, I have no falſe idea; but ſuch an one as repreſents an action, either as I find or imagine it; and ſo is capable of neither truth or falſehood. But when I give the name frugality or virtue to this action, then it may be called a falſe idea, if thereby it be ſuppoſed to agree with that idea, to which, in propriety of ſpeech, the name of frugality doth belong; or to be conformable to that law, which is the ſtandard of virtue and vice.

Thirdly, ideas of ſubſtances when falſe.

§. 18. Thirdly, our complex ideas of ſubſtances, being all referred to patterns in things themſelves, may be falſe. That they are all falſe, when looked upon as the repreſentations of the unknown eſſences of things, is ſo evident,

evident, that there needs nothing to be ſaid of it. I ſhall therefore paſs over that chimerical ſuppoſition, and conſider them as collections of ſimple ideas in the mind taken from combinations of ſimple ideas existing together conſtantly in things, of which patterns they are the ſuppoſed copies: and in this reference of them to the exiſtence of things, they are falſe ideas. 1. When they put together ſimple ideas, which in the real exiſtence of things have no union; as when to the ſhape and ſize that exiſt together in a horſe is joined, in the ſame complex idea, the power of barking like a dog: which three ideas, however put together into one in the mind, were never united in nature; and this therefore may be called a falſe idea of an horſe. 2. Ideas of ſubſtances are, in this reſpect, alſo falſe, when from any collection of ſimple ideas that do always exiſt together, there is ſeparated, by a direct negation, any other ſimple idea which is conſtantly joined with them. Thus, if to extenſion, ſolidity, fuſibility, the peculiar weightineſs, and yellow colour of gold, any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixedneſs than is in lead or copper, he may be ſaid to have a falſe complex idea, as well as when he joins to thoſe other ſimple ones the idea of a perfect abſolute fixedneſs. For either way, the complex idea of gold being made up of ſuch ſimple ones as have no union in nature, may be termed falſe. But if we leave out of this his complex idea, that of fixedneſs quite, without either actually joining to, or ſeparating of it from the reſt in his mind, it is, I think, to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect idea, rather than a falſe one; ſince though it contains not all the ſimple ideas that are united in nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exiſt together.

Truth or falſhood always ſuppoſes affirmation or negation.

§. 19. Though in compliance with the ordinary way of ſpeaking I have ſhowed in what ſenſe, and upon what ground our ideas may be ſometimes called true or falſe; yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter, in all caſes where any idea is called true or falſe, it is from ſome judgment that the mind makes,

makes, or is ſuppoſed to make, that is true or falſe. For truth or falſhood, being never without ſome affirmation or negation, expreſs or tacit, it is not to be found but where ſigns are joined and ſeparated, according to the agreement or diſagreement of the things they ſtand for. The ſigns we chiefly uſe are either ideas or words, wherewith we make either mental or verbal propoſitions. Truth lies in ſo joining or ſeparating theſe repreſentatives, as the things they ſtand for do in themſelves agree or diſagree; and falſhood in the contrary, as ſhall be more fully ſhown hereafter.

Ideas in themſelves neither true nor falſe

§. 20. Any idea then which we have in our minds, whether conformable or not to the exiſtence of things, or to any idea in the minds of other men, cannot properly for this alone be called falſe. For theſe repreſentations, if they have nothing in them but what is really exiſting in things without, cannot be thought falſe, being exact repreſentations of ſomething: nor yet, if they have any thing in them differing from the reality of things, can they properly be ſaid to be falſe repreſentations, or ideas of things they do not repreſent. But the miſtake and falſhood is,

But are falſe, 1. When judged agreeable to another man's idea, without being ſo.

§. 21. Firſt, when the mind having any idea, it judges and concludes it the ſame that is in other men's minds, ſignified by the ſame name; or that it is conformable to the ordinary received ſignification or definition of that word, when indeed it is not: which is the moſt uſual miſtake in mixed modes, though other ideas alſo are liable to it.

2. When judged to agree to real exiſtence, when they do not.

§. 22. Secondly, when it having a complex idea made up of ſuch a collection of ſimple ones, as nature never puts together it judges it to agree to a ſpecies of creatures really exiſting; as when it joins the fixedneſs of gold.

3. When judged adequate, without being ſo.

§. 23. Thirdly, when in its complex idea it has united a certain number of ſimple ideas that do really exiſt together in

ſome ſort of creatures, but has alſo left out others as much inſeparable, it judges this to be a perfect complete idea of a ſort of things which really it is not; v. g. having joined the ideas of ſubſtance, yellow, malleable, moſt heavy, and fuſible, it takes that complex idea to be the complete idea of gold, when yet its peculiar fixedneſs and ſolubility in aqua regia are as inſeparable from thoſe other ideas or qualities of that body, as they are from one another.

4. When judged to repreſent the real eſſence.

§. 24. Fourthly, the miſtake is yet greater, when I judge, that this complex idea contains in it the real eſſence of any body exiſting, when at leaſt it contains but ſome few of thoſe properties which flow from its real eſſence and conſtitution. I ſay, only ſome few of thoſe properties; for thoſe properties conſiſting moſtly in the active and paſſive powers it has, in reference to other things, all that are vulgarly known of any one body, of which the complex idea of that kind of things is uſually made, are but a very few, in compariſon of what a man, that has ſeveral ways tried and examined it, knows of that one ſort of things: and all that the moſt expert man knows are but a few, in compariſon of what are really in that body, and depend on its internal or eſſential conſtitution. The eſſence of a triangle lies in a very little compaſs, conſiſts in a very few ideas: three lines including a ſpace make up that eſſence: but the properties that flow from this eſſence are more than can be eaſily known or enumerated. So I imagine it is in ſubſtances, their real eſſences lie in a little compaſs, though the properties flowing from that internal conſtitution are endleſs.

Ideas, when falſe.

§. 25. To conclude, a man having no notion of any thing without him, but by the idea he has of it in his mind (which idea he has a power to call by what name he pleaſes) he may indeed make an idea neither anſwering the reaſon of things, nor agreeing to the idea commonly ſignified by other people's words; but cannot make a wrong or falſe idea of a thing, which is no otherwiſe known to him but by the idea he has of it: v. g. when

I frame an idea of the legs, arms, and body of a man, and join to this a horſe's head and neck, I do not make a falſe idea of any thing; becauſe it repreſents nothing without me. But when I call it a man or Tartar, and imagine it to repreſent ſome real being without me, or to be the ſame idea that others call by the ſame name; in either of theſe caſes I may err. And upon this account it is, that it comes to be termed a falſe idea; though indeed the falſhood lies not in the idea, but in that tacit mental propoſition, wherein a conformity and reſemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having framed ſuch an idea in my mind, without thinking either that exiſtence, or the name man or Tartar, belongs to it, I will call it man or Tartar, I may be juſtly thought fantaſtical in the naming, but not erroneous in my judgment; nor the idea any way falſe.

More properly to be called right or wrong.

§. 26. Upon the whole matter, I think, that our ideas, as they are conſidered by the mind, either in reference to the proper ſignification of their names, or in reference to the reality of things, may very fitly be called right or wrong ideas, according as they agree or diſagree to thoſe patterns to which they are referred. But if any one had rather call them true or falſe, it is fit he uſe a liberty, which every one has, to call things by thoſe names he thinks beſt; though, in propriety of ſpeech, truth or falſhood, will, I think, ſcarce agree to them, but as they, ſome way or other, virtually contain in them ſome mental propoſition. The ideas that are in a man's mind, ſimply conſidered, cannot be wrong, unleſs complex ones, wherein inconſiſtent parts are jumbled together. All other ideas are in themſelves right, and the knowledge about them right and true knowledge: but when we come to refer them to any thing, as to their patterns and archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they diſagree with ſuch archetypes.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Aſſociation of Ideas.

§. 1. THERE is ſcarce any one that does not obſerve ſomething that ſeems odd to him, and is in itſelf really extravagant in the opinions, reaſonings, and actions of other men. The leaſt flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-ſighted enough to eſpy in another, and will by the authority of reaſon forwardly condemn, though he be guilty of much greater unreaſonableneſs in his own tenets and conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly, if at all, be convinced of. Something unreaſonable in moſt men.

§. 2. This proceeds not wholly from ſelf-love, though that has often a great hand in it. Men of fair minds, and not given up to the over-weening of ſelf-flattery, are frequently guilty of it; and in many caſes one with amazement hears the arguings, and is aſtoniſhed at the obſtinacy of a worthy man, who yields not to the evidence of reaſon, though laid before him as clear as day-light. Not wholly from ſelf-love.

§. 3. This ſort of unreaſonableneſs is uſually imputed to education and prejudice, and for the moſt part truly enough, though that reaches not the bottom of the diſeaſe, nor ſhows diſtinctly enough whence it riſes, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly aſſigned for the cauſe, and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itſelf: but yet, I think, he ought to look a little farther, who would trace this ſort of madneſs to the root it ſprings from, and ſo explain it, as to ſhow whence this flaw has its original in very ſober and rational minds, and wherein it conſiſts. Not from education.

§. 4. I ſhall be pardoned for calling it by ſo harſh a name as madneſs, when it is conſidered, that oppoſition to reaſon de- A degree of madneſs.

ſerves that name, and is really madneſs; and there is ſcarce a man ſo free from it, but that if he ſhould always, on all occaſions, argue or do as in ſome caſes he conſtantly does, would not be thought fitter for Bedlam than civil converſation. I do not here mean when he is under the power of an unruly paſſion, but in the ſteady calm courſe of his life. That which will yet more apologize for this harſh name, and ungrateful imputation on the greateſt part of mankind, is, that inquiring a little by the bye into the nature of madneſs, b. ii. c. xi. §. 13. I found it to ſpring from the very ſame root, and to depend on the very ſame cauſe we are here ſpeaking of. This conſideration of the thing itſelf, at a time when I thought not the leaſt on the ſubject which I am now treating of, ſuggeſted it to me. And if this be a weakneſs to which all men are ſo liable; if this be a taint which ſo univerſally infects mankind; the greater care ſhould be taken to lay it open under its due name, thereby to excite the greater care in its prevention and cure.

From a wrong connexion of ideas.

§. 5. Some of our ideas have a natural correſpondence and connexion one with another: it is the office and excellency of our reaſon to trace theſe, and hold them together in that union and correſpondence which is founded in their peculiar beings. Beſides this, there is another connexion of ideas wholly owing to chance or cuſtom: ideas, that in themſelves are not all of kin, come to be ſo united in ſome men's minds, that it is very hard to ſeparate them; they always keep in company, and the one no ſooner at any time comes into the underſtanding, but its aſſociate appears with it; and if they are more than two, which are thus united, the whole gang, always inſeparable, ſhow themſelves together.

This connexion how made.

§. 6. This ſtrong combination of ideas, not allied by nature, the mind makes in itſelf either voluntarily or by chance; and hence it comes in different men to be very different, according to their different inclinations, education, intereſts, &c. Cuſtom ſettles habits of thinking in the

underſtanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in the body; all which ſeems to be but trains of motion in the animal ſpirits, which once ſet a-going, continue in the ſame ſteps they have been uſed to: which, by often treading, are worn into a ſmooth path, and the motion in it becomes eaſy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend thinking, thus ideas ſeem to be produced in our minds; or if they are not, this may ſerve to explain their following one another in an habitual train, when once they are put into their track, as well as it does to explain ſuch motions of the body. A muſician uſed to any tune will find, that let it but once begin in his head, the ideas of the ſeveral notes of it will follow one another orderly in his underſtanding, without any care or attention, as regularly as his fingers move orderly over the keys of the organ to play out the tune he has begun, though his unattentive thoughts be elſewhere a wandering. Whether the natural cauſe of theſe ideas, as well as of that regular dancing of his fingers, be the motion of his animal ſpirits, I will not determine, how probable ſoever, by this inſtance, it appears to be ſo: but this may help us a little to conceive of intellectual habits, and of the tying together of ideas.

Some antipathies an effect of it.

§. 7. That there are ſuch aſſociations of them made by cuſtom in the minds of moſt men, I think no-body will queſtion, who has well conſidered himſelf or others; and to this, perhaps, might be juſtly attributed moſt of the ſympathies and antipathies obſervable in men, which work as ſtrongly, and produce as regular effects as if they were natural; and are therefore called ſo, though they at firſt had no other original but the accidental connexion of two ideas, which either the ſtrength of the firſt impreſſion, or future indulgence ſo united, that they always afterwards kept company together in that man's mind, as if they were but one idea. I ſay moſt of the antipathies, I do not ſay all, for ſome of them are truly natural, depend upon our original conſtitution, and are born with us; but a great part of thoſe which are counted natural, would have been known to

be from unheeded, though, perhaps, early impreſſions, or wanton fancies at firſt, which would have been acknowledged the original of them, if they had been warily obſerved. A grown perſon ſurfeiting with honey, no ſooner hears the name of it, but his fancy immediately carries ſickneſs and qualms to his ſtomach, and he cannot bear the very idea of it; other ideas of diſlike, and ſickneſs, and vomiting, preſently accompany it, and he is diſturbed, but he knows from whence to date this weakneſs, and can tell how he got this indiſpoſition. Had this happened to him by an overdoſe of honey, when a child, all the ſame effects would have followed, but the cauſe would have been miſtaken, and the antipathy counted natural.

§. 8. I mention this not out of any great neceſſity there is, in this preſent argument, to diſtinguiſh nicely between natural and acquired antipathies; but I take notice of it for another purpoſe, viz. that thoſe who have children, or the charge of their education, would think it worth their while diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue connexion of ideas in the minds of young people. This is the time moſt ſuſceptible of laſting impreſſions; and though thoſe relating to the health of the body are by diſcreet people minded and fenced againſt, yet I am apt to doubt, that thoſe which relate more peculiarly to the mind, and terminate in the underſtanding or paſſions, have been much leſs heeded than the thing deſerves: nay, thoſe relating purely to the underſtanding have, as I ſuſpect, been by moſt men wholly overlooked.

A great cauſe of errours.

§. 9. This wrong connexion in our minds of ideas in themſelves looſe and independent of one another, has ſuch an influence, and is of ſo great force to ſet us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, paſſions, reaſonings and notions themſelves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deſerves more to be looked after.

Inſtances.

§. 10. The ideas of goblins and ſprights have really no more to do with darkneſs than light; yet let but a fooliſh maid inculcate theſe often on the mind of a child, and raiſe them there together,

gether, poſſibly he ſhall never be able to ſeparate them again ſo long as he lives: but darkneſs ſhall ever afterwards bring with it thoſe frightful ideas, and they ſhall be ſo joined, that he can no more bear the one than the other.

§. 11. A man receives a ſenſible injury from another, thinks on the man and that action over and over; and by ruminating on them ſtrongly, or much in his mind, ſo cements thoſe two ideas together, that he makes them almoſt one: never thinks on the man, but the pain and diſpleaſure he ſuffered comes into his mind with it, ſo that he ſcarce diſtinguiſhes them, but has as much an averſion for the one as the other. Thus hatreds are often begotten from ſlight and innocent occaſions, and quarrels propagated and continued in the world.

§. 12. A man has ſuffered pain or ſickneſs in any place; he ſaw his friend die in ſuch a room; though theſe have in nature nothing to do one with another, yet when the idea of the place occurs to his mind, it brings (the impreſſion being once made) that of the pain and diſpleaſure with it; he confounds them in his mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

Why time cures ſome diſorders in the mind, which reaſon cannot.

§. 13. When this combination is ſettled, and while it laſts, it is not in the power of reaſon to help us, and relieve us from the effects of it. Ideas in our minds, when they are there, will operate according to their natures and circumſtances; and here we ſee the cauſe why time cures certain affections, which reaſon, though in the right, and allowed to be ſo, has not power over, nor is able againſt them to prevail with thoſe who are apt to hearken to it in other caſes. The death of a child, that was the daily delight of his mother's eyes, and joy of her ſoul, rends from her heart the whole comfort of her life, and gives her all the torment imaginable: uſe the conſolations of reaſon in this caſe, and you were as good preach caſe to one on the rack, and hope to allay, by rational diſcourſes, the pain of his joints rearing aſunder. Till time has by diſuſe ſeparated the ſenſe of that enjoy-

ment, and its loſs, from the idea of the child returning to her memory, all repreſentations, though ever ſo reaſonable, are in vain; and therefore ſome in whom the union between theſe ideas is never diſſolved, ſpend their lives in mourning, and carry an incurable ſorrow to their graves.

Farther inſtances of the effect of the aſſociation of ideas.

§. 14. A friend of mine knew one perfectly cured of madneſs by a very harſh and offenſive operation. The gentleman, who was thus recovered, with great ſenſe of gratitude and acknowledgment, owned the cure all his life after, as the greateſt obligation he could have received; but whatever gratitude and reaſon ſuggeſted to him, he could never bear the ſight of the operator: that image brought back with it the idea of that agony which he ſuffered from his hands, which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure.

§. 15. Many children imputing the pain they endured at ſchool to their books they were corrected for, ſo join thoſe ideas together, that a book becomes their averſion, and they are never reconciled to the ſtudy and uſe of them all their lives after; and thus reading becomes a torment to them, which otherwiſe poſſibly they might have made the great pleaſure of their lives. There are rooms convenient enough, that ſome men cannot ſtudy in, and faſhions of veſſels, which though ever ſo clean and commodious, they cannot drink out of, and that by reaſon of ſome accidental ideas which are annexed to them, and make them offenſive: and who is there that hath not obſerved ſome man to flag at the appearance, or in the company of ſome certain perſon not otherwiſe ſuperior to him, but becauſe having once on ſome occaſion got the aſcendant, the idea of authority and diſtance goes along with that of the perſon, and he that has been thus ſubjected, is not able to ſeparate them?

§. 16. Inſtances of this kind are ſo plentiful everywhere, that if I add one more, it is only for the pleaſant oddneſs of it. It is of a young gentleman, who having learnt to dance, and that to great perfection, there happened to ſtand an old trunk in the room where

where he learnt. The idea of this remarkable piece of houſhold-ſtuff had ſo mixed itſelf with the turns and ſteps of all his dances, that though in that chamber he could dance excellently well, yet it was only whilſt that trunk was there; nor could he perform well in any other place, unleſs that or ſome ſuch other trunk had its due poſition in the room. If this ſtory ſhall be ſuſpected to be dreſſed up with ſome comical circumſtances, a little beyond preciſe nature; I anſwer for myſelf that I had it ſome years ſince from a very ſober and worthy man, upon his own knowledge, as I report it: and I dare ſay, there are very few inquiſitive perſons, who read this, who have not met with accounts, if not examples of this nature, that may parallel, or at leaſt juſtify this.

Its influence on intellectual habits.

§. 17. Intellectual habits and defects this way contracted, are not leſs frequent and powerful, though leſs obſerved. Let the ideas of being and matter be ſtrongly joined either by education or much thought, whilſt theſe are ſtill combined in the mind, what notions, what reaſonings will there be about ſeparate ſpirits? Let cuſtom from the very childhood have joined figure and ſhape to the idea of God, and what abſurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity?

Let the idea of infallibility be inſeparably joined to any perſon, and theſe two conſtantly together poſſeſs the mind; and then one body, in two places at once, ſhall unexamined be ſwallowed for a certain truth, by an implicit faith, whenever that imagined infallible perſon dictates and demands aſſent without inquiry.

Obſervable in different ſects.

§. 18. Some ſuch wrong and unnatural combinations of ideas will be found to eſtabliſh the irreconcilable oppoſition between different ſects of philoſophy and religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impoſe wilfully on himſelf, and knowingly refuſe truth offered by plain reaſon. Intereſt, though it does a great deal in the caſe, yet cannot be thought to work whole ſocieties of men to ſo univerſal a perverſeneſs, as that every one of them to a man ſhould knowingly maintain

tain falſhood: ſome at leaſt muſt be allowed to do what all pretend to, i. e. to purſue truth ſincerely; and therefore there muſt be ſomething that blinds their underſtandings, and makes them not ſee the falſhood of what they embrace for real truth. That which thus captivates their reaſons, and leads men of ſincerity blindfold from common ſenſe, will, when examined, be found to be what we are ſpeaking of: ſome independent ideas, of no alliance to one another, are by education, cuſtom, and the conſtant din of their party, ſo coupled in their minds, that they always appear there together; and they can no more ſeparate them in their thoughts, than if there were but one idea, and they operate as if they were ſo. This gives ſenſe to jargon, demonſtration to abſurdities, and conſiſtency to nonſenſe, and is the foundation of the greateſt, I had almoſt ſaid of all the errours in the world; or if it does not reach ſo far, it is at leaſt the moſt dangerous one, ſince ſo far as it obtains, it hinders men from ſeeing and examining. When two things in themſelves disjoined, appear to the ſight conſtantly united; if the eye ſees theſe things riveted, which are looſe, where will you begin to rectify the miſtakes that follow in two ideas, that they have been accuſtomed ſo to join in their minds, as to ſubſtitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themſelves? This, whilſt they are under the deceit of it, makes them incapable of conviction, and they applaud themſelves as zealous champions for truth, when indeed they are contending for errour; and the confuſion of two different ideas, which a cuſtomary connexion of them in their minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their heads with falſe views, and their reaſonings with falſe conſequences.

Concluſion. §. 19. Having thus given an account of the original, ſorts, and extent of our ideas, with ſeveral other conſiderations, about theſe (I know not whether I may ſay) inſtruments or materials of our knowledge; the method I at firſt propoſed to myſelf would now require, that I ſhould immediately proceed to ſhow what uſe the underſtanding makes of them, and what knowledge we have by them. This was that which,

which, in the firſt general view I had of this ſubject, was all that I thought I ſhould have to do: but, upon a nearer approach, I find that there is ſo cloſe a connexion between ideas and words; and our abſtract ideas, and general words, have ſo conſtant a relation one to another, that it is impoſſible to ſpeak clearly and diſtinctly of our knowledge, which all conſiſts in propoſitions, without conſidering, firſt the nature, uſe, and ſignification of language; which therefore muſt be the buſineſs of the next book.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of Words or Language in general.

Man fitted to form articulate ſounds.

§. 1. GOD having deſigned man for a ſociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a neceſſity to have fellowſhip with thoſe of his own kind; but furniſhed him alſo with language, which was to be the great inſtrument and common tie of ſociety. Man therefore had by nature his organs ſo faſhioned, as to be fit to frame articulate ſounds, which we call words. But this was not enough to produce language; for parrots, and ſeveral other birds, will be taught to make articulate ſounds diſtinct enough, which yet, by no means, are capable of language.

To make them ſigns of ideas.

§. 2. Beſides articulate ſounds therefore, it was farther neceſſary, that he ſhould be able to uſe theſe ſounds as ſigns of internal conceptions; and to make them ſtand as marks for the ideas within his own mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men's minds be conveyed from one to another.

To make general ſigns.

§. 3. But neither was this ſufficient to make words ſo uſeful as they ought to be.

It is not enough for the perfection of language, that ſounds can be made ſigns of ideas, unleſs thoſe ſigns can be ſo made uſe of as to comprehend ſeveral particular things: for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their uſe, had every particular thing need of a diſtinct name to be ſignified by. To remedy this inconvenience, language had yet a farther improvement in the uſe of general terms, whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular exiſtences: which advantageous uſe of ſounds was obtained only by the difference of the ideas they were made ſigns of: thoſe names becoming general, which are made to ſtand for general ideas, and thoſe remaining particular, where the ideas they are uſed for are particular.

§. 4. Beſides theſe names which ſtand for ideas, there be other words which men make uſe of, not to ſignify any idea, but the want or abſence of ſome ideas ſimple or complex, or all ideas together; ſuch as are nihil in Latin, and in Engliſh, ignorance and barrenneſs. All which negative or privative words cannot be ſaid properly to belong to, or ſignify no ideas: for then they would be perfectly inſignificant ſounds; but they relate to poſitive ideas, and ſignify their abſence.

Words ultimately derived from ſuch as ſignify ſenſible ideas.

§. 5. It may alſo lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our words have on common ſenſible ideas: and how thoſe, which are made uſe of to ſtand for actions and notions quite removed from ſenſe, have their riſe from thence, and from obvious ſenſible ideas are transferred to more abſtruſe ſignifications; and made to ſtand for ideas that come not under the cognizance of our ſenſes: v. g. to imagine, apprehend, comprehend, adhere, conceive, inſtil, diſguſt, diſturbance, tranquillity, &c. are all words taken from the operations of ſenſible things, and applied to certain modes of thinking. Spirit, in its primary ſignification, is breath: angel a meſſenger: and I doubt not, but if we could trace them to their ſources, we ſhould find, in all languages, the names, which ſtand for things that fall not under our ſenſes, to have had

had their firſt riſe from ſenſible ideas. By which we may give ſome kind of gueſs what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds who were the firſt beginners of languages: and how nature, even in the naming of things, unawares ſuggeſted to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge: whilſt, to give names that might make known to others any operations they felt in themſelves, or any other ideas that came not under their ſenſes, they were fain to borrow words from ordinary known ideas of ſenſation, by that means to make others the more eaſily to conceive thoſe operations they experimented in themſelves, which made no outward ſenſible appearances: and then when they had got known and agreed names, to ſignify thoſe internal operations of their own minds, they were ſufficiently furniſhed to make known by words all their other ideas; ſince they could conſiſt of nothing, but either of outward ſenſible perceptions, or of the inward operations of their minds about them: we having, as has been proved, no ideas at all, but what originally come either from ſenſible objects without, or what we feel within ourſelves, from the inward workings of our own ſpirits, of which we are conſcious to ourſelves within.

Diſtribution. §. 6. But to underſtand better the uſe and force of language, as ſubſervient to inſtruction and knowledge, it will be convenient to conſider,

Firſt, To what it is that names, in the uſe of language, are immediately applied.

Secondly, Since all (except proper) names are general, and ſo ſtand not particularly for this or that ſingle thing, but for ſorts and ranks of things; it will be neceſſary to conſider, in the next place, what the ſorts and kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin names, what the ſpecies and genera of things are; wherein they conſiſt, and how they come to be made. Theſe being (as they ought) well looked into, we ſhall the better come to find the right uſe of words, the natural advantages and defects of language, and the remedies that ought to be uſed, to avoid the inconveniences of

obſcurity

obſcurity or uncertainty in the ſignification of words, without which it is impoſſible to diſcourſe with any clearneſs, or order, concerning knowledge: which being converſant about propoſitions, and thoſe moſt commonly univerſal ones, has greater connexion with words than perhaps is ſuſpected.

Theſe conſiderations therefore ſhall be the matter of the following chapters.

CHAP. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

Words are ſenſible ſigns neceſſary, for communication.

§. 1. MAN, though he has great variety of thoughts, and ſuch, from which others, as well as himſelf, might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his own breaſt, inviſible and hidden from others, nor can of themſelves be made appear. The comfort and advantage of ſociety not being to be had without communication of thoughts, it was neceſſary that man ſhould find out ſome external ſenſible ſigns, whereof thoſe inviſible ideas, which his thoughts are made up for, might be made known to others. For this purpoſe nothing was ſo fit, either for plenty or quickneſs, as thoſe articulate ſounds, which with ſo much eaſe and variety he found himſelf able to make. Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature ſo well adapted to that purpoſe, come to be made uſe of by men, as the ſigns of their ideas; not by any natural connexion that there is between particular articulate ſounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongſt all men: but by a voluntary impoſition, whereby ſuch a word is made arbitrarily the mark of ſuch an idea. The uſe then of words is to be ſenſible marks of ideas; and the ideas they ſtand for are their proper and immediate ſignification.

§. 2.

§. 2. The uſe men have of theſe marks being either to record their own thoughts for the aſſiſtance of their own memory, or as it were to bring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others; words in their primary or immediate ſignification ſtand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uſes them, how imperfectly ſoever or careleſsly thoſe ideas are collected from the things which they are ſuppoſed to repreſent. When a man ſpeaks to another, it is that he may be underſtood; and the end of ſpeech is, that thoſe ſounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the ſpeaker: nor can any one apply them, as marks, immediately to any thing elſe, but the ideas that he himſelf hath. For this would be to make them ſigns of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas; which would be to make them ſigns, and not ſigns, of his ideas at the ſame time; and ſo in effect to have no ſignification at all. Words being voluntary ſigns, they cannot be voluntary ſigns impoſed by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them ſigns of nothing, ſounds without ſignification. A man cannot make his words the ſigns either of qualities in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Till he has ſome ideas of his own, he cannot ſuppoſe them to correſpond with the conceptions of another man; nor can he uſe any ſigns for them: for thus they would be the ſigns of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the ſigns of nothing. But when he repreſents to himſelf other men's ideas by ſome of his own, if he conſent to give them the ſame names that other men do, it is ſtill to his own ideas; to ideas that he has, and not to ideas that he has not.

Words are the ſenſible ſigns of his ideas who uſes them.

§. 3. This is ſo neceſſary in the uſe of language, that in this reſpect the knowing and the ignorant, the learned and unlearned, uſe the words they ſpeak (with any meaning) all alike. They, in every man's mouth, ſtand for the ideas he has, and which he would expreſs by them. A child having taken notice of nothing in

the

nexion between the ſound and the idea, and a deſignation that the one ſtands for the other; without which application of them, they are nothing but ſo much inſignificant noiſe.

Their ſignification perfectly arbitrary.

§. 8. Words by long and familiar uſe, as has been ſaid, come to excite in men certain ideas ſo conſtantly and readily, that they are apt to ſuppoſe a natural connection between them. But that they ſignify only men's peculiar ideas, and that by a perfect arbitrary impoſition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that uſe the ſame language) the ſame ideas we take them to be the ſigns of: and every man has ſo inviolable a liberty to make words ſtand for what ideas he pleaſes, that no one hath the power to make others have the ſame ideas in their minds that he has, when they uſe the ſame words that he does. And therefore the great Auguſtus himſelf, in the poſſeſſion of that power which ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word: which was as much as to ſay, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what idea any ſound ſhould be a ſign of, in the mouths and common language of his ſubjects. It is true, common uſe by a tacit conſent appropriates certain ſounds to certain ideas in all languages, which ſo far limits the ſignification of that ſound, that unleſs a man applies it to the ſame idea, he does not ſpeak properly: and let me add, that unleſs a man's words excite the ſame ideas in the hearer, which he makes them ſtand for in ſpeaking, he does not ſpeak intelligibly. But whatever be the conſequence of any man's uſing of words differently, either from their general meaning, or the particular ſenſe of the perſon to whom he addreſſes them, this is certain, their ſignification, in his uſe of them, is limited to his ideas, and they can be ſigns of nothing elſe.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of General Terms.

§. 1. ALL things that exiſt being particulars, it may perhaps be thought reaſonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, ſhould be ſo too; I mean in their ſignification: but yet we find the quite contrary. The far greateſt part of words, that make all languages, are general terms; which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but of reaſon and neceſſity. The greateſt part of words general.

§. 2. Firſt, It is impoſſible that every particular thing ſhould have a diſtinct peculiar name. For the ſignification and uſe of words, depending on that connexion which the mind makes between its ideas and the ſounds it uſes as ſigns of them, it is neceſſary, in the application of names to things that the mind ſhould have diſtinct ideas of the things, and retain alſo the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain diſtinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with: every bird and beaſt men ſaw, every tree and plant that affected the ſenſes, could not find a place in the moſt capacious underſtanding. If it be looked on as an inſtance of a prodigious memory, that ſome generals have been able to call every ſoldier in their army by his proper name, we may eaſily find a reaſon, why men have never attempted to give names to each ſheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much leſs to call every leaf of plants, or grain of ſand that came in their way, by a peculiar name. For every particular thing to have a name is impoſſible.

§. 3. Secondly, If it were poſſible, it would yet be uſeleſs; becauſe it would not ſerve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names of particular things, that would not And uſeleſs.

ſerve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names, and uſe them in talk with others, only that they may be underſtood: which is then only done, when by uſe or conſent the ſound I make by the organs of ſpeech, excites in another man's mind, who hears it, the idea I apply it to in mine, when I ſpeak it. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things, whereof I alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be ſignificant or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all thoſe very particular things which had fallen under my notice.

§. 4. Thirdly, But yet granting this alſo feaſible (which I think is not) yet a diſtinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great uſe for the improvement of knowledge: which though founded in particular things, enlarges itſelf by general views; to which things reduced into ſorts under general names, are properly ſubſervient. Theſe, with the names belonging to them, come within ſome compaſs, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain, or uſe requires: and therefore, in theſe, men have for the moſt part ſtopped; but yet not ſo as to hinder themſelves from diſtinguiſhing particular things, by appropriated names, where convenience demands it. And therefore in their own ſpecies, which they have moſt to do with, and wherein they have often occaſion to mention particular perſons, they make uſe of proper names; and there diſtinct individuals have diſtinct denominations.

What things have proper names.

§. 5. Beſides perſons, countries alſo, cities, rivers, mountains, and other the like diſtinctions of place, have uſually found peculiar names, and that for the ſame reaſon; they being ſuch as men have often an occaſion to mark particularly, and as it were ſet before others in their diſcourſes with them. And I doubt not, but if we had reaſon to mention particular horſes, as often as we have to mention particular men, we ſhould have proper names for the one, as familiar as for the other; and Bucephalus would be a word as much in uſe, as Alexander.

Alexander. And therefore we ſee that, amongſt jockeys, horſes have their proper names to be known and diſtinguiſhed by, as commonly as their ſervants; becauſe, amongſt them, there is often occaſion to mention this or that particular horſe, when he is out of ſight.

How general words are made.

§. 6. The next thing to be conſidered, is, how general words come to be made. For ſince all things that exiſt are only particulars, how come we by general terms, or where find we thoſe general natures they are ſuppoſed to ſtand for? Words become general, by being made the ſigns of general ideas; and ideas become general, by ſeparating from them the circumſtances of time, and place, and any other ideas, that may determine them to this or that particular exiſtence. By this way of abſtraction they are made capable of repreſenting more individuals than one; each of which having in it a conformity to that abſtract idea, is (as we call it) of that ſort.

§. 7. But to deduce this a little more diſtinctly, it will not perhaps be amiſs to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and obſerve by what degrees we proceed, and by what ſteps we enlarge our ideas from our firſt infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the ideas of the perſons children converſe with (to inſtance in them alone) are like the perſons themſelves, only particular. The ideas of the nurſe, and the mother, are well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there, repreſent only thoſe individuals. The names they firſt gave to them are confined to theſe individuals; and the names of nurſe and mamma the child uſes, determine themſelves to thoſe perſons. Afterwards, when time and a larger acquaintance have made them obſerve, that there are a great many other things in the world that in ſome common agreements of ſhape, and ſeveral other qualities, reſemble their father and mother, and thoſe perſons they have been uſed to, they frame an idea, which they find thoſe many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with others, the name man for example.

ample. And thus they come to have a general name, and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.

§. 8. By the ſame way that they come by the general name and idea of man, they eaſily advance to more general names and notions. For obſerving that ſeveral things that differ from their idea of man, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name, have yet certain qualities wherein they agree with man, by retaining only thoſe qualities, and uniting them into one idea, they have again another and more general idea; to which having given a name, they make a term of a more comprehenſive extenſion: which new idea is made, not by any new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the ſhape, and ſome other properties ſignified by the name man, and retaining only a body, with life, ſenſe, and ſpontaneous motion, comprehended under the name animal.

General natures are nothing but abſtract ideas.

§. 9. That this is the way whereby men firſt formed general ideas, and general names to them, I think, is ſo evident, that there needs no other proof of it, but the conſidering of a man's ſelf, or others, and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge: and he that thinks general natures or notions are any thing elſe but ſuch abſtract and partial ideas of more complex ones, taken at firſt from particular exiſtences, will, I fear, be at a loſs where to find them. For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his idea of man differ from that of Peter and Paul, or his idea of horſe from that of Bucephalus, but in the leaving out ſomething that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining ſo much of thoſe particular complex ideas of ſeveral particular exiſtences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas ſignified by the names man and horſe, leaving out but thoſe particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only thoſe wherein they agree, and of thoſe making a new diſtinct complex idea,

idea, and giving the name animal to it; one has a more general term, that comprehends with man ſeveral other creatures. Leave out of the idea of animal, ſenſe and ſpontaneous motion; and the remaining complex idea, made up of the remaining ſimple ones of body, life, and nouriſhment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehenſive term vivens. And not to dwell longer upon this particular, ſo evident in itſelf, by the ſame way the mind proceeds to body, ſubſtance, and at laſt to being, thing, and ſuch univerſal terms, which ſtand for any of our ideas whatſoever. To conclude, this whole myſtery of genera and ſpecies, which make ſuch a noiſe in the ſchools, and are with juſtice ſo little regarded out of them, is nothing elſe but abſtract ideas, more or leſs comprehenſive, with names annexed to them. In all which this is conſtant and unvariable, that every more general term ſtands for ſuch an idea, and is but a part of any of thoſe contained under it.

Why the genus is ordinarily made uſe of in definitions.

§. 10. This may ſhow us the reaſon, why, in the defining of words, which is nothing but declaring their ſignifications, we make uſe of the genus, or next general word that comprehends it. Which is not out of neceſſity, but only to ſave the labour of enumerating the ſeveral ſimple ideas, which the next general word or genus ſtands for; or, perhaps, ſometimes the ſhame of not being able to do it. But though defining by genus and differentia (I crave leave to uſe theſe terms of art, though originally Latin, ſince they moſt properly ſuit thoſe notions they are applied to) I ſay, though defining by the genus be the ſhorteſt way, yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the beſt. This I am ſure, it is not the only, and ſo not abſolutely neceſſary. For definition being nothing but making another underſtand by words what idea the term defined ſtands for, a definition is beſt made by enumerating thoſe ſimple ideas that are combined in the ſignification of the term defined: and if inſtead of ſuch an enumeration, men have accuſtomed themſelves to uſe the next general term; it has not been out of neceſſity, or for

greater clearneſs, but for quickneſs and diſpatch ſake. For, I think, that to one who deſired to know what idea the word man ſtood for, if it ſhould be ſaid, that man was a ſolid extended ſubſtance; having life, ſenſe, ſpontaneous motion, and the faculty of reaſoning: I doubt not but the meaning of the term man would be as well underſtood, and the idea it ſtands for be at leaſt as clearly made known, as when it is defined to be a rational animal: which by the ſeveral definitions of animal, vivens, and corpus, reſolves itſelf into thoſe enumerated ideas. I have, in explaining the term man, followed here the ordinary definition of the ſchools: which though, perhaps, not the moſt exact, yet ſerves well enough to my preſent purpoſe. And one may, in this inſtance, ſee what gave occaſion to the rule, that a definition muſt conſiſt of genus and differentia: and it ſuffices to ſhow us the little neceſſity there is of ſuch a rule, or advantage in the ſtrict obſerving of it. For definitions, as has been ſaid, being only the explaining of one word by ſeveral others, ſo that the meaning or idea it ſtands for may be certainly known; languages are not always ſo made according to the rules of logic, that every term can have its ſignification exactly and clearly expreſſed by two others. Experience ſufficiently ſatisfies us to the contrary; or elſe thoſe who have made this rule have done ill, that they have given us ſo few definitions conformable to it. But of definitions more in the next chapter.

General and univerſal are creatures of the underſtanding.

§. 11. To return to general words; it is plain by what has been ſaid, that general and univerſal belong not to the real exiſtence of things; but are the inventions and creatures of the underſtanding, made by it for its own uſe, and concern only ſigns, whether words or ideas. Words are general, as has been ſaid, when uſed for ſigns of general ideas, and ſo are applicable indifferently to many particular things: and ideas are general, when they are ſet up as the repreſentatives of many particular things: but univerſality belongs not to things themſelves, which are all of them particular in their exiſtence; even thoſe words and ideas, which in

their ſignification are general. When therefore we quit particulars, the generals that reſt are only creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the underſtanding, of ſignifying or repreſenting many particulars. For the ſignification they have is nothing but a relation, that by the mind of man is added to them (1).

§. 12.

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(1) Againſt this the biſhop of Worceſter objects, and our author * anſwers as followeth; 'however, ſaith the biſhop, the abſtracted ideas are 'the work of the mind, yet they are not mere creatures of the mind; as 'appears by an inſtance produced of the eſſence of the ſun being in one 'ſingle individual: in which caſe it is granted, That the idea may be 'ſo abſtracted; that more ſuns might agree in it, and it is as much a ſort, 'as if there were as many ſuns as there are ſtars. So that here we have a 'real eſſence ſubſiſting in one individual, but capable of being multiplied 'into more, and the ſame eſſence remaining. But in this one ſun there is 'a real eſſence, and not a mere nominal, or abſtracted eſſence: but ſup-'poſe there were more ſuns; would not each of them have the real eſſence 'of the ſun? For what is it makes the ſecond ſun, but having the ſame 'real eſſence with the firſt? If it were but a nominal eſſence, then the 'ſecond would have nothing but the name.'

This, as I underſtand it, replies Mr. Locke, is to prove that the abſtract general eſſence of any ſort of things, or things of the ſame denomination, v. g. of man or marigold, hath a real being out of the underſtanding? which, I confeſs, I am not able to conceive. Your lordſhip's proof here brought out of my eſſay, concerning the ſun, I humbly conceive, will not reach it; becauſe what is ſaid there, does not at all concern the real but nominal eſſence, as is evident from hence, that the idea I ſpeak of there, is a complex idea; but we have no complex idea of the internal conſtitution or real eſſence of the ſun. Beſides, I ſay expreſsly, That our diſtinguiſhing ſubſtances into ſpecies, by names, is not at all founded on their real eſſences. So that the ſun being one of theſe ſubſtances, I cannot, in the place quoted by your lordſhip, be ſuppoſed to mean by eſſence of the ſun, the real eſſence of the ſun, unleſs I had ſo expreſſed it. But all this argument will be at an end, when your lordſhip ſhall have explained what you mean by theſe words, 'true ſun.' In my ſenſe of them, any thing will be a true ſun to which the name ſun may be truly and properly applied, and to that ſubſtance or thing the name ſun may be truly and properly applied. which has united in it that combination of ſenſible qualities, by which any thing elſe, that is called ſun, is diſtinguiſhed from other ſubſtances, i. e. by the nominal eſſence: and thus our ſun is denominated and diſtinguiſhed from a fixed ſtar, not by a real eſſence that we do not know (for if we did, it is poſſible we ſhould find the real eſſence or conſtitution of one of the fixed ſtars to be the ſame

* In his firſt letter.

with

Abſtract ideas are the eſſences of the genera and ſpecies.

§. 12. The next thing therefore to be conſidered, is, what kind of ſignification it is, that general words have. For as it is evident, that they do not ſignify barely one particular thing; for then they would not be general terms, but proper names; ſo on the other ſide it is as evident, they do not ſignify a plurality; for

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with that of our ſun) but by a complex idea of ſenſible qualities co-exiſting, which, wherever they are found, make a true ſun. And thus I crave leave to anſwer your lordſhip's queſtion: 'for what is it makes the ſecond 'ſun to be a true ſun, but having the ſame real eſſence with the firſt? If 'it were but a nominal eſſence, then the ſecond would have nothing but 'the name.'

I humbly conceive, if it had the nominal eſſence, it would have ſomething beſides the name, viz. That nominal eſſence which is ſufficient to denominate it truly a ſun, or to make it be a true ſun, though we know nothing of that real eſſence whereon that nominal one depends. Your lordſhip will then argue, that that real eſſence is in the ſecond ſun, and makes the ſecond ſun. I grant it, when the ſecond ſun comes to exiſt, ſo as to be perceived by us to have all the ideas contained in our complex idea, i. e. in our nominal eſſence of a ſun. For ſhould it be true, (as is now believed by aſtronomers) that the real eſſence of the ſun were in any of the fixed ſtars, yet ſuch a ſtar could not for that be by us called a ſun, whilſt it anſwers not our complex idea, or nominal eſſence of a ſun. But how far that will prove, that the eſſences of things, as they are knowable by us, have a reality in them diſtinct from that of abſtract ideas in the mind, which are merely creatures of the mind, I do not ſee; and we ſhall farther inquire, in conſidering your lordſhip's following words. 'Therefore,' ſay you, 'there muſt be a real eſſence in every individual of the 'ſame kind.' Yes, and I beg leave of your lordſhip to ſay, of a different kind too. For that alone is it which makes it to be what it is.

That every individual ſubſtance has real, internal, individual conſtitution, i. e. a real eſſence, that makes it to be what it is, I readily grant. Upon this your lordſhip ſays, 'Peter, James and John, are all true and 'real men.' Anſ. Without doubt, ſuppoſing them to be men, they are true and real men, i. e. ſuppoſing the name of that ſpecies belongs to them. And ſo three bobaques are all true and real bobaques, ſuppoſing the name of that ſpecies of animals belongs to them.

For I beſeech your lordſhip to conſider, whether in your way of arguing, by naming them, Peter, James and John, names familiar to us, as appropriated to individuals of the ſpecies man, your lordſhip does not firſt ſuppoſe them men, and then very ſafely aſk, whether they be not all true and real men? But if I ſhould aſk your lordſhip, whether Weweena, Chuckery and Couſheda, were true and real men or no? Your lordſhip would not be able to tell me, till, I having pointed out to your lordſhip the individuals called by thoſe names, your lordſhip, by examining whether

for man and men would then ſignify the ſame, and the diſtinction of numbers (as the grammarians call them) would be ſuperfluous and uſeleſs. That then which general words ſignify is a ſort of things; and each of them does that, by being a ſign of an abſtract idea in the mind, to which idea, as things exiſting are found to agree, ſo they come to be ranked under that name: or,

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ther they had in them thoſe ſenſible qualities which your lordſhip has combined into that complex idea to which you give the ſpecific name man, determined them all, or ſome of them, to be the ſpecies which you call man, and ſo to be true and real man: which when your lordſhip has determined, it is plain you did it by that which is only the nominal eſſence, as not knowing the real one. But your lordſhip farther aſks, 'What is 'it makes Peter, James and John real men? Is it the attributing the gene-'ral name to them? No, certainly; but that the true and real eſſence 'of a man is in every one of them.'

If, when your lordſhip aſks, 'What makes them men?' your lordſhip uſed the word making in the proper ſenſe for the efficient cauſe, and in that ſenſe it were true, that the eſſence of a man, i. e. the ſpecific eſſence of that ſpecies made a man; it would undoubtedly follow, that this ſpecific eſſence had a reality beyond that of being only a general abſtract idea in the mind. But when it is ſaid, that it is the true and real eſſence of a man in every one of them that makes Peter, James and John true and real men, the true and real meaning of theſe words is no more, but that the eſſence of that ſpecies, i. e. the properties anſwering the complex abſtract idea to which the ſpecific name is given, being found in them, that makes them be properly and truly called men, or is the reaſon why they are called men. Your lordſhip adds, 'and we muſt be as certain of this, as we are 'that they are men.'

How, I beſeech your lordſhip, are we certain that they are men, but only by our ſenſes, finding thoſe properties in them which anſwer the abſtract complex idea, which is in our minds, of the ſpecific idea to which we have annexed the ſpecific name man? This I take to be the true meaning of what your lordſhip ſays in the next words. viz. 'They take 'their denomination of being men from that common nature or eſſence 'which is in them;' and I am apt to think, theſe words will not hold true in any other ſenſe.

Your lordſhip's fourth inference begins thus; 'That the general idea is 'not made from the ſimple ideas by the mere act of the mind abſtracting 'from circumſtances, but from reaſon and conſideration of the nature of 'things.'

I thought, my lord, that reaſon and conſideration had been acts of the mind, mere acts of the mind, when any thing was done by them. Your lordſhip gives a reaſon for it, viz. 'For, when we ſee ſeveral individuals 'that have the ſame powers and properties, we thence infer, that there muſt 'be ſomething common to all, which makes them of one kind.'

I grant

or, which is all one, be of that ſort. Whereby it is evident, that the eſſences of the ſorts, or (if the Latin word pleaſes better) ſpecies of things, are nothing elſe but theſe abſtract ideas. For the having the eſſence of any ſpecies, being that which makes any thing to be of that ſpecies, and the conformity to the idea to which the name is annexed, being that which gives a right to that name;

I grant the inference to be true; but muſt beg leave to deny that this proves, that the general idea the name is annexed to, is not made by the mind. I have ſaid, and it agrees with what your lordſhip here ſays, * That 'the mind, in making its complex ideas of ſubſtances, only follows nature, and puts no ideas together, which are not ſuppoſed to have an union in nature. Nobody joins the voice of a ſheep with the ſhape of an horſe; nor the colour of lead with the weight and fixedneſs of gold, to be the complex ideas of any real ſubſtances; unleſs he has a mind to fill his head with chimeras, and his diſcourſes with unintelligible words. Men obſerving certain qualities always joined and exiſting together, therein copied nature, and of ideas ſo united, made their complex ones of ſubſtance, &c.' Which is very little different from what your lordſhip here ſays, that it is from our obſervation of individuals, that we come to infer, 'that there is ſomething common to them all.' But I do not ſee how it will thence follow, that the general or ſpecific idea is not made by the mere act of the mind. No, ſays your lordſhip, 'There is ſomething common to them all, which makes them of one kind; and if the difference of kinds be real, that which makes them all of one kind muſt not be a nominal, but real eſſence.'

This may be ſome objection to the name of nominal eſſence; but is, as I humbly conceive, none to the thing deſigned by it. There is an internal conſtitution of things, on which their properties depend. This your lordſhip and I are agreed of, and this we call the real eſſence. There are alſo certain complex ideas, or combinations of theſe properties in men's minds, to which they commonly annex ſpecific names, or names of ſorts or kinds of things. This, I believe, your lordſhip does not deny. Theſe complex ideas, for want of a better name, I have called nominal eſſences; how properly, I will not diſpute. But if any one will help me to a better name for them, I am ready to receive it; till then, I muſt, to expreſs myſelf, uſe this. Now, my lord, body, life, and the power of reaſoning, being not the real eſſence of a man, as I believe your lordſhip will agree, will your lordſhip ſay, that they are not enough to make the thing wherein they are found, of the kind called man, and not of the kind called baboon, becauſe the difference of theſe kinds is real? If this be not real enough to make the thing of one kind and not of another, I do not ſee how animal rationale can be enough really to diſtinguiſh a man from an horſe; for that is but the nominal, not real eſſence of that kind, deſigned by the name

* B. 3. C. 6. §. 28, 29.

man:

name; the having the eſſence, and the having that conformity, muſt needs be the ſame thing: ſince to be of any ſpecies, and to have a right to the name of that ſpecies, is all one. As for example, to be a man, or of the ſpecies man, and to have right to the name man, is the ſame thing. Again, to be a man, or of the ſpecies man, and have the eſſence of a man, is the ſame thing. Now

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man: and yet I ſuppoſe, every one thinks it real enough to make a real difference between that and other kinds. And if nothing will ſerve the turn, to MAKE things of one kind and not of another (which, as I have ſhowed, ſignifies no more but ranking of them under different ſpecific names) but their real unknown conſtitutions, which are the real eſſences we are ſpeaking of, I fear it would be a long while before we ſhould have really different kinds of ſubſtances, or diſtinct names for them, unleſs we could diſtinguiſh them by theſe differences, of which we have no diſtinct conceptions. For I think it would not be readily anſwered me, if I ſhould demand, wherein lies the real difference in the internal conſtitution of a ſtag from that of a buck, which are each of them very well known to be of one kind, and not of the other; and nobody queſtions but that the kinds, whereof each of them is, are really different.

Your lordſhip farther ſays, 'And this difference doth not depend upon 'the complex ideas of ſubſtances, whereby men arbitrarily join modes toge-'ther in their minds.' I confeſs, my lord, I know not what to ſay to this, becauſe I do not know what theſe complex ideas of ſubſtances are, whereby men arbitrarily join modes together in their minds. But I am apt to think there is a miſtake in the matter, by the words that follow, which are theſe: 'For let them miſtake in their complication of ideas, either in 'leaving out or putting in what doth not belong to them; and let their 'ideas be what they pleaſe, the real eſſence of a man, and an horſe, and a 'tree, are juſt what they were.'

The miſtake I ſpoke of, I humbly ſuppoſe, is this, that things are here taken to be diſtinguiſhed by their real eſſences; when, by the very way of ſpeaking of them, it is clear, that they are already diſtinguiſhed by their nominal eſſences, and are ſo taken to be. For what, I beſeech your lordſhip, does your lordſhip mean, when you ſay, 'The real eſſence of a 'man, and an horſe, and a tree,' but that there are ſuch kinds already ſet out by the ſignification of theſe names, man, horſe, tree? And what, I beſeech your lordſhip, is the ſignification of each of theſe ſpecific names, but the complex idea it ſtands for? And that complex idea is the nominal eſſence, and nothing elſe. So that taking man, as your lordſhip does here, to ſtand for a kind or ſort of individuals, all which agree in that common complex idea, which that ſpecific name ſtands for, it is certain that the real eſſence of all the individuals comprehended under the ſpecific name man, in your uſe of it, would be juſt the ſame; let others leave out or put into their complex idea of man what they pleaſe; becauſe the

Now ſince nothing can be a man, or have a right to the name man, but what has a conformity to the abſtract idea the name man ſtands for; nor any thing be a man, or have a right to the ſpecies man, but what has the eſſence of that ſpecies; it follows, that the abſtract idea for which the name ſtands, and the eſſence of the ſpecies, is one and the ſame. From whence it is eaſy to obſerve, that the eſſences of the ſorts of things, and conſequently the ſorting of this, is the workmanſhip of the underſtanding, that abſtracts and makes thoſe general ideas.

§. 13.

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the real eſſence on which that unaltered complex idea, i. e. thoſe properties depend, muſt neceſſarily be concluded to be the ſame.

For I take it for granted, that in uſing the name man, in this place, your lordſhip uſes it for that complex idea which is in your lordſhip's mind of that ſpecies. So that your lordſhip, by putting it for, or ſubſtituting it in the place of that complex idea where you ſay the real eſſence of it is juſt as it was, or the very ſame as it was, does ſuppoſe the idea it ſtands for to be ſteadily the ſame. For, if I change the ſignification of the word man, whereby it may not comprehend juſt the ſame individuals which in your lordſhip's ſenſe it does, but ſhut out ſome of thoſe that to your lordſhip are men in your ſignification of the word man, or take in others to which your lordſhip does not allow the name man; I do not think you will ſay, that the real eſſence of man in both theſe ſenſes is the ſame. And yet your lordſhip ſeems to ſay ſo, when you ſay, 'Let men 'miſtake in the complication of their ideas, either in leaving out or putting 'in what doth not belong to them;' and let their ideas be what they please, the real eſſence of the individuals comprehended under the names annexed to theſe ideas, will be the ſame: for ſo, I humbly conceive, it muſt be put, to make out what your lordſhip aims at. For as your lordſhip puts it by the name of man, or any other ſpecific name, your lordſhip ſeems to me to ſuppoſe, that that name ſtands for, and not for the ſame idea, at the ſame time.

For example, my lord, let your lordſhip's idea, to which you annex the ſign man, be a rational animal: let another man's idea be a rational animal of ſuch a ſhape; let a third man's idea be of an animal of ſuch a ſize and ſhape, leaving out rationality; let a fourth's be an animal with a body of ſuch a ſhape, and an immaterial ſubſtance, with a power of reaſoning; let a fifth leave out of his idea an immaterial ſubſtance. It is plain every one of theſe will call his a man, as well as your lordſhip; and yet it is as plain that men, as ſtanding for all theſe diſtinct, complex ideas, cannot be ſuppoſed to have the ſame internal conſtitution, i. e. the ſame real eſſence. The truth is, every diſtinct abſtract idea with a name to it, makes a real diſtinct kind, whatever the real eſſence (which we know not of any of them) be.

And

§. 13. I would not here be thought to forget, much leſs to deny, that nature in the production of things makes ſeveral of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, eſpecially in the races of animals, and all things propagated by ſeed. But yet, I think, we may ſay the ſorting of them under names is the workmanſhip of the underſtanding, taking occaſion from the ſimilitude it obſerves amongſt them to make abſtract general ideas, and ſet them up in the mind, with names annexed to them as patterns or forms (for in that ſenſe the word form has a very proper ſignification) to which as particular things exiſting are found to agree, ſo they come to be of that ſpe-

They are the workmanſhip of the underſtanding, but have their foundation in the ſimilitude of things.

And therefore I grant it true what your lordſhip ſays in the next words, 'And let the nominal eſſences differ never ſo much, the real common eſ-'ſence or nature of the ſeveral kinds, are not at all altered by them,' i. e. That our thoughts or ideas cannot alter the real conſtitutions that are in things that exiſt, there is nothing more certain. But yet it is true, that the change of ideas, to which we annex them, can and does alter the ſignification of their names, and thereby alter the kinds, which by theſe names we rank and ſort them into. Your lordſhip farther adds, 'And 'theſe real eſſences are unchangeable,' i. e. the internal conſtitutions are unchangeable. Of what, I beſeech your lordſhip, are the internal conſtitutions unchangeable? Not of any thing that exiſts, but of God alone; for they may be changed all as eaſily by that hand that made them, as the internal frame of a watch. What then is it that is unchangeable? The internal conſtitution, or real eſſence of a ſpecies; which, in plain Engliſh, is no more but this, whilſt the ſame ſpecific name, v. g. of man, horſe, or tree, is annexed to, or made the ſign of the ſame abſtract complex idea, under which I rank ſeveral individuals; it is impoſſible but the real conſtitution on which that unaltered, complex idea, or nominal eſſence depends, muſt be the ſame, i. e. in other words, where we find all the ſame properties, we have reaſon to conclude there is the ſame real, internal conſtitution from which thoſe properties flow.

But your lordſhip proves the real eſſences to be unchangeable, becauſe God makes them, in theſe following words: 'For, however there may 'happen ſome variety in individuals by particular accidents, yet the eſſences 'of men, and horſes, and trees, remain always the ſame; becauſe they do 'not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the Creator, who hath 'made ſeveral ſorts of beings.'

It is true, the real conſtitutions or eſſences of particular things exiſting do not depend on the ideas of men, but on the will of the Creator: but their being ranked into ſorts, under ſuch and ſuch names, does depend, and wholly depend, on the ideas of men.

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cies, have that denomination, or are put into that claſſis. For when we ſay, this is a man, that a horſe; this juſtice, that cruelty; this a watch, that a jack; what do we elſe but rank things under different ſpecific names, as agreeing to thoſe abſtract ideas, of which we have made thoſe names the ſigns? And what are the eſſences of thoſe ſpecies ſet out and marked by names, but thoſe abſtract ideas in the mind; which are as it were the bonds between particular things that exiſt and the names they are to be ranked under? And when general names have any connexion with particular beings, theſe abſtract ideas are the medium that unites them: ſo that the eſſences of ſpecies, as diſtinguiſhed and denominated by us, neither are nor can be any thing but thoſe preciſe abſtract ideas we have in our minds. And therefore the ſuppoſed real eſſences of ſubſtances, if different from our abſtract ideas, cannot be the eſſences of the ſpecies we rank things into. For two ſpecies may be one as rationally, as two different eſſences be the eſſence of one ſpecies: and I demand what are the alterations may or may not be in a horſe or lead, without making either of them to be of another ſpecies? In determining the ſpecies of things by our abſtract ideas, this is eaſy to reſolve: but if any one will regulate himſelf herein by ſuppoſed real eſſences, he will, I ſuppoſe, be at a loſs; and he will never be able to know when any thing preciſely ceaſes to be of the ſpecies of a horſe or lead.

Each diſtinct abſtract idea is a diſtinct eſſence.

§. 14. Nor will any one wonder, that I ſay theſe eſſences, or abſtract ideas (which are the meaſures of name, and the boundaries of ſpecies) are the workmanſhip of the underſtanding, who conſiders, that at leaſt the complex ones are often, in ſeveral men, different collections of ſimple ideas: and therefore that is covetouſneſs to one man, which is not ſo to another. Nay, even in ſubſtances, where their abſtract ideas ſeem to be taken from the things themſelves, they are not conſtantly the ſame; no not in that ſpecies which is moſt familiar to us, and with which we have the moſt intimate acquaintance: it having been more than once doubted, whether the fœtus born of a woman were a man; even ſo far, as that it hath

hath been debated, whether it were or were not to be nouriſhed and baptized: which could not be, if the abſtract idea or eſſence, to which the name man belonged, were of nature's making; and were not the uncertain and various collection of ſimple ideas, which the underſtanding put together, and, then abſtracting it, affixed a name to it. So that in truth every diſtinct abſtract idea is a diſtinct eſſence: and the names that ſtand for ſuch diſtinct ideas are the names of things eſſentially different. Thus a circle is as eſſentially different from an oval, as a ſheep from a goat: and rain is as eſſentially different from ſnow, as water from earth; that abſtract idea which is the eſſence of one being impoſſible to be communicated to the other. And thus any two abſtract ideas, that in any part vary one from another, with two diſtinct names annexed to them, conſtitute two diſtinct ſorts, or, if you pleaſe, ſpecies, as eſſentially different as any two of the moſt remote, or oppoſite in the world.

Real and nominal eſſence.

§. 15. But ſince the eſſences of things are thought, by ſome, (and not without reaſon) to be wholly unknown; it may not be amiſs to conſider the ſeveral ſignifications of the word eſſence.

Firſt, eſſence may be taken for the being of any thing, whereby it is what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally, in ſubſtances, unknown conſtitution of things, whereon their diſcoverable qualities depend, may be called their eſſence. This is the proper original ſignification of the word, as is evident from the formation of it; eſſentia, in its primary notation, ſignifying properly being. And in this ſenſe it is ſtill uſed, when we ſpeak of the eſſence of particular things, without giving them any name.

Secondly, the learning and diſputes of the ſchools having been much buſied about genus and ſpecies, the word eſſence has almoſt loſt its primary ſignification: and inſtead of the real conſtitution of things, has been almoſt wholly applied to the artificial conſtitution of genus and ſpecies. It is true, there is ordinarily ſuppoſed a real conſtitution of the ſorts of things; and it

is paſt doubt, there muſt be ſome real conſtitution, on which any collection of ſimple ideas co-exiſting muſt depend. But it being evident, that things are ranked under names into ſorts or ſpecies, only as they agree to certain abſtract ideas, to which we have annexed thoſe names: the eſſence of each genus, or ſort, comes to be nothing but that abſtract idea, which the general, or ſortal (if I may have leave ſo to call it from ſort, as I do general from genus) name ſtands for. And this we ſhall find to be that which the word eſſence imports in its moſt familiar uſe. Theſe two ſorts of eſſences, I ſuppoſe, may not unfitly be termed, the one the real, the other nominal eſſence.

Conſtant connexion between the name and nominal eſſence.

§. 16. Between the nominal eſſence and the name, there is ſo near a connexion, that the name of any ſort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being but what has this eſſence, whereby it anſwers that abſtract idea, whereof that name is the ſign.

Suppoſition, that ſpecies are diſtinguiſhed by their real eſſences, uſeleſs.

§. 17. Concerning the real eſſences of corporeal ſubſtances, (to mention theſe only) there are, if I miſtake not, two opinions. The one is of thoſe, who uſing the word eſſence for they know not what, ſuppoſe a certain number of thoſe eſſences, according to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and ſo become of this or that ſpecies. The other, and more rational opinion, is of thoſe who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown conſtitution of their inſenſible parts; from which flow thoſe ſenſible qualities, which ſerve us to diſtinguiſh them one from another, according as we have occaſion to rank them into ſorts under common denominations. The former of theſe opinions, which ſuppoſes theſe eſſences, as a certain number of forms or moulds, wherein all natural things, that exiſt, are caſt, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the knowledge of natural things. The frequent productions of monſters, in all the ſpecies of animals, and of changelings, and other ſtrange

ſtrange iſſues of human birth, carry with them difficulties, not poſſible to conſiſt with this hypotheſis: ſince it is as impoſſible, that two things, partaking exactly of the ſame real eſſence, ſhould have different properties, as that two figures partaking of the ſame real eſſence of a circle ſhould have different properties. But were there no other reaſon againſt it, yet the ſuppoſition of eſſences that cannot be known, and the making of them nevertheleſs to be that which diſtinguiſhes the ſpecies of things, is ſo wholly uſeleſs, and unſerviceable to any part of our knowledge, that that alone were ſufficient to make us lay it by, and content ourſelves with ſuch eſſences of the ſorts or ſpecies of things as come within the reach of our knowledge: which, when ſeriouſly conſidered, will be found, as I have ſaid, to be nothing elſe but thoſe abſtract complex ideas, to which we have annexed diſtinct general names.

Real and nominal eſſence the ſame in ſimple ideas and modes, different in ſubſtances.

§. 18. Eſſences being thus diſtinguiſhed into nominal and real, we may farther obſerve, that in the ſpecies of ſimple ideas and modes, they are always the ſame; but in ſubſtances always quite different. Thus a figure including a ſpace between three lines, is the real as well as nominal eſſence of a triangle; it being not only the abſtract idea to which the general name is annexed, but the very eſſentia or being of the thing itſelf, that foundation from which all its properties flow, and to which they are all inſeparably annexed. But it is far otherwiſe concerning that parcel of matter, which makes the ring on my finger, wherein theſe two eſſences are apparently different. For it is the real conſtitution of its inſenſible parts, on which depend all thoſe properties of colour, weight, fuſibility, fixedneſs, &c. which are to be found in it, which conſtitution we know not, and ſo having no particular idea of, have no name that is the ſign of it. But yet it is its colour, weight, fuſibility, fixedneſs, &c. which makes it to be gold, or gives it a right to that name, which is therefore its nominal eſſence: ſince nothing can be called gold but what has a conformity of quali-

ties to that abſtract complex idea, to which that name is annexed. But this diſtinction of eſſences belonging particularly to ſubſtances, we ſhall, when we come to conſider their names, have an occaſion to treat of more fully.

Eſſences ingenerable and incorruptible.

§. 19. That ſuch abſtract ideas, with names to them, as we have been ſpeaking of, are eſſences, may farther appear by what we are told concerning eſſences, viz. that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real conſtitutions of things which begin and periſh with them. All things that exiſt, beſides their author, are all liable to change; eſpecially thoſe things we are acquainted with, and have ranked into bands under diſtinct names or enſigns. Thus that which was graſs to-day, is to-morrow the fleſh of a ſheep; and within a few days after becomes part of a man: in all which, and the like changes, it is evident their real eſſence, i. e. that conſtitution, whereon the properties of theſe ſeveral things depended, is deſtroyed and periſhes with them. But eſſences being taken for ideas, eſtabliſhed in the mind, with names annexed to them, they are ſuppoſed to remain ſteadily the ſame, whatever mutations the particular ſubſtances are liable to. For whatever becomes of Alexander and Bucephalus, the ideas to which man and horſe are annexed, are ſuppoſed nevertheleſs to remain the ſame; and ſo the eſſences of thoſe ſpecies are preſerved whole and undeſtroyed, whatever changes happen to any, or all of the individuals of thoſe ſpecies. By this means the eſſence of a ſpecies reſts ſafe and entire, without the exiſtence of ſo much as one individual of that kind. For were there now no circle exiſting any where in the world, (as perhaps that figure exiſts not any where exactly marked out) yet the idea annexed to that name would not ceaſe to be what it is; nor ceaſe to be as a pattern to determine which of the particular figures we meet with have or have not a right to the name circle, and ſo to ſhow which of them by having that eſſence, was of that ſpecies. And though there neither were nor had been in nature ſuch a beaſt as an unicorn, or ſuch

ſuch a fiſh as a mermaid; yet ſuppoſing thoſe names to ſtand for complex abſtract ideas that contained no inconſiſtency in them, the eſſence of a mermaid is as intelligible as that of a man; and the idea of an unicorn as certain, ſteady, and permanent as that of a horſe. From what has been ſaid it is evident, that the doctrine of the immutability of eſſences proves them to be only abſtract ideas; and is founded on the relation eſtabliſhed between them and certain ſounds as ſigns of them; and will always be true as long as the ſame name can have the ſame ſignification.

Recapitulation.

§. 20. To conclude, this is that which in ſhort I would ſay, viz. that all the great buſineſs of genera and ſpecies, and their eſſences, amounts to no more but this, That men making abſtract ideas, and ſettling them in their minds with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themſelves to conſider things, and diſcourſe of them as it were in bundles, for the eaſier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge; which would advance but ſlowly, were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of Simple Ideas.

Names of ſimple ideas, modes, and ſubſtances, have each ſomething peculiar.

§. 1. THOUGH all words, as I have ſhown, ſignify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the ſpeaker; yet upon a nearer ſurvey we ſhall find that the names of ſimple ideas, mixed modes, (under which I compriſe relations too) and natural ſubſtances, have each of them ſomething peculiar and different from the other. For example:

1. Names of ſimple ideas and ſub-

§. 2. Firſt, The names of ſimple ideas and ſubſtances, with the abſtract ideas in the mind, which they immediately ſignify,

ſtances intimate real exiſtence.

intimate alſo ſome real exiſtence, from which was derived their original pattern. But the names of mixed modes terminate in the idea that is in the mind, and lead not the thoughts any farther, as we ſhall ſee more at large in the following chapter.

2. Names of ſimple ideas and modes ſignify always both real and nominal eſſence.

§. 3. Secondly, The names of ſimple ideas and modes ſignify always the real as well as nominal eſſence of their ſpecies. But the names of natural ſubſtances ſignify rarely, if ever, any thing but barely the nominal eſſences of thoſe ſpecies; as we ſhall ſhow in the chapter that treats of the names of ſubſtances in particular.

3. Names of ſimple ideas undefinable.

§. 4. Thirdly, The names of ſimple ideas are not capable of any definition; the names of all complex ideas are. It has not, that I know, been yet obſerved by any body, what words are, and what are not capable of being defined; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not ſeldom the occaſion of great wrangling and obſcurity in men's diſcourſes, whilſt ſome demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined; and others think they ought not to reſt ſatisfied in an explication made by a more general word, and its reſtriction, (or, to ſpeak in terms of art, by a genus and difference) when even after ſuch definition made according to rule, thoſe who hear it have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before. This at leaſt I think, that the ſhowing what words are, and what are not capable of definitions, and wherein conſiſts a good definition, is not wholly beſides our preſent purpoſe; and perhaps will afford ſo much light to the nature of theſe ſigns, and our ideas, as to deſerve a more particular conſideration.

If all were definable, it would be a proceſs in infinitum.

§. 5. I will not here trouble myſelf to prove that all terms are not definable from that progreſs in infinitum, which it will viſibly lead us into, if we ſhould allow that all names could be defined. For if the terms of one definition were ſtill to be defined by another,

another, where at laſt ſhould we ſtop? But I ſhall from the nature of our ideas, and the ſignification of our words, ſhow, why ſome names can, and others cannot be defined, and which they are.

What a definition is.

§. 6. I think, it is agreed, that a definition is nothing elſe but the ſhowing the meaning of one word by ſeveral other not ſynonimous terms. The meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to ſtand for by him that uſes them, the meaning of any term is then ſhowed, or the word is defined, when by other words the idea it is made the ſign of, and annexed to, in the mind of the ſpeaker, is as it were repreſented, or ſet before the view of another; and thus its ſignification aſcertained: this is the only uſe and end of definitions; and therefore the only meaſure of what is, or is not a good definition.

Simple ideas why undefinable.

§. 7. This being premiſed, I ſay, that the names of ſimple ideas, and thoſe only are incapable of being defined. The reaſon whereof is this, that the ſeveral terms of a definition, ſignifying ſeveral ideas, they can all together by no means repreſent an idea, which has no compoſition at all: and therefore definition, which is properly nothing but the ſhowing the meaning of one word by ſeveral others not ſignifying each the ſame thing, can in the names of ſimple ideas have no place.

Inſtances; motion.

§. 8. The not obſerving this difference in our ideas, and their names, has produced that eminent trifling in the ſchools, which is ſo eaſy to be obſerved in the definitions they give us of ſome few of theſe ſimple ideas. For as to the greateſt part of them, even thoſe maſters of definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the impoſſibility they found in it. What more exquiſite jargon could the wit of man invent, than this definition, "The act of a being in power, as far forth as in "power?" which would puzzle any rational man, to whom it was not already known by its famous abſurdity, to gueſs what word it could ever be ſuppoſed to be the explication of. If Tully, aſking a Dutchman

what "beweeginge" was, ſhould have received this explication in his own language, that it was "actus "entis in potentia quatenus in potentia;" I aſk whether any one can imagine he could thereby have underſtood what the word "beweeginge" ſignified, or have gueſſed what idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would ſignify to another, when he uſed that ſound.

§. 9. Nor have the modern philoſophers, who have endeavoured to throw off the jargon of the ſchools, and ſpeak intelligibly, much better ſucceeded in defining ſimple ideas, whether by explaining their cauſes, or any otherwiſe. The atomiſts, who define motion to be a paſſage from one place to another, what do they more than put one ſynonymous word for another? For what is paſſage other than motion? And if they were aſked what paſſage was, how would they better define it than by motion? For is it not at leaſt as proper and ſignificant to ſay, paſſage is a motion from one place to another, as to ſay, motion is a paſſage, &c.? This is to tranſlate, and not to define, when we change two words of the ſame ſignification one for another; which, when one is better underſtood than the other, may ſerve to diſcover what idea the unknown ſtands for; but is very far from a definition, unleſs we will ſay every Engliſh word in the dictionary is the definition of the Latin word it anſwers, and that motion is a definition of motus. Nor will the ſucceſſive application of the parts of the ſuperficies of one body to thoſe of another, which the Carteſians give us, prove a much better definition of motion, when well examined.

Light. §. 10. "The act of perſpicuous, as far forth as perſpicuous," is another peripatetic definition of a ſimple idea; which though not more abſurd than the former of motion, yet betrays its uſeleſſneſs and inſignificancy more plainly, becauſe experience will eaſily convince any one, that it cannot make the meaning of the word light (which it pretends to define) at all underſtood by a blind man; but the definition of motion appears not at firſt ſight ſo uſeleſs, becauſe it eſcapes this way of trial. For this ſimple idea, entering by the touch as well as ſight, it is impoſſible

poſſible to ſhow an example of any one, who has no other way to get the idea of motion, but barely by the definition of that name. Thoſe who tell us, that light is a great number of little globules, ſtriking briſkly on the bottom of the eye, ſpeak more intelligibly than the ſchools; but yet theſe words ever ſo well underſtood would make the idea the word light ſtands for no more known to a man that underſtands it not before, than if one ſhould tell him, that light was nothing but a company of little tennis-balls, which fairies all day long ſtruck with rackets againſt ſome men's foreheads, whilſt they paſſed by others. For granting this explication of the thing to be true; yet the idea of the cauſe of light, if we had it ever ſo exact, would no more give us the idea of light itſelf, as it is ſuch a particular perception in us, than the idea of the figure and motion of a ſharp piece of ſteel would give us the idea of that pain which it is able to cauſe in us. For the cauſe of any ſenſation, and the ſenſation itſelf, in all the ſimple ideas of one ſenſe, are two ideas; and two ideas ſo different and diſtant one from another, that no two can be more ſo. And therefore ſhould Des Cartes's globules ſtrike ever ſo long on the retina of a man, who was blind by a gutta ſerena, he would thereby never have any idea of light, or any thing approaching it, though he underſtood what little globules were, and what ſtriking on another body was, ever ſo well. And therefore the Carteſians very well diſtinguiſh between that light which is the cauſe of that ſenſation in us, and the idea which is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly light.

Simple ideas, why undefinable, farther explained.

§. 11. Simple ideas, as has been ſhown, are only to be got by thoſe impreſſions objects themſelves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed to each ſort. If they are not received this way, all the words in the world, made uſe of to explain or define any of their names, will never be able to produce in us the idea it ſtands for. For words being ſounds, can produce in us no other ſimple ideas, than of thoſe very ſounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary

connexion which is known to be between them and thoſe ſimple ideas, which common uſe has made them ſigns of. He that thinks otherwiſe, let him try if any words can give him the taſte of a pine-apple, and make him have the true idea of the reliſh of that celebrated delicious fruit. So far as he is told it has a reſemblance with any taſtes, whereof he has the ideas already in his memory, imprinted there by ſenſible objects not ſtrangers to his palate, ſo far may he approach that reſemblance in his mind. But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, but exciting in us other ſimple ideas by their known names; which will be ſtill very different from the true taſte of that fruit itſelf. In light and colours, and all other ſimple ideas, it is the ſame thing; for the ſignification of ſounds is not natural, but only impoſed and arbitrary. And no definition of light, or redneſs, is more fitted, or able to produce either of thoſe ideas in us, than the ſound light or red by itſelf. For to hope to produce an idea of light, or colour, by a ſound, however formed, is to expect that ſounds ſhould be viſible, or colours audible, and to make the ears do the office of all the other ſenſes. Which is all one as to ſay, that we might taſte, ſmell, and ſee by the ears; a ſort of philoſophy worthy only of Sancho Pança, who had the faculty to ſee Dulcinea by hearſay. And therefore he that has not before received into his mind, by the proper inlet, the ſimple idea which any word ſtands for, can never come to know the ſignification of that word by any other words or ſounds whatſoever, put together according to any rules of definition. The only way is by applying to his ſenſes the proper object, and ſo producing that idea in him, for which he has learned the name already. A ſtudious blind man, who had mightily beat his head about viſible objects, and made uſe of the explication of his books and friends, to underſtand thoſe names of light and colours, which often came in his way, bragged one day, that he now underſtood what ſcarlet ſignified. Upon which his friend demanding, what ſcarlet was? the blind man anſwered, It was like the ſound of a trumpet. Juſt ſuch an under-

ſtanding of the name of any other ſimple idea will he have, who hopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made uſe of to explain it.

The contrary ſhowed in complex ideas, by inſtances of a ſtatue and rainbow.

§. 12. The caſe is quite otherwiſe in complex ideas; which conſiſting of ſeveral ſimple ones, it is in the power of words, ſtanding for the ſeveral ideas that make that compoſition, to imprint complex ideas in the mind, which were never there before, and ſo make their names be underſtood. In ſuch collections of ideas, paſſing under one name, definition, or the teaching the ſignification of one word by ſeveral others, has place, and may make us underſtand the names of things, which never came within the reach of our ſenſes; and frame ideas ſuitable to thoſe in other men's minds, when they uſe thoſe names: provided that none of the terms of the definition ſtand for any ſuch ſimple ideas, which he to whom the explication is made has never yet had in this thought. Thus the word ſtatue may be explained to a blind man by other words, when picture cannot; his ſenſes having given him the idea of figure, but not of colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him. This gained the prize to the painter againſt the ſtatuary: each of which contending for the excellency of his art, and the ſtatuary bragging that his was to be preferred, becauſe it reached farther, and even thoſe who had loſt their eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it, the painter agreed to refer himſelf to the judgment of a blind man; who being brought where there was a ſtatue, made by the one, and a picture drawn by the other, he was firſt led to the ſtatue, in which he traced with his hands all the lineaments of the face and body, and with great admiration applauded the ſkill of the workman. But being led to the picture, and having his hands laid upon it, was told, that now he touched the head, and then the forehead, eyes, noſe, &c. as his hands moved over the parts of the picture on the cloth, without finding any the leaſt diſtinction: whereupon he cried out, that certainly that muſt needs be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanſhip, which could repre-

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ſent to them all thoſe parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive any thing.

§. 13. He that ſhould uſe the word rainbow to one who knew all thoſe colours, but yet had never ſeen that phænomenon, would, by enumerating the figure, largeneſs, poſition and order of the colours, ſo well define that word, that it might be perfectly underſtood. But yet that definition, how exact and perfect ſoever, would never make a blind man underſtand it; becauſe ſeveral of the ſimple ideas that make that complex one, being ſuch as he never received by ſenſation and experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind.

The ſame of complex ideas when to be made intelligible by words.

§. 14. Simple ideas, as has been ſhowed, can only be got by experience, from thoſe objects, which are proper to produce in us thoſe perceptions. When by this means we have our minds ſtored with them, and know the names for them, then we are in a condition to define, and by definition to underſtand the names of complex ideas, that are made up of them. But when any term ſtands for a ſimple idea, that a man has never yet had in his mind, it is impoſſible by any words to make known its meaning to him. When any term ſtands for an idea a man is acquainted with, but is ignorant that that term is the ſign of it; there another name, of the ſame idea which he has been accuſtomed to, may make him underſtand its meaning. But in no caſe whatſoever is any name, of any ſimple idea, capable of a definition.

4. Names of ſimple ideas leaſt doubtful.

§. 15. Fourthly, But though the names of ſimple ideas have not the help of definition to determine their ſignification, yet that hinders not but that they are generally leſs doubtful and uncertain, than thoſe of mixed modes and ſubſtances: becauſe they ſtanding only for one ſimple perception, men, for the moſt part, eaſily and perfectly agree in their ſignification; and there is little room for miſtake and wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once that whiteneſs is the name of that colour he has obſerved in ſnow or milk, will not be apt

apt to miſapply that word, as long as he retains that idea; which when he has quite loſt, he is not apt to miſtake the meaning of it, but perceives he underſtands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of ſimple ideas to be put together, which makes the doubtfulneſs in the names of mixed modes; nor a ſuppoſed, but an unknown real eſſence, with properties depending thereon, the preciſe number whereof is alſo unknown, which makes the difficulty in the names of ſubſtances. But, on the contrary, in ſimple ideas the whole ſignification of the name is known at once, and conſiſts not of parts, whereof more or leſs being put in, the idea may be varied, and ſo the ſignification of name be obſcure or uncertain.

5. Simple ideas have few aſcents in lineâ prædicamentali.

§. 16. Fifthly, This farther may be obſerved concerning ſimple ideas and their names, that they have but few aſcents in lineâ prædicamentali (as they call it) from the loweſt ſpecies to the ſummum genus. The reaſon whereof is, that the loweſt ſpecies being but one ſimple idea, nothing can be left out of it; that ſo the difference being taken away, it may agree with ſome other thing in one idea common to them both; which, having one name, is the genus of the other two: v. g. there is nothing that can be left out of the idea of white and red, to make them agree in one common appearance, and ſo have one general name; as rationality being left out of the complex idea of man, makes it agree with brute, in the more general idea and name of animal: and therefore when to avoid unpleaſant enumerations, men would comprehend both white and red, and ſeveral other ſuch ſimple ideas, under one general name, they have been fain to do it by a word, which denotes only the way they get into the mind. For when white, red, and yellow are all comprehended under the genus or name colour, it ſignifies no more but ſuch ideas as are produced in the mind only by the ſight, and have entrance only through the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term, to comprehend both colours and ſounds, and the like ſimple ideas, they do it by a word that ſignifies all

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ſuch as come into the mind only by one ſenſe: and ſo the general term quality, in its ordinary acceptation, comprehends colours, ſounds, taſtes, ſmells, and tangible qualities, with diſtinction from extenſion, number, motion, pleaſure and pain, which make impreſſions on the mind, and introduce their ideas by more ſenſes than one.

6. Names of ſimple ideas not at all arbitrary.

§. 17. Sixthly, The names of ſimple ideas, ſubſtances, and mixed modes have alſo this difference; that thoſe of mixed modes ſtand for ideas perfectly arbitrary; thoſe of ſubſtances are not perfectly ſo, but refer to a pattern, though with ſome latitude; and thoſe of ſimple ideas are perfectly taken from the exiſtence of things, and are not arbitrary at all. Which, what difference it makes in the ſignifications of their names, we ſhall ſee in the following chapters.

The names of ſimple modes differ little from thoſe of ſimple ideas.

CHAP. V.

Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations.

They ſtand for abſtract ideas, as other general names.

§. 1. THE names of mixed modes being general, they ſtand, as has been ſhown, for ſorts or ſpecies of things, each of which has its peculiar eſſence. The eſſences of theſe ſpecies alſo, as has been ſhowed, are nothing but the abſtract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far the names and eſſences of mixed modes have nothing but what is common to them with other ideas: but if we take a little nearer ſurvey of them, we ſhall find that they have ſomething peculiar, which perhaps may deſerve our attention.

§. 2.

§. 2. The firſt particularity I ſhall obſerve in them, is, that the abſtract ideas, or, if you pleaſe, the eſſences of the ſeveral ſpecies of mixed modes are made by the underſtanding, wherein they differ from thoſe of ſimple ideas: in which ſort the mind has no power to make any one, but only receives ſuch as are preſented to it, by the real exiſtence of things, operating upon it.

1. The ideas they ſtand for are made by the underſtanding.

§. 3. In the next place, theſe eſſences of the ſpecies of mixed modes are not only made by the mind, but made very arbitrarily, made without patterns, or reference to any real exiſtence. Wherein they differ from thoſe of ſubſtances, which carry with them the ſuppoſition of ſome real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But in its complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to follow the exiſtence of things exactly. It unites and retains certain collections, as ſo many diſtinct ſpecific ideas, whilſt others, that as often occur in nature, and are as plainly ſuggeſted by outward things, paſs neglected, without particular names or ſpecifications. Nor does the mind, in theſe of mixed modes, as in the complex idea of ſubſtances, examine them by the real exiſtence of things; or verify them by patterns, containing ſuch peculiar compoſitions in nature. To know whether his idea of adultery or inceſt be right, will a man ſeek it any where amongſt things exiſting? Or is it true, becauſe any one has been witneſs to ſuch an action? No: but it ſuffices here, that men have put together ſuch a collection into one complex idea, that makes the archetype and ſpecific idea, whether ever any ſuch action were committed in rerum natura or no.

2. Made arbitrarily, and without patterns.

§. 4. To underſtand this right, we muſt conſider wherein this making of theſe complex ideas conſiſts; and that is not in the making any new idea, but putting together thoſe which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does theſe three things: firſt, it chooſes a certain number: ſecondly, it gives them connexion, and makes them into one idea: thirdly,

How this is done.

thirdly, it ties them together by a name. If we examine how the mind proceeds in theſe, and what liberty it takes in them, we ſhall eaſily obſerve how theſe eſſences of the ſpecies of mixed modes are the workmanſhip of the mind; and conſequently, that the ſpecies themſelves are of men's making.

Evidently arbitrary, in that the idea is often before the exiſtence.

§. 5. No-body can doubt, but that theſe ideas of mixed modes are made by a voluntary collection of ideas put together in the mind, independent from any original patterns in nature, who will but reflect that this ſort of complex ideas may be made, abſtracted, and have names given them, and ſo a ſpecies be conſtituted, before any one individual of that ſpecies ever exiſted. Who can doubt but the ideas of ſacrilege or adultery might be framed in the minds of men, and have names given them; and ſo theſe ſpecies of mixed modes be conſtituted, before either of them was ever committed; and might be as well diſcourſed of and reaſoned about, and as certain truths diſcovered of them, whilſt yet they had no being but in the underſtanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real exiſtence? Whereby it is plain, how much the ſorts of mixed modes are the creatures of the underſtanding, where they have a being as ſubſervient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as when they really exiſt: and we cannot doubt but lawmakers have often made laws about ſpecies of actions, which were only the creatures of their own underſtandings; beings that had no other exiſtence but in their own minds. And I think no-body can deny, but that the reſurrection was a ſpecies of mixed modes in the mind, before it really exiſted.

Inſtances; murder, inceſt, ſtabbing.

§. 6. To ſee how arbitrarily theſe eſſences of mixed modes are made by the mind, we need but take a view of almoſt any of them. A little looking into them will ſatisfy us, that it is the mind that combines ſeveral ſcattered independent ideas into one complex one, and, by the common name it gives them, makes them the eſſence of a certain ſpecies, without regulating itſelf by

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any connexion they have in nature. For what greater connexion in nature has the idea of a man, than the idea of a ſheep, with killing; that this is made a particular ſpecies of action, ſignified by the word murder, and the other not? Or what union is there in nature between the idea of the relation of a father with killing, than that of a ſon, or neighbour; that thoſe are combined into one complex idea, and thereby made the eſſence of the diſtinct ſpecies parricide, whilſt the other make no diſtinct ſpecies at all? But though they have made killing a man's father, or mother, a diſtinct ſpecies from killing his ſon, or daughter; yet, in ſome other caſes, ſon and daughter are taken in too, as well as father and mother: and they are all equally comprehended in the ſame ſpecies, as in that of inceſt. Thus the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites into complex ideas ſuch as it finds convenient; whilſt others that have altogether as much union in nature, are left looſe, and never combined into one idea, becauſe they have no need of one name. It is evident then, that the mind by its free choice gives a connexion to a certain number of ideas, which in nature have no more union with one another, than others that it leaves out: why elſe is the part of the weapon, the beginning of the wound is made with, taken notice of to make the diſtinct ſpecies called ſtabbing, and the figure and matter of the weapon left out? I do not ſay, this is done without reaſon, as we ſhall ſee more by and by; but this I ſay, that it is done by the free choice of the mind, purſuing its own ends; and that therefore theſe ſpecies of mixed modes are the workmanſhip of the underſtanding: and there is nothing more evident, than that, for the moſt part, in the framing theſe ideas the mind ſearches not its patterns in nature, nor refers the ideas it makes to the real exiſtence of things; but puts ſuch together, as may beſt ſerve its own purpoſes, without tying itſelf to a preciſe imitation of any thing that really exiſts.

§. 7. But though theſe complex ideas, or eſſences of mixed modes, depend on the mind, and are made by it with great liberty; yet they are not made at random, and

But ſtill ſubſervient to the end of language.

jumbled together without any reaſon at all. Though theſe complex ideas be not always copied from nature, yet they are always ſuited to the end for which abſtract ideas are made: and though they be combinations made of ideas that are looſe enough, and have as little union in themſelves, as ſeveral other to which the mind never gives a connexion that combines them into one idea; yet they are always made for the convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language. The uſe of language is by ſhort ſounds to ſignify with eaſe and diſpatch general conceptions: wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained, but alſo a great variety of independent ideas collected into one complex one. In the making therefore of the ſpecies of mixed modes, men have had regard only to ſuch combinations as they had occaſion to mention one to another. Thoſe they have combined into diſtinct complex ideas, and given names to; whilſt others, that in nature have as near an union, are left looſe and unregarded. For to go no farther than human actions themſelves, if they would make diſtinct abſtract ideas of all the varieties might be obſerved in them, the number muſt be infinite, and the memory confounded with the plenty, as well as overcharged to little purpoſe. It ſuffices, that men make and name ſo many complex ideas of theſe mixed modes, as they find they have occaſion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs. If they join to the idea of killing the idea of father, or mother, and ſo make a diſtinct ſpecies from killing a man's ſon or neighbour, it is becauſe of the different heinouſneſs of the crime, and the diſtinct puniſhment is due to the murdering a man's father and mother, different from what ought to be inflicted on the murder of a ſon or neighbour; and therefore they find it neceſſary to mention it by a diſtinct name, which is the end of making that diſtinct combination. But though the ideas of mother and daughter are ſo differently treated, in reference to the idea of killing, that the one is joined with it, to make a diſtinct abſtract idea with a name, and ſo a diſtinct ſpecies, and the other not; yet in reſpect of carnal knowledge,

knowledge, they are both taken in under inceſt: and that ſtill for the ſame convenience of expreſſing under one name, and reckoning of one ſpecies, ſuch unclean mixtures as have a peculiar turpitude beyond others; and this to avoid circumlocutions and tedious deſcriptions.

Whereof the intranſlatable words of divers languages are a proof.

§. 8. A moderate ſkill in different languages will eaſily ſatisfy one of the truth of this, it being ſo obvious to obſerve great ſtore of words in one language, which have not any that anſwer them in another. Which plainly ſhows, that thoſe of one country, by their cuſtoms and manner of life, have found occaſion to make ſeveral complex ideas, and given names to them, which others never collected into ſpecific ideas. This could not have happened, if theſe ſpecies were the ſteady workmanſhip of nature, and not collections made and abſtracted by the mind, in order to naming, and for the convenience of communication. The terms of our law, which are not empty ſounds, will hardly find words that anſwer them in the Spaniſh or Italian, no ſcanty languages; much leſs, I think, could any one tranſlate them into the Caribbee or Weſtoe tongues: and the Verſura of the Romans, or Corban of the Jews, have no words in other languages to anſwer them: the reaſon whereof is plain, from what has been ſaid. Nay, if we look a little more nearly into this matter, and exactly compare different languages, we ſhall find, that though they have words which in tranſlations and dictionaries are ſuppoſed to anſwer one another, yet there is ſcarce one of ten amongſt the names of complex ideas, eſpecially of mixed modes, that ſtands for the ſame preciſe idea, which the word does that in dictionaries it is rendered by. There are no ideas more common, and leſs compounded, than the meaſures of time, extenſion, and weight, and the Latin names, hora, pes, libra, are without difficulty rendered by the Engliſh names, hour, foot, and pound: but yet there is nothing more evident, than that the ideas a Roman annexed to theſe Latin names, were very far different from thoſe which an Engliſhman expreſſes by thoſe Engliſh ones. And if either of

theſe ſhould make uſe of the meaſures that thoſe of the other language deſigned by their names, he would be quite out in his account. Theſe are too ſenſible proofs to be doubted; and we ſhall find this much more ſo, in the names of more abſtract and compounded ideas, ſuch as are the greateſt part of thoſe which make up moral diſcourſes: whoſe names, when men come curiouſly to compare with thoſe they are tranſlated into, in other languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correſpond in the whole extent of their ſignifications.

This ſhows ſpecies to be made for communication.

§. 9. The reaſon why I take ſo particular notice of this, is, that we may not be miſtaken about genera and ſpecies, and their eſſences, as if they were things regularly and conſtantly made by nature, and had a real exiſtence in things; when they appear, upon a more wary ſurvey, to be nothing elſe but an artifice of the underſtanding, for the eaſier ſignifying ſuch collections of ideas, as it ſhould often have occaſion to communicate by one general term; under which divers particulars, as far forth as they agreed to that abſtract idea, might be comprehended. And if the doubtful ſignification of the word ſpecies may make it ſound harſh to ſome, that I ſay the ſpecies of mixed modes are made by the underſtanding; yet, I think, it can by no-body be denied, that it is the mind makes thoſe abſtract complex ideas, to which ſpecific names are given. And if it be true, as it is, that the mind makes the patterns for ſorting and naming of things, I leave it to be conſidered who makes the boundaries of the ſort or ſpecies; ſince with me ſpecies and ſort have no other difference than that of a Latin and Engliſh idiom.

In mixed modes it is the name that ties the combination together, and makes it a ſpecies.

§. 10. The near relation that there is between ſpecies, eſſences, and their general name, at leaſt in mixed modes, will farther appear, when we conſider that it is the name that ſeems to preſerve thoſe eſſences, and give them their laſting duration. For the connexion between the looſe parts of thoſe

thoſe complex ideas being made by the mind, this union, which has no particular foundation in nature, would ceaſe again, were there not ſomething that did, as it were, hold it together, and keep the parts from ſcattering. Though therefore it be the mind that makes the collection, it is the name which is as it were the knot that ties them faſt together. What a vaſt variety of different ideas does the word triumphus hold together, and deliver to us as one ſpecies? Had this name been never made, or quite loſt, we might, no doubt, have had deſcriptions of what paſſed in that ſolemnity: but yet, I think, that which holds thoſe different parts together, in the unity of one complex idea, is that very word annexed to it; without which the ſeveral parts of that would no more be thought to make one thing, than any other ſhow, which having never been made but once, had never been united into one complex idea, under one denomination. How much therefore, in mixed modes, the unity neceſſary to any eſſence depends on the mind, and how much the continuation and fixing of that unity depends on the name in common uſe annexed to it, I leave to be conſidered by thoſe who look upon eſſences and ſpecies as real eſtabliſhed things in nature.

§. 11. Suitable to this, we find, that men ſpeaking of mixed modes, ſeldom imagine or take any other for ſpecies of them, but ſuch as are ſet out by name: becauſe they being of man's making only, in order to naming, no ſuch ſpecies are taken notice of, or ſuppoſed to be, unleſs a name be joined to it, as the ſign of man's having combined into one idea ſeveral looſe ones; and by that name giving a laſting union to the parts, which could otherwiſe ceaſe to have any, as ſoon as the mind laid by that abſtract idea, and ceaſed actually to think on it. But when a name is once annexed to it, wherein the parts of that complex idea have a ſettled and permanent union; then is the eſſence as it were eſtabliſhed, and the ſpecies looked on as compleat. For to what purpoſe ſhould the memory charge itſelf with ſuch compoſitions, unleſs it were by abſtraction to make them general? And to what purpoſe make them

general, unleſs it were that they might have general names, for the convenience of diſcourſe and communication? Thus we ſee, that killing a man with a ſword or a hatchet, are looked on as no diſtinct ſpecies of action: but if the point of the ſword firſt enter the body, it paſſes for a diſtinct ſpecies, where it has a diſtinct name; as in England, in whoſe language it is called ſtabbing: but in another country, where it has not happened to be ſpecified under a peculiar name, it paſſes not for a diſtinct ſpecies. But in the ſpecies of corporeal ſubſtances, though it be the mind that makes the nominal eſſence; yet ſince thoſe ideas which are combined in it are ſuppoſed to have an union in nature, whether the mind joins them or no, therefore thoſe are looked on as diſtinct names, without any operation of the mind, either abſtracting or giving a name to that complex idea.

For the originals of mixed modes, we look no farther than the mind, which alſo ſhows them to be the workmanſhip of the underſtanding.

§. 12. Conformable alſo to what has been ſaid, concerning the eſſences of the ſpecies of mixed modes, that they are the creatures of the underſtanding, rather than the works of nature: conformable, I ſay, to this, we find that their names lead our thoughts to the mind, and no farther. When we ſpeak of juſtice, or gratitude, we frame to ourſelves no imagination of any thing exiſting, which we would conceive; but our thoughts terminate in the abſtract ideas of thoſe virtues, and look not farther: as they do, when we ſpeak of a horſe, or iron, whoſe ſpecific ideas we conſider not, as barely in the mind, but as in things themſelves, which afford the original patterns of thoſe ideas. But in mixed modes, at leaſt the moſt conſiderable parts of them, which are moral beings, we conſider the original patterns as being in the mind; and to thoſe we refer for the diſtinguiſhing of particular beings under names. And hence I think it is, that theſe eſſences of the ſpecies of mixed modes are by a more particular name called notions, as, by a peculiar right, appertaining to the underſtanding.

§. 13.

§. 13. Hence likewiſe we may learn, why the complex ideas of mixed modes are commonly more compounded and decompounded, than thoſe of natural ſubſtances. Becauſe they being the workmanſhip of the underſtanding, purſuing only its own ends, and the conveniency of expreſſing in ſhort thoſe ideas it would make known to another, it does with great liberty unite often into one abſtract idea things that in their nature have no coherence; and ſo, under one term, bundle together a great variety of compounded and decompounded ideas. Thus the name of proceſſion, what a great mixture of independent ideas of perſons, habits, tapers, orders, motions, ſounds, does it contain in that complex one, which the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, to expreſs by that one name? Whereas the complex ideas of the ſorts of ſubſtances are uſually made up of only a ſmall number of ſimple ones; and in the ſpecies of animals, theſe two, viz. ſhape and voice, commonly make the whole nominal eſſence.

Their being made by the underſtanding without patterns ſhows the reaſon why they are ſo compounded.

§. 14. Another thing we may obſerve from what has been ſaid, is, that the names of mixed modes always ſignify (when they have any determined ſignification) the real eſſences of their ſpecies. For theſe abſtract ideas being the workmanſhip of the mind, and not referred to the real exiſtence of things, there is no ſuppoſition of any thing more ſignified by that name, but barely that complex idea the mind itſelf has formed, which is all it would have expreſſed by it: and is that on which all the properties of the ſpecies depend, and from which alone they all flow: and ſo in theſe the real and nominal eſſence is the ſame; which of what concernment it is to the certain knowledge of general truth, we ſhall ſee hereafter.

Names of mixed modes ſtand always for their real eſſences.

§. 15. This alſo may ſhow us the reaſon, why for the moſt part the names of mixed modes are got, before the ideas they ſtand for are perfectly known. Becauſe there being no ſpecies of theſe ordinarily

Why their names are uſually got before their ideas.

taken notice of, but what have names; and thoſe ſpecies, or rather their eſſences, being abſtract complex ideas made arbitrarily by the mind; it is convenient, if not neceſſary, to know the names, before one endeavour to frame theſe complex ideas: unleſs a man will fill his head with a company of abſtract complex ideas, which others having no names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. I confeſs, that in the beginning of languages it was neceſſary to have the idea, before one gave it the name: and ſo it is ſtill, where making a new complex idea, one alſo, by giving it a new name, makes a new word. But this concerns not languages made, which have generally pretty well provided for ideas, which men have frequent occaſion to have and communicate: and in ſuch, I aſk, whether it be not the ordinary method, that children learn the names of mixed modes, before they have their ideas? What one of a thouſand ever frames the abſtract ideas of glory and ambition, before he has heard the names of them? In ſimple ideas and ſubſtances I grant it is otherwiſe; which being ſuch ideas as have a real exiſtence and union in nature, the ideas and names are got one before the other, as it happens.

Reaſon of my being ſo large on this ſubject.

§. 16. What has been ſaid here of mixed modes, is with very little difference applicable alſo to relations; which, ſince every man himſelf may obſerve, I may ſpare myſelf the pains to enlarge on: eſpecially, ſince what I have here ſaid concerning words in this third book, will poſſibly be thought by ſome to be much more than what ſo ſlight a ſubject required. I allow it might be brought into a narrower compaſs: but I was willing to ſtay my reader on an argument that appears to me new, and a little out of the way, (I am ſure it is one I thought not of when I began to write) that by ſearching it to the bottom, and turning it on every ſide, ſome part or other might meet with every one's thoughts, and give occaſion to the moſt averſe or negligent to reflect on a general miſcarriage; which, though of great conſequence, is little taken notice of. When it is conſidered what a pudder is made about eſſences,

eſſences, and how much all ſorts of knowledge, diſcourſe, and converſation are peſtered and diſordered by the careleſs and confuſed uſe and application of words, it will perhaps be thought worth while thoroughly to lay it open. And I ſhall be pardoned if I have dwelt long on an argument which I think therefore needs to be inculcated; becauſe the faults, men are uſually guilty of in this kind, are not only the greateſt hindrances of true knowledge, but are ſo well thought of as to paſs for it. Men would often ſee what a ſmall pittance of reaſon and truth, or poſſibly none at all, is mixed with thoſe huffing opinions they are ſwelled with, if they would but look beyond faſhionable ſounds, and obſerve what ideas are, or are not comprehended under thoſe words with which they are ſo armed at all points, and with which they ſo confidently lay about them. I ſhall imagine I have done ſome ſervice to truth, peace, and learning, if, by any enlargement on this ſubject, I can make men reflect on their own uſe of language; and give them reaſon to ſuſpect, that ſince it is frequent for others, it may alſo be poſſible for them to have ſometimes very good and approved words in their mouths and writings, with very uncertain, little, or no ſignification. And therefore it is not unreaſonable for them to be wary herein themſelves, and not to be unwilling to have them examined by others. With this deſign therefore I ſhall go on with what I have farther to ſay concerning this matter.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Subſtances.

§. 1. THE common names of ſubſtances, as well as other general terms, ſtand for ſorts; which is nothing elſe but the being made ſigns of ſuch complex ideas, wherein ſeveral particular ſubſtances

The common names of ſubſtances ſtand for ſorts.

ſtances do, or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common conception, and ſignified by one name. I ſay, do or might agree: for though there be but one ſun exiſting in the world, yet the idea of it being abſtracted, ſo that more ſubſtances (if there were ſeveral) might each agree in it; it is as much a ſort, as if there were as many ſuns as there are ſtars. They want not their reaſons who think there are, and that each fixed ſtar would anſwer the idea the name ſun ſtands for, to one who was placed in a due diſtance; which, by the way, may ſhow us how much the ſorts, or, if you pleaſe, genera and ſpecies of things (for thoſe Latin terms ſignify to me no more than the Engliſh word ſort) depend on ſuch collections of ideas as men have made, and not on the real nature of things; ſince it is not impoſſible but that, in propriety of ſpeech, that might be a ſun to one, which is a ſtar to another.

The eſſence of each ſort is the abſtract idea.

§. 2. The meaſure and boundary of each ſort, or ſpecies, whereby it is conſtituted that particular ſort, and diſtinguiſhed from others, is that we call its eſſence, which is nothing but that abſtract idea to which the name is annexed: ſo that every thing contained in that idea is eſſential to that ſort. This, though it be all the eſſence of natural ſubſtances that we know, or by which we diſtinguiſh them into ſorts; yet I call it by a peculiar name, the nominal eſſence, to diſtinguiſh it from the real conſtitution of ſubſtances, upon which depends this nominal eſſence, and all the properties of that ſort; which therefore, as has been ſaid, may be called the real eſſence: v. g. the nominal eſſence of gold is that complex idea the word gold ſtands for, let it be, for inſtance, a body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fuſible, and fixed. But the real eſſence is the conſtitution of the inſenſible parts of that body, on which thoſe qualities and all the other properties of gold depend. How far theſe two are different, though they are both called eſſence, is obvious at firſt ſight to diſcover.

§. 3.

The nominal and real eſſence different.

§. 3. For though perhaps voluntary motion, with ſenſe and reaſon, joined to a body of a certain ſhape, be the complex idea to which I, and others, annex the name man, and ſo be the nominal eſſence of the ſpecies ſo called; yet nobody will ſay that complex idea is the real eſſence and ſource of all thoſe operations which are to be found in any individual of that ſort. The foundation of all thoſe qualities, which are the ingredients of our complex idea, is ſomething quite different: and had we ſuch a knowledge of that conſtitution of man, from which his faculties of moving, ſenſation, and reaſoning, and other powers flow, and on which his ſo regular ſhape depends, as it is poſſible angels have, and it is certain his Maker has; we ſhould have a quite other idea of his eſſence than what now is contained in our definition of that ſpecies, be it what it will: and our idea of any individual man would be as far different from what it is now, as is his who knows all the ſprings and wheels and other contrivances within, of the famous clock at Straſburgh, from that which a gazing countryman has for it, who barely ſees the motion of the hand, and hears the clock ſtrike, and obſerves only ſome of the outward appearances.

Nothing eſſential to individuals.

§. 4. That eſſence, in the ordinary uſe of the word, relates to ſorts; and that it is conſidered in particular beings no farther than as they are ranked into ſorts; appears from hence: that take but away the abſtract ideas, by which we ſort individuals, and rank them under common names, and then the thought of any thing eſſential to any of them inſtantly vaniſhes; we have no notion of the one without the other; which plainly ſhows their relation. It is neceſſary for me to be as I am; God and nature has made me ſo: but there is nothing I have is eſſential to me. An accident, or diſeaſe, may very much alter my colour, or ſhape; a fever, or fall, may take away my reaſon or memory, or both, and an apoplexy leave neither ſenſe nor underſtanding, no nor life. Other creatures of my ſhape may be made with more and better, or fewer and worſe

faculties than I have; and others may have reaſon and ſenſe in a ſhape and body very different from mine. None of theſe are eſſential to the one, or the other, or to any individual whatever, till the mind refers it to ſome ſort or ſpecies of things; and then preſently, according to the abſtract idea of that ſort, ſomething is found eſſential. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and he will find that as ſoon as he ſuppoſes or ſpeaks of eſſential, the conſideration of ſome ſpecies, or the complex idea, ſignified by ſome general name, comes into his mind: and it is in reference to that, that this or that quality is ſaid to be eſſential. So that if it be aſked, whether it be eſſential to me or any other particular corporeal being to have reaſon? I ſay no; no more than it is eſſential to this white thing I write on to have words in it. But if that particular being be to be counted of the ſort man, and to have the name man given it, then reaſon is eſſential to it, ſuppoſing reaſon to be a part of the complex idea the name man ſtands for: as it is eſſential to this thing I write on to contain words, if I will give it the name treatiſe, and rank it under that ſpecies. So that eſſential, and not eſſential, relate only to our abſtract ideas, and the names annexed to them: which amounts to no more but this, that whatever particular thing has not in it thoſe qualities, which are contained in the abſtract idea, which any general term ſtands for, cannot be ranked under that ſpecies, nor be called by that name, ſince that abſtract idea is the very eſſence of that ſpecies.

§. 5. Thus if the idea of body, with ſome people, be bare extenſion or ſpace, then ſolidity is not eſſential to body: if others make the idea, to which they give the name body, to be ſolidity and extenſion, then ſolidity is eſſential to body. That therefore, and that alone, is conſidered as eſſential, which makes a part of the complex idea the name of a ſort ſtands for, without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that ſort, nor be intitled to that name. Should there be found a parcel of matter that had all the other qualities that are in iron, but wanted obedience to the loadſtone; and would neither be drawn by it, nor receive direction

from

from it; would any one queſtion, whether it wanted any thing eſſential? It would be abſurd to aſk, Whether a thing really exiſting wanted any thing eſſential to it. Or could it be demanded, Whether this made an eſſential or ſpecific difference or no; ſince we have no other meaſure of eſſential or ſpecific, but our abſtract ideas? And to talk of ſpecific differences in nature, without reference to general ideas and names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would aſk any one, What is ſufficient to make an eſſential difference in nature, between any two particular beings, without any regard had to ſome abſtract idea, which is looked upon as the eſſence and ſtandard of a ſpecies? All ſuch patterns and ſtandards being quite laid aſide, particular beings, conſidered barely in themſelves, will be found to have all their qualities equally eſſential; and every thing, in each individual, will be eſſential to it, or, which is more, nothing at all. For though it may be reaſonable to aſk, Whether obeying the magnet be eſſential to iron? yet, I think, it is very improper and inſignificant to aſk, Whether it be eſſential to the particular parcel of matter I cut my pen with, without conſidering it under the name iron, or as being of a certain ſpecies? And if, as has been ſaid, our abſtract ideas, which have names annexed to them, are the boundaries of ſpecies, nothing can be eſſential but what is contained in thoſe ideas.

§. 6. It is true, I have often mentioned a real eſſence, diſtinct in ſubſtances from thoſe abſtract ideas of them, which I call their nominal eſſence. By this real eſſence I mean the real conſtitution of any thing, which is the foundation of all thoſe properties that are combined in, and are conſtantly found to co-exiſt with the nominal eſſence; that particular conſtitution which every thing has within itſelf, without any relation to any thing without it. But eſſence, even in this ſenſe, relates to a ſort, and ſuppoſes a ſpecies; for being that real conſtitution, on which the properties depend, it neceſſarily ſuppoſes a ſort of things, properties belonging only to ſpecies, and not to individuals; v. g. ſuppoſing the nominal eſſence of gold to be a body of ſuch a peculiar

a peculiar colour and weight, with malleability and fuſibility, the real eſſence is that conſtitution of the parts of matter, on which theſe qualities and their union depend; and is alſo the foundation of its ſolubility in aqua regia and other properties accompanying that complex idea. Here are eſſences and properties, but all upon ſuppoſition of a ſort, or general abſtract idea, which is conſidered as immutable: but there is no individual parcel of matter, to which any of theſe qualities are ſo annexed, as to be eſſential to it, or inſeparable from it. That which is eſſential belongs to it as a condition, whereby it is of this or that ſort: but take away the conſideration of its being ranked under the name of ſome abſtract idea, and then there is nothing neceſſary to it, nothing inſeparable from it. Indeed, as to the real eſſences of ſubſtances, we only ſuppoſe their being, without preciſely knowing what they are: but that which annexes them ſtill to the ſpecies, is the nominal eſſence, of which they are the ſuppoſed foundation and cauſe.

The nominal eſſence bounds the ſpecies.

§. 7. The next thing to be conſidered, is, by which of thoſe eſſences it is that ſubſtances are determined into ſorts, or ſpecies; and that, it is evident, is by the nominal eſſence. For it is that alone that the name, which is the mark of the ſort, ſignifies. It is impoſſible therefore that any thing ſhould determine the ſorts of things, which we rank under general names, but that idea which that name is deſigned as a mark for; which is that, as has been ſhown, which we call nominal eſſence. Why do we ſay, this is a horſe, and that a mule; this is an animal, that an herb? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that ſort, but becauſe it has that nominal eſſence, or, which is all one, agrees to that abſtract idea that name is annexed to? And I deſire any one but to reflect on his own thoughts, when he hears or ſpeaks any of thoſe, or other names of ſubſtances, to know what ſort of eſſences they ſtand for.

§. 8. And that the ſpecies of things to us are nothing but the ranking them under diſtinct names, according

cording to the complex ideas in us, and not according to preciſe, diſtinct, real eſſences in them; is plain from hence, that we find many of the individuals that are ranked into one ſort, called by one common name, and ſo received as being of one ſpecies, have yet qualities depending on their real conſtitutions, as far different one from another, as from others, from which they are accounted to differ ſpecifically. This, as it is eaſy to be obſerved by all who have to do with natural bodies; ſo chemiſts eſpecially are often, by ſad experience, convinced of it, when they, ſometimes in vain, ſeek for the ſame qualities in one parcel of ſulphur, antimony or vitriol, which they have found in others. For though they are bodies of the ſame ſpecies, having the ſame nominal eſſence, under the ſame name; yet do they often, upon ſevere ways of examination, betray qualities ſo different one from another, as to fruſtrate the expectation and labour of very wary chemiſts. But if things were diſtinguiſhed into ſpecies, according to their real eſſences, it would be as impoſſible to find different properties in any two individual ſubſtances of the ſame ſpecies, as it is to find different properties in two circles, or two equilateral triangles. That is properly the eſſence to us, which determines every particular to this or that claſſis; or, which is the ſame thing, to this or that general name: and what can that be elſe, but that abſtract idea, to which that name is annexed? and ſo has, in truth, a reference, not ſo much to the being of particular things, as to their general denominations.

Not the real eſſence, which we know not.

§. 9. Nor indeed can we rank and ſort things, and conſequently (which is the end of ſorting) denominate them by their real eſſences, becauſe we know them not. Our faculties carry us no farther towards the knowledge and diſtinction of ſubſtances, than a collection of thoſe ſenſible ideas which we obſerve in them; which, however made with the greateſt diligence and exactneſs we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true internal conſtitution, from which thoſe qualities flow, than, as I ſaid, a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance

trivance of that famous clock at Straſburgh, whereof he only ſees the outward figure and motions. There is not ſo contemptible a plant or animal, that does not confound the moſt enlarged underſtanding. Though the familiar uſe of things about us take off our wonder; yet it cures not our ignorance. When we come to examine the ſtones we tread on, or the iron we daily handle, we preſently find we know not their make, and can give no reaſon of the different qualities we find in them. It is evident the internal conſtitution, whereon their properties depend, is unknown to us. For to go no farther than the groſſeſt and moſt obvious we can imagine amongſt them, what is that texture of parts, that real eſſence, that makes lead and antimony fuſible; wood and ſtones not? What makes lead and iron malleable, antimony and ſtones not? And yet how infinitely theſe come ſhort of the fine contrivances, and unconceivable real eſſences of plants or animals, every one knows. The workmanſhip of the all-wiſe and powerful God, in the great fabric of the univerſe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the capacity and comprehenſion of the moſt inquiſitive and intelligent man, than the beſt contrivance of the moſt ingenious man doth the conceptions of the moſt ignorant of rational creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range things into ſorts, and diſpoſe them into certain claſſes, under names, by their real eſſences, that are ſo far from our diſcovery or comprehenſion. A blind man may as ſoon ſort things by their colours, and he that has loſt his ſmell, as well diſtinguiſh a lily and a roſe by their odours, as by thoſe internal conſtitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can diſtinguiſh ſheep and goats by their real eſſences, that are unknown to him, may be pleaſed to try his ſkill in thoſe ſpecies, called caſſiowary and querechinchio; and by their internal real eſſences determine the boundaries of thoſe ſpecies, without knowing the complex idea of ſenſible qualities, that each of thoſe names ſtand for, in the countries where thoſe animals are to be found.

§. 10. Thoſe therefore who have been taught, that the ſeveral ſpecies of ſubſtances had their diſtinct internal ſubſtantial forms; and that it was thoſe forms which made the diſtinction of ſubſtances into their true ſpecies and genera; were led yet farther out of the way, by having their minds ſet upon fruitleſs inquiries after ſubſtantial forms, wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have ſcarce ſo much as any obſcure or confuſed conception in general.

Not ſubſtantial forms, which we know leſs.

§. 11. That our ranking and diſtinguiſhing natural ſubſtances into ſpecies, conſiſts in the nominal eſſences the mind makes, and not in the real eſſences to be found in the things themſelves, is farther evident from our ideas of ſpirits. For the mind getting, only by reflecting on its own operations, thoſe ſimple ideas which it attributes to ſpirits, it hath, or can have no other notion of ſpirit, but by attributing all thoſe operations, it finds in itſelf, to a ſort of beings, without conſideration of matter. And even the moſt advanced notion we have of God is but attributing the ſame ſimple ideas which we have got from reflection on what we find in ourſelves, and which we conceive to have more perfection in them, than would be in their abſence; attributing, I ſay, thoſe ſimple ideas to him in an unlimited degree. Thus having got, from reflecting on ourſelves, the idea of exiſtence, knowledge, power, and pleaſure, each of which we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have of each, the better: joining all theſe together, with infinity to each of them, we have the complex idea of an eternal, omniſcient, omnipotent, infinitely wiſe and happy Being. And though we are told, that there are different ſpecies of angels; yet we know not how to frame diſtinct ſpecific ideas of them: not out of any conceit that the exiſtence of more ſpecies than one of ſpirits is impoſſible, but becauſe having no more ſimple ideas (nor being able to frame more) applicable to ſuch beings, but only thoſe few taken from ourſelves, and from the actions of our own minds in

That the nominal eſſence is that whereby we diſtinguiſh ſpecies, farther evident from ſpirits.

thinking, and being delighted, and moving ſeveral parts of our bodies, we can no otherwiſe diſtinguiſh in our conceptions the ſeveral ſpecies of ſpirits one from another, but by attributing thoſe operations and powers, we find in ourſelves, to them in a higher or lower degree; and ſo have no very diſtinct ſpecific ideas of ſpirits, except only of God, to whom we attribute both duration, and all thoſe other ideas with infinity; to the other ſpirits, with limitation. Nor as I humbly conceive do we, between God and them in our ideas, put any difference by any number of ſimple ideas, which we have of one, and not of the other, but only that of infinity. All the particular ideas of exiſtence, knowledge, will, power, and motion, &c. being ideas derived from the operations of our minds, we attribute all of them to all ſorts of ſpirits, with the difference only of degrees, to the utmoſt we can imagine, even infinity, when we would frame, as well as we can, an idea of the firſt being; who yet, it is certain, is infinitely more remote, in the real excellency of his nature, from the higheſt and perfecteſt of all created beings, than the greateſt man, nay pureſt ſeraph, is from the moſt contemptible part of matter; and conſequently muſt infinitely exceed what our narrow underſtandings can conceive of him.

Whereof there are probably numberleſs ſpecies.

§. 12. It is not impoſſible to conceive, nor repugnant to reaſon, that there may be many ſpecies of ſpirits, as much ſeparated and diverſified one from another by diſtinct properties whereof we have no ideas, as the ſpecies of ſenſible things are diſtinguiſhed one from another by qualities which we know, and obſerve in them. That there ſhould be more ſpecies of intelligent creatures above us, than there are of ſenſible and material below us, is probable to me from hence; that in all the viſible corporeal world, we ſee no chaſms or gaps. All quite down from us the deſcent is by eaſy ſteps, and a continued ſeries of things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are fiſhes that have wings, and are not ſtrangers to the airy region; and there are ſome birds that are inhabi-

tants of the water, whoſe blood is cold as fiſhes; and their fleſh ſo like in taſte, that the ſcrupulous are allowed them on fiſh-days. There are animals ſo near of kin both to birds and beaſts, that they are in the middle between both: amphibious animals link the terreſtrial and aquatic together; ſeals live at land and ſea, and porpoiſes have the warm blood and entrails of a hog, not to mention what is confidently reported of mermaids or ſea-men. There are ſome brutes, that ſeem to have as much knowledge and reaſon, as ſome that are called men; and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are ſo nearly joined, that if you will take the loweſt of one, and the higheſt of the other, there will ſcarce be perceived any great difference between them; and ſo on, till we come to the loweſt and the moſt inorganical parts of matter, we ſhall find every-where, that the ſeveral ſpecies are linked together, and differ but in almoſt inſenſible degrees. And when we conſider the infinite power and wiſdom of the Maker, we have reaſon to think, that it is ſuitable to the magnificent harmony of the univerſe, and the great deſign and infinite goodneſs of the architect, that the ſpecies of creatures ſhould alſo, by gentle degrees, aſcend upward from us toward his infinite perfection, as we ſee they gradually deſcend from us downwards: which if it be probable, we have reaſon then to be perſuaded, that there are far more ſpecies of creatures above us, than there are beneath: we being, in degrees of perfection, much more remote from the infinite being of God, than we are from the loweſt ſtate of being, and that which approaches neareſt to nothing. And yet of all thoſe diſtinct ſpecies, for the reaſons aboveſaid, we have no clear diſtinct ideas.

The nominal eſſence that of the ſpecies, proved from water and ice.

§. 13. But to return to the ſpecies of corporeal ſubſtances. If I ſhould aſk any one, whether ice and water were two diſtinct ſpecies of things, I doubt not but I ſhould be anſwered in the affirmative: and it cannot be denied, but he that ſays they are two diſtinct ſpecies is in the right. But if an Engliſhman, bred in Jamaica, who perhaps had never

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

in the win-
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diſtinct ſpecies are nothing but
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whereon depend thoſe ſenſible
we obſerve in it; but the ranking
which is nothing but ſorting
them under general titles, is done by us according to the
ideas we have of them: which though ſufficient
to diſtinguish them by names, ſo that we may be able
to diſtinguish of them, when we have them not preſent
before us; yet if we ſuppoſe it to be done by their real
internal conſtitutions, and that things exiſting are diſ-
tinguished by nature into ſpecies, by real eſſences, ac-
cording as we diſtinguish them into ſpecies by names,
we ſhall be liable to great miſtakes.

§ 14. To diſtinguiſh ſubſtantial beings into ſpecies, according to the uſual ſuppoſition, that there are certain preciſe eſſences or forms of things, whereby all the individuals exiſting are by nature diſtinguiſhed into ſpecies, theſe things are neceſſary.

Firſt, To be aſſured that nature, in the production of things, always deſigns them to partake of certain regulated eſtabliſhed eſſences, which are to be the pattern and meaſure of all things that are to be produced. This, in that ſtrict ſenſe it is uſually propoſed, would need ſome large explanation before it can fully be aſſented to.

Secondly, It would be neceſſary to know whether nature always aims at that eſſence it deſigns in the production of things. The irregular and monſtrous births,

: in divers ſorts of animals have been ob-
ll always give us reaſon to doubt of one or
eſe.

Thirdly, It ought to be determined whether
call monſters be really a diſtinct ſpecies, ac-
to the ſcholaſtic notion of the word ſpecies;
is certain, that every thing that exiſts has its
ular conſtitution: and yet we find that ſome of
monſtrous productions have few or none of thoſe
ities, which are ſuppoſed to reſult from, and ac-
mpany the eſſence of that ſpecies, from whence they
rive their originals, and to which, by their deſcent,
ey ſeem to belong.

Our nominal eſſences of ſubſtances not perfect collections of properties.

§. 18. Fourthly, The real eſſences of thoſe things, which we diſtinguiſh into ſpecies, and as ſo diſtinguiſhed we name, ought to be known; i. e. we ought to have ideas of them. But ſince we are ignorant in theſe four points, the ſuppoſed real eſſences of things ſtand us not in ſtead for the diſtinguiſhing ſubſtances into ſpecies.

§. 19. Fifthly, The only imaginable help in this caſe would be, that having framed perfect complex ideas of the properties of things, flowing from their different real eſſences, we ſhould thereby diſtinguiſh them into ſpecies. But neither can this be done; for being ignorant of the real eſſence itſelf, it is impoſſible to know all thoſe properties that flow from it, and are ſo annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we may certainly conclude, that that eſſence is not there, and ſo the thing is not of that ſpecies. We can never know what is the preciſe number of properties depending on the real eſſence of gold, any one of which failing, the real eſſence of gold, and conſequently gold, would not be there, unleſs we knew the real eſſence of gold itſelf, and by that determined that ſpecies. By the word gold here, I muſt be underſtood to deſign a particular piece of matter; v. g. the laſt guinea that was coined. For if it ſhould ſtand here in its ordinary ſignification for that complex idea, which I or any one elſe calls gold; i. e. for the nominal eſſence of gold, it

ſeen nor heard of ice, coming into England in the winter, find the water, he put in his baſon at night, in a great part frozen in the morning, and not knowing any peculiar name it had, ſhould call it hardened water; I aſk, whether this would be a new ſpecies to him different from water? And, I think, it would be anſwered here, it would not be to him a new ſpecies, no more than congealed jelly, when it is cold, is a diſtinct ſpecies from the ſame jelly fluid and warm; or than liquid gold, in the furnace, is a diſtinct ſpecies from hard gold in the hands of a workman. And if this be ſo, it is plain, that our diſtinct ſpecies are nothing but diſtinct complex ideas, with diſtinct names annexed to them. It is true, every ſubſtance that exiſts has its peculiar conſtitution, whereon depend thoſe ſenſible qualities and powers we obſerve in it; but the ranking of things into ſpecies, which is nothing but ſorting them under ſeveral titles, is done by us according to the ideas that we have of them: which though ſufficient to diſtinguiſh them by names, ſo that we may be able to diſcourſe of them, when we have them not preſent before us; yet if we ſuppoſe it to be done by their real internal conſtitutions, and that things exiſting are diſtinguiſhed by nature into ſpecies, by real eſſences, according as we diſtinguiſh them into ſpecies by names, we ſhall be liable to great miſtakes.

Difficulties againſt a certain number of real eſſences.

§. 14. To diſtinguiſh ſubſtantial beings into ſpecies, according to the uſual ſuppoſition, that there are certain preciſe eſſences or forms of things, whereby all the individuals exiſting are by nature diſtinguiſhed into ſpecies, theſe things are neceſſary.

§. 15. Firſt, To be aſſured that nature, in the production of things, always deſigns them to partake of certain regulated eſtabliſhed eſſences, which are to be the models of all things to be produced. This, in that crude ſenſe it is uſually propoſed, would need ſome better explication before it can fully be aſſented to.

§. 16. Secondly, It would be neceſſary to know whether nature always attains that eſſence it deſigns in the production of things. The irregular and monſtrous births,

births, that in divers ſorts of animals have been obſerved, will always give us reaſon to doubt of one or both of theſe.

§. 17. Thirdly, It ought to be determined whether thoſe we call monſters be really a diſtinct ſpecies, according to the ſcholaſtic notion of the word ſpecies; ſince it is certain, that every thing that exiſts has its particular conſtitution: and yet we find that ſome of theſe monſtrous productions have few or none of thoſe qualities, which are ſuppoſed to reſult from, and accompany the eſſence of that ſpecies, from whence they derive their originals, and to which, by their deſcent, they ſeem to belong.

Our nominal eſſences of ſubſtances not perfect collections of properties.

§. 18. Fourthly, The real eſſences of thoſe things, which we diſtinguiſh into ſpecies, and as ſo diſtinguiſhed we name, ought to be known; i. e. we ought to have ideas of them. But ſince we are ignorant in theſe four points, the ſuppoſed real eſſences of things ſtand us not in ſtead for the diſtinguiſhing ſubſtances into ſpecies.

§. 19. Fifthly, The only imaginable help in this caſe would be, that having framed perfect complex ideas of the properties of things, flowing from their different real eſſences, we ſhould thereby diſtinguiſh them into ſpecies. But neither can this be done; for being ignorant of the real eſſence itſelf, it is impoſſible to know all thoſe properties that flow from it, and are ſo annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we may certainly conclude, that that eſſence is not there, and ſo the thing is not of that ſpecies. We can never know what is the preciſe number of properties depending on the real eſſence of gold, any one of which failing, the real eſſence of gold, and conſequently gold, would not be there, unleſs we knew the real eſſence of gold itſelf, and by that determined that ſpecies. By the word gold here, I muſt be underſtood to deſign a particular piece of matter; v. g. the laſt guinea that was coined. For if it ſhould ſtand here in its ordinary ſignification for that complex idea, which I or any one elſe calls gold; i. e. for the nominal eſſence of gold, it

would be jargon: ſo hard is it to ſhow the various meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing elſe but words to do it by.

§. 20. By all which it is clear, that our diſtinguiſhing ſubſtances into ſpecies by names, is not at all founded on their real eſſences; nor can we pretend to range and determine them exactly into ſpecies, according to internal eſſential differences.

But ſuch a collection as our name ſtands for.

§. 21. But ſince, as has been remarked, we have need of general words, though we know not the real eſſences of things; all we can do is to collect ſuch a number of ſimple ideas, as by examination we find to be united together in things exiſting, and thereof to make one complex idea. Which though it be not the real eſſence of any ſubſtance that exiſts, is yet the ſpecific eſſence, to which our name belongs, and is convertible with it; by which we may at leaſt try the truth of theſe nominal eſſences. For example, there be that ſay, that the eſſence of body is extenſion: if it be ſo, we can never miſtake in putting the eſſence of any thing for the thing itſelf. Let us then in diſcourſe put extenſion for body; and when we would ſay that body moves, let us ſay that extenſion moves, and ſee how ill it will look. He that ſhould ſay that one extenſion by impulſe moves another extenſion, would, by the bare expreſſion, ſufficiently ſhow the abſurdity of ſuch a notion. The eſſence of any thing, in reſpect of us, is the whole complex idea, comprehended and marked by that name; and in ſubſtances, beſides the ſeveral diſtinct ſimple ideas that make them up, the confuſed one of ſubſtance, or of an unknown ſupport and cauſe of their union, is always a part: and therefore the eſſence of body is not bare extenſion, but an extended ſolid thing: and ſo to ſay an extended ſolid thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible as to ſay, body moves or impels. Likewiſe to ſay, that a rational animal is capable of converſation, is all one as to ſay a man. But no one will ſay, that rationality is capable of converſation, becauſe it makes not the whole eſſence to which we give the name man.

§. 22.

§. 22. There are creatures in the world that have ſhapes like ours, but are hairy, and want language and reaſon. There are naturals amongſt us that have perfectly our ſhape, but want reaſon, and ſome of them language too. There are creatures, as it is ſaid ("ſit fides penes authorem," but there appears no contradiction that there ſhould be ſuch) that, with language and reaſon, and a ſhape in other things agreeing with ours, have hairy tails; others where the males have no beards, and others where the females have. If it be aſked, whether theſe be all men or no, all of human ſpecies? It is plain, the queſtion refers only to the nominal eſſence: for thoſe of them to whom the definition of the word man, or the complex idea ſignified by that name, agrees, are men, and the other not. But if the inquiry be made concerning the ſuppoſed real eſſence, and whether the internal conſtitution and frame of theſe ſeveral creatures be ſpecifically different, it is wholly impoſſible for us to anſwer, no part of that going into our ſpecific idea; only we have reaſon to think, that where the faculties or outward frame ſo much differs, the internal conſtitution is not exactly the ſame. But what difference in the internal real conſtitution makes a ſpecific difference, it is in vain to inquire; whilſt our meaſures of ſpecies be, as they are, only our abſtract ideas, which we know; and not that internal conſtitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of hair only on the ſkin, be a mark of a different internal ſpecific conſtitution between a changeling and a drill, when they agree in ſhape, and want of reaſon and ſpeech? And ſhall not the want of reaſon and ſpeech be a ſign to us of different real conſtitutions and ſpecies between a changeling and a reaſonable man? And ſo of the reſt, if we pretend that diſtinction of ſpecies or ſorts is fixedly eſtabliſhed by the real frame and ſecret conſtitutions of things.

Our abſtract ideas are to us the meaſures of ſpecies; inſtance in that of man.

§. 23. Nor let any one ſay, that the power of propagation in animals by the mixture of male and female, and in plants by ſeeds,

Species not diſtinguiſhed by generation.

keeps the ſuppoſed real ſpecies diſtinct and entire. For granting this to be true, it would help us in the diſtinction of the ſpecies of things no farther than the tribes of animals and vegetables. What muſt we do for the reſt? But in thoſe too it is not ſufficient: for if hiſtory lye not, women have conceived by drills; and what real ſpecies, by that meaſure, ſuch a production will be in nature, will be a new queſtion: and we have reaſon to think this is not impoſſible, ſince mules and jumarts, the one from the mixture of an aſs and a mare, the other from the mixture of a bull and a mare, are ſo frequent in the world. I once ſaw a creature that was the iſſue of a cat and a rat, and had the plain marks of both about it; wherein nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither ſort alone, but to have jumbled them together. To which, he that ſhall add the monſtrous productions that are ſo frequently to be met with in nature, will find it hard, even in the race of animals, to determine by the pedigree of what ſpecies every animal's iſſue is; and be at a loſs about the real eſſence, which he thinks certainly conveyed by generation, and has alone a right to the ſpecific name. But farther, if the ſpecies of animals and plants are to be diſtinguiſhed only by propagation, muſt I go to the Indies to ſee the ſire and dam of the one, and the plant from which the ſeed was gathered that produced the other, to know whether this be a tyger or that rea?

Not by ſubſtantial forms.

§. 24. Upon the whole matter, it is evident, that it is their own collections of ſenſible qualities, that men make the eſſences of their ſeveral ſorts of ſubſtances; and that their real internal ſtructures are not conſidered by the greateſt part of men, in the ſorting them. Much leſs were any ſubſtantial forms ever thought on by any, but thoſe who have in this one part of the world learned the language of the ſchools: and yet thoſe ignorant men, who pretend not any inſight into the real eſſences, nor trouble themſelves about ſubſtantial forms, but are content with knowing things one from another by their ſenſible qualities, are

are often better acquainted with their differences, can more nicely diſtinguiſh them from their uſes, and better know what they expect from each, than thoſe learned quick-ſighted men, who look ſo deep into them, and talk ſo confidently of ſomething more hidden and eſſential.

The ſpecific eſſences are made by the mind.

§. 25. But ſuppoſing that the real eſſences of ſubſtances were diſcoverable by thoſe that would ſeverely apply themſelves to that inquiry, yet we could not reaſonably think, that the ranking of things under general names was regulated by thoſe internal real conſtitutions, or any thing elſe but their obvious appearances: ſince languages, in all countries, have been eſtabliſhed long before ſciences. So that they have not been philoſophers, or logicians, or ſuch who have troubled themſelves about forms and eſſences, that have made the general names that are in uſe amongſt the ſeveral nations of men: but thoſe more or leſs comprehenſive terms have for the moſt part, in all languages, received their birth and ſignification from ignorant and illiterate people, who ſorted and denominated things by thoſe ſenſible qualities they found in them; thereby to ſignify them, when abſent, to others, whether they had an occaſion to mention a ſort or a particular thing.

Therefore very various and uncertain.

§. 26. Since then it is evident, that we ſort and name ſubſtances by their nominal, and not by their real eſſences; the next thing to be conſidered is, how and by whom theſe eſſences come to be made. As to the latter, it is evident they are made by the mind, and not by nature: for were they nature's workmanſhip, they could not be ſo various and different in ſeveral men, as experience tells us they are. For if we will examine it, we ſhall not find the nominal eſſence of any one ſpecies of ſubſtances in all men the ſame; no not of that, which of all others we are the moſt intimately acquainted with. It could not poſſibly be, that the abſtract idea to which the name man is given, ſhould be different in ſeveral men, if it were of nature's making;

and

and that to one it ſhould be "animal rationale," and to another, "animal implume bipes latis unguibus." He that annexes the name man to a complex idea made up of ſenſe and ſpontaneous motion, joined to a body of ſuch a ſhape, has thereby one eſſence of the ſpecies man; and he that, upon farther examination, adds rationality, has another eſſence of the ſpecies he calls man: by which means, the ſame individual will be a true man to the one, which is not ſo to the other. I think, there is ſcarce any one will allow this upright figure, ſo well known, to be the eſſential difference of the ſpecies man; and yet how far men determine of the ſorts of animals rather by their ſhape than deſcent, is very viſible: ſince it has been more than once debated, whether ſeveral human fœtuſes ſhould be preſerved or received to baptiſm or no, only becauſe of the difference of their outward configuration from the ordinary make of children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of reaſon, as infants caſt in another mould: ſome whereof, though of an approved ſhape, are never capable of as much appearance of reaſon all their lives, as is to be found in an ape, or an elephant, and never give any ſigns of being acted by a rational ſoul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, which only was found wanting, and not the faculty of reaſon, which no-body could know would be wanting in its due ſeaſon, was made eſſential to the human ſpecies. The learned divine and lawyer muſt, on ſuch occaſions, renounce his ſacred definition of "animal rationale," and ſubſtitute ſome other eſſence of the human ſpecies. Monſieur Menage furniſhes us with an example worth the taking notice of on this occaſion: "When the "abbot of St. Martin (ſays he) was born, he had ſo "little of the figure of a man, that it beſpake him "rather a monſter. It was for ſome time under deli-"beration, whether he ſhould be baptized or no. "However, he was baptized and declared a man pro-"viſionally [till time ſhould ſhow what he would "prove.] Nature had moulded him ſo untowardly, "that he was called all his life the Abbot Malotru, "i. e. ill-ſhaped. He was of Caen. Menagiana, $\frac{2}{3}\frac{7}{3}\frac{8}{0}$."

This

This child, we ſee, was very near being excluded out of the ſpecies of man, barely by his ſhape. He eſcaped very narrowly as he was, and it is certain a figure a little more oddly turned had caſt him, and he had been executed as a thing not to be allowed to paſs for a man. And yet there can be no reaſon given, why if the lineaments of his face had been a little altered, a rational ſoul could not have been lodged in him; why a viſage ſomewhat longer, or a noſe flatter, or a wider mouth, could not have conſiſted, as well as the reſt of his ill figure, with ſuch a ſoul, ſuch parts, as made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a dignitary in the church.

§. 27. Wherein then, would I gladly know, conſiſt the preciſe and unmoveable boundaries of that ſpecies? It is plain, if we examine, there is no ſuch thing made by nature, and eſtabliſhed by her amongſt men. The real eſſence of that, or any other ſort of ſubſtances, it is evident we know not; and therefore are ſo undetermined in our nominal eſſences, which we make ourſelves, that if ſeveral men were to be aſked concerning ſome oddly-ſhaped fœtus, as ſoon as born, whether it were a man or no, it is paſt doubt, one ſhould meet with different anſwers. Which could not happen, if the nominal eſſences, whereby we limit and diſtinguiſh the ſpecies of ſubſtances, were not made by man, with ſome liberty; but were exactly copied from preciſe boundaries ſet by nature, whereby it diſtinguiſhed all ſubſtances into certain ſpecies. Who would undertake to reſolve, what ſpecies that monſter was of, which is mentioned by Licetus, lib. i. c. 3. with a man's head and hog's body? Or thoſe other, which to the bodies of men had the heads of beaſts, as dogs, horſes, &c. If any of theſe creatures had lived, and could have ſpoke, it would have increaſed the difficulty. Had the upper part, to the middle, been of human ſhape, and all below ſwine; had it been murder to deſtroy it? Or muſt the biſhop have been conſulted, whether it were man enough to be admitted to the font or no? as, I have been told, it happened in France ſome years ſince, in ſomewhat a like caſe. So uncertain are the

boundarie

boundaries of ſpecies of animals to us, who have no other meaſures than the complex ideas of our own collecting: and ſo far are we from certainly knowing what a man is; though, perhaps it will be judged great ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet, I think, I may ſay, that the certain boundaries of that ſpecies are ſo far from being determined, and the preciſe number of ſimple ideas, which make the nominal eſſence, ſo far from being ſettled and perfectly known, that very material doubts may ſtill ariſe about it. And I imagine, none of the definitions of the word man, which we yet have, nor deſcriptions of that ſort of animal, are ſo perfect and exact, as to ſatisfy a conſiderate inquiſitive perſon; much leſs to obtain a general conſent, and to be that which men would every-where ſtick by, in the deciſion of caſes, and determining of life and death, baptiſm or no baptiſm, in productions that might happen.

But not ſo arbitrary as mixed modes.

§. 28. But though theſe nominal eſſences of ſubſtances are made by the mind, they are not yet made ſo arbitrarily as thoſe of mixed modes. To the making of any nominal eſſence, it is neceſſary, Firſt, that the ideas whereof it conſiſts have ſuch an union as to make but one idea, how compounded ſoever. Secondly, that the particular idea ſo united be exactly the ſame, neither more nor leſs. For if two abſtract complex ideas differ either in number or ſorts of their component parts, they make two different, and not one and the ſame eſſence. In the firſt of theſe, the mind, in making its complex ideas of ſubſtances, only follows nature; and puts none together, which are not ſuppoſed to have an union in nature. No-body joins the voice of a ſheep, with the ſhape of a horſe; nor the colour of lead, with the weight and fixedneſs of gold; to be the complex ideas of any real ſubſtances: unleſs he has a mind to fill his head with chimeras, and his diſcourſe with unintelligible words. Men obſerving certain qualities always joined and exiſting together, therein copied nature; and of ideas ſo united, made their complex ones of ſubſtances. For though men may make what complex

ideas

ideas they pleaſe, and give what names to them they will; yet if they will be underſtood, when they ſpeak of things really exiſting, they muſt in ſome degree conform their ideas to the things they would ſpeak of: or elſe men's language will be like that of Babel; and every man's words being intelligible only to himſelf, would no longer ſerve to converſation, and the ordinary affairs of life, if the ideas they ſtand for be not ſome way anſwering the common appearances and agreement of ſubſtances, as they really exiſt.

Though very imperfect.

§. 29. Secondly, though the mind of man, in making its complex ideas of ſubſtances, never puts any together that do not really or are not ſuppoſed to co-exiſt; and ſo it truly borrows that union from nature: yet the number it combines depends upon the various care, induſtry, or fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themſelves with ſome few ſenſible obvious qualities; and often, if not always, leave out others as material, and as firmly united, as thoſe that they take. Of ſenſible ſubſtances there are two ſorts; one of organized bodies, which are propagated by ſeed; and in theſe, the ſhape is that, which to us is the leading quality and moſt characteriſtical part that determines the ſpecies. And therefore in vegetables and animals, an extended ſolid ſubſtance of ſuch a certain figure uſually ſerves the turn. For however ſome men ſeem to prize their definition of "animal rationale," yet ſhould there a creature be found, that had language and reaſon, but partook not of the uſual ſhape of a man, I believe it would hardly paſs for a man, how much ſoever it were "animal rationale." And if Balaam's aſs had, all his life, diſcourſed as rationally as he did once with his maſter, I doubt yet whether any one would have thought him worthy the name man, or allowed him to be of the ſame ſpecies with himſelf. As in vegetables and animals it is the ſhape, ſo in moſt other bodies, not propagated by ſeed, it is the colour we moſt fix on, and are moſt led by. Thus where we find the colour of gold, we are apt to imagine all the other qualities, com-

comprehended in our complex idea, to be there alſo: and we commonly take theſe two obvious qualities, viz. ſhape and colour, for ſo preſumptive ideas of ſeveral ſpecies, that in a good picture we readily ſay this is a lion, and that a roſe; this is a gold, and that a ſilver goblet, only by the different figures and colours repreſented to the eye by the pencil.

Which yet ſerve for common converſe.

§. 30. But though this ſerves well enough for groſs and confuſed conceptions, and inaccurate ways of talking and thinking; yet men are far enough from having agreed on the preciſe number of ſimple ideas, or qualities, belonging to any ſort of things, ſignified by its name. Nor is it a wonder, ſince it requires much time, pains, and ſkill, ſtrict inquiry, and long examination, to find out what and how many thoſe ſimple ideas are, which are conſtantly and inſeparably united in nature, and are always to be found together in the ſame ſubject. Moſt men wanting either time, inclination, or induſtry enough for this, even to ſome tolerable degree, content themſelves with ſome few obvious and outward appearances of things, thereby readily to diſtinguiſh and ſort them for the common affairs of life: and ſo, without farther examination, give them names, or take up the names already in uſe. Which, though in common converſation they paſs well enough for the ſigns of ſome few obvious qualities co-exiſting, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a ſettled ſignification, a preciſe number of ſimple ideas; much leſs all thoſe which are united in nature. He that ſhall conſider, after ſo much ſtir about genus and ſpecies, and ſuch a deal of talk of ſpecific differences, how few words we have yet ſettled definitions of; may with reaſon imagine that thoſe forms, which there hath been ſo much noiſe made about, are only chimeras, which give us no light into the ſpecific natures of things. And he that ſhall conſider, how far the names of ſubſtances are from having ſignifications, wherein all who uſe them do agree, will have reaſon to conclude, that though the nominal eſſences of ſubſtances are all ſuppoſed

poſed to be copied from nature, yet they are all, or moſt of them, very imperfect. Since the compoſition of thoſe complex ideas are, in ſeveral men, very different: and therefore that theſe boundaries of ſpecies are as men, and not as nature makes them, if at leaſt there are in nature any ſuch prefixed bounds. It is true, that many particular ſubſtances are ſo made by nature, that they have agreement and likeneſs one with another, and ſo afford a foundation of being ranked into ſorts. But the ſorting of things by us, or the making of determinate ſpecies, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms; I cannot ſee how it can be properly ſaid, that nature ſets the boundaries of the ſpecies of things: or if it be ſo, our boundaries of ſpecies are not exactly conformable to thoſe in nature. For we having need of general names for preſent uſe, ſtay not for a perfect diſcovery of all thoſe qualities which would beſt ſhow us their moſt material differences and agreements; but we ourſelves divide them, by certain obvious appearances, into ſpecies, that we may the eaſier under general names communicate our thoughts about them. For having no other knowledge of any ſubſtance, but of the ſimple ideas that are united in it; and obſerving ſeveral particular things to agree with others in ſeveral of thoſe ſimple ideas; we make that collection our ſpecific idea, and give it a general name; that in recording our thoughts, and in our diſcourſe with others, we may in one ſhort word deſign all the individuals that agree in that complex idea, without enumerating the ſimple ideas that make it up; and ſo not waſte our time and breath in tedious deſcriptions: which we ſee they are fain to do, who would diſcourſe of any new ſort of things they have not yet a name for.

Eſſences of ſpecies under the ſame name very different.

§. 31. But however theſe ſpecies of ſubſtances paſs well enough in ordinary converſation, it is plain that this complex idea, wherein they obſerve ſeveral individuals to agree, is by different men made very differently; by ſome more, and others leſs accurately. In ſome, this complex idea contains a greater, and in others

others a ſmaller number of qualities; and ſo is apparently ſuch as the mind makes it. The yellow ſhining colour makes gold to children; others add weight, malleableneſs, and fuſibility; and others yet other qualities, which they find joined with that yellow colour, as conſtantly as its weight and fuſibility: for in all theſe and the like qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex idea of that ſubſtance wherein they are all joined, as another. And therefore different men leaving out or putting in ſeveral ſimple ideas, which others do not, according to their various examination, ſkill, or obſervation of that ſubject, have different eſſences of gold: which muſt therefore be of their own, and not of nature's making.

The more general our ideas are, the more incomplete and partial they are.

§. 32. If the number of ſimple ideas, that make the nominal eſſence of the loweſt ſpecies, or firſt ſorting of individuals, depends on the mind of man variouſly collecting them, it is much more evident that they do ſo, in the more comprehenſive claſſes, which by the maſters of logic are called genera. Theſe are complex ideas deſignedly imperfect: and it is viſible at firſt ſight, that ſeveral of thoſe qualities that are to be found in the things themſelves, are purpoſely left out of generical ideas. For as the mind, to make general ideas comprehending ſeveral particulars, leaves out thoſe of time, and place, and ſuch other, that make them incommunicable to more than one individual; ſo to make other yet more general ideas, that may comprehend different ſorts, it leaves out thoſe qualities that diſtinguiſh them, and puts into its new collection only ſuch ideas as are common to ſeveral ſorts. The ſame convenience that made men expreſs ſeveral parcels of yellow matter coming from Guinea and Peru under one name, ſets them alſo upon making of one name that may comprehend both gold and ſilver, and ſome other bodies of different ſorts. This is done by leaving out thoſe qualities, which are peculiar to each ſort; and retaining a complex idea made up of thoſe that are common to them all; to which the name metal being annexed, there is a genus conſtituted;

conſtituted; the eſſence whereof being that abſtract idea, containing only malleableneſs and fuſibility, with certain degrees of weight and fixedneſs, wherein ſome bodies of ſeveral kinds agree, leaves out the colour, and other qualities peculiar to gold and ſilver, and the other ſorts comprehended under the name metal. Whereby it is plain, that men follow not exactly the patterns ſet them by nature, when they make their general ideas of ſubſtances; ſince there is no body to be found, which has barely malleableneſs and fuſibility in it, without other qualities as inſeparable as thoſe. But men, in making their general ideas, ſeeing more the convenience of language and quick diſpatch, by ſhort and comprehenſive ſigns, than the true and preciſe nature of things as they exiſt, have, in the framing their abſtract ideas, chiefly purſued that end, which was to be furniſhed with ſtore of general and variouſly comprehenſive names. So that in this whole buſineſs of genera and ſpecies, the genus, or more comprehenſive, is but a partial conception of what is in the ſpecies, and the ſpecies but a partial idea of what is to be found in each individual. If therefore any one will think, that a man, and a horſe, and an animal, and a plant, &c. are diſtinguiſhed by real eſſences made by nature, he muſt think nature to be very liberal of theſe real eſſences, making one for body, another for an animal, and another for a horſe; and all theſe eſſences liberally beſtowed upon Bucephalus. But if we would rightly conſider what is done, in all theſe genera and ſpecies, or ſorts, we ſhould find, that there is no new thing made, but only more or leſs comprehenſive ſigns, whereby we may be enabled to expreſs, in a few ſyllables, great numbers of particular things, as they agree in more or leſs general conceptions, which we have framed to that purpoſe. In all which we may obſerve, that the more general term is always the name of a leſs complex idea; and that each genus is but a partial conception of the ſpecies comprehended under it. So that if theſe abſtract general ideas be thought to be complete, it can only be in reſpect of a certain eſta-

bliſhed relation between them and certain names, which are made uſe of to ſignify them; and not in reſpect of any thing exiſting, as made by nature.

This all accommodated to the end of ſpeech.

§. 33. This is adjuſted to the true end of ſpeech, which is to be the eaſieſt and ſhorteſt way of communicating our notions. For thus he, that would diſcourſe of things as they agreed in the complex ideas of extenſion and ſolidity, needed but uſe the word body to denote all ſuch. He that to theſe would join others, ſignified by the words life, ſenſe, and ſpontaneous motion, needed but uſe the word animal, to ſignify all which partook of thoſe ideas: and he that had made a complex idea of a body, with life, ſenſe, and motion, with the faculty of reaſoning, and a certain ſhape joined to it, needed but uſe the ſhort monoſyllable man to expreſs all particulars that correſpond to that complex idea. This is the proper buſineſs of genus and ſpecies: and this men do, without any conſideration of real eſſences, or ſubſtantial forms, which come not within the reach of our knowledge, when we think of thoſe things; nor within the ſignification of our words, when we diſcourſe with others.

Inſtance in caſſuaries.

§. 34. Were I to talk with any one of a ſort of birds I lately ſaw in St. James's Park, about three or four feet high, with a covering of ſomething between feathers and hair, of a dark brown colour, without wings, but in the place thereof two or three little branches coming down like ſprigs of Spaniſh broom, long great legs, with feet only of three claws, and without a tail; I muſt make this deſcription of it, and ſo may make others underſtand me: but when I am told that the name of it is caſſuaris, I may then uſe that word to ſtand in diſcourſe for all my complex idea mentioned in that deſcription: though by that word, which is now become a ſpecific name, I know no more of the real eſſence or conſtitution of that ſort of animals than I did before; and knew probably as much of the nature of that ſpecies

cies of birds, before I learned the name, as many Engliſhmen do of ſwans, or herons, which are ſpecific names, very well known, of ſorts of birds common in England.

Men determine the ſorts.

§. 35. From what has been ſaid, it is evident, that men make ſorts of things. For it being different eſſences alone that make different ſpecies, it is plain that they who make thoſe abſtract ideas, which are the nominal eſſences, do thereby make the ſpecies, or ſort. Should there be a body found, having all the other qualities of gold, except malleableneſs, it would no doubt be made a queſtion whether it were gold or no, i. e. whether it were of that ſpecies. This could be determined only by that abſtract idea to which every one annexed the name gold; ſo that it would be true gold to him, and belong to that ſpecies, who included not malleableneſs in his nominal eſſence, ſignified by the ſound gold; and on the other ſide it would not be true gold, or of that ſpecies, to him who included malleableneſs in his ſpecific idea. And who, I pray, is it that makes theſe diverſe ſpecies even under one and the ſame name, but men that make two different abſtract ideas conſiſting not exactly of the ſame collection of qualities? Nor is it a mere ſuppoſition to imagine that a body may exiſt, wherein the other obvious qualities of gold may be without malleableneſs; ſince it is certain, that gold itſelf will be ſometimes ſo eager (as artiſts call it) that it will as little endure the hammer as glaſs itſelf. What we have ſaid, of the putting in or leaving malleableneſs out of the complex idea the name gold is by any one annexed to, may be ſaid of its peculiar weight, fixedneſs, and ſeveral other the like qualities: for whatſoever is left out, or put in, it is ſtill the complex idea, to which that name is annexed, that makes the ſpecies: and as any particular parcel of matter anſwers that idea, ſo the name of the ſort belongs truly to it; and it is of that ſpecies. And thus any thing is true gold, perfect

metal. All which determination of the ſpecies, it is plain, depends on the underſtanding of man, making this or that complex idea.

Nature makes the ſimilitude.

§. 36. This then, in ſhort, is the caſe: nature makes many particular things which do agree one with another, in many ſenſible qualities, and probably too in their internal frame and conſtitution: but it is not this real eſſence that diſtinguiſhes them into ſpecies; it is men, who, taking occaſion from the qualities they find united in them, and wherein they obſerve often ſeveral individuals to agree, range them into ſorts, in order to their naming, for the convenience of comprehenſive ſigns; under which individuals, according to their conformity to this or that abſtract idea, come to be ranked as under enſigns; ſo that this is of the blue, that the red regiment; this is a man, that a drill: and in this, I think, conſiſts the whole buſineſs of genus and ſpecies.

§. 37. I do not deny but nature, in the conſtant production of particular beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike and of kin one to another: but I think it nevertheleſs true, that the boundaries of the ſpecies, whereby men ſort them, are made by men; ſince the eſſences of the ſpecies, diſtinguiſhed by different names, are, as has been proved, of man's making, and ſeldom adequate to the internal nature of the things they are taken from. So that we may truly ſay, ſuch a manner of ſorting of things is the workmanſhip of men.

Each abſtract idea is an eſſence.

§. 38. One thing I doubt not but will ſeem very ſtrange in this doctrine; which is, that from what has been ſaid it will follow, that each abſtract idea, with a name to it, makes a diſtinct ſpecies. But who can help it if truth will have it ſo? For ſo it muſt remain till ſome body can ſhow us the ſpecies of things limited and diſtinguiſhed by ſomething elſe; and let us ſee, that general terms ſignify not our abſtract ideas, but ſomething different from them. I would fain know why a

ſhock

ſhock and a hound are not as diſtinct ſpecies as a ſpaniel and and elephant. We have no other idea of the different eſſence of an elephant and a ſpaniel, than we have of the different eſſence of a ſhock and a hound; all the eſſential difference, whereby we know and diſtinguiſh them one from another, conſiſting only in the different collection of ſimple ideas, to which we have given thoſe different names.

Genera and ſpecies are in order to naming.

§. 39. How much the making of ſpecies and genera is in order to general names, and how much general names are neceſſary, if not to the being, yet at leaſt to the completing of a ſpecies, and making it paſs for ſuch, will appear, beſides what has been ſaid above concerning ice and water, in a very familiar example. A ſilent and a ſtriking watch are but one ſpecies to thoſe who have but one name for them: but he that has the name watch for one, and clock for the other, and diſtinct complex ideas, to which thoſe names belong, to him they are different ſpecies. It will be ſaid perhaps that the inward contrivance and conſtitution is different between theſe two, which the watch-maker has a clear idea of. And yet, it is plain, they are but one ſpecies to him, when he has but one name for them. For what is ſufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new ſpecies? There are ſome watches that are made with four wheels, others with five: is this a ſpecific difference to the workman? Some have ſtrings and phyſies, and others none; ſome have the balance looſe, and others regulated by a ſpiral ſpring, and others by hogs briſtles: are any or all of theſe enough to make a ſpecific difference to the workman, that knows each of theſe, and ſeveral other different contrivances, in the internal conſtitutions of watches? It is certain each of theſe hath a real difference from the reſt: but whether it be an eſſential, a ſpecific difference or no, relates only to the complex idea to which the name watch is given: as long as they all agree in the idea which that name ſtands for, and that name does not as a generical name comprehend different ſpecies

under it, they are not eſſentially nor ſpecifically different. But if any one will make minuter diviſions from differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to ſuch preciſe complex ideas give names that ſhall prevail; they will then be new ſpecies to them who have thoſe ideas with names to them, and can, by thoſe differences, diſtinguiſh watches into theſe ſeveral ſorts, and then watch will be a generical name. But yet they would be no diſtinct ſpecies to men ignorant of clock-work and the inward contrivances of watches, who had no other idea but the outward ſhape and bulk, with the marking of the hours by the hand. For to them all thoſe other names would be but ſynonymous terms for the ſame idea, and ſignify no more, nor no other thing but a watch. Juſt thus, I think, it is in natural things. No-body will doubt that the wheels or ſprings (if I may ſo ſay) within, are different in a rational man and a changeling, no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a drill and a changeling. But whether one, or both the differences be eſſential or ſpecifical, is only to be known to us, by their agreement or diſagreement with the complex idea that the name man ſtands for: for by that alone can it be determined, whether one, or both, or neither of thoſe be a man or no.

Species of artificial things leſs confuſed than natural.

§. 40. From what has been before ſaid, we may ſee the reaſon why, in the ſpecies of artificial things, there is generally leſs confuſion and uncertainty, than in natural. Becauſe an artificial thing being a production of man, which the artificer deſigned, and therefore well knows the idea of, the name of it is ſuppoſed to ſtand for no other idea, nor to import any other eſſence than what is certainly to be known, and eaſy enough to be apprehended. For the idea or eſſence of the ſeveral ſorts of artificial things conſiſting, for the moſt part, in nothing but the determinate figure of ſenſible parts; and ſometimes motion depending thereon, which the artificer faſhions in matter, ſuch as he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to attain a certain idea thereof, and to ſettle the ſignification of the

the names, whereby the ſpecies of artificial things are diſtinguiſhed with leſs doubt, obſcurity, and equivocation, than we can in things natural, whoſe differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the reach of our diſcoveries.

Artificial things of diſtinct ſpecies.

§. 41. I muſt be excuſed here if I think artificial things are of diſtinct ſpecies as well as natural: ſince I find they are as plainly and orderly ranked into ſorts, by different abſtract ideas, with general names annexed to them, as diſtinct one from another as thoſe of natural ſubſtances. For why ſhould we not think a watch and piſtol, as diſtinct ſpecies one from another, as a horſe and a dog, they being expreſſed in our minds by diſtinct ideas, and to others by diſtinct appellations?

Subſtances alone have proper names.

§. 42. This is farther to be obſerved concerning ſubſtances, that they alone of all our ſeveral ſorts of ideas have particular or proper names, whereby one only particular thing is ſignified. Becauſe in ſimple ideas, modes, and relations, it ſeldom happens that men have occaſion to mention often this or that particular when it is abſent. Beſides, the greateſt part of mixed modes, being actions which periſh in their birth, are not capable of a laſting duration as ſubſtances, which are the actors: and wherein the ſimple ideas that make up the complex ideas deſigned by the name, have a laſting union.

Difficulty to treat of words.

§. 43. I muſt beg pardon of my reader, for having dwelt ſo long upon this ſubject, and perhaps with ſome obſcurity. But I deſire it may be conſidered how difficult it is to lead another by words into the thoughts of things, ſtripped of thoſe ſpecifical differences we give them: which things, if I name not, I ſay nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into ſome ſort or other, and ſuggeſt to the mind the uſual abſtract idea of that ſpecies; and ſo croſs my purpoſe. For to talk of a man, and to lay by, at the ſame time, the ordinary ſignification of the name man, which is

our complex idea uſually annexed to it; and bid the reader conſider man as he is in himſelf, and as he is really diſtinguiſhed from others in his internal conſtitution, or real eſſence; that is, by ſomething he knows not what; looks like trifling: and yet thus one muſt do who would ſpeak of the ſuppoſed real eſſences and ſpecies of things, as thought to be made by nature, if it be but only to make it underſtood, that there is no ſuch thing ſignified by the general names, which ſubſtances are called by. But becauſe it is difficult by known familiar names to do this, give me leave to endeavour by an example to make the different conſideration the mind has of ſpecific names and ideas a little more clear; and to ſhow how the complex ideas of modes are referred ſometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings; or, which is the ſame, to the ſignification annexed by others to their received names; and ſometimes to no archetypes at all. Give me leave alſo to ſhow how the mind always refers its ideas of ſubſtances, either to the ſubſtances themſelves, or to the ſignification of their names as to the archetypes; and alſo to make plain the nature of ſpecies, or ſorting of things, as apprehended, and made uſe of by us; and of the eſſences belonging to thoſe ſpecies, which is perhaps of more moment, to diſcover the extent and certainty of our knowledge, than we at firſt imagine.

Inſtances of mixed modes in kinneah and niouph.

§. 44. Let us ſuppoſe Adam in the ſtate of a grown man, with a good underſtanding, but in a ſtrange country, with all things new and unknown about him; and no other faculties, to attain the knowledge of them, but what one of this age has now. He obſerves Lamech more melancholy than uſual, and imagines it to be from a ſuſpicion he has of his wife Adah (whom he moſt ardently loved) that ſhe had too much kindneſs for another man. Adam diſcourſes theſe his thoughts to Eve, and deſires her to take care that Adah commit not folly: and in theſe diſcourſes with Eve he makes uſe of theſe two new words, kinneah and niouph. In time

Adam's miſtake appears, for he finds Lamech's trouble proceeded from having killed a man: but yet the two names kinneah and niouph (the one ſtanding for ſuſpicion, in a huſband, of his wife's diſloyalty to him, and the other for the act of committing diſloyalty) loſt not their diſtinct ſignifications. It is plain then that here were two diſtinct complex ideas of mixed modes with names to them, two diſtinct ſpecies of actions eſſentially different; I aſk wherein conſiſted the eſſences of theſe two diſtinct ſpecies of actions? And it is plain it conſiſted in a preciſe combination of ſimple ideas, different in one from the other. I aſk, Whether the complex idea in Adam's mind, which he called kinneah, were adequate or no? And it is plain it was; for it being a combination of ſimple ideas, which he, without any regard to any archetype, without reſpect to any thing as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abſtracted and gave the name kinneah to, to expreſs in ſhort to others, by that one ſound, all the ſimple ideas contained and united in that complex one; it muſt neceſſarily follow, that it was an adequate idea. His own choice having made that combination, it had all in it he intended it ſhould, and ſo could not but be perfect, could not be adequate, it being referred to no other archetype which it was ſuppoſed to repreſent.

§. 45. Theſe words, kinneah and niouph, by degrees grew into common uſe; and then the caſe was ſomewhat altered. Adam's children had the ſame faculties, and thereby the ſame power that he had to make what complex ideas of mixed modes they pleaſed in their own minds; to abſtract them, and make what ſounds they pleaſed the ſigns of them: but the uſe of names being to make our ideas within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the ſame ſign ſtands for the ſame idea in two who would communicate their thoughts and diſcourſe together. Thoſe therefore of Adam's children, that found theſe two words, kinneah and niouph, in familiar uſe, could not take them for inſignificant ſounds; but muſt needs conclude,

conclude, they ſtood for ſomething, for certain ideas, abſtract ideas, they being general names, which abſtract ideas were the eſſences of the ſpecies diſtinguiſhed by thoſe names. If therefore they would uſe theſe words, as names of ſpecies already eſtabliſhed and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds, ſignified by theſe names, to the ideas that they ſtood for in other men's minds, as to their patterns and archetypes; and then indeed their ideas of theſe complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (eſpecially thoſe that conſiſted of combinations of many ſimple ideas) not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other men's minds, uſing the ſame names; though for this there be uſually a remedy at hand, which is to aſk the meaning of any word we underſtand not, of him that uſes it: it being as impoſſible to know certainly what the words jealouſy and adultery (which I think anſwer קנאה and נאוף) ſtand for in another man's mind, with whom I would diſcourſe about them; as it was impoſſible, in the beginning of language, to know what kinneah and niouph ſtood for in another man's mind, without explication, they being voluntary ſigns in every one.

Inſtance of ſubſtances in zahab.

§. 46. Let us now alſo conſider, after the ſame manner, the names of ſubſtances in their firſt application. One of Adam's children, roving in the mountains, lights on a glittering ſubſtance which pleaſes his eye; home he carries it to Adam, who, upon conſideration of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow colour, and an exceeding great weight. Theſe, perhaps, at firſt, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it; and abſtracting this complex idea, conſiſting of a ſubſtance having that peculiar bright yellowneſs, and a weight very great in proportion to its bulk, he gives it the name zahab, to denominate and mark all ſubſtances that have theſe ſenſible qualities in them. It is evident now that, in this caſe, Adam acts quite differently from what he did before in forming thoſe ideas of mixed modes, to which he gave the names kinneah and

and niouph. For there he puts ideas together, only by his own imagination, not taken from the exiſtence of any thing; and to them he gave names to denominate all things that ſhould happen to agree to thoſe his abſtract ideas, without conſidering whether any ſuch thing did exiſt or no; the ſtandard there was of his own making. But in the forming his idea of this new ſubſtance, he takes the quite contrary courſe; here he has a ſtandard made by nature; and therefore being to repreſent that to himſelf, by the idea he has of it, even when it is abſent, he puts in no ſimple idea into his complex one, but what he has the perception of from the thing itſelf. He takes care that his idea be conformable to this archetype, and intends the name ſhould ſtand for an idea ſo conformable.

§. 47. This piece of matter, thus denominated zahab by Adam, being quite different from any he had ſeen before, no-body, I think, will deny to be a diſtinct ſpecies, and to have its peculiar eſſence; and that the name zahab is the mark of the ſpecies, and a name belonging to all things partaking in that eſſence. But here it is plain, the eſſence, Adam made the name zahab ſtand for, was nothing but a body hard, ſhining, yellow, and very heavy. But the inquiſitive mind of man, not content with the knowledge of theſe, as I may ſay, ſuperficial qualities, puts Adam on farther examination of this matter. He therefore knocks and beats it with flints, to ſee what was diſcoverable in the inſide: He finds it yield to blows, but not eaſily ſeparate into pieces: he finds it will bend without breaking. Is not now ductility to be added to his former idea, and made part of the eſſence of the ſpecies that name zahab ſtands for? Farther trials diſcover fuſibility and fixedneſs. Are not they alſo, by the ſame reaſon that any of the others were, to be put into the complex idea ſignified by the name zahab? If not, what reaſon will there be ſhown more for the one than the other? If theſe muſt, then all the other properties, which any farther trials ſhall diſcover in this matter, ought by the ſame reaſon to make a part of the ingredients

dients of the complex idea, which the name zahab ſtands for, and ſo be the eſſence of the ſpecies marked by that name. Which properties, becauſe they are enleſs, it is plain, that the idea made after this faſhion by this archetype, will be always inadequate.

Their ideas imperfect, and therefore various.

§. 48. But this is not all, it would alſo follow, that the names of ſubſtances would not only have (as in truth they have) but would alſo be ſuppoſed to have, different ſignifications, as uſed by different men, which would very much cumber the uſe of language. For if every diſtinct quality, that were diſcovered in any matter by any one, were ſuppoſed to make a neceſſary part of the complex idea, ſignified by the common name given it, it muſt follow, that men muſt ſuppoſe the ſame word to ſignify different things in different men; ſince they cannot doubt but different men may have diſcovered ſeveral qualities in ſubſtances of the ſame denomination, which others know nothing of.

Therefore to fix their ſpecies, a real eſſence is ſuppoſed.

§. 49. To avoid this therefore, they have ſuppoſed a real eſſence belonging to every ſpecies, from which theſe properties all flow, and would have their name of the ſpecies ſtand for that. But they not having any idea of that real eſſence in ſubſtances, and their words ſignifying nothing but the ideas they have; that which is done by this attempt, is only to put the name or ſound in the place and ſtead of the thing having that real eſſence, without knowing what the real eſſence is: and this is that which men do, when they ſpeak of ſpecies of things, as ſuppoſing them made by nature, and diſtinguiſhed by real eſſences.

Which ſuppoſition is of no uſe.

§. 50. For let us conſider, when we affirm, that all gold is fixed, either it means that fixedneſs is a part of the definition, part of the nominal eſſence the word gold ſtands for; and ſo this affirmation, all gold is fixed, contains nothing but the ſignification of the term gold. Or elſe it means, that fixedneſs, not being

being a part of the definition of the gold, is a property of that ſubſtance itſelf: in which caſe, it is plain, that the word gold ſtands in the place of a ſubſtance, having the real eſſence of a ſpecies of things made by nature. In which way of ſubſtitution it has ſo confuſed and uncertain a ſignification, that though this propoſition, gold is fixed, be in that ſenſe an affirmation of ſomething real, yet it is a truth will always fail us in its particular application, and ſo is of no real uſe nor certainty. For let it be ever ſo true, that all gold, i. e. all that has the real eſſence of gold, is fixed, what ſerves this for, whilſt we know not in this ſenſe what is or is not gold? For if we know not the real eſſence of gold, it is impoſſible we ſhould know what parcel of matter has that eſſence, and ſo whether it be true gold or no.

§. 51. To conclude: what liberty Adam had at firſt to make any complex ideas of mixed modes, by no other patterns but his own thoughts, the ſame have all men ever ſince had. And the ſame neceſſity of conforming his ideas of ſubſtances to things without him, as to archetypes made by nature, that Adam was under, if he would not wilfully impoſe upon himſelf; the ſame are all men ever ſince under too. The ſame liberty alſo that Adam had of affixing any new name to any idea, the ſame has any one ſtill (eſpecially the beginners of languages, if we can imagine any ſuch) but only with this difference, that in places where men in ſociety have already eſtabliſhed a language amongſt them, the ſignifications of words are very warily, and ſparingly to be altered: becauſe men being furniſhed already with names for their ideas, and common uſe having appropriated known names to certain ideas, an affected miſapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous. He that hath new notions, will, perhaps, venture ſometimes on the coining of new terms to expreſs them; but men think it a boldneſs, and it is uncertain whether common uſe will ever make them paſs for current. But in communication with others, it is neceſſary, Concluſion.

ceſſary, that we conform the ideas we make the vulgar words of any language ſtand for to their known proper ſignifications (which I have explained at large already) or elſe to make known that new ſignification we apply them to.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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